I put forward a new theoretical framework to analyze the relationship between soft budget constraint syndrome and the economic performances of firms. It differs from the existing theoretical framework, à la Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), in the soft budget constraint literature. In this paper, soft budget constraint syndrome arises when firms that are expected to lose money are financed. The paper highlights a trade-off between hard and soft budget constraints. While soft budget constraints may compromise firms' incentives to improve performances, an all-out effort to harden budget constraints may put macro stability at risk, especially for economies suffering from allocative inefficiency. Based on this trade-off, the paper shows that a transition from centralized financing to decentralized financing in fact compromises firms' incentives to improve their performances, whereas a transition from centralized financing to a dual track system enhances efficiency. In the dual track system, budget constraints are soft in the centralized track but the macro stability of the economy is assured as a result. The macro stability enhances the disciplinary effect of hard budget constraints in the decentralized track, which in turn promotes firms' incentives to improve performances. The paper sheds light on a complementary relation between soft budget constraint syndrome in the state sector (i.e., the centralized track) and the remarkable growth of the non-state sector (i.e., the decentralized track) in China.
Guillém López i Casasnovas, Esther Martínez Garcia
The authors analyse the magnitude and composition of the fiscal imbalance between Catalonia and the Spanish Central government for 1995-1998, and its evolution since 1986. A flow approach is adopted, whereas the usual incidence hypothesis is followed in alloating tax revenues. The results show a rather stable net contribution of Catalonia to the Spanish Central government in 1998 of 1.3 trillion pesetas (8.37% of Catalan GDP). Calalonia participated in 19.60 % of Central government revenues, but received only 15.03% of expenditures. Catalan population is 15.5% of the Spanish total. Overall, in 1994 constant terms, the evolution of the per capita imbalance rises from 117,133 PTAs. in 1986, to 192,294 PTAs. in 1998. The authors also introduce an explicit way to deal with the effects of Central government budget deficits on fiscal revenues, in computing the financial distortions of the political and economic central role of Madrid, different tax compliance among regions, the impact of inflation differentials, and the evaluation of the social security flows on regional imbalances. In general, the authors favour an estimation of the amount of revenues at the disposal of Catalonia in order to finance its own expenditure, without the mediation of the Central government, but maintaining a single Spanish fiscal system. This approach may force the contribution of Catalonia as any other region to finance the joint expenditures of the Central government, and/or to finance its owm public sector, but in a rather more dear way. As a result, with regard to the financial decentralization system, territorial solidarity and social cohesion is enhanced, at the same time that autonomy and self-governance,
in a better way than it is today.
Localism and regionalism are normally seen as conflicting, conceptions of metropolitan area governance. Localism is the belief that the existing system of a large number of relatively small governments wielding power over such critical matters as land use regulation, local taxation, and the financing of local public services ought to be preserved. Regionalism would move some power to institutions, organizations or procedures with a larger territorial scope and more population than existing local governments. Regionalism appears to be a step towards centralization, and the antithesis of the decentralization represented by localism. Yet, in the metropolitan areas that dominate America at the end of the twentieth century, regionalism is not just the enemy of localism: It is also localism's logical extension. Localism is based on a set of arguments concerning the role of local governments in promoting governmental efficiency, democracy, and community. But in contemporary metropolitan areas, the economically, socially, and ecologically relevant local area is often the region. In these areas, concerns about efficiency, democracy, and community ought to lead to a shift in power from existing localities to new processes, structures, or organizations that can promote decision-making on behalf of the region. Regionalism is, thus, localism for metropolitan areas. Localists, however, do not become regionalists when they live in metropolitan areas. Indeed, resistance to regionalism is intense in many metropolitan areas. Localism is not simply a theory intended to advance certain normative goals. It is also a means of protecting the interests of those who receive advantages from the existing governance structure. Local self-interest, rather than the political values localism is said to advance, plays a central role in the opposition to regionalism. This essay explores the relationship between localism and regionalism. It considers the meaning of regionalism in contemporary urban policy debates and the reasons why regionalism currently enjoys so much attention from academics, urbanists and policy analysts. It reviews the arguments for localism, and explains how, despite the asserted conflict between localism and regionalism, the theories underlying localism actually make a case for regionalism in contemporary metropolitan areas. Finally, it examines the role of local self-interest in the resistance to regionalism, and the efforts of regionalists to respond by making the case for regionalism in terms of local self-interest as well.
Problems of `soft budget` constraints in intergovernmental relationships are currently at the frontier of research in local public economics. This paper reviews the Italian experience in the field, starting from the mid-1970s up to the present period, compares it with that of other countries, and uses it to comment upon the state of the literature. The paper argues that the soft budget constraint problem has been a rampant one in Italian local public finance, generating efficiency losses, lack of political accountability and undermining the soundness of public finances. The paper inquires into the causes and possible solutions to the problem, and in particular describes and comments upon the decentralization process of the 1990s. Finally, the Italian debate on fiscal federalism of the 1990s is also reviewed, arguing that some of the suggestions of this debate may be of interest more generally.
Fiscal Decentralization is a popular economic development strategy among transition and developing countries. This article reviews the advantages of fiscal decentralization in a theoretical context, but critiques the relevance of the standard theory of federalism as it applies to emerging economies. It is argued that the macroeconomic benefits of fiscal centralization, the absence of good instruments of local government finance, and the centralist politics that characterize most low income countries have been strong enough to hold back increased emphasis on local government finance.
The purpose of the paper is to revaluate the roles of the reformed local autonomy for promoting decentralization and local autonomy against new centralization. I consider the local autonomy and finance in Japan after World War II, focussing on the roles of so called 'Kakushin Jichitai', reformed local autonomy in the 1960's and 1970's. Firstly I review the developing and declining processes of 'reformed local autonomy' in the period of high economic growth in Japan. Then I discuss the roles of these reformed local government bodies through rising citizen movements. The local governments like Minobe-Tosei or Asukata-Yokohama-Shisei contributed to the tax reforms and some other financial reforms and promoting decentralization. The 1960's and 1970's in Japan are called 'The Period of New Centralization' in intergovernmental relations. However, the roles of these reformed local autonomy for promoting decentralization against new centralization should be revaluated.
The note highlights the importance of \n sound intergovernmental fiscal relations, and proper \n regulation for successful sub-national borrowing, and \n illustrates the potential macroeconomic hazards of \n decentralizing borrowing powers, arguing that the impact of \n a possible moral hazard problem, namely, the access to \n financial markets by sub-national governments, may generate \n unplanned liabilities for central governments. Yet academia, \n and country experiences do not suggest adverse links between \n decentralized borrowing powers, and the central \n government's ability to maintain fiscal discipline, and \n macroeconomic stability. Rather the key seems to lie in the \n design of fiscal decentralization, particularly the \n regulatory framework under which borrowing powers are \n decentralized. The note outlines the reasons why \n sub-national governments require access to financial \n markets: to finance capital spending, and foster political \n accountability, which can be achieved through direct \n borrowing by central government, through a public financial \n intermediary, or, through direct borrowing. As per designing \n the regulatory framework, the note suggests better \n information systems, bankruptcy laws, and access to tax \n bases, in addition to separate fiscal/financial systems, and \n sound legislation to impose budget discipline, enabling \n access to capital markets to complement fiscal powers \n devolution to regional authorities.
Local governments (LGs) are seen as producers of the local public good ('the good'). An authoritarian country is one in which the government decides if the good should be produced and how much to tax to finance it, as versus a democracy in which voters decide. This paper identifies conditions under which it is more efficient for a non-democratic government to delegate to the LGs the authority to 1) decide whether or not to produce the good and2) Collect tax to finance it if the good is produced. Two conditions are identified First, when the net benefit of producing the good is sufficiently small so that, compared with the benefit, inducing LGs effort under the centralized system is too costly (a moral hazard problem). Second, when the net benefit of the is higher in a locale with a higher production cost parameters, making it difficult for the center to induce the LGs to truthfully reveal the cost parameter (an adverse selection problem). These results are consistent with the experience of China in the past several decades, where "too small to be worth bothering" and "too diversified and complicated local conditions for the center to know" have been the two most prominent official arguments made by the communist government itself for decentralization
This dissertation examines why and how jurisdictions choose to finance their roads. The systematic causes of revenue choice are explored qualitatively by examining the history of turnpikes. The question is approached analytically by employing game theory to model revenue choice on a long road. The road is covered by a series of jurisdictions seeking to maximize local welfare. Jurisdictions are responsible for building and maintaining the local network. Complexity arises because local network users may not be local residents, and local residents may use non-local networks. Key factors posited to explain the choice of revenue mechanism include the length of trips using the road, the size of the governing jurisdiction, the degree of excludability, and the transaction costs of toll collection. These factors dictate the size and scope of the free rider problem. It is hypothesized that smaller jurisdictions and lower collection costs favor tolling policies over taxes.The analytical model is operationalized by assuming jurisdictions have two decisions: the strategic decision to tax or toll, and the tactical decision of setting the rate of tax or toll. Models of user demand as a function of trip distance and monetary cost and of network costs as a function of traffic flow and the number of toll collections are specified. The values of the constants and coefficients of the model are developed from recent cost literature and the estimation of a model of collection costs from California Toll Bridge data.The model is applied to evaluate the dissertation's hypotheses. The application evaluates the welfare implications of a jurisdiction and its neighbors imposing general tax, cordon toll, odometer tax, or perfect toll policies. Sensitivity tests of the model under alternative behavioral assumptions, and with varying model coefficients are conducted. Finally, policy implications from the analysis are drawn. The general trends which bode well for road pricing (electronic toll collection (ETC), decentralization, advanced infrastructure, privatization, and federal rules) are established. Possible scenarios for three cases are presented: deploying ETC and building new toll roads, and converting free roads.
This paper is one of eight case studies in the health sector conducted under the project "Population and Urbanization: Managing the Urbanization Process Under the decentralized Governance Framework" jointly undertaken by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, National Economic and Development Authority and Development Academy of the Philippines. This paper is a case study on Cotabato City recommended by NEDA-Region XII as a model city for health. The city has come up with the Special Project on Health and Sanitation that won a silver Award in the 1997 Health and Management Information System Contest.
This article explains (1) the origins of central banking and (2) variations in the spread and durability of central banks across nations. Early central banks helped bind governments to honor their debts and thereby furthered governments' capacities to efficiently finance military expenditures. The origins of central banking are problematic because government credit-worthiness and efficient wartime fiscal policy are public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Applying a variant of the joint-products model, I argue that governments offered private benefits (monopoly privileges) to select creditors to induce participation in central banks. To explain cross-national differences, I argue that the level of domestic political decentralization negatively affected the incidence and durability of central banking. Countries with decentralized political systems faced regulatory competition from strong local authorities as licensers of banking monopolies, making it difficult to adopt or sustain central banking. Qualitative and statistical evidence from Europe and the United States to about 1850 support the arguments.
This two-part paper provides a theoretical framework for appraising trade-offs between alternative methods of delegating authority over the delivery of public services, on the targeting and cost-effectiveness of public spending programs in developing countries. Authority over these programs has to be delegated owing to absence of information at the central level concerning local needs and costs of specific communities. In a top-down centralized system, this authority is delegated to bureaucrats by a central government that has limited ability to monitor their performance with respect to either service delivery or cost control. In a decentralized system, it is allocated instead to elected local governments or client groups, which may be subject to capture by local elites. Both systems are thus prone to local corruption and lack of accountability. Part 1 of the paper studies the relevant tradeoffs in the context of a poverty alleviation program, whose aim is to deliver a private merit good available on competitive markets to the poor. Decentralization generally dominates with respect to inter-community targeting as well as cost-effectiveness. However, the ranking of intracommunity targeting under the two systems is ambiguous, and depends on the relative degree of capture that local and national governments are prone to, besides the nature of uncertainty and preferences of the good by the nonpoor. Part 2 of the paper considers an infrastructure service provided by a public enterprise which has a natural monopoly. In this context it is shown that decentralization dominates if the following four conditions are satisfied: (i) local governments are not vulnerable to capture; (ii) local governments have access to adequate local financing sources; (iii) there are no interjurisdictional externalities in service provision; and (iv) local governments have all the bargaining power and access to relevant cost information vis-a-vis public enterprise managers. Absent any one of these institutional conditions, however, decentralization may perform worse than centralization. The Appendix develops a model of electoral competition (adapted from Grossman-Helpman (1996)) where parties are prone to capture by special interest groups, which helps identify some of the institutional determinants of the degree of capture of local and central governments.
Financing Decentralized Expenditures presents new original research papers on the structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations in virtually all types of countries and the design and implementation of transfer mechanisms between different levels of government.
In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ('infrastructure'), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.
This paper is the fruit of an attempt to distinguish the elements, present in a fiscal decentralization process, that are likely to contribute to efficiency enhancement in the provision of social services in developing countries. From the methodological point of view, the paper makes an effort, whenever possible, to isolate the economic from the political in the arguments for and against fiscal decentralization. These two sets of arguments, economic and political, both equally important, are often intermingled in the literature. The distinction between them may improve our understanding of the advantages and limitations of the selection of a 'decentralized' provision of social services. Although nearly all the aspects of the fiscal decentralization process may be of some relevance in terms of the issue of equitable social service provision, the paper tries to stress the need to provide adequate incentives to local bureaucracies through the design of transfers and through community participation.
Via regression analysis, this study is able to establish factors that impinge on per capita social sector expenditures. In addition, 32 out of the 62 provincial governments have allocated less on social sectors than what is needed to maintain their 1991 expenditure level in real terms. Inconsistencies regarding budget allocation of provincial governments on the social sectors and the objective indicators are detected.
This paper is intended to analyze, in a comparative perspective, the financing mechanisms of urban local governments in two groups of countries. The first group refers to a sample of OECD countries. They are rather decentralized, and have institutional features which date back many years from now. The scope of responsibilities faced by these countries. The second group is constituted by a number of Latin American countries. They are, in general, less decentralized and have the characteristic of not having a well established institutional structure. This has experienced various changes over the recent years, one of them being a process of transferring responsibilities to local tiers of governments, a tendency which in general, has not been accompanied by an increasing capacity to get resources neither from the central government nor from the local financial market.
Robin Boadway, Isao Horiba, Raghbendra Jha, Boadway, Robin · 6 authors
It has realized since Pigou (1947) that if public goods are financed by distortionary taxation, the marginal social cost of providing the public good will exceed the actual resource cost by the marginal deadweight cost of taxation.
The Caiden and Wildavsky work of 1974 postulates a model of poverty-uncertainty: the governments of poor countries face disappearing and decremental budgets in financing public programs because of a lack of economic growth or poverty. The core argument is that economic development, as a critical variable, determines increments in budgeting practices. In other words, budgeting is incremental, and incremental budgeting results from the growth of GNP. This model has since become a set of principles with identifiable attributes to explain the budgetary processes in poor nations. \n \nThis study is about application of that model in China's budgeting. China has a unitary budget system. The central government used to draw most of its revenues from provinces and its budget includes those of 31 provinces. Provinces thus play a dual role of collecting revenues from within and remitting them to the center in the name of revenue sharing. In 1978 China decided to open to the world, reform its economy, and decentralize budget to provinces. But the original intent of decentralization was to give incentives so that provinces accumulate more resources for further central extraction. The decentralization, however, has led to fiscal decline not anticipated by the reformers.