A new type of Automated Market Makers (AMMs) powered by Blockchain technology keep liquidity on-chain and offer transparent price mechanisms. This innovation is a significant step in the direction of building a more transparent and efficient financial market. This paper explores analytically market mechanisms and shows the conditions when those mechanisms are equivalent. Furthermore, we show that AMM mechanisms inherently create loses for market makers from inefficient prices (dictated by the AMM solutions), however, these mechanisms work well for assets with low volatility. We further analytically explore the losses and quantify them. The paper ends by discussing the design of efficient decentralized exchange compared to traditional Central Limited Order Books (CLOBs) and highlights the former's potential regarding decentralized finance.
Blockchain Technology can enhance the basic services that are essential in traditional finance and it has the potential to become the foundation for decentralized business models, empowering entrepreneurs and innovators with all the right tools. By means of a trustless and distributed infrastructure, blockchain technology is optimizing transactional costs and allows the rise of decentralized, innovative, interoperable, borderless and transparent applications which facilitate open access and encourage permissionless innovations. DeFi stands for "Decentralized Finance" and refers to the ecosystem comprised of financial applications that are being developed on top of blockchain and distributed ledger systems. The Decentralized Finance (DeFi) or Open Finance movement takes that promise a step further. Imagine a global, open alternative to every financial service you use today - savings, loans, trading, insurance and many others - accessible to anyone in the world only by means of a smartphone and internet connection.
Lewis Gudgeon, Sam M. Werner, Daniel Pérez, William J. Knottenbelt
We coin the term *Protocols for Loanable Funds (PLFs)* to refer to protocols\nwhich establish distributed ledger-based markets for loanable funds. PLFs are\nemerging as one of the main applications within Decentralized Finance (DeFi),\nand use smart contract code to facilitate the intermediation of loanable funds.\nIn doing so, these protocols allow agents to borrow and save programmatically.\nWithin these protocols, interest rate mechanisms seek to equilibrate the supply\nand demand for funds. In this paper, we review the methodologies used to set\ninterest rates on three prominent DeFi PLFs, namely Compound, Aave and dYdX. We\nprovide an empirical examination of how these interest rate rules have behaved\nsince their inception in response to differing degrees of liquidity. We then\ninvestigate the market efficiency and inter-connectedness between multiple\nprotocols, examining first whether Uncovered Interest Parity holds within a\nparticular protocol and second whether the interest rates for a particular\ntoken market show dependence across protocols, developing a Vector Error\nCorrection Model for the dynamics.\n
Philipp Schuster, Erik Theissen, Marliese Uhrig‐Homburg
The blockchain technology was first implemented in 2009 as the basis of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. The technology is said to be a disruptive technology that has the potential to significantly affect many areas of the economy. In this paper we provide a survey of the blockchain technology and its applications in finance. We focus on cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, initial coin offerings, the clearing and settlement of transactions in financial markets, and implications for the governance of exchange-listed firms.
Nowadays the global financial system faces a triple challenge: the threat of a new systemic financial crisis at both global and regional levels; difficulties of constant adaptation of existing financial business and regulatory practices to intensive technological innovations; direct and hidden consequences of excessive political influence on the financial system through sanctions and selectively applied practices for sanction purposes. Improving the quality of financial regulation will require deeper cooperation between regulators of leading economies and a proactive position of the financial industry, as well as the decentralization of financial regulation. However, it is unlikely that this will happen at the global level. Financial stability became a key goal of global financial regulation in the post-crisis period. We consider financial stability as the «tragedy of commons». The article describes the main trends of financial markets regulation after the crisis: transformation of global financial architecture, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing practices (AML/ CT), financial sanctions. The article analyzes the existing failures of modern post-crisis financial regulation: credit crunch, reduction in the effectiveness of monetary policy, regulatory arbitrage, and increased compliance costs (AML/CT legislation, tax legislation, and the sanctions regime). In the future we expect simultaneous trends of harmonization and standardization of requirements in traditional sectors of financial markets (including traditional institutions of the shadow banking sector), but at the same time regulatory arbitrage1 will induce new financial technologies in order to reduce regulatory costs. The crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 despite its non-financial nature will almost inevitably have a major impact on financial markets and their regulation. Possible steps to eliminate failures in the financial regulation system are proposed, including recommendations for international organizations.
Open access
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Economic Issues in Ukraine
Economic, Social, and Public Health Issues in Russia and Globally
Ahmad Shauqi Haji Mohamad Zubir, Nur Aishah Awi, Azwadi Ali, Safiek Mokhlis · 5 authors
Cryptocurrency technology is considered as smart technology that would transform our way of doing business in the near future. Its unique features are said to be far superior than our existing business technology which mainly based on cash and credit, especially in time, security and cost. Nevertheless, its entrance into the business arena has also turns our existing systems of financial reporting and taxing upside down as both systems were moulded, formulated and evolved just to suit the systems of cash and credit. Therefore, the financial regulators and inland revenue boards should come out with a new system that can properly and fairly adapt to the technology of cryptocurrency, in order to secure the imbalances between financial application and its law and order.
Economic theory suggests that introduction of derivative contracts can improve the informational efficiency of the underlying asset prices (Danthine, 1978). In this study, we examine the impact of the introduction of Bitcoin futures on price clustering in Bitcoin. Our findings suggest that price clustering in Bitcoin meaningfully decreases post the introduction of its futures contracts.
Classical monetary systems regularly subject the most vulnerable majority of the world's population to debilitating financial shocks, and have manifestly allowed uncontrolled global inequality over the long term. Given these basic failures, how can we avoid asking whether mainstream macroeconomic principles are actually compatible with democratic principles such as equality or the protection of human rights and dignity? This idea paper takes a constructive look at this question, by exploring how alternate monetary principles might result in a form of money more compatible with democratic principles -- dare we call it "democratic money"? In this alternative macroeconomic philosophy, both the supply of and the demand for money must be rooted in people, so as to give all people both equal opportunities for economic participation. Money must be designed around equality, not only across all people alive at a given moment, but also across past and future generations of people, guaranteeing that our descendants cannot be enslaved by their ancestors' economic luck or misfortune. Democratic money must reliably give all people a means to enable everyday commerce, investment, and value creation in good times and bad, and must impose hard limits on financial inequality. Democratic money must itself be governed democratically, and must economically facilitate the needs of citizens in a democracy for trustworthy and unbiased information with which to make wise collective decisions. An intriguing approach to implementing and deploying democratic money is via a cryptocurrency built on a proof-of-personhood foundation, giving each opt-in human participant one equal unit of stake. Such a cryptocurrency would have both interesting similarities to, and important differences from, a Universal Basic Income (UBI) denominated in an existing currency.
Innovative technologies, such as distributed ledgers, allow securities to be issued or represented in a new form known as digital tokens. Such "tokenisation" of securities will alter post-trade clearing and settlement, and could improve efficiency in some dimensions. But the fundamental trade-offs involving credit risk and liquidity remain in a tokenised world. To succeed, tokens will need to interoperate with account-based systems, at least in the interim.
Lewis Gudgeon, Daniel Pérez, Dominik Harz, Benjamin Livshits · 5 authors
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008, caused by the accumulation of excessive financial risk, inspired Satoshi Nakamoto to create Bitcoin. Now, more than ten years later, Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a peer-to-peer financial paradigm which leverages blockchain-based smart contracts to ensure its integrity and security, contains over 702m USD of capital as of April 15th, 2020. As this ecosystem develops, it is at risk of the very sort of financial meltdown it is supposed to be preventing. In this paper we explore how design weaknesses and price fluctuations in DeFi protocols could lead to a DeFi crisis. We focus on DeFi lending protocols as they currently constitute most of the DeFi ecosystem with a 76% market share by capital as of April 15th, 2020. First, we demonstrate the feasibility of attacking Maker's governance design to take full control of the protocol, the largest DeFi protocol by market share, which would have allowed the theft of 0.5bn USD of collateral and the minting of an unlimited supply of DAI tokens. In doing so, we present a novel strategy utilizing so-called flash loans that would have in principle allowed the execution of the governance attack in just two transactions and without the need to lock any assets. Approximately two weeks after we disclosed the attack details, Maker modified the governance parameters mitigating the attack vectors. Second, we turn to a central component of financial risk in DeFi lending protocols. Inspired by stress-testing as performed by central banks, we develop a stress-testing framework for a stylized DeFi lending protocol, focusing our attention on the impact of a drying-up of liquidity on protocol solvency. Based on our parameters, we find that with sufficiently illiquidity a lending protocol with a total debt of 400m USD could become undercollateralized within 19 days.
Silvia Valero, Francisco Climent, Rafael José Esteban de la Rosa
The banking sector has begun a process of digital transformation that is changing the way financial products and services are sold. This transformation is a consequence of the growing demand for digital channels by some sectors of the population, the progress of new technologies and the banks’ need to improve efficiency after the economic crisis. The emergence of innovative financial technology (fintech) startups in the banking sector has been the lever initiating this digital transformation. Technology companies are challenging established banking business models and promoting the democratisation of finance in a more efficient and transparent financial ecosystem. Increasing investment in these technology companies has also attracted the interest of various regulators, and the future suggests a scenario of collaboration between these new players and traditional companies, with a consequently difficult task for the regulators of guaranteeing the same conditions of competition for new entrants and incumbents. However, technology companies with vast experience in the gathering and use of data from millions of users (such as Amazon, Google or Facebook) are considered a threat. Moreover, some types of evolving fintechs, such as neobanks with bank licences, may also become competitors. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) or blockchain, a fintech technology that is evolving constantly, has already awoken the interest of all financial sector participants because it could trigger real disruption and produce a new era of value.
The purpose of this Note is to determine which cryptocurrency initial distribution methods involve the offering of securities as regulated by the 1933 Securities Act. The primary legal issue is the Howey test. This test identifies whether an offering is an investment contract, and thus subject to regulation by the 1933 Securities Act, based on whether it involves an investment of money in a common enterprise, in which investors are led to expect profits from the efforts of a promoter or third party. The distribution methods discussed are mining, airdropping, forking, and initial coin offerings (“ICOs”). Mining, airdropping and forking are likely not investment contracts, but initial coin offerings likely are. However, regulators should make it clear that mining, airdropping and forking are acceptable practices. Furthermore, they should proceed with a light touch when regulating initial coin offerings, except in the case of fraud. In particular, the ICO community in partnership with government should instigate a system where ‘crypto-underwriters’ vet ICOs and the crypto-underwriters are regulated by the SEC.
Cryptocurrencies are nowadays one of the most important alternative investment markets and therefore have been in spotfor regulatory purposes. One of the main characteristics is to be easy traded all over the world without governmentalinterference
Management of public finance and economic development is the art by which a nation improves the economic, political and social well-being of its people. The research paper starts from the reality that finance plays an important role in each economy. Nowadays, finance has to manage and adapt to Digital Era. The purpose of this paper is an attempt to identify and encourage managing financial statements through artificial intelligence using XBRL and Blockchain. In many countries, financial and tax authorities encourage the adoption of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) and Blockchain. XBRL enable business to generate their required reporting information directly from their financial data. Blockchain technology continues to grow and it is being used in more and more business sectors. Finance, accounting and auditing has been identified as areas that could greatly benefit the distributed registry and other features of Blockchain. The main benefits generated by these innovative tools include reducing the risk of error (especially human error); low risk of fraud; system automation, big data analysis, huge cost savings (by increasing the efficiency and decreasing in errors), increased reliability in financial reports, and reduced workflow. The research paper comes to present how artificial intelligence combine financial information with tech capabilities, accelerate digital transformation of finance and accounting, and may create a more safety business and economic environment, reducing human error. We have to manage our work and time differently. We are living in a digital and intelligent era, where machines take over repetitive, time-consuming and redundant tasks, giving finance professionals more time to approach higher level and more lucrative analysis and research.
In the first chapter, To Pool or Not to Pool? Security Design in OTC Markets with Vincent Glode and Christian C. Opp, we study security issuers' decision whether to pool assets when facing counterparties endowed with market power, as is common in over-the-counter markets. Unlike in competitive markets, pooling assets may be suboptimal in the presence of market power --- both privately and socially --- in particular, when the potential gains from trade are large. In these cases, pooling assets reduces the elasticity of trade volume in the relevant part of the payoff distribution, exacerbating inefficient rationing associated with the exercise of market power. Our results shed light on recently observed time-variation in the prevalence of pooling in financial markets. In the second chapter, Selling to Investor Network: Allocations in the Primary Corporate Bond Market, I develop a model of the primary market for corporate bonds, in which an issuer optimally chooses an issuance price and allocations to investors based on their trading connections in the secondary over-the-counter market. Expected secondary market liquidity, which depends on the structure of the trading network in this market, determines investors' demands in the primary market and, in turn, the issuer's revenues. I show that trading by less connected investors has a relatively high negative impact on expected secondary market liquidity and disproportionately reduces the demands of all investors in the primary market. As a result, the issuer can increase her profits by restricting allocations of new bonds only to more connected investors. This explains the commonly observed exclusion of small institutional investors from the primary market, which is often coupled with seemingly underpriced bonds. In the third chapter, Initial Coin Offerings as a Commitment to Competition with Itay Goldstein and Deeksha Gupta, we model Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) of utility tokens, which are increasingly used to finance the development of online platforms where buyers and sellers can meet to exchange services or goods. Utility tokens serve as the sole medium of exchange on a platform and can be traded in a secondary market. We show that such a financing mechanism allows an entrepreneur to give up monopolistic rents associated with the control of the platform and make a credible commitment to long-run competitive prices. The entrepreneur optimally chooses to have an ICO, rather than operate as a monopolist, only if future consumers of the platform participate in financing. ICOs, therefore, endogenously require crowd-funding to be viable.
Smart contracts are one of the business and organizational areas where blockchain technology is thought to have a major potential impact.Smart contracts can be a secure method to technologically ensure that a certain action is followed by other agreed-upon transactions.Payment transactions for contract bindings might be the first go-to thought in this regard, also considering that blockchain technology's most significant impact until now has been through cryptocurrencies.And yet, so many other aspects of organizational processes rely upon transactions between different organizational units.There might not be a flow of currencies, and the value driver might be the flow of correct, on-time information.Such is the case when patients are released from a hospital to the organizations that provide home care in the Norwegian health care system.The health care professionals in home care need the right information to be able to provide the necessary care and medication.There is an ongoing ITprogram in the Norwegian health care system called AKSON, with the goal of one patientone journal.This article sheds light on opportunities regarding the potential use of smart contracts-technology in the Akson program, for information sharing when patients are transferred from hospital to home-care.
Publicly traded securities generally are held by investors in securities accounts with intermediaries such as stockbrokers and central securities depositories — intermediated securities. For many investors this is the only practical means of holding and dealing with securities. These intermediated holding systems (IHSs) impose a variety of risks and costs. Investors are exposed to intermediary risk (default or insolvency of an intermediary holding securities) as well as impediments to the exercise of rights such as voting and asserting claims against securities issuers. The nontransparency of IHSs imposes other social costs, such as obstacles to anti-money laundering enforcement. The emergence of FinTech and the potentially disruptive effects of distributed ledger technology (blockchain) now present realistic opportunities for reforms of securities holding infrastructures that would increase transparency and allow investors to hold securities directly on the books of their issuers.
This article proposes a “New Platform System” (NPS) for the direct holding of securities that would connect issuers and investors and also connect both with trading and settlement systems (which would remain intact, at least for now). Unlike other recent transparency and direct holding proposals, the NPS would cover both equity and debt securities and would flexibly accommodate beneficial aspects of current IHSs, such as margin lending, securities lending, and rehypothecation. The article presents a broader menu of problems that the NPS could resolve. The NPS addresses the probable objections that the intermediaries who benefit from the status quo would make to any transparency or direct holding proposals. Disintermediation likely would require regulatory intervention by the SEC in the United States. By offering reforms that would minimize the disruption of current market practices, the NPS could encourage intervention and blunt opposition. It also could provide a “primordial soup” for future, more extensive reforms of trading and settlement systems.
Alexander Bechtel, Agata Ferreira, Jonas Groß, Philipp Sandner
Distributed ledger technology (DLT) hasDistributed ledger technologies (DLTs) the potential to address long-standing industrial challenges, remove frictions, build trust, and unlock new value across businesses and industries. It enables decentralization, the immutability of data, transparency, and the automation of business processes. Thereby, it creates a multitude of use cases ranging from energy and manufacturing to mobility and logistics. However, a digitized economy based on DLT can flourish only if it does not merely enable the exchange of assets, goods, and services but also the exchange of money. In other words, there is a need for a payment solution that is compatible with DLT-based decentralized networks and enables transactions denominated in euro. This is particulary relevant in the currently evolving geopolitical environment.
We examine how liquidity affects cryptocurrency market efficiency and study commonalities in anomaly performance in cryptocurrency market. Based on the unique features of cryptocurrencies, we build a model with anonymous traders valuing cryptocurrencies as payments for goods and investment assets, and find that decreases in funding liquidity translate into lower asset liquidity in the cryptocurrency market. Empirically, we observe that many widely recognized stock market anomalies also exist in the cryptocurrency market, though some have opposite long/short legs. We also find supportive evidence that a decrease in cryptocurrency liquidity enhances anomaly returns while preventing the cryptocurrency market from achieving efficiency.