Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) is a new form of organization, the innovation of which consists in the use of blockchain technology to record the applicable rules governing the project as well as the rights and obligations of its members, usually investors. Moreover, the method of financing the project is also new here, since tokens (cryptocurrency), which are acquired by investors for the capital contributed, are most frequently used. Management in DAO is previously unheard of (until the creation of DAO-2016), since there are no governing bodies, and all decisions are made by the voting of all members of the organization. In the article, an attempt is made to assess the DAO management process, having previously analyzed blockchain technology and the specificity of this new form of organization. The own research was conducted on a selected DAO project, when analyzing the management process implemented by voting by the members of this organization from its launch (May 2022) to 11 May 2023. The obtained results confirmed the dominance of majority shareholders in DAO votes, although the method of voting (Qudratic voting) used in the project under study to protect the rights of small shareholders significantly reduced this impact. The unusual unanimity of decision-makers was also noted (as much as 65% of unanimous votes), which, as it turned out, could be the result of information campaigns conducted before each vote by groups of small investors deeply involved in the project. These activities should also translate into the accuracy of the decisions made, and thus the quality of the DAO management process.
Abstract Are managers necessary for organizations? Could organizations function without them? To answer, we must separate between two questions: are top managers necessary? And are middle managers necessary? I argue that larger organizations are prone to need someone to have oversight of the wholeness and to take responsibility for its design and development. Given the dedication and time commitment needed to fulfill that role, it is virtually impossible to have a larger organization without any top management. However, a large organization with top management and frontline employeesâbut no managerial layers in betweenâis already a much more realistic possibility. It typically requires having autonomous, self-managing teams empowered to make all the necessary decisions related to their own work, accompanied by certain structural solutions (often enhanced by ICT) solving key information- and coordination-related tasks that are traditionally taken care of by middle managers. Often specific coach roles also emerge. In principle, if working substitutes are found to all tasks traditionally taken care of by middle managers, an organization can be functional and successful without any managerial layers. I examine a few successful examples of such organizations, Buurtzorg and Reaktor, while also highlighting key boundary conditions for when, where, and how self-managing organizations can succeed. I conclude by distinguishing between structure and hierarchy, arguing that while self-managing organizations are characterized by high levels of decentralization, their functionality is ensured through having enough structure, thus combining low hierarchy with adequate structure to find the most functional form of organizing in a particular context.
Lars Karbach, Moritz Korte, Nils Orbat, Daniel Muschiol · 5 authors
Games based on a blockchain exist in all variants and facets, mostly as single- or multiplayer games. This chapter deals with the implementation of a multiplayer strategy game (Connect Four), using blockchain technology for decentralized data storage and the entire game logic. The focus is on the use of the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) principle, for coordination and voting within the teams. The chosen game just stands as an example; other games or gamification approaches in which users can take decisions collaboratively can be used here. A web application was implemented acting as a central interface between players and the blockchain. Hence, it was possible for players to compete against each other in teams and to collectively decide the next move by participating in a roundly voting. With the help of a standardized questionnaire, answered by each player after each match, possible impacts of the voting mechanism on the usability were determined.
Abstract Research summary International business strategy and international management are two distinct but related fields of study. This article explores the connections between them. It shows how internalization theory can act as a bridge between them. The key is to analyze not only core activities, such as production, marketing and R&D, but support services such as human resource management, information technology, and corporate finance. Internalization decisions and location decisions must be analyzed holistically, and diagrammatic techniques show how this can be done. These diagrams reveal the networks of communication and the hierarchical structures that emerge from such decisions. Managerial summary The organizational structure of a multinational enterprise is inherently complex, making it difficult to determine whether one organizational structure is more efficient than another. Delayering, decentralization, and agility are recommended, but what are their practical implications? Internalization theory addresses these problems in a simple and coherent way. It shows that it is not only core activities, namely production, marketing and R&D, that need to be coordinated, but support services too. Decisions on the location and outâsourcing of support services must be aligned with similar decisions on core activities. A diagrammatic analysis is presented that facilitates the solution of these problems.
Controversy surrounding whether cryptocurrency is a bubble and whether the price of bitcoin should be zero instead of $40.000 USD ignores a foundational problem: cryptocurrency has been assessed based on the wrong assumptions. This article outlines a method for providing a more suitable and reasonable assessment of the real value of cryptocurrency. The main argument against cryptocurrency has been that there is nothing behind it. Backing a traditional currency is a national bank, a state and the right of taxation. When cryptocurrency is measured these traditional measures it falls short and the value calculation comes to zero. However, a cryptocurrency is not a traditional currency and should not be measured as such. Instead, it is the associated blockchain that provides cryptocurrency its real value and not its properties as a currency. A blockchain is a digital platform. A piece of software that supports the demand of different companies for a common independent ledger. The valuation of a cryptocurrency must, therefore, be based on the value of its blockchain. The right question to ask is âHow valuable is the blockchain itself?â From that point of view, it is clear that a cryptocurrency must be priced more like the price of a digital platform company rather than as a regular currency. To demonstrate the usefulness of this approach the value of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Solana, Filecoin, and Cardano is assessed, and it is suggested that several of these cryptocurrenciesâwhen understood and priced as digital platformsâare priced low in relation to their business potential and application area.
Ashutosh Kolte, Avinash Pawar, Jewel Kumar Roy, Imre Vida · 5 authors
Cryptocurrency is the blockchain financial technology used for transactions in financial institutions and exchanges. Bitcoin has attracted much coverage from investors and commentators as it represents the maximum market capitalization on a crypto-currency exchange. The study aims to determine the correlation between the daily log-returns and to understand the tendencies in the cryptocurrency market instability of Bitcoin, Litecoin, XRP, Nxt, Dogecoin, Vertcoin, DigiByte, DASH, Counterparty, and MonaCoin. The correlation among the selected cryptocurrencies exists in the study. The analysis is focused primarily upon reference information from the preserved servers of cryptocurrency websites and finance.yahoo.com. This research assesses regular details on the Logarithmic return of Bitcoin, Litecoin, XRP, Nxt, Dogecoin, Vertcoin, DigiByte, DASH, Counterparty, and MonaCoin for a timeframe spanning from October 01st, 2014, to April 30th, 2020. From 131 cryptocurrencies, we considered only 10 Cryptocurrencies due to the availability of data after October 2014. Where there was insufficient information, there were average results determined from preceding and succeeding data. Findings demonstrate that there is GARCH modelling of cryptocurrencies against Bitcoin. Litecoin, XRP, Nxt, Dogecoin, Vertcoin, DigiByte, DASH, Counterparty, and MonaCoin; variability values throughout the duration had a significant effect on the updates from Bitcoin returns. We believe that it helps create information and resources that are valuable to practitioners and scholars who research and form cryptocurrency markets in the future.
Cristiano Bellavitis, Christian Fisch, Paul P. Momtaz
Blockchain technology and smart contracts are catalysts for decentralization and disintermediation. These new technologies reduce transaction costs, agency costs, and offer a basis for trustless social and economic interactions. They are fueling new business models for decentralized platforms and have revolutionized crowdfunding. A recent trend, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), stands to fundamentally transform organizing and governance. DAOs are blockchain-native, decentralized organizations that are collectively owned and managed by their members via smart contracts. In this note, we assess the promises and challenges of DAOs, with a focus on decentralized governance and disintermediation, and offer a first empirical glimpse at the rise and functioning of DAOs. Overall, DAOs may introduce a new era in organizational economics, transforming the global corporate landscape from hierarchical organizations to democratic and distributed organizations powered by organizational entrepreneurship and innovations.
The recently proposed Uniswap v3 replaces the fungible liquidity provider token (LP token) into non-fungible ones, making the design for liquidity mining more difficult. In this paper, we propose a flexible liquidity mining scheme that realizes the overall liquidity distribution through the fine control of local rewards. From the liquidity provider's point of view, the liquidity provision strategy forms a multiplayer zero-sum game. We analyze the Nash Equilibrium and the corresponding strategy, approximately, deploying the liquidity proportional to the reward distribution, in some special cases and use it to guide the general situations. Based on the strategic response above, such a scheme allows the mining rewards provider to optimize the distribution of liquidity for the purpose such as low slippage and price stabilization.
David Gligor, Kishore Gopalakrishna Pillai, Ä°smail GölgeciÌ
New technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and big data analytics, can shape how B2B relationships are managed and how dark side effects are manifested in B2B relationships. Moreover, despite several advances in the dark side of B2B relationships research, concerns have recently been raised that this stream is under theorized, and the focus has been on the manifestations of the dark side and not on the underlying processes. We address these challenges by examining how the emergence of new technologies has the potential to transform B2B relationships and lead to the emergence of dark side effects through processes that have not been hitherto examined or understood. In the process, we further illustrate how theories that have been largely neglected within this literature (i.e., social dominance, organizational inertia, organizational information processing , and role theory) can provide novel insights when exploring the dark side of B2B relationships.
Eleu Wong Ellinger, Tobias Mini, Robert Wayne Gregory, Thomas Widjaja
An increasing number of platform organizations are run by agentic algorithms. While much is known about algorithmic management on centralized platform organizations such as Uber, where human agency is limited through data-driven surveillance and control, decentralized organizing has begun to emerge in agentic IS platforms, characterized by conjoined human and algorithmic agency. We examine this shift toward decentralized organizing by analyzing multiple cases of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that leverage blockchain technology and seek to expand, not limit, collective human action while being run by agentic algorithms. The phenomenon of DAOs gives rise to a puzzle: How is collective action facilitated in agentic IS platforms when they are increasingly run by algorithms? Our findings show that agentic algorithms have the ability to facilitate collective action that is aligned around a common human purpose dynamically negotiated through adaptation of the set of algorithms running the organization. We explain how collective action is enacted in DAOs, as an example of agentic IS platforms, presenting a grounded model developed inductively based on our multiple-case study. Our study complements and extends the work of Baird and Maruping (2021) by expanding the focus of analysis of agentic IS artifacts to agentic IS platforms and considering facilitation as well as delegation. Our detailed findings about decentralized algorithmic management and decentralized management of algorithms in DAOs extend the literature on platform organizing, which thus far has paid only limited attention to the unique mechanisms at play in the context of conjoined agency.
The main purpose of the paper is to discuss the nature of the enterprise architecture of the blockchain platform (EAoBP). The authors also highlighted how the main technology challenges for enterprises are addressed through the proposed solution. The paper consists of the introduction and 3 chapters. Chapter 2 presents related works about the blockchain technology and defines the platform concept. The architecture layers which are required to build the enterprise blockchain platforms are described in the 3rd chapter. The 4th chapter constitutes the implementation aspects of the EAoBP. The permissioned blockchain systems leverage a cross-organizational collaboration model, what constitutes cooperation within the network without 3rd party authorities. The open source character of the implementation technology and the clear guidance of the scope of each layer clarified in the article should help businesses in applying the concept.
Blockchain is a relatively new technology that is often described as âcreating trustâ or âremoving intermediariesâ. In this paper, we posit that blockchain is a new form of digitally-enabled boundary spanning that allows co-ownership models for the companies in question. Where companies have traditionally employed humans to act as interfaces to the external world, new digital technologies enable a digitised approach to many corporate operations that require interaction towards the external market and environment within which firms must operate. Blockchain is a special subset of digital technologies in this regard, enabling companies to co-operate to control parts of the market and to internalise transaction costs that until now have been a market function; using blockchain companies effectively create a new transaction boundary that means boundary spanning can be deeply embedded in core business, rather than kept to its periphery. This digitally-enabled boundary spanning is a key attribute of the emerging digital economy. Understanding its implications is of critical importance for economics, business and social science literature.
Tobias Riasanow, Lea JÀntgen, Sebastian Hermes, Markus Böhm · 5 authors
Abstract Digital transformation is continuously changing ecosystems, which also forces established companies to re-evaluate their value proposition. However, only transformations of single ecosystems have been studied. Therefore, this work targets to examine the similarities of digital transformation in five platform ecosystems: automotive, blockchain, financial, insurance, and IIoT. For our analysis, we combine the strengths of conceptual modeling using e3 value with a cluster analysis based on text mining to identify similarities in the respective ecosystems. As a result, we identified 15 clusters. Cluster 01 is the core cluster, containing the roles of organizations from all five ecosystems. Cluster 02â05 are intertwined, as they include roles from at least two ecosystems. Clusters 06â15 are ecosystem-specific that only include roles found in one ecosystem. Scholars and practitioners can use these clusters when analyzing or building a new platform ecosystem, or transforming a traditional ecosystem towards a platform ecosystem.
Jessica Schmeiss, Katharina Hoelzle, Robin P. G. Tech
The paradox of openness is inherent to all platform ecosystemsâthe tension in enabling maximum openness to create joint innovation while guaranteeing value capturing for all actors. Governance mechanisms to solve this paradox are embedded into the technical architecture of the platform, addressing the dimensions of access, control, and incentives. Blockchain technology offers unique ways to design novel governance mechanisms through the standardization of interactions. However, the design of such an architecture requires careful consideration of the cost associated with it.
The dissertation examined the effect of cryptocurrencies on the portfolio risk-adjusted returns of traditional and alternative investments using daily arithmetic returns from August 2015 to October 2018 of traditional assets (South African stocks, bonds, currencies), alternative assets (commodities, South African real estate) and cryptocurrencies (Cryptocurrency index (CRIX) and ten other individual cryptocurrencies). This is worth investigating as cryptocurrencies have been performing well while the listed equities in South Africa and most alternative investments have been underperforming (Srilakshmi & Karpagam, 2017). The mean-variance analysis, the Sharpe ratio, the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) and the mean-variance spanning techniques were employed to analyse the data. The spanning test carried out was the multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression Wald test. The research findings showed that the inclusion of cryptocurrencies in a portfolio of investments improves the efficient frontier of the portfolio of investments and the portfolio of investments risk-adjusted returns. Moreover, the findings suggested that cryptocurrencies are good portfolio diversification assets. However, investments in cryptocurrencies should be made with caution as the risks of investments are high in relation to traditional and alternative investments. The findings of this study advocate for individual and institutional investors to include cryptocurrencies within their South African portfolio of traditional and alternative investments.
The block chain constructs a decentralized trust and collaboration system. The emergence of block chain technology effectively solves the problem that trust and value cannot be transferred in the Internet era, which makes information have value and guarantees the rights and interests of information producers. This paper briefly introduces the basic concept of block chain, and then expounds the application value of block chain technology in the field of global trade and finance.