Abstract While contemporary technological disruption is increasingly conceptualized in terms of the logic and paradoxes of the digital platform economy, discussions of FinTech have only engaged to a limited extent with these debates—particularly from an economic geographic standpoint. This chapter fills this gap by extending the Global Financial Network (GFN) framework to problematize the organizational and geographic logic of the digital platform economy in finance, and applying it to examine the impact of the digital platform model on asset management. It shows that asset management is being profoundly disrupted by what we dub digital asset management platforms—or DAMPs—which encompass services including index fund and ETF provision, robo-advising, and analytics and trading support. Like other digital platforms, DAMPs do not so much leverage technology to enhance their competitiveness within markets, as to radically restructure the market itself. Also, like other platforms, their rise has produced a winner-take-all paradox of centralization through democratization that defies predictions of technology-enabled industry decentralization. However, the logic and implications of the rise of DAMPs diverges, in other respects, from nonfinancial digital platforms, as finance has long possessed an informational intensity and regulatory and organizational fluidity characteristic of the digital platform economy. Consequently, the digital platform model has mostly developed endogenously in asset management through incremental innovation by major financial firms—in a process that has reinforced the position of leading incumbent asset management centers, and above all New York—rather than being introduced from the outside by upstart technology firms and clusters.
Finansallaşma, kapitalizmin son kırk yıllık dönüşümünü açıklayan önemli kavramlardan biridir. Dijital ve finansal alanda yaşanan gelişmeler dikkate alındığında, teknoloji ile finansallaşma arasında güçlü bir bağ bulunmaktadır. Yüzyılın başından bu yana hızla yükselen büyük teknoloji şirketlerinin iş modelleri, dijital ve finansal alanı giderek daha fazla bütünleştirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, dijital ve finansal alanların bütünleşmesi, finansallaşma literatüründe dijital finansallaşma olarak tanımlanan yeni bir kavram ortaya çıkarmıştır. Finansal alandaki dönüşüme öncülük eden dijitalleşme, 2008 yılı itibariyle dijital dönüşümün yeni aşaması olan blok zincir teknolojisi ve kripto para piyasalarını finansal sisteme dâhil etmiştir. Blok zincir teknolojisinin yeni finansal iş modelleri ve kripto para piyasaları, oldukça yeni ve dinamik bir alandır. Ancak, farklı iş modellerinin her biri finansallaşma çatısı altında birleşmektedir. Finansal dijitalleşmenin önemli parçaları olarak blok zincir teknolojisi ve yeni finansal iş modellerinin finansallaşma bağlantıları litertürde ihmal edilmiştir. Bu makale, blok zincir teknolojisinin yeni finansal iş modellerini ve kripto para piyasalarını dijital finansallaşma kavramı üzerinden ele almakta ve betimleyici analiz yöntemiyle incelemektedir. Makalenin amacı, kripto para piyasalarının finansallaşma bağlantılarını ortaya koymak ve dijital finansallaşma kavramını blok zincir teknolojisini de kapsayacak biçimde genişletmektir. Elde edilen bulgulara göre, blok zincir teknolojisi dijital verileri herhangi bir üretim ilişkisine dâhil olmadan doğrudan kripto para formuna dönüştürerek finansallaşmasını sağlamaktadır. Blok zincir teknolojisi ve yeni finansal iş modelleri, kripto paralar eliyle dijital ve finansal alanları bütünleştirdiği ölçüde finansallaşma alanını genişletmekte ve derinleştirmektedir.
This article examines banks’ de-risking practices inside Hong Kong's Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, a problem that has created considerable tension between the demands of AML/CFT prevention and those of financial inclusion. It unravels the public policy tensions stemming from a multitude of financial reform causes, namely the facilitation of AML/CFT regulatory compliance, the promotion of financial technology (FinTech) innovation and an ultimate expansion in financial inclusion. The article argues that tiered account services are an important first step towards financial inclusion, culminating in the introduction of simple bank accounts by some banks to mitigate the effect of de-risking. While proposed solutions such as the know-your-client utility system and central data repository may contribute to a digital financial inclusion framework, they are not tailored to solve a specific problem (de-risking). The article therefore proposes and evaluates whether FinTech and blockchain-based smart contracts qualify as alternative solutions to de-risking. The article aims to address those policy tensions and contribute to the regulatory policy formulation and the rule-making for financial law and regulation intended to facilitate financial inclusion.
This article explores the emerging phenomenon of use cases for Non-fungible Tokens (NFTs) in novel forms of crypto-finance, a stage we call ‘NFT financialisation’, that can be developed from stages of consumption and commoditisation of NFTs, which are increasingly observed. Despite the emerging contests regarding property rights conferred by NFTs, the needs for commoditisation and financialisation in NFT markets would likely shape the delineation and framing of such rights in order for users to exploit the asset potential of NFTs. We argue that an institutional response is timely and beneficial for NFT financialisation. Financial regulatory governance can provide the institutions of market certainty and order, also fostering the clarification and standardisation of property framing underlying NFTs. We explore aspects of financial regulatory governance for supporting the investment mobilisation of NFTs and suggest that these provide insights too for the broader regulatory agenda for crypto-finance, including novel forms of fund-raising and Decentralised Finance (DeFi). Such financial regulatory governance involves reform and we provide a critical discussion of the EU’s Markets in Crypto-assets Regulation in relation to NFT financialisation. We also suggest that NFT financialisation reinforces the need for financial regulatory agencies to confront the challenges that crypto-finance brings, in relation to unconventional products and services, by reconsidering the limitations of their scope and mandates.
Abstract This article consists of a critical review of the conceptual scholarship on the governance of climate finance and includes an overview of the institutional arrangements and governance logics that provide climate finance. New decentralized, polycentric structures allow for climate finance to more effectively reach the sub‐ and non‐state actors most directly implementing climate change governance. However, the expansion of climate finance into market‐inflected forms of blended finance, as well as debt‐based financing, express a neoliberal logic that shifts power to market actors. This may challenge the efficacy of climate finance. We suggest that further research is needed on polycentric systems in climate finance, since an apparent expansion in the diversity of providers is also accompanied by a counter‐intuitive concentration of decision‐making power with financial fund managers. We join others in suggesting that the weight of scholarship advocates for a strong return to public authored finance and governance, under the auspices of Green New Deal programs and more widely. This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance
In this paper I argue that the 2008 housing market crash was the culmination of a decades-long legislative process enabled by the federal government. I analyze the effects of these policies on Monroe County, Pennsylvania, which became and continues to be the site of one the worst foreclosure crises nationally. Federal policies that promoted decentralization, deindustrialization, and deregulation created the conditions in Monroe County that allowed real estate developers, banks, and brokers to take advantage of an urban crisis that was only 1.5 hours away in New York City—without traffic. I describe the process through the story of real estate developer Gene Percudani. Enabled by the federal government, Percudani lured black and Hispanic residents from New York City who were looking for affordable single family homes, safe neighborhoods, and good schools. Not only did these migrants not escape the urban crisis but continued to be victims of it—far away from home.
Recent technological progresses made it possible for complementary and community currencies to be increasingly transformed into digital currencies. An increasing number of them run on blockchain, a technology that allows for greater decentralization and trust-less systems. This fusion between social and cryptocurrencies opens a series of questionings: can social currencies maintain their values regarding the creation of community and a fuller citizenship? Is the total decentralization an important value for the communities that use social currencies? Can "trust", as defined for these monetary systems be replaced by a system that presupposes it? These comprehensive questions conform our current research project. With an inductive and multidisciplinary plan of demonstration in mind, this particular document tries to put in discussion the characteristics and potentialities, as well as the problems, limits and tensions generated by the circulation of digital currencies that run on Blockchain (cryptocurrencies), leaving for future research the in-depth discussion that this new mixture of technologies brings up. These issues will be addressed by studying the case of a digital social currency system running on blockchain, based on mutual credit, implemented in Argentina today: MonedaPAR, which was conceived as a defense mechanism against the economic crisis that plagues Argentina since 2016.
Joseph Vogl's new book, Capital and Ressentiment (2021/2022), traces an epistemic shift from knowledge to information driven by the convergence of financialization and the platform economy. As a variable that is determined less by semantic content than by difference to existing expectations, information invites indifference to other distinctions, such as those between fact and fiction, claim and proof. The circulation of information takes the form of opinion markets wherein the production of reality itself is at stake. In this extract, taken from the book's final chapter, “The cunning of ressentiment-driven reason”, Vogl analyses populist ressentiment as both structural affect of and vital resource for information capitalism, laying out the resulting reconfiguration of the social.
Abstract Postcapitalist commons are a growing area of interest in the efforts to generate alternatives to capitalism in the present. Commons are understood as self‐organised collectives based around shared resources; yet postcapitalist commons have an additional element, in operating within while projecting an “after” capitalism. This can give rise to tensions since commons striving for postcapitalism also require a certain amount of capital to survive and function within capitalism. FairCoop is a radical postcapitalist commons that adopted the cryptocurrency FairCoin in 2014. FairCoop, through FairCoin, was able to generate some trans‐local connections through its use of peer2peer technologies and was thus able to scale‐up. Its design, however, was ultimately unsustainable due to insufficiently clear boundaries from capital. After highlighting the lack of commons boundaries around FairCoop, we identify some additional commons‐capital boundary design principles which could contribute to the sustainability of future postcapitalist commons experiments that are seeking to scale.
Neoliberalism initially invoked the authority of competitive markets as the ideal epistemic mechanism for socio-economic coordination. Yet, the rise of neoliberal ‘market society’ in Western advanced economies since the 1970s has been underpinned by a normative political theory that advocates the reconfiguration of society and politics around the authority of economic theory and knowledge in both production, but especially finance. Conversely, the reform-era development of China’s ‘socialist market economy’ has been underpinned by an insistence on retaining centralized political power over the allocation of financial capital. This article argues that the rise of digital algorithmic technologies constitutes one means by which these contrasting politico-economic visions are being more closely reconciled. It investigates the ways in which China’s ongoing construction of an explicitly authoritarian capitalism is being facilitated by the deployment of complementary financial technologies that enable the Chinese Communist Party to embrace the micro-level epistemic coordinative function of markets without relinquishing macro-level political power and juridical sovereignty over these markets. Following a comparative historiography of the praxis of ‘neoliberal’ and ‘neostatist’ political theory in contemporary capitalism, two case studies of blockchain-enabled currency and big-data driven credit scoring in China illustrate the emergent Fintech foundations of Chinese authoritarian capitalism. The findings contribute to our understanding of how markets are being reshaped by new algorithmic technologies, as well as illuminate some of ideological contradictions in existing conceptions of markets as (neo)liberal institutions at the centre of capitalist political economy.
Over the last decade, the term ‘gig economy’ has risen to prominence in public discourse, but has failed to attract sustained attention from political philosophers. The gig economy is a subsection of the overall economy that predominantly relies on ‘on-demand work’:11 Prassl 2018, p. 11. workers22 Throughout this article, we deliberately speak of ‘workers’ in a broad sense: not only those permanently employed count as workers of a firm, but all those who actually work for it. receive short-term and freelance contracts rather than permanent jobs. Firms treat them as independent sellers of services and only hire them to perform a particular ‘gig’, that is, to complete a specified task or project. Gig work thereby increases the granularity of work contracts: work is sold in ever smaller quantities and, in extremis, firms only buy the exact amount of labour they need, at the particular moment they need it. On a social level, the higher granularity of labour market transactions leads to an expansion of the reach of markets. Not only a one-off hiring decision, but the conditions of every single micro-labour contract become subject to the market forces of supply and demand. From an economic perspective, the ability to hire and dispense with workers at will is often seen as a measure for ‘removing friction’ in labour markets, and unlocking efficiency gains as ‘unproductive human capital’ is ‘set free’.33 On the flexibilization of labour markets in the 1990s, see Davies and Freedland 2007. Major expositions of this policy programme include European Commission 1994; OECD 1994. Whenever a firm can do without a worker’s additional unit of labour, she re-enters the labour market, which can then, in theory, allocate her work to the most productive use. The business practices of ride-service providers like Uber and Lyft in the US best embody this trend, paying drivers by the ride and only if there are rides. But, beyond such extreme and well-publicized cases, many firms are gradually moving away from the paradigmatic form of employment in the industrial age—a job with a fixed number of hours, worked in set shifts, in one place, and for a predetermined salary (call this ‘standard employment’)—towards work that is contracted at short notice on the basis of current demand (call this ‘gig work’).44 Some other forms of work, like fixed-term employment with a longer duration or employment at temporary work agencies, lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. They often display many of the normatively problematic features of gig work, but to a lesser extent. While various statistics employ different criteria for determining whether or not someone counts as a contract worker, the number of people affected by this shift has dramatically increased over the past decades and is projected to rise further. According to a recent study, those in alternative work arrangements—like on-call workers, contract workers, and freelancers—made up 15.8 per cent of the US workforce in 2015, up from 10.7 per cent a decade before.55 Katz and Krueger 2019, p. 382. At Google, contract workers are now reported to outnumber permanent staff.66 Wakabayashi 2019. The trend towards gig work poses a challenge to the paradigm of standard employment, which is modelled on the industrial worker and has dominated debates in political philosophy and labour economics.77 See also Vallas and Schor (2020), who focus on the specific context of the platform economy, where firms obtain a near-monopoly position in connecting buyers and sellers of labour. They contend that such gig-economy platforms require new regulatory approaches, as they reject responsibility for individual but over one many regulatory of the past the work and not to gig such work rise to the context of standard employment, has a social workers will not become but they will work, only of or at a social like as is not to short-term the but trend towards work and a new for that on the of in on to the rise of forms of employment and that the shift in employment is best as a of of firms business by of workers, thereby them to that this that current and the shift are normatively the of the article, this has the shift from the of affected that workers, ability to form and thereby of of gig work not we the gig economy to of and, the shift from the of that firms in the gig economy in a they a on the of the on the of work in affected and on social the as the of gig the to at an the of gig work, and for the of this article, such is a the of a of which that the and a form of employment, the higher the to social by the which can the of a has to the of gig work the of gig workers by a new this we that there has a shift towards forms of employment, which is best but not the rise of the gig has by who and to by social by and of in with and the of the trend towards gig that this trend is best as a the of firms business by of workers, thereby them to increased on we a broad of as or where of human has at and where the is p. are by in business are are business can for increased in is often by and social that See for a of in debates in the philosophy of work, this of is for the of forms of the to is an and political in See and to the of the or See in the and the to a social and social and can if they do not as we will by people from and Over the past labour markets in seen a rise in the number of people who are in temporary or forms of that the of work can the of conditions over and the or to in of work is by an of economic a a recent that the in US employment the has in temporary and contract Katz and Krueger 2019. the for that the number of is, of employment contracts that do not amount of the has risen from to over the past for Not has become an for the and that per cent of the by from in from the and p. the flexibilization of employment has to the forces of and and the of in the of in regulatory political in the labour market not but only by of are of in the of has as has the of by as a form of has are to the rise of temporary in as temporary workers to and and at the are also the of of the of the flexibilization of the labour the of forms of employment is not that they with or to but that they workers to thereby them in a form of and ability to and to the recent not in of an or a but a business is to workers and thereby business as as The in a which in or in an in to a The most of this is by them on to See who as business and the a firm can employment and in to demand or for other this to workers to such increases in they to or buy additional The up a firms but in the context of standard employment they of permanent work fixed with and workers from such an to for other of business on to that this is but the to which they all on the rise the in most to the contracts of permanent to employ workers only contracts as workers need not to contracts of to the number of of work a for business The most extreme of this trend are where do not number of of work and workers are only if The from fixed or contracts a of platforms the to the for individual gig and only at the a worker not but set by a for business is in the from fixed work firms to in a to in demand. often to on work at short and to work if the for on to workers a or the workers the for such by and work is of thereby to the other the in the of rather than the the for and workers are are but to business and the of such by on to firms in the to which they do the of specific but is also affected by the of business of the of labour the of in firms like Uber and Lyft the in an employment a fixed number of work hours, a fixed work they hire people as in workers often labour for a single Throughout all of the economy, employ of They on to temporary workers, only temporary to new workers or work contracts for if the most the that the gig economy in also a number of that on of in or the or in the of business in the gig economy, this a of this The the of gig work on workers and at which the of gig we a new paradigm for conditions of a of often has of and not only at but also at is The subsection gig work in shift the of where gig work is is to that it. Not all gig work is to The freelance over the past become the of the gig at a she has from the rise of short-term employment contracts by the her to in work in which she has a and to her services in a labour market by and longer receive to or and are a a number of work per in the of 2019. and work them for the of they most workers in gig economy in a position different from that of the the on a subsection of the gig economy, on gig While is to of the of the labour in the gig economy, like workers, and form an the employment contracts and for a on a job and the for all other Gig work On the one and to the US in has become the for 2019, p. that the employed often a of in or new jobs. The of in a new of p. The need to market and to for employment can The is for those who to without for a short this is the rather than the as the one in US over per cent of with that they are the of the work and a to the of gig work the ability of workers to and on recent to treat as an and a of 2019. While they focus on the amount of we are with of is affected not only by one but also by and thereby on a by p. that the to and of is as as the amount of such is the ability of an a to towards the of an to do need to a that that the of which they at do not the of the 2018, p. See also p. a of over But, as of economic the of people to and to for the and this in in and in the of the with economic they to work towards that require a or a if one not whether one will a job in in the of work people to in that require sustained with a or a political at fixed but work is one has to to every extreme where one is subject to for a as as the in is not only with in to the in to new on of the for and that economic also which they as a of by the that and are and the in ability to to and and 2018, p. See also other we can that a in the and of On a level, this not as a on many of human to is to the human of to for that as a human to a p. the of towards a is to people to of the which will the form of a is not only the of a to of as a a by a p. the of her her is only we the longer and are and the are to the p. According to are for a of the p. that the this is normatively at we gig work to a for a the of gig workers to increased is not only a to various a in if as a of work this is to in the of and, in extremis, to an from ability to a as an 2018, At this an additional to if a worker to a gig is this not that she from we are to standard economic theory, gig work as an additional if there are by for gig work we this for workers such as the The freelance but also higher not work for workers who all workers the of or not a of and of in workers are in supply and is to to the of workers, also on whether gig work is of or rather one that from job or see Schor that many workers but to the employment of the gig a recent by that a of the a permanent The that per cent of over higher in the in the of the and in of work, many workers for work as an and now a permanent p. the from of is to in that the of gig work not labour markets are firms the that employment, like that of a are gig like that of an gig work often firms a on thereby the to a of the rise of gig work, employment become or to at if people gig work is the best they this not other or not gig work has to problematic from the of an individual worker will on her which is for her of to and her position is as in the of is that the worker the in for like increased or her position is she The of the for by that whether a in a can only by the set of the economic contracts can as as but are by in the social which such are p. to the to workers by gig work also the of and At in the of the gig economy, where workers and the shift towards gig work to in of and According to for to conditions need to such that is to on over than the of to over which that social is by or p. that for the of the of and the to which the of is by can all in the in the labour market for gig work is best of as a The of many gig workers to work a of to a which is most where the supply of labour is this can firms to without in the towards gig work can such an of on to workers who to it. gig work is the the granularity of work contracts firms to and over conditions of At firms will that without as the one of subject to is problematic in but the gig economy to of According to for and if and only if and are in a in which to a from p. On to someone is to treat her as a in that of her to subject to the of and to a that overall According to this at gig firms and workers as there are for the gig economy is to such many of the gig economy, the of firms over the conditions of employment with a of where firms in business without they a in the form of an in conditions and are While is to exact for as of and as the of gig firms on for which to drivers to work in those and at those that on and of as as on who the efficiency of various Uber Uber not the of workers are a Uber can to treat workers as a and to and of in other of employment as there are for that the gig economy is to rise to of the higher granularity of work at the of the gig many of the gig economy, we this a as is of in can in an firms can buy work in ever smaller they are to the of workers and the for them in ever the for that the shift towards gig work in the place, the higher granularity of work to an is this of and that at gig firms a position to is a whether firms of this as the of Uber is to that at of them the of gig work from the of individual workers, we now attention to on the of business can without social on the of public such as the of a an and from and there is a that business in the of the conditions that in the While the is with to the of and the of the there is to in this we there is an of social in the of a set of social the business of gig firms to than those of firms standard they on the of workers, on ability to to and on social if one to that we as they the in that forms of are by which the gig economy the of gig economy to those who work for The of employment a for if one the workforce to one has to in is that many gig are that require often demand a and a a of work a that an economy with business See 2019. the of short employment the of workers to is in the of workers in that are specific to firm or this increases but also them to from current a to the to which workers are and for they will to in current in the of set will in OECD the of employment with the of if workers are to or employment in the gig economy them with to do the need to work and most people with to to in the form of or the of economic and the where conditions of work become in this in or to they conditions of in which the gig economy to is that employment conditions the ability of workers to in and The is not with of workers, but with that there will a of as as has in the work of who a at firms in an see is that firms not only but in labour from Firms are on as is for there to a of they on to workers from work and from for the and a in the is if the is to p. 11. Over the past there has The of labour market has risen in OECD and the paradigm of the and the is as that for the of and the While all this has to the of and work are the work to While firms do and work they to to that such Firms in the gig economy in particular to to do we the work they has a number of on the work and workers to increased of and need to to work and the of are in that require other to they also on the of if is on social to to the to which other as and are to work towards has a of to and who various an see on social are a as firms in the gig economy, like all on the of at a of social that the in which they While is to a the rise of the gig economy and a of social the that such a as the gig economy we a of employment, where one at to the other which is to rise to forms of are in the US and the where a of and by work the of if the of employment in a higher of gig workers on the social this the of the to such if the of gig work ability to thereby also ability to in as this ability to work towards a to social The that gig work with for individual workers as as at that there are the of gig They standard employment is But, that on forms of employment can also The of workers, like and the of The employment of the of from the of gig workers, which firms to services at we the work is of the freelance we do not that of gig work can an we do that the of the of gig work is up to to that there are specific form of gig work, such a to which a business on gig work people other than that conditions of standard to that social the social of gig one to an that on gig workers and for the of is with a for social and social a for and a of is to on for the of to the of the by gig work, we for a specific will require and to the of for one not only to on to but also to the of which in an of for an While in are not only in but also away from the of a of gig work in we will not to we to the of we that there are the of gig work and that this the of where gig work is are but we this can policy to the rise of gig this has a of the the rise of the gig economy and of this we to a the rise of the gig is by the of gig we to fixed to to See p. They to buy labour on an this them a over those that forms of is by the that many to social hiring the for at an an contract worker her than of her permanently employed for and 2019, p. in cases, firms to standard employment for economic for if the of this in the of gig work that is the of this an for this on other firms to to work to of the the of to the rise of the gig economy in we set for a policy of the of and with other the the shift and the of business to the workforce and other to of gig work that in particular on can seen as a demand of if gig work is to in the of but individual workers to for the of only that to them in that to from of the of the shift that the gig is to that we do not that of is the gig economy also rise to other like or other we to for the of a gig The and a work the higher the to social by the The additional to new forms of that for short-term in of those in employment for the as as the of at one of the On the the the of a on a on a market that social which to to social See this we social as a broad measure for that are by rather than the economic to The is towards the work the the shift and the towards ever work of the a on work is the of the of this the to per cent higher than the salary of with or permanent While there is that this in current form has not of and and is not with and is a towards the economic to gig such a not the of the is to the to them a new on the of a gig work, most to the The of a the of on to the the is in place, business become and are are that only that is, they on an business economic them to one for social by the will include a that the to gig work by the social it. of the gig work to as in the of a a on forms of employment will set at an level, the will those business that are only they to of and of the of an will not only on economic the but also on the of the of gig is a business can also that are not by the business to of that in this not amount to a the of to a on all to for the they and to a for those that not for by the The for the gig Gig work and the if to specific forms of gig work, they do On the the that the from the to new forms of social that to short-term in labour worked towards conditions for those in standard employment, for work and The to this standard by a of in the gig economy, workers are longer in employment or but and they the that social are not to an up a worker’s to a of her labour over the past the to a moving of the labour a workers to work not but to that workers an to work rather than on the this the the to thereby the economic that with gig work and are not of a that has but the of are on the At many social by of social and OECD 2019, p. The the to workers by the the and of an social by the of gig can on that in the in the the of on a basis and a a for the we the current of the is not in this the of is and, for a for to an for the the and that the to a in gig work, but that a While a for work, will the amount of gig work, the can only from not the of the of and the a on work the but not for those who subject to that is not this is a in to that are of various the set and they in in the context of a specific economy or in is then, to the of the we a policy rather than a for this is the of forms work can and the social and labour market a policy require to and with and other social At the the the of gig work in a this to to than like all workers of on we that the a of a policy to the rise of the gig economy, and one that has we do not that the is for the we that there are that is to alternative in of the rise of the gig a on forms of employment and the of a on forms of employment that workers are from But, as we business gig work and of the to can by forms of a a on work in form of a is to on work contracts where the on workers are and that work on short notice a as the of workers such require to the conditions and the position of workers, and has in in to of see and 2019. a that and has a firms shift on to workers without and of and are to But, in of the we to on at also a on forms of employment, as a to the by gig firms in a problematic is to the at at from a of the the of as as to for the of the of the the the only for the gig economy, the a by the to those who the of the rise of the gig economy is the of social by workers are to labour in a for The higher granularity of work contracts the of labour markets in which human can to most productive this article, we to that the expansion of the gig economy at human gig work in a shift of from to At in the of the gig economy, workers are not for on such additional The of this of which if the not are normatively The shift the most by them to with to and the of ability to form which in and of But, also on in that of we the of and that that by this can the trend towards gig work and the challenge of of an gig economy a they that labour is not a like but one that is On the one labour is the of a of workers, and a On the other labour hours, and to social the basis of the and of workers and, of and labour as a and firms in the gig economy this social of labour. They to from the social from and to is that this that will political and to and this
Abstract How might the structure of banking affect economic resilience? We address this question by analyzing how the organizational structures of banks and banking markets were associated with unemployment trajectories in local economies during the Great Recession. Two county-level analyses yield convergent results. Increasing branch densities of giant derivative holding banks within local economies were associated with greater surges in unemployment, weaker employment recoveries and stronger recession effects on unemployment from 2007 through 2016. Increasing branch densities of community banks and credit unions and localism in banking were associated with lower unemployment spikes, stronger recoveries and dampened crisis effects. These findings advance sociological studies of finance by providing new quantitative evidence for links between the social structures of banking and economic performance. They also confound arguments that decentralized systems of small, locally based financial institutions are inherently fragile by design, suggesting instead that alternatives to ‘too-big-to-fail’ banking can enhance local economies’ capacities to adapt proactively, withstand crisis and sustain employment during recessions.
This document outlines our approach to conducting a rapid realist review to identify evidence for potential impacts on people and society of peer-to-peer energy trading (and of distributed ledger technology used in this context). Our motivation for the study is to help anticipate who might stand to win or lose (and how and why), inform policy/regulation to help maximize benefits and minimize harm, and identify research gaps. While our focus is in the energy sector, we also plan to draw on evidence (where relevant) from examples of sharing economy models in non-energy sectors. We have already developed and engaged around a provisional programme theory (presented as a set of Context-Mechanism-Outcome statements), which we will develop as the review progresses. We set out where and how we will seek to identify evidence (through online searching, reference checking and calling for evidence). In line with our exploratory and iterative approach, we propose broad inclusion criteria. We will assess evidence quality subjectively on the basis of relevance and rigour for each Context-Mechanism-Outcome group, not at document level. Synthesis will be achieved through developing our programme theory and connecting evidence to it. We will disseminate findings through an academic paper (or papers), one or more policy briefings (with associated engagement events), one or more public blogs, and materials will be openly shared on an ongoing basis through an Open Science Framework page.
For many, the appeal of bitcoin is in its detachment from government regulation. \nHowever, the Coffee bonding theory, which initially arose in the context of foreign \nstocks, suggests certain benefits of regulation for bitcoin, including increased \nlegitimacy. By invoking the Coffee bonding theory, this Article offers another \nperspective on the regulation of bitcoin.
Can social movements mobilize market devices to challenge the political–economic order? Focusing on Bitcoin, we argue that an effective anti-state market device needs to be durably ‘counterearmarked’, to use Viviana Zelizer’s term, with radical meaning. This durability, however, requires that the movement build alliances with holders of political and economic power who also embrace the device’s radical meaning, lest those actors reformat the device to suit their purposes. To make this case, we locate Bitcoin’s radical origins in a performative project built on elements of Austrian monetary theory. We then track Bitcoin’s dual transformation between 2009 and 2014: the anti-state movement gave way to a market featuring big financial players, and the Internal Revenue Service officially redefined the bitcoin currency as property. Understanding this dual transformation requires joining Zelizerian conceptions of money with theories of markets-and-movements on the one hand, and symbolic-cultural conceptions of the classificatory state on the other.
G. Balachandran, Grégoire Mallard, Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Lucio Baccaro · 9 authors
This chapter attempts a broad analytical compass for surveying the main actors, institutions and instruments governing our world. Despite its seeming ubiquity, governance is a relatively new expression in this context suggestive both of new modes of exercising power, and an enhanced focus on ordering a world undergoing rapid change. Speaking generally governance may be understood as the exercise of power organized around multiple dispersed sites operating through transnational networks of actors, public as well as private, and national, regional as well as local. The turn to governance is often held to be coeval if not conjoined to profound changes in the meaning and nature of government associated with the ascendancy of ‘neo-liberal’ ideas and precepts. This has had significant implications for how governance tends to be understood. Critics associate it directly with the changing role of states in the economic and social sphere. Transnational governance, in particular, is criticized for foregrounding the priorities of corporate investors often to the detriment of social or environmental goals, subordinating principles of ‘comparative’ or ‘cooperative’ advantage to ‘competitive’ advantage, and promoting microregulatory forms of regulation over strategic or structurally-focused interventions (such as industrial policy). Associated shifts trace states’ powers, otherwise a touchstone of sovereignty, being increasingly negotiated with transnational private actors and international financial institutions (IFIs), and placed under external jurisdictions. The turn to governance tends also to framed, whether directly or directly, justifiably or otherwise, alongside cuts in the public provisioning of health, education, housing, and social expenditures wherever they may have taken place, a parallel proliferation of managerial controls, and to governments contracting out public services to private and quasi-private agencies, or relinquishing them to the voluntary sector. At the risk of oversimplifying its critics’ views, if modern governments describe rule by/of citizens, governance describes rule over subjects. This chapter maps a rather more fluid and differentiated landscape of governance across the five areas it surveys, i.e. finance, investment, trade, labor and environment. In finance, while regulation may appear to have become more transnational and to an extent even voluntary, deregulatory outcomes have reconfigured the nature of risk and the cognitive and policy frameworks for dealing with it. At the same time a growing risk of states having to foot the ultimate bill may still become a point of departure for more differentiated regulatory approaches. On the other hand, not only are environmental agreements continued to be implemented and enforced at national and sub-national scales, the ascendency of market interventions and transnational institutions here has taken place in parallel with—and sometimes through mutual cooptation of—other kinds of interventions including those for promoting decentralization and community control over resources. Trends in labor regulation may also reflect individual state choices more than direct transnational pressures, or run contrary to the preferences of specialized international organizations in the domain. Even in the controversial sphere of investment treaties, there is considerable ongoing fluidity with regard to norms, jurisdiction, and actors within and between national and international arenas. Thus, upon closer inspection and with the benefit of a more domain-specific approach, we may not necessarily observe a sweeping or uniform shift, but more a mosaic of regulatory frameworks, quite disparate trends with regard to their negotiation, implementation and impact, and a future rife with possibilities.
Abstract This paper outlines how the digital currency and network technology of bitcoin functions and explores the context from which it emerged. Bitcoin was conceived in 2008 as an attempt to alleviate trust in government and banks which was at a low during this period of financial crisis. However, with bitcoin trust does not dissipate, rather it shifts. Trust moves from trust in banks or states to trust in algorithms and encryption software. There is a move from conventional trust in the gold standard—“In Gold We Trust”—to the trust announced on U.S. currency—“In God We Trust”—to trust in software and networks—“In Digital We Trust”. The hyperbole of bitcoin discourse is deemed to be an expression of the Californian Ideology, which itself often conceals a right-wing agenda. The paper analyses the hype behind the celebration of decentralised digital networks. It proposes that a form of network fetishism operates here. The failure of bitcoin as a currency (rather than as a hoarded commodity in an emergent bubble) and as an idea might be attributed to the failure to see how ultra-modern digital networks conceal very traditional consolidation of power and capital. The rise and fall of bitcoin, in terms of its original ambition, serves as a cautionary tale in the digital age—it reveals how ingenious innovations that might challenge power and the consolidation of capital become co-opted and colonised by capital. Finally, the paper offers a discussion of the possible progressive uses of the digital technology bitcoin has facilitated.
36 Yale Journal on Regulation 735 (2019).Fintech is the hottest topic in finance today. Recent advances in cryptography, data analytics, and artificial intelligence are visibly “disrupting” traditional methods of delivering financial services and conducting financial transactions. Less visibly, fintech is also changing the way we think about finance: The rise of fintech is gradually recasting our collective understanding of the financial system as simply another sphere of normatively neutral information technology and objective computer science. By making financial transactions faster, cheaper, and more easily accessible, fintech seems to promise a micro-level “win-win” solution to the financial system’s many ills.This Article challenges such narratives and presents an alternative account of fintech as a systemic, macro-level phenomenon. Grounding the analysis of evolving fintech trends in a broader institutional context, the Article exposes the normative and political significance of the current fintech moment. It argues that the arrival of fintech enables a potentially decisive shift in the underlying public-private balance of powers, competencies, and roles in the financial system.In developing this argument, the Article makes three principal scholarly contributions. First, it introduces the concept of the New Deal settlement in finance: a fundamental political arrangement, in force for nearly a century, pursuant to which profit-seeking private actors retain control over allocating capital and generating financial risks, while the sovereign public bears responsibility for maintaining systemic financial stability. Second, the Article advances a novel conceptual framework for understanding the deep-seated financial dynamics that have eroded the New Deal settlement in recent decades. In particular, it offers a working taxonomy of principal mechanisms that both (a) enable private market actors to continuously synthesize tradable financial assets and scale up trading activities, and (b) undermine the public’s ability to manage the resulting system-wide risks. Finally, the Article shows how and why specific fintech applications – cryptocurrencies, distributed ledger technologies, digital crowdfunding, and robo-advising – are poised to amplify the effect of these destabilizing mechanisms, and thus potentially exacerbate the tensions and imbalances in today’s financial markets and the broader economy. It is this potential that renders fintech a public policy challenge of the highest order.
Although indispensable and in daily use, money and more specifically money creation in our two-layered fractional reserve banking system is still poorly recognized by social science at large. Its main features are outlined in order to identify (a) money’s double nature to be private and public at once and (b) inflation and speculative excess as two of its inherent dangers. Bitcoin and sovereign money are discussed as prominent examples of, on the one hand, private or libertarian and, on the other hand state-oriented or social-democratic monetary reforms, each intended to solve one of the two systemic problems our currency order. The new money’s respective advantages notwithstanding, it is shown that neither Bitcoin nor sovereign money can overcome money’s double nature or realize the dream of an eventually neutral money.
Tema ovog rada su kriptovalute. Budući da većina ljudi nije pravodobno upoznata s ovom temom, ovaj rad prikazuje i opisuje kriptovalute te način na koji se upotrjebljuju u svakodnevnom životu. Kriptovalute (eng. cryptocurrency) digitalne su valute dizajnirane kao sredstvo razmjene. Poznate su po tome što su državne agencije i banke isključene iz procesa razmjene. Kriptovalute omogućuju jednostavnu, jeftinu i brzu transakciju na području cijeloga svijeta. Trenutno najisplativije kriptovalute su Bitcoin i Ethereum, a u radu je opisana njihova korisnost, prednosti i mane. Budući da se Bitcoinu predviđa uspješna budućnost i sve je prisutniji i prihvatljiviji na tržištu, u radu su navedeni primjeri iz Hrvatske koji to potvrđuju. Sve veći broj poduzetnika odlučuje se za uvođenje kriptovaluta. U primjerima je obuhvaćen širok spektar djelatnosti, od frizerskih usluga, preko raznih tvrtki koji se bave prodajom računalne opreme, ugostiteljskih usluga preko mogućnosti brzog i lakog podizana gotovine na kripto bankomatima pa sve do plaćanja komunalnih usluga, pa čak i humanitarno djelovanje. Mnogi smatraju da su kriptovalute samo sinonim za prijevare i pranje novca, no programeri tvrde da su kriptovalute samo jedna vrsta tehnologije, alat koji sam po sebi ne može biti ni dobar ni loš, ovisno o tome za što se koristi. Autor ovoga rada proveo je istraživanje o tome kako se može besplatno započeti trgovanje kriptovalutama te je anketom ispitao stavove ispitanika o implementaciji kriptovaluta u društvu.
The investments of Caixas and Institutos de Aposentadoria e Pensões (CAP and IAP) in homes of Natal, between the decades of 1930-60, helped to boost up the local real estate market in consolidation at the time. Inserted in the first national policy on social housing in the country, these operations have demanded the creation of a wide qualified organizational structure, which would be from the "Central Offices" of Rio de Janeiro to the decentralized units of the federal states. The professionals linked to the Local Agencies have developed, on this matter, from activities related to the design and construction of residential complexes, to the daily study of financing proposals in isolated units. As from these studies, the evaluation of shelters was essential to the effectiveness of the policy, resulting in the production of data on the market value of the properties by observing and issuing judgments upon the living quarters of different social groups. Given these considerations, the aim here is to contribute to the understanding on how to operate these real estate actions in the legitimization of boundaries about the urban space and dwellings available to workers in Natal. Therefore, the views of the city and constructions expressed by the evaluating engineers in their technical reports have been taken as the focus. Being the main primary sources of work, these reports are part of the edifices process of CAP/IAP regarding Natal, whose content is systematized in the database "Enterprises", the HCUrb Research Group. In addition, there were used local newspapers at the time and interviews with professionals as complementary sources. It was found that, in general, the evaluations have configured – in a more everyday dimension of bureaucratic routines - a vehicle, among others, circulating ideas about "home" within the social security institutions, being imbued with assumptions historically constructed about the "modern habitat". Filled in loco, the reports expose the clash between modernizing ideals in vogue and clear limitations in the city scenario at the time. Fragmented images of the town are given to read through the labels assigned to the evaluated sites – these being coated of certain "scientific" character - which both legitimated and contributed to the dynamics of appreciation/depreciation of the soil and to the socio-spatial differentiation. Contradictions were evident in the endorsement given by the technicians when financing of admittedly precarious homes for insured disadvantaged categories at the local level - such as industrial workers - while strict regulations were imposed to new construction, designed, above all, to better paid categories. By identifying raters engineers as urban agents, members of a technical-focused operating system for safety and efficiency in the real estate investments of those authorities corporatist, it is desired the usefulness of further studies on these characters, their training, professional activity and participation in the construction of discourses and practices of intervention about the city and its buildings, discussing individual and grouped interests that were left behind.
Greece's residual type of welfare model is facing the past six years an intense pressure caused by the economic crisis (2008) and the emergence of new social risks. Restrictive policies and internal devaluation process adopted to restructure economy, underestimated the social impact. The State, choosing a different welfare model with emphasis on commodification and selective services, gradually withdraws from the implementation of social policy, seeking, through administrative reforms, to transfer responsibilities to local government, without, however, the necessary funding. At the same time, European Union's social policy, despite its rhetoric and some initially ambitious efforts, particularly with the Treaty of Lisbon, shows inability to create a “community acquis”, which would contribute decisively to the Europeanization of the southern countries. By applying “soft law” measures and always based on the principle of subsidiarity, European strategy is confined, almost entirely, to an application of employment support measures, primarily seeking to improve competitiveness and meet the financial objectives of Monetary Union. The study of basic economic and social EU-28 indices for the period 2008-2012, confirms that diversification of welfare models has a crucial effect in mitigating income inequality and reducing the risk of poverty, enhancing therefore, the dispute over theoretical approaches that support the adequacy of policies related to economic growth. This paper attempts, given the aforementioned conditions, to present the current situation in local government organizations, both from the structures and the financing means perspective, based on a primary research, conducted for this purpose using a structured questionnaire filled by competent executives of all municipalities in the Prefecture (now regional unit) of Thessaloniki. Research findings, though highlighting the efforts to substitute central government's role in an institutional context, constantly under reform, indicate that municipalities are facing significant efficiency problems. Social policy is exercised by different organizational units without integrated strategic planning, new structures which were created primarily to address poverty are inadequate to meet the actual needs and funding is limited in an effort to replace the reduced own resources through European programs, without seeking future alternative sources. The acute lack of human resources and coordination, adversely affects evaluation of local government's social policy. The findings also intensify the concern about structures sustainability and the capacity of municipalities’ overall support, but at the same time detect needed interventions in order to implement an efficient decentralized policy, which will become an essential factor of social cohesion and prevent escalation of social exclusion.