The 2012 national health policy is the \n overarching health policy framework in Zambia. The policy \n takes a human rights approach to health care provision, \n where all citizens are entitled to basic health care \n (Ministry of Health 2012). The policy is actualized through \n successive five-year national health strategic plans. \n Operationally, Zambia’s health system is centralized, with \n delegated responsibilities from the center to lower levels \n of the health care delivery system. The Ministry of Health \n plays a dual role of policy formulation and strategic \n planning and delivery of health services, with provincial \n and district health offices being upwardly accountable to \n the Ministry of Health headquarters. Going forward, Zambia \n is in the process of launching two major reforms which will \n further affect the organization of the health sector. These \n are (a) implementation of the National Decentralization \n Policy, and (b) introduction of a National Health Insurance \n (NHI) scheme. The PHC function (including transfer of PHC \n staff to local government authorities) is among the front \n runner for decentralization. If national decentralization is \n fully implemented, it will affect the way health services \n are organized, delivered, and financed in the country. Thus, \n adequate preparations in the health sector are required to \n minimize challenges. Secondly, Zambia enacted the NHI Act in \n April 2018 which provides the legal mandate to establish the \n NHI management authority, and the NHI scheme. At the time of \n this study, it was envisaged that implementation of the NHI \n scheme will be done in a phased manner with a view of \n covering the entire population in the medium to long term. \n However, depending on the final design and implementation \n process, the NHI will have a substantial effect on the \n financing and delivery of health programs and services in \n Zambia. One of the immediate challenges will be providing \n insurance cover to the informal sector and indigent people \n in rural areas.
BACKGROUND: Decentralization is promoted as a strategy to improve health system performance by bringing decision-making closer to service delivery. Some studies have investigated if decentralization actually improves the health system. However, few have explored the conditions that enable it to be effective. To determine these conditions, we have analyzed the perspectives of decision-makers in the Philippines where devolution, one form of decentralization, was introduced 25 years ago. METHODS: Drawing from the "decision space" approach, we interviewed 27 decision-makers with an average of 23.6 years of working across different levels of the Philippine government health sector and representing various local settings. Qualitative analysis followed the "Framework Method." Conditions that either enable or hinder the effectiveness of decentralization were identified by exploring decision-making in five health sector functions. RESULTS: These conditions include: for planning, having a multi-stakeholder approach and monitoring implementation; for financing and budget allocation, capacities to raise revenues at local levels and pooling of funds at central level; for resource management, having a central level capable of augmenting resource needs at local levels and a good working relationship between the local health officer and the elected local official; for program implementation and service delivery, promoting innovation at local levels while maintaining fidelity to national objectives; and for monitoring and data management, a central level capable of ensuring that data collection from local levels is performed in a timely and accurate manner. CONCLUSIONS: The Philippine experience suggests that decentralization is a long and complex journey and not an automatic solution for enhancing service delivery. The role of the central decision-maker (e.g. Ministry of Health) remains important to assist local levels unable to perform their functions well. It is policy-relevant to analyze the conditions that make decentralization work and the optimal combination of decentralized and centralized functions that enhance the health system.
Moritz Piatti-Fünfkirchen, Magnus Lindelöw, Katelyn Jison Yoo
Progress toward universal health care (UHC) in Africa will require sustained increases in public spending on health and reduced reliance on out-of-pocket financing. This article reviews trends and patterns of government spending in the East and Southern Africa regions and points out methodological challenges with interpreting data from the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Health Expenditure Database (GHED) and other sources. Government expenditure for health has increased for most countries, albeit at a slower rate than gross domestic product (GDP). In most countries there has been a prioritization away from health in government budgets, putting the onus on the private sector and donors to fill the gap. Donor support is important in the region but reliance on external spending is not consistent with countries' stated ambitions of universal health coverage. A number of methodological challenges with estimating health expenditures are identified. Capturing health expenditures adequately across agencies and levels of decentralization can be challenging, and off-budget funds and arrears are evasive. Measurement error can be significant because actual expenditure information can be hard to come by and is often dated and unreliable. Furthermore, how external financing is captured will affect government health expenditure estimates. These factors have contributed to differences in expenditure estimates between the WHO GHED and country-specific public expenditure reviews and complicate interpretation. The article concludes that it is critical to strengthen national data capacity and international efforts to promote quality and consistency of data. The GHED is an invaluable resource for monitoring and benchmarking health expenditures. It is best used in combination with deep dive country expenditure assessments.
This article analyses the impact of state decentralization on one aspect of territorial diversity, specifically on the policy discretion of regions, as an expression of their political autonomy for self-government. Our interest focuses on the factors that determine the decisions and actions of regional governments in developing their policies. We ask: why do regional governments take different public policy options? Conceding that several factors help explain policy decisions (such as productive structure, government ideology, social capital, political context, budgetary resources), we choose to explore the impact of two of them, by asking: in what way, and to what extent, are policy decisions and actions conditioned by the financing model and by their different ideologies? We present quantitative and qualitative comparative evidence from two contrasting case studies: two regions in decentralized Spain that have developed their own policies of income and spending, and have translated them into differing public management policies and regulatory models for providing health services. These governments are ideologically different and have undergone different degrees of recent ideological changes, but the resources provided to them by the financing model have also been different. We show how resources determine the scope of governments’ actions, while ideology determines their direction.
Background: Governments engage in setting health sector priorities among competing interests to maximize health system goals within the available resources. This is important as misalignment between health priorities and budget allocations can lead to low budget allocations and underspending in the health sector.\nGoal: The goals of the study are twofold. First, measure the extent of alignment between a stated government priority and actual government expenditure. Second, if there is misalignment, explain the underlying bottlenecks including institutions, structures, and capacities.\nMethod: The study focuses on one stated health sector priority shared between Kenya and Mozambique, which is improving geographical equity of governmental resources for health. An explanatory mixed methods design is used, in which quantitative analysis is followed by a qualitative assessment. In quantitative analysis, Gini index is used to summarize the differences in per capita health expenditures across regions. In addition, health expenditure is decomposed as a product of total budget, health budget priority, and health budget execution to identify whether resource allocation or resource utilization lead to geographical inequity. The qualitative assessment consisted of 23 semi-structured key informant interviews, 10 for Kenya, 11 for Mozambique, to explain the quantitative results.\nResults: In both Kenya and Mozambique there is geographical inequity in government health spending, which is inconsistent with the stated government priority (Gini greater than zero). The decomposition of health expenditure suggests that, in Kenya, the misalignment is driven by both resource allocation and utilization processes; in Mozambique, it is driven largely by the resource allocation process. \nThe qualitative analysis reveals several bottlenecks that are common between the two countries. At the institutional level, there is institutional separation between planning and budgeting, decision-making is ad hoc, and difficult decisions on hard choices and tradeoffs are left to the end of the budget process. At the structural level, rapid and unplanned decentralization in Kenya and the deconcentration model in Mozambique have led to inadequate structures to align planning and budgeting. At the capacity level, there are too many administrative demands on planning and budgeting staff, who also lack technical expertise and adequate data to make evidence-based decisions.
To what extent do the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank remain central today and how much influence do they still wield in shaping the global agenda? While several studies have traced the development of various intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), charting their growth and influence in international affairs, and assessing their prospects, few if any have compared IGOs across various fields. This paper aims to fill this gap by taking a closer look at three different policy fields to better understand the current architecture of global governance, the centrality of IGOs, the role of new and other actors, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of this "new" architecture. The authors find that, first, the emergence of new private players has significantly eroded the centrality of IGOs such that the course of global governance in health, trade, and development finance has changed irreversibly. Second, regional arrangements have overtaken global ones and nonstate actors have assumed more prominent roles. Third, this multiplicity of powerful players has led to some positive outcomes but also greater inefficiencies and redundancies. Fourth, developed countries have been pivotal in eroding the centrality of IGOs, but developing countries are taking on a greater role in global governance. Fifth, the new architecture can be described as one of diversification in global health governance, fragmentation in global trade, and variation in multilateral development finance. Global governance in the 21st century is thus characterized by a proliferation of actors and a decentralization of authority, an erosion of IGO centrality accompanied by a greater role for nonstate actors, developing countries, and by increased regionalism. Depending on the sector of governance, its inherent aims, and the nature of the actors involved, the new architecture may be one of variation, fragmentation, or diversification. While this new architecture is complex and might possibly lead to inefficiencies and redundancies, it allows a greater number of actors to participate, making it more representative of the current world order and making it possible to mobilize more resources to promote development.
A major challenge to achieve health coverage in Nigeria is expansion of health access to the poor, vulnerable and informal sectors, which constitute over 70% of the population of more than 186 million. Evidence from other countries suggests that it is difficult for contributory insurance schemes to achieve universal health coverage in such conditions, especially with such a large informal sector. In fact, Nigeria's national social health insurance program has provided coverage to less than 5% of the population since its implementation in 2005, private voluntary health insurance has shown poor potential to extend coverage, and community-based health insurance has failed to expand access to poor, vulnerable and informal sector populations as well. Decentralization of health insurance to the states has limited potential to expand health insurance coverage for the poor, vulnerable and those in the informal sector. Furthermore, social health insurance in many developed countries has taken many years to achieve universal health coverage. This paper suggests that policy makers should consider adopting a tax-based, noncontributory, universal health-financing system as the primary funding mechanism to accelerate progress toward universal health coverage. Social health insurance and its decentralization to states for formal sector workers should serve as a supplement, while private voluntary health insurance should cover better-off groups. Simultaneously, it is critical to tackle issues of poor governance structures, mismanagement of funds, corruption, and lack of transparency and accountability within regulatory and implementing agencies, to ensure that monies allocated for expanded health insurance coverage are well managed. Although the proposed universal health coverage reform may take some years to achieve, it is more feasible to collect taxes, improve tax administration and expand the tax base than to enforce payment of contributions from nonsalaried workers and those who cannot afford to pay for health insurance or for services out of pocket.
Brian M. Till, Alexander W. Peters, Salim Afshar, John G. Meara
Blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies could remake global health financing and usher in an era global health equity and universal health coverage. We outline and provide examples for at least four important ways in which this potential disruption of traditional global health funding mechanisms could occur: universal access to financing through direct transactions without third parties; novel new multilateral financing mechanisms; increased security and reduced fraud and corruption; and the opportunity for open markets for healthcare data that drive discovery and innovation. We see these issues as a paramount to the delivery of healthcare worldwide and relevant for payers and providers of healthcare at state, national and global levels; for government and non-governmental organisations; and for global aid organisations, including the WHO, International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group.
The Spanish National Health System (SNHS) was legally defined in 1986. There are many well documented studies on how its basic traits (universality, accessibility, decentralization, integrated public health networks, public and private provision, financed by taxes, social premiums and copayments, etc.) have evolved since then.
This paper explains how the SNHS facilities and functions are deeply decentralized and how the recent economic crisis has changed this picture, with central health planning basically located into the Ministry of Finance and mainly guided by deficit control considerations.
Edwine Barasa, Anthony Muchai Manyara, Sassy Molyneux, Benjamin Tsofa
BACKGROUND: In 2013, Kenya transitioned into a devolved system of government with a central government and 47 semi-autonomous county governments. In this paper, we report early experiences of devolution in the Kenyan health sector, with a focus on public county hospitals. Specifically, we examine changes in hospital autonomy as a result of devolution, and how these have affected hospital functioning. METHODS: We used a qualitative case study approach to examine the level of autonomy that hospitals had over key management functions and how this had affected hospital functioning in three county hospitals in coastal Kenya. We collected data by in-depth interviews of county health managers and hospital managers in the case study hospitals (n = 21). We adopted the framework proposed by Chawla et al (1995) to examine the autonomy that hospitals had over five management domains (strategic management, finance, procurement, human resource, and administration), and how these influenced hospital functioning. FINDINGS: Devolution had resulted in a substantial reduction in the autonomy of county hospitals over the five key functions examined. This resulted in weakened hospital management and leadership, reduced community participation in hospital affairs, compromised quality of services, reduced motivation among hospital staff, non-alignment of county and hospital priorities, staff insubordination, and compromised quality of care. CONCLUSION: Increasing the autonomy of county hospitals in Kenya will improve their functioning. County governments should develop legislation that give hospitals greater control over resources and key management functions.
Hilaire Zon, Milena Pavlova, Koiné Maxime Drabo, Wim Groot
'Four' types of decentralization are distinguished in health care: deconcentration when the shift in authority is to regional or district offices; devolution when the shift is to state, provincial or municipal governments; delegation when semi-autonomous agencies are granted new powers; and privatization when ownership is granted to private entities. This article systematically reviews the experiences of local governments of Sub-Saharan African countries with the provision of health services during and after decentralization reforms. The article highlights the achievements, challenges and issues associated with decentralization. The review shows that most countries have mainly focused on the process by enacting numerous policies, regulations and standards with mixed outcomes for health services delivery. Decentralization in general, and resource transfer from the central to local governments in particular, are a highly political issue that influences the health reform strategy on decentralization. The literature shows the complexity of implementing decentralization schemes which strongly impact the health service organization and delivery. The theory of decision space applied in a comparative analysis found that some functions, particularly financing, remain under the control of the central state. Despite the numerous challenges, this review identifies some good practices in resources transfer, key determinants being the type of decentralization and the government's will to make legislative and administrative changes required for the effectiveness of decentralization. The literature search, even though systematic, resulted in a limited number of relevant publications with evidence on the link between decentralization and health services delivery. This is a largely unexplored research area, especially the use of financial resources by local governments, the factors that drive local decision-making processes and the effects of decentralization on health care sector performance.
Like many countries, the health care industries of England 1 and the United States consume large amounts of resources and struggle to achieve equity and efficiency. They attempt to reach these goals in quite different ways, exhibiting common challenges familiar to reformers throughout the world. Recent activities in England and the United States suggest that significant changes being discussed in the United States or implemented in the United Kingdom could upset previously accepted policies and threaten some or many of the gains made to provide more equal and timely accessible care to all individuals. Policy makers in both countries wrestle with similar problems of redistribution and system design. Although in the United States, the issues of equity and expenditure controls do not have the same importance as in England, both countries seek the “Holy Grail” of limiting spending both by government and the private sector by redesigning institutions that manifest inefficiency and contribute to inflationary pressures. Yet competing value systems permeate the political debate about how to accomplish these aims. These value systems underlie political preferences for regulation and markets. Although a minority in the United States advocates for universal care funded by a single payer, private employer-based insurance remains the bedrock mechanism. Unlike the United Kingdom and most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the United States has never shown a political willingness to have government responsible for financial protection for all inhabitants against the cost of medical care. The United States has, however, accepted this responsibility for major components of society, namely, the aged, disabled, and low-income families and children (e.g., via Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program). This commitment was expanded with the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, commonly known as Obamacare. The outcomes of the two health care systems reflect a preference for collectivism in funding and access in the United Kingdom and for pluralism in funding (less third-party coverage) and a greater role for privately delivered care in the United States. But the battle continues in both countries as important groups advocate for the reversal of these preferences. Policy makers continually try to change their health care systems. Some of these changes seek to develop greater efficiency in how care is delivered as a means of controlling the burdens imposed on society by ever-increasing public and private expenditure. Both countries face common problems that have been well identified for decades but have proven difficult to resolve. Reformers face three common problems. First, unwarranted variations in clinical practice (Wennberg, 2008, Wennberg, 2012) are produced by price variations in insurance systems and volume variations elsewhere (Institute of Medicine, 2013). Second, both systems have been slow to develop measures of the value of health care outcomes, that is, improvements in the length and quality of life. Third, both health care systems have perverse incentives that inhibit efficiency-inducing change; for example, they use hospital pricing or tariff systems that incentivise activity with little regard to patient value. Inadequate evaluation and political resistance to change continue to produce inefficiency. The end result is unnecessary spending and unethical deprivation of beneficial care for some populations. The English single payer system is characterised by frugality and cycles of famine and plenty, with attendant bouts of supply side reform (Street & Maynard, 2007). Constrained funding in the 1980s led to the Thatcher reforms and the creation of the “quasimarket” of purchaser and providers contracting for public and private care. These structural reforms received increased funding in the early 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, financial parsimony was creating renewed performance problems, for example, increased waiting times for elective surgery. As a consequence, the Blair government financed a large increase in funding. Since 2010, the Coalition and now Conservative government has exerted extreme expenditure controls, and current plans will result in real per capita funding falling by 2018. Since the Thatcher era, the often violent fluctuations in NHS funding have been accompanied by the “redisorganisation” of structures and processes of care whilst maintaining universal cover age free at the point of use. The purchaser side of the National Health Service (NHS) market has evolved from health authorities to primary care trusts and now to clinical commissioning groups, all with similar functions and uncertain impact. The provider side of the market remains dominated by public institutions as private providers have made only marginal inroads to public funding. The current chronic underfunding of the NHS and social care, manifested currently by increased waiting times for elective procedures, has produced inevitable pursuit of the “Holy Grail” of increased productivity. The Five Year Forward View (NHS, 2014) involved the acceptance of government parsimony and for the 2015–2020 period. Its authors argued that the NHS would require £30 billion to meet demographic and technological demands, of which only £8 billion was to be provided from tax revenues. The additional £22 billion was to be funded from productivity increases. Current NHS spending is £110 billion. Currently, a frenzy of structural reform proposals range from integration of currently fragmented hospital, primary and social care systems to hospital mergers to the abolition of the purchaser-provider “market” with the creation of accountable care organisations. These proposals involve unevidenced merger plans and deskilling of nursing and other workforce changes. The Sustainability and Transformation Plans (https://www.england.nhs.uk/stps/) are radical but unlikely to yield £22 billion of productivity gains in 5 years. There is little available funding to finance the change process, and its duration is likely to take many years to free up resources. Both options assume that healthcare is much more expensive in the United States than in any OECD country because American patients use too much medical care. Yet the evidence does not support this assumption. Americans are less likely to be admitted to a hospital and have a lower length of stay once in a hospital than many OECD countries. Americans also are less likely to see a doctor or use fewer pharmaceuticals than patients in OECD countries. U.S. patients do use more very expensive medical devices such as MRIs or new and expensive drugs, but on net, the pluses and minus may cancel out. What separates United States spending from that in OECD countries are the prices charged for all medical activities. The reasons for the higher prices are complicated and due to a myriad of factors including the higher wages paid to most participants in the healthcare system (not only physicians); the much higher prices Americans pay for drugs and medical devices; and the fact that the complexity of the U.S. system has evolved in a way that requires the use of many more lawyers, consultants, and administrators, all of whom are well paid. The latter consideration is possibly more central because some key providers such as primary care physicians receive relatively low compensation relative to education costs and work conditions. Additional efforts within the United States that are sometimes related to the ACA include a broad interest in insurance redesign, emphasis on value from services provided, and a focus on patient-centred outcomes. Value-based cost-sharing approaches are being implemented in the United States as well as other OECD countries (Thomson, Schang, & Chernew, 2013), though these approaches are more easily implemented for certain services such as pharmaceuticals. The Medicare program is testing a number of value-based payment innovations and incentive payments. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute is a nongovernmental institute created under ACA that was charged with assessing the effectiveness and appropriateness of medical treatments. However, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute is not able to mandate coverage or reimbursement for any treatments and infamously is prohibited from considering cost per quality-adjusted life years in its recommendations despite widespread interest in this measure in many other countries. The American and the English health and social care systems differ greatly, but they are surprisingly similar in some dimensions. Key differences pertain to who pays for care and how it is delivered, with the United States having a more decentralized and fragmented system leading to inequalities in the provision of care and its funding. The English system is universal and largely free at the point of consumption system but constrained by limited funding (which also generates inequalities in access to timely care). The supply side problems are more similar for both countries. Increasingly, U.S. reform in terms of payment mechanisms is being emulated by the English. Both systems seek better measurement and management of “value,” that is, the effects of health care on the length and quality of patients' lives. The hospital systems of both countries are attempting to integrate care function and move away from “fee for service” to bundled or incentive payments. The American system is the product of producer incentives producing grossly inflated costs. Concomitantly, a growing proportion of the U.S. population has a limited view about who should be eligible for government-supported health care services and the types of services that should be supported. Despite greater underlying consensus in favour of universal coverage, the English system's crisis is a product of parsimony and fragmentation of funding and provision. Both systems are permeated by organisational inertia and the defence of political values and self-interest. The United States is grappling with more than a sea change given political restructuring and the very uncertain future of most expansions of insurance or medical cost coverage under the ACA. England faces potentially revolutionary structural changes in supply and a real political challenge in its single payment system. Although current trends are not positive, the authors maintain hope that both countries will prevent further deterioration in health care coverage and return towards more progressive policies to protect their inhabitants' access to care when subjected to the misfortunes of medical illness.
Background Mechanisms for and levels of financing for public health services in Europe are insufficiently documented and understood. Concerns have been raised in a number of countries over recent budget cuts. Methods Our study draws on (i) a review of grey and published evidence, (ii) detailed descriptions of the financing of public health services in nine European countries (England, France, Germany, Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden) using a structured data collection template, and (iii) a review of WHO, Eurostat and OECD datasets as well as national statistics. Results Levels of financing for public health services remain difficult to assess, but available data suggest that funding is low as a percentage of total health expenditure. Available data differ between international and national databases, further complicating a detailed assessment. Public budgets at national, regional and local levels (financed mainly through taxation and social health insurance) are the main source of financing for public health services. In some countries, such as Poland, private sources also play an important role. Allocation mechanisms frequently do not allow for medium- to long-term planning. Approaches that bring together health and other sectors for the funding of public health programmes remain rare, as does the use of taxes dedicated to public health. Countries such as England and the Netherlands have seen major budget cuts for public health services in recent years, while others (Italy, Germany) saw increases in funding, sometimes linked to new policy developments, such as the new Prevention Law in Germany. There are also major differences in financing levels and mechanisms within countries, in particular in decentralized systems. Conclusions The lack of sufficient and sustainable resources is a challenge for public health services in several countries, but there are also positive examples that can be emulated.
-Within the last two decades, the Nigerian government has committed to strengthening its primary health care system, through reforms addressing institutional restructuring, deepening decentralized governance, and the incorporation of an alternative health care financing strategy. One of these reforms prescribed the establishment of state primary health care agencies/boards (SPHCDBs) as an integral part of the national health system, with the principal responsibility "for the coordination of planning, budgeting, provision and monitoring of all primary health care services that affect residents of the state." Central to this reform is the integration of primary health care (PHC) governance and management, popularly called primary health care under one roof. Another reform, piloting results-based financing, has been implemented since 2011 in three states under the Nigeria State Health Investment Project. This study assesses the implementation of the Primary Health Care Under One Roof (PHCUOR) policy as part of the broader PHC reforms, with a specific focus on how this policy has been strengthened through the Nigeria State Health Investment Project (NSHIP) in Adamawa, Nasarawa, and Ondo states, documenting the evolution of SPHCDB and PHC service delivery, with a focus on management, accountability, and incentives. The study shows that, in the above-mentioned states, significant milestones were achieved in the establishment of the SPHCDB, the strengthening of PHC systems, the improvement of accountability linkages, and an increase in service utilization. The authors therefore argue that integrated PHC systems through SPHCDBs, as enshrined in the PHCUOR guidelines, are a panacea for effective provision of primary health care and a potential game changer for health outcomes, especially when reinforced with a results-based financing approach.
This analysis of the Romanian health system reviews recent developments in organization and governance, health financing, health care provision, health reforms and health system performance. The Romanian health care system is a social health insurance system that has remained highly centralized despite recent efforts to decentralize some regulatory functions. It provides a comprehensive benefits package to the 85% of the population that is covered, with the remaining population having access to a minimum package of benefits. While every insured person has access to the same health care benefits regardless of their socioeconomic situation, there are inequities in access to health care across many dimensions, such as rural versus urban, and health outcomes also differ across these dimensions. The Romanian population has seen increasing life expectancy and declining mortality rates but both remain among the worst in the European Union. Some unfavourable trends have been observed, including increasing numbers of new HIV/AIDS diagnoses and falling immunization rates. Public sources account for over 80% of total health financing. However, that leaves considerable out-of-pocket payments covering almost a fifth of total expenditure. The share of informal payments also seems to be substantial, but precise figures are unknown. In 2014, Romania had the lowest health expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) among the EU Member States. In line with the government's objective of strengthening the role of primary care, the total number of hospital beds has been decreasing. However, health care provision remains characterized by underprovision of primary and community care and inappropriate use of inpatient and specialized outpatient care, including care in hospital emergency departments. The numbers of physicians and nurses are relatively low in Romania compared to EU averages. This has mainly been attributed to the high rates of workers emigrating abroad over the past decade, exacerbated by Romania's EU accession and the reduction of public sector salaries due to the economic crisis. Reform in the Romanian health system has been both constant and yet frequently ineffective, due in part to the high degree of political instability. Recent reforms have focused mainly on introducing cost-saving measures, for example, by attempting to shift some of the health care costs to drug manufacturers by claw-back and to the population through co-payments, and on improving the monitoring of health care expenditure.
For more than three decades healthcare decentralization has been promoted in developing countries as a way of improving the financing and delivery of public healthcare. Decision autonomy under healthcare decentralization would determine the role and scope of responsibility of local authorities. Jalal Mohammed, Nicola North, and Toni Ashton analyze decision autonomy within decentralized services in Fiji. They conclude that the narrow decision space allowed to local entities might have limited the benefits of decentralization on users and providers. To discuss the costs and benefits of healthcare decentralization this paper uses the U-form and M-form typology to further illustrate the role of decision autonomy under healthcare decentralization. This paper argues that when evaluating healthcare decentralization, it is important to determine whether the benefits from decentralization are greater than its costs. The U-form and M-form framework is proposed as a useful typology to evaluate different types of institutional arrangements under healthcare decentralization. Under this model, the more decentralized organizational form (M-form) is superior if the benefits from flexibility exceed the costs of duplication and the more centralized organizational form (U-form) is superior if the savings from economies of scale outweigh the costly decision-making process from the center to the regions. Budgetary and financial autonomy and effective mechanisms to maintain local governments accountable for their spending behavior are key decision autonomy variables that could sway the cost-benefit analysis of healthcare decentralization.
Análise da capacidade de autofinanciamento e da dependência financeira dos municípios fluminenses para custear o gasto municipal no Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS). Estudo descritivo, seccional e analítico com dados do Sistema de Informações sobre Orçamentos Públicos em Saúde (Siops). A receita per capita própria municipal foi utilizada como medida da capacidade de autofinanciamento. O Índice de Capacidade de Autofinanciamento (ICA) permitiu o ordenamento dos municípios por graus de capacidade de autofinanciamento. As medidas estatísticas utilizadas foram a média, desvio padrão, intervalo de confiança e o coeficiente de correlação de Pearson. Os valores de receita e gasto em saúde foram deflacionados pelo Índice Geral de Preços (IGP-DI). Os resultados evidenciaram que houve aumento da capacidade de autofinanciamento entre os anos de 2002 e 2013, com decréscimo a partir de 2014. Na distribuição por graus de capacidade de autofinanciamento identificou-se entre os aos 2002 e 2008 uma continua ascensão dos municípios para graus mais elevados e, a partir do ano de 2009 em diante, todos se encontraram no grau 4, demonstrando maior aproximação das receitas municipais. Por outro lado, verificou-se permanência de desigualdades de receita própria para gasto em saúde. Houve elevação da despesa total em saúde durante todo o período com participação dos dois subcomponentes de receita (receita própria e de transferências SUS) neste crescimento. O gasto próprio deteve a maior participação na despesa total em que pese a relevância das transferências SUS, em especial da União, onde 80 por cento dos municípios apresentaram uma dependência de recursos de transferências do SUS acima de 20 por cento na execução de sua despesa total em saúde
Aku Kwamie, Han van Dijk, Evelyn Ansah, Irène Akua Agyepong
The district health system in Ghana today is characterized by high resource-uncertainty and narrow decision-space. This article builds a theory-driven historical case study to describe the influence of path-dependent administrative, fiscal and political decentralization processes on development of the district health system and district manager decision-space. Methods included a non-exhaustive literature review of democratic governance in Ghana, and key informant interviews with high-level health system officials integral to the development of the district health system. Through our analysis we identified four periods of district health system progression: (1) development of the district health system (1970-85); (2) Strengthening District Health Systems Initiative (1986-93); (3) health sector reform planning and creation of the Ghana Health Service (1994-96) and (4) health sector reform implementation (1997-2007). It was observed that district manager decision-space steadily widened during periods (1) and (2), due to increases in managerial profile, and concerted efforts at managerial capacity strengthening. Periods (3) and (4) saw initial augmentation of district health system financing, further widening managerial decision-space. However, the latter half of period 4 witnessed district manager decision-space contraction. Formalization of Ghana Health Service structures influenced by self-reinforcing tendencies towards centralized decision-making, national and donor shifts in health sector financing, and changes in key policy actors all worked to the detriment of the district health system, reversing early gains from bottom-up development of the district health system. Policy feedback mechanisms have been influenced by historical and contemporary sequencing of local government and health sector decentralization. An initial act of administrative decentralization, followed by incomplete political and fiscal decentralization has ensured that the balance of power has remained at national level, with strong vertical accountabilities and dependence of the district on national level. This study demonstrates that the rhetoric of decentralization does not always mirror actual implementation, nor always result in empowered local actors.
This paper considers an overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, the paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first-best allocation is an \nallocation that maximizes welfare when a social planner \ndistributes resources and forces an old agent to work and \nretire as she wants. The second-best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when she can use only pay-as-you-go social security in a decentralized economy. The paper finds a range of an old agent’s labor productivity such \nthat the first-best allocation is achieved in the decentralized economy. This differs from the finding in Micheland Pestieau [“Social security and early retirement in an overlapping-generations growth model”, Annals of Economics & Finance, 2013] that the first-best allocation cannot be achieved in the decentralized economy.
Renate Hartwig, Robert Sparrow, Sri Budiyati, Athia Yumna · 7 authors
We exploit variation in the design of subnational health-care financing initiatives in Indonesian districts to assess the effects of these local schemes on maternal care from 2004 to 2010. The analysis is based on a district pseudopanel, combining data from a unique survey among District Health Offices with the Indonesian Demographic and Health Surveys, the national socioeconomic household surveys, and the village census. Our results show that these district schemes contribute to an increase in antenatal care visits and the probability of receiving basic recommended antenatal care services for households that are not targeted by the national health insurance programs. We observe a decrease in home births. However, there is no effect on professional assistance at birth. We also observe variation in scheme design across districts as well as constraints to the effectiveness of local schemes. Including antenatal and delivery services explicitly in benefits packages and contracting local rather than national health-care providers increases the effects on maternal care. Increasing population coverage reduces effectiveness, delineating limitations to local funding and risk pooling. Furthermore, we do not find any effects for districts outside Java and Bali, where access to basic health care remains a key policy concern.