Edimara Mezzomo Luciano, Odirlei Antônio Magnagnagno, Rodrigo Couto de Souza, Guilherme Costa Wiedenhöft
The recent popularization of distributed ledger technologies, which is better known in the financial sector due to digital currencies, has led to the appearance of numerous applications developed for the blockchain environment. The goal of this research is to investigate how a blockchain can contribute to the reduction of the vulnerabilities to corruption in the Brazilian context. Two stages of a literature review have been performed. The first identified the vulnerabilities to corruption in the Brazilian context and the second one identified the effective uses of blockchain characteristics. Subsequently, a deductive analysis was performed, aiming to verify which of the Blockchain initiatives presented could be potentially applied in the fight against corruption. This study points out ways to mitigate fraud and other causes of corruption to help regain society's trust in state institutions in Brazil, which has been suffering over the years from corruption scandals. Additionally, a research agenda leading to anti-corruption studies has been discussed.
De forma acadêmica e construtiva, sem pretender esgotar o assunto, a presente pesquisa tem como objetivo realizar um estudo jurídico e econômico do bitcoin, que é a espécie de moeda virtual mais utilizada no mundo, mediante as ferramentas metodológicas da Análise Econômica do Direito, demonstrando como o uso de bitcoins nas transações realizadas pela empresa em recuperação pode reduzir os custos de transação e contribuir para uma recuperação judicial menos custosa, mais célere e mais eficiente, colaborando, ainda, para que a recuperação judicial cumpra os seus objetivos previstos no art. 47 da Lei n. 11.101/05, quais sejam, viabilizar a superação da situação de crise econômico-financeira do devedor, a manutenção da fonte produtora, bem como do emprego dos trabalhadores e dos interesses dos credores, promovendo, assim, a preservação da empresa, sua função social e o estímulo à atividade econômica
Mawuko Dza, Evan Kyeremeh ., Simon S. K. Dzandu ., Samuel Afran .
The paper probes corruption in public procurement in Ghana. The research, which focused on Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) across the country, revealed widespread corruption in the public service of Ghana. Notable procurement related corrupt practices unraveled included influence peddling, inflating contract sums, payment for non-existing contracts, deliberate contract splitting, multiple payments for contracts, use of phantom vendors and misapplication of public funds. The study further noted that some principal officers such as Coordinating Directors, Finance Officers, Budget and Planning officers, Engineers, Internal Auditors, Stores and Procurement officers, as well as government representatives misappropriate funds meant for development projects in their catchment areas, while staff looked on unconcerned. The research also discovered how Internal and external auditors ostensibly “train” principal officers on how to conceal corrupt practices in return for money and other rewards. The study is significant because the concept of decentralization was introduced to enable MMDAs to effectively and efficiently manage resources for the development of their communities. The concept has been defeated as some public servants connive with external auditors and other stakeholders to amass wealth at the expense of the generality of the people. A worrying phenomenon is the culture of silence by employees who are witnesses to most of these corrupt practices. Indeed, our findings show that most public servants are nonchalant about the act of corruption perpetuated by colleague workers. Essentially, some employees see nothing wrong with their principal officers and other colleagues indulging in acts of corruption, their reason being that they might do same when they assume similar positions in future. With this revelation, the onus is on government not to only adopt a combative strategy in dealing with the incidence of corruption. Rather, it is recommended that a blend of combative and the moral suasion strategies be adopted if the fight against corruption is to achieve desired results.
This study examines the relationship between decentralization, democratic governance, and the working of local self-government institutions in India. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments established Panchayats and Municipalities as constitutionally recognized bodies of grassroots governance, intended to promote participation, accountability, and locally responsive development. However, the quality of decentralization continues to vary because the transfer of authority, finance, and personnel remains uneven across states. The study adopts a descriptive and analytical design to assess how local self-government influences democratic participation, administrative responsiveness, and service satisfaction. For academic demonstration, a structured survey framework using a sample of 63 respondents was prepared, including elected representatives, officials, and citizens. Three dimensions were examined: the link between citizen participation and accountability, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and service delivery satisfaction, and differences in perceptions of responsiveness among stakeholder groups. The analysis applies Chi-square, Spearman rank correlation, one-way ANOVA, and multiple regression to interpret the data. The results indicate that decentralization improves democratic governance when it is accompanied by meaningful devolution, transparent institutions, trained local leadership, and active community engagement. The study concludes that local self-government can become a more effective instrument of inclusive development when constitutional design is supported by administrative capacity, fiscal autonomy, and regular citizen oversight.
Five billion people in the world do not have the kind of ledgers that provide the documented information that allows them to transfer, partition, and aggregate assets and talents in such a way that they can be scaled up, secure investment, guarantee credit, certify reputation, and capture abstract surplus value. The difficulty that most people have in making combinations is a major cause of global inequality and unnecessary poverty.
The study attempted to investigate how leadership can be used to combat corruption in decentralized governance structures of Ghana. In conducting the study, purposive sampling technique was employed to select key officials of GA south municipal assembly whose duties often promote corrupt practices. The questionnaire technique was the research instrument while a statistical package for social science was used to facilitate the analysis of data captured from the field. Findings of the study noted that under invoicing, over invoicing, payment for works not done among others are serious corrupt practices prevailing within the decentralized grassroots governance structures. It also came to light that political interference, appointing political operatives to key positions in governance units all promotes corrupt practices. The study noted that if political interference can be removed in the administration of these decentralized structures, effective leaders who are mainly technocrats can offer sound management framework for carrying out the developmental agenda of these decentralized structures. The study called on government of African countries to endeavour to finance the activities of political parties so as to remove the need for amassing wealth through fair or foul means for strengthen political structures to win elections. Strong leaders are required towards combating corruptions, however there is the need to ameliorate completely the effect of political interference in the administration of decentralized governance structures.
Decentralized service delivery refers to the mode in which service delivery is done through delegation and devolution of power from center to local governments whereby efficiency and effectiveness are likely to be achieved. The purpose of this study was to assess the improvements in education and health services delivery in Yeka sub city of Addis Ababa city government. To realize the purpose of the study, case study research method was conducted. The study is qualitative whereby simple quantitative tools were employed so as to complement the qualitative narrations. The study primarily utilized secondary data obtained, from policy documents, constitution, proclamations, intervention plans and performance reports, etc. The study was supported with primary data obtained through interviews and questionnaires. The data results revealed that there is achievement in health and education service delivery as well as there are gaps in the services delivered. The findings of the study revealed that various functions of education and health services have been devolved to the lowest tier of government. The study has indicated that there are multiple bodies established at lower levels of government to support school and health centers activities. As a result, the services provided have expanded; there is now an increased availability and accessibility of the services in both education and health. The study also observed constraints; the constraints consider human resource, finance and facilities . Key Words concepts: service delivery, education & health, decentralization
There are three chapters in my dissertation. In chapter one I study the impact of government corruption on tax avoidance by corporations with tax liability in China. I begin by developing a model of a firm's choice of tax avoidance based on the level of corruption in the firm's province. I show that a higher level of government corruption and a higher tax rate are predicted to increase a firm's tax avoidance. My empirical estimates show that a one-standard-deviation increase in government corruption corresponds to a 6% increase in tax avoidance by firms, based on data from nearly 600,000 firms from 1998 to 2007. When I separate the sample by type of ownership of firms, I find that domestic private firms tend to avoid a larger portion of their tax liabilities than foreign or state-owned firms. I also find that tax avoidance increases when the effective tax rate increases. The size of the firm, age of the firm, and whether the firm exports from China also influence tax avoidance. In chapter two, a joint work with Sergey Mityakov, we study the impact of competition on tax avoidance by corporations in Mexico. Using more than 2,000 firm level data, we show that firms tend to avoid more taxes in less competitive markets, that is more concentrated market. A one standard deviation increase in competition leads to a 7.7% increase in tax avoidance. By splitting the sample based on ownership structure, we show that domestic firms avoid more taxes. When we separate the firms according to the plant size, we find that larger firms tend to avoid more taxes. We find robust and consistent results by using different competition measures and other robustness tests. In chapter three, I theoretically demonstrate how fiscal decentralization affects corruption. The theory predicts that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption. This result is then tested using a panel data set of 31 provincial level government from 1998 to 2007 in China. My estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government expenditures and government revenue is negatively correlated with corruption. Using leader and location dummy variables, I find that central government leaders can influence the corruption level in China. I also find that more developed regions in China tend to be less corrupt.
During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize public decision making. Such reforms have proved controversial. Critics of these reforms argue that decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption. Proponents of these reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by bringing decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers people to hold government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long run. They further state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading infrastructure to underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such decentralization is also expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local financing. These debates, nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on infrastructure provision is scant or non-existent. Empirical work is hampered by a lack of reliable data on the incidence of corruption. This paper presents conceptual underpinnings of the impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesizes scant available empirical evidence to make a case for further empirical research to document the real world experiences to update our current state of knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.
Built on the theories about talent competition between rent-seeking and entrepreneurship, and the theories about constitutional environment and rent-seeking, this dissertation explores empirically the effects of a country's constitutional settings on entrepreneurship, in terms of the quantity of entrepreneurs and the quality of their performance. Both the de facto and de jure constitutional environments are studied. In particular, with respect to the de facto constitutional environment, I considered the property rights protection, decentralization, and the factors suggested by the "selectorate theory". In relation to the de jure constitutional environment, I focused on six aspects including electoral rules, form of government, federalism, property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions. Three indexes were constructed to measure the de jure property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions, using the data set provided by the Comparative Constitution Project.The empirical study first shows that the quantity of entrepreneurs is inversely correlated with the quality of entrepreneurship in a country. If entrepreneurship does serve as the engine of economic growth, it is perhaps the quality, rather than quantity, that matters. This study then demonstrates that the de facto property rights protection is associated negatively with the quantity of entrepreneurs, but positively with the quality of entrepreneurship. The effects of the two key factors of the selectorate theory, the size of the winning coalition and the ratio of this size to the size of the selectorate, also appear to be compatible with what the theory is to predict. On the other hand, neither fiscal nor political decentralization is found to significantly affect entrepreneurship. Among the de jure constitutional features, two have significant influence on entrepreneurship. First, the constitutional design of judicial independence has a negative effect on the quantity of entrepreneurs, but a positive one on the quality of their performance. Second, majoritarian electoral rules, compared with non-majoritarian rules, have a negative effect on the quality of entrepreneurship. In contrast, the presumed effects of the other three formal constitutional attributes, federalism, presidentialism and property rights protection, cannot be ascertained.Apart from the cross-country study, I also conducted a detailed research on China. Entrepreneurship in China is a case of entrepreneurial development in an authoritarian state lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, hence afflicted with profuse rent-seeking activities. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurship hinges on both the rent-seeking and the entrepreneurial abilities. Drawing on the private enterprise surveys, I found that, in China, the politically connected were systematically advantaged in terms of bank finance, entry to regulated industries and judicial treatment, when they plunged into the business world. The Chinese case also indicates that, when entrepreneurs cannot trust the commitment made by the state in the constitution, they will be eager to scoop profits as soon as possible and exit swiftly with accumulated wealth.Finally, this dissertation concludes by suggesting that a healthy development of entrepreneurship should be sustainable rather than aiming merely at quick money and instant success. It should allow all talented people to reach their full potentials, rather than keep the politically disconnected away from resources needed to make the best use of their potentials. Above all, it wants a constitutional environment with reliable property rights and equal access to opportunities, neither of which is seen in today's China.
One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.
Decentralization has the potential to lower corruption and alleviate poverty across the world. The true effects of this process are unclear since there are relatively few studies on decentralization and many of these studies, both theoretical and empirical, give conflicting results. One major problem in the literature for the effects of decentralization on corruption has been sample selection bias. The main cross-country dataset for decentralization, the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), has data for only about 40 countries, and most of these are developed. I attempt to mitigate this sample-selection problem by first estimating a Heckman model for decentralization in order to predict values for unobserved countries and then using these predicted values to estimate decentralization's impact on corruption. My results show that decentralization has an insignificant effect on corruption, suggesting that decentralization alone may not be a useful tool for mitigating corruption.
This short note provides a framework for looking at public sector governance and productivity improvements. It argues that the role of government in enhancing productivity growth is two-fold. First, government should provide an environment that is conducive in improving total factor productivity in private sector production. Second, government should work to increase the productivity of the public sector itself. In terms of providing the appropriate economic setting that is favorable to private-sector-led development, government needs (1) to provide the macroeconomic and the microeconomic environment that will establish incentives for firms/individuals to act in accordance with the invisible hand had there been no market imperfection, (2) to provide the institutional infrastructure (i.e., property rights, law and order, rules and even application and enforcement of the same) that markets need to work efficiently; and (3) to ensure the financing/provision of adequate basic health care and education, and basic physical infrastructure (World Bank 1992). In particular, the instruments that government may use in this regard are include (1) direct government interventions in the product markets as defined by the regulatory structure in strategic sectors, and (2) economy-wide policies like financial liberalization, trade liberalization, and foreign investments liberalization. On the other hand, (1) budget reform (2) the installation of a system of performance measurement and incentive in the public sector, (3) the re-engineering of the bureaucracy, (4) the combating of corruption, and (5) decentralization are the key features of a program that will increase the productivity of government operations.