This paper proposes an economic logic for underpinning decentralization in the infrastructure sectors. It starts by detailing the definition of the infrastructure gap and the methodologies to calculate it. It provides some global trends for developing countries in terms of the gap and briefly discusses financing possibilities for developing countries to address the gap. Then it turns to the discussion of the link between the infrastructure gap and decentralization, providing a typology infrastructure subsectors and possible jurisdiction of service provision. It briefly discusses the potential for raising local finances for provision and the relationship between poverty and provision. While it is very difficult to provide blanket recommendations on decentralizing the various sectors and respective subcomponents of infrastructure services, the paper offers a set of guidelines to direct policymakers in their decision to decentralize or not. First, decentralization is intrinsically neither good nor bad for infrastructure; its impact depends entirely on the incentives facing the various decision-makers in the decentralization process; second, decentralization is most fruitful when the decision-makers bear the financial and political cost with respect to design, finance, operation and maintenance; and, finally, political leaders are accountable to their constituents for the manner in which they spend tax revenues and how they use and allocate transfers from the central government.
Muhammad Asim Tufail, Abu Hassan Abu Bakar, Wiwied Virgiyanti, Faisal Manzoor Arain
Technological development in the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector is essential to attain sustainability in today’s era. Cities have developed satellite towns at the periphery with hi-fidelity digital and physical infrastructure which converts a single cantered city into a multi cantered one. In case of Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Area (KLMA) the shift of civic services to Putrajaya and development of Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) which offers incentives to local and foreign companies to develop a super block of research and development based economic sector. This development spearheaded the Malaysian Vision 2020 of knowledge based economy and society and has become an attraction to the business community across Malaysia. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the key factors that have attracted the companies to physically move from KLMA to MSC. To achieve the study objectives, a questionnaire survey and interviews were carried out to collect pertinent information from companies focusing on businesses in finance, insurance and real-estate. The data collected was analyzed to identify the ranking of variables of Bill of Guarantees offered in MSC policy. The study findings suggest that in addition to good infrastructure and good working environment, the tax exemption offered by the government has been the driving force for companies to decentralize towards MSC. The results suggest that the better infrastructure, connectivity, low taxes, low telecommunication tariffs, and land cost were considered as the most important factors for decentralization of ICT companies in Malaysia. The other factors that were highlighted in this study include low cost of doing business, and competitive conditions for attracting companies to avail MSC status. The study also presents the initial hindrances faced by the ICT companies i.e., accessibility issue for city clients and workers, high rental rates of the property and slow development of supportive public amenities in MSC
Decentralized or distributed small renewable power facilities are usually installed in local communities for households and small business companies. These facilities include solar PV, concentrated solar power, and wind power, etc. In order to promote installations of such facilities, governments in many countries have developed a number of policies and business models. For example, in Germany and Canada, electricity feed-in tariff policy and business model were developed; in the USA, tax rebate policies and relevant business models were promoted. These policies and models have in some but not in large scale promoted decentralized small renewable power in local communities. The key issue is that these policies and business models do not provide sufficient incentives to local distribution companies (LDC), nor to renewable power installers and users. This paper’s research covers the creation of a business and communication model, named as LDC model, to incentivize both renewable power installers/users and LDCs. This LDC model can play a key role in promoting decentralized small-scale generation (DSG) with renewable energy in local communities. The core element of the LDC model is a revenue model which serves as an instrument to finance renewable installations for households and small commercial businesses. A case study is undertaken with real data of a power distribution company in Toronto, Canada. This paper concludes that with appropriate government policy and with the development of customized information systems for accessing households and small business via internet, an LDC will be able to take leadership in investing and installing small renewable power, and consequently enlarge the share of renewable energy supply in its local power distribution network.
In 1601, Elizabeth I and her government devalued the Irish coin from nine ounces fine to three ounces fine of silver in order to finance the high cost of the Nine Years War in Ireland. 1 This unilateral move by the English government, combined with the failure to remove the old sterling from circulation, caused catastrophic problems throughout Ireland. 2 In addition to rapid inflation in common foodstuffs, the people in Ireland would only accept the new coin at its reduced intrinsic value rather than face value. 3 Further, merchants refused to accept the devalued coin in commercial transactions leading to a shortage of vital goods from England. 4
This paper covers network investment problems under decentralized control of regulation, infrastructure ownership and management. The model features two countries managing domestic infrastructures, used simultaneously for downstream international service provision. Initially, the welfare losses from non-cooperative investment financing policy and access pricing are derived. The impact of strategic interaction between the countries' access prices on the choice of financing policy is investigated. Under strict budget balancing, there are no incentives for efficiency improving investments. Further, investment coordination is shown useless in the absence of regulatory coordination. Illustrations from European network regulation policy for energy and rail are presented.
We consider the regulation of national firms in a common market. Regulators can influence the production of national firms but they incur in a positive cost of public funds. First, we show that market integration is welfare improving if and only if the efficiency gains compensate for the negative public finance effect (related to business stealing). We also show that supranational competition can have very different consequences on the rent seeking behaviour of firms, depending on cost correlation and ex-ante technological risk. Finally, we characterize the global optimum and show how it can be sustained in a decentralized bargaining solution.
In this contribution, we analyse the pattern of the so-called PIP (Partnerships and Public Initiatives) that have been approved between 2000 and mid-2003 in the POE1 framework. In particular, we will evaluate the extent of decentralisation that this new instrument has generated in competitiveness policy. Partnership approaches are a relatively recent phenomenon, but partnerships have received widespread attention and support from economic and political agents, including policy makers at national, regional and local levels. In fact, the term “public-private partnership” covers a wide range of concepts and practices. In our contribution, we will focus on partnerships in a competitiveness policy framework. In a first section, we discuss briefly the meaning and the extent of what we call competitiveness policy. Then, in a second section, we focus our attention in public-private partnerships as a specific instrument for policy. In particular, we make a first assessment on the distinctive principles that differentiate public-private partnerships from more traditional instruments such as direct investment in public agencies or direct subventions to firms. We follow the perspective that these principles, mainly decentralization of policy, may contribute to a greater effectiveness of policy, because a more decentralised policy is supposed to increase focus and accountability and to involve agencies with specialized skills and a more narrow range of objectives. But, also, we will refer that some inefficiencies and some lack of equity may arise from the use of private-public partnerships instrument. Finally, in the main section of this contribution, we will analyse the above-mentioned questions considering the case of the 131 PIP projects approved and financed by the POE between 2000 and mid-2003. As the major part of the variables used are nominal, and in order to define the decentralization pattern induced by this new instrument, we will use multivariate data analysis techniques in order to establish associations between several variables linked to decentralisation criteria and, also, to identify clusters of projects.
Implementing the African Information Society Initiative (AISI), African Ministers of Planning and Economic Development identified the use of ICTs in central Government and local administration as one of the priority sectors for the entry of Africa into the information era and as a means to support Government’s administration and decentralization process, which is consistent with Vision 2020 in developing electronic information for development in the Gambia.
Responding to a request from the Hon. Secretary of State for Finance and Economic Affairs, of the Republic of The Gambia, The Executive Secretary of United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) sent a mission to the Gambia in November 2002 to carryout a preliminary assessment and discuss modalities for the design of e-Government Strategy for the Gambia with a view to start an e-Government pilot project between the Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs and the Office of The President for the sharing of Financial and Economic Management data and information. It is envisaged that after the successful implementation of the pilot project, all the relevant institutions and services across the country will be subsequently interconnected electronically.
The paper provides information and analysis in support of the Bank's subnational development strategy (GN-2026). The strategy will guide future Bank operations in support of decentralization to address the complex issues countries are facing in their efforts to promote the socioeconomic development in subnational territories. The document is divided in three sections: the first section provides an overview of the decentralization process in Latin America and the Caribbean and sets the stage for an analysis of the key isuues that need to be addresses by the Bank when supporting the decentralization process in the region; the next chapter discusses the challenges confronted by subnational governments. The development of subnational governments is key to improving well-being. The next section focuses on the structure of intergovernmental relations and concludes that a well-designed structure provides subnational governments with incentives to efficiently allocate resources to the most socially profitable uses. The next chapter discusses the governance issues involved in decentralization, while the next section concentrates on the institucional aspects of the institucional aspects of decentralization and concludes that the Bank should emphasize the need for subnational governments to have sufficient institutional capacity at socially acceptable levels of performance. Finally, the last chapter discusses the variety of issues related to financing subnational governments and recommends that the Bank stress the paramount importance of sufficient sources of financing for ensuing good subnational government performance.