Financial regulators have long-standing concerns about fully decentralized exchanges that run 'on-chain' without any obvious regulatory hooks. The popularity of Uniswap, an automated market makers (AMM), made these concerns a reality. AMMs implement a lightweight dealer-based trading system, but they are unlike anything on Wall Street, require fees intrinsically, and are susceptible to front-running attacks. This leaves the following research questions we address in this paper: (1) are conventional (i.e., order books), secure (i.e., resistant to front-running and price manipulation) and fully decentralized exchanges feasible on a public blockchain like Ethereum, (2) what is the performance profile, and (3) how much do Layer 2 techniques (e.g., Arbitrum) increase performance? To answer these questions, we implement, benchmark, and experiment with an Ethereum-based call market exchange called Lissy. We confirm the functionality is too heavy for Ethereum today (you cannot expect to exceed a few hundred trade executions per block) but show it scales dramatically (99.88% gas cost reduction) on Arbitrum.
The virtual nature of digital money is fueling the conflict between usability, functionality and trust in the digital form. Institutional trust drivers should move forward in understanding the nature of confidence in digital money. Do central banks digital money (CBDC – central bank digital currency) and private cryptocurrencies demonstrate the same or different trust patterns? The paper used the general regression method to discover the relationship between trust in different forms of digital money and selected variables that may generate this trust. Simple empirical tests were sufficient to find the fundamental importance of age as a confidence driver relevant to CBDC and cryptocurrencies. It is found that traditional factors associated with the inflation history and quality of monetary order (central banks independence and rule of law) do not play a role in the case of CBDC, but are important in the case of cryptocurrencies. Structural features (like FinTech development or social trust) that should support trust in digital money are not found to be important. Societies with larger fraction of younger generations demonstrate higher confidence in centralized and decentralized forms of digital money. This challenges the traditional approach to money and calls into question the future role of monetary stability institutions in the digital age. Digitalization is perceived as an improvement in welfare only when fiat money institutions become fragile. The efficiency and credibility of central banks are not a bonus to confidence in CBDC. This is a challenge for the institutional design of the future digital-based monetary order.
Abstract Stablecoins are second generation cryptocurrencies, aimed at maintaining their value stable with respect to official currencies. The most famous example is perhaps represented by libra, the cryptocurrency announced by Facebook in 2019 and yet to be issued; the most widespread is tether, with a market capitalization of almost 10 billion dollars and a daily transaction volume of almost 50 billion dollars, which makes it the most used cryptocurrency. The diffusion of stablecoins is hardly surprising. By minimizing volatility – the main flaw of first generation cryptocurrencies, including bitcoin –, stablecoins are expected to play an even more important role on a global scale within a few years. Our contribution deals not with the economic, but specifically with the geopolitical factors that could foster the use of stablecoins for strategic and military purposes. In particular, we focus on how such payment instruments, together with other alternative electronic payment systems, could be used as a means to circumvent economic sanctions and ultimately as a challenge to the hegemony of the US dollar in the international monetary system.
Abstract Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf outlined an alternative to the current monetary system in which banks are replaced by a peer-to-peer system to issue and transfer digital money: the Bitcoin. While Bitcoin has attracted a substantial investment volume, the system has not achieved the status of a viable alternative monetary system. However, the distributed ledger technology (DLT) underlying the payment system is being applied successfully by financial institutions and is likely to have important implications for the future of money and banking. In this paper we therefore focus on the most advanced distributed ledger application in the financial industry: R3 Corda. This paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we relate the debate about systems of money creation to the rise of Bitcoin. Next, the development of R3 Corda is discussed and the lessons learned for monetary reform. We conclude with an assessment of the scope and likelihood of monetary reform as a consequence of DLT applications by central banks.
Real-time financial settlements constrain traders to have the cash on hand before they can enter a trade [Khapko and Zoican, 2017]. This prevents short-selling and ultimately impedes liquidity. We propose a novel trading protocol which relaxes the cash constraint, and manages chains of deferred payments. Traders can buy without paying first, and can re-sell while still withholding payments. Trades naturally arrange in chains which contract when deals are closed and extend when new ones open. Default risk is handled by reversing trades. In this short note we propose a class of novel financial instruments for zero-risk and zero-collateral intermediation. The central idea is that bilateral trades can be chained into trade lines. The ownership of an underlying asset becomes distributed among traders with positions in the trade line. The trading protocol determines who ends up owning that asset and the overall payoffs of the participants. Counterparty risk is avoided because the asset itself serves as a collateral for the entire chain of trades. The protocol can be readily implemented as a smart contract on a blockchain. Additional examples, proofs, protocol variants, and game-theoretic properties related to the order-sensitivity of the games defined by trade lines can be found in the extended version of this note [Danos et al., 2019]. Therein, one can also find the definition and game-theoretic analysis of standard trade-lines with applications to trust-less zero-collateral intermediation.
The popularity of crypto-assets that have become a fast-growing trend in world finances is changing the list of tools and techniques of wealth management. Being a form of decentralized digital instruments, crypto-assets (cryptocurrencies, tokenized securities and decentralized finance (DeFi) products) disrupt the conventional approaches to investment, custodial activities, and portfolio diversification. The present paper discusses how wealth management has evolved to accommodate the incorporation of crypto-assets, citing the opportunities and risks that the latter have. On the one hand, these assets mean that it is now possible to achieve a better portfolio diversification, obtain a global reach, and make investment opportunities more democratic. They, on the other hand, come up with essential dissatisfaction concerning volatility, regulatory insecurity, cybersecurity risks, and absence of structured valuation standards. The research focus is on how wealth managers are coping with the paradigm shift by integrating some digital assets into client plans, creating new advisory frameworks, as well as using enhanced analytics to manage risk and make maximum returns. The ethical and fiduciary obligation of wealth managers is highlighted because wealth managers operate in such an environment with high levels of information asymmetry and a reshaping legal framework. In addition, the paper discusses how much the adoption of the institutions as well as regulation structure and investor education play in future integration into mainstream financial management of crypto-assets. In blending scholarly studies, regulatory statements, and business activity, this paper reveals that the effectiveness of the wealth management industry under the digital age will be determined by establishing a compromise between scientifical experimentation and wisdom. In the end, crypto-assets are not only speculative tools, much more are the gears that push managers into reconsidering expired paradigms, agile approaches, and technology-based solutions to satisfy their clients whose needs and wants are not confined to the realms of a rapidly digitalizing economy.
When economic agents have private information, the agents will be incentivised to use this information advantage by acting in a manner that does not always coincide with production and social efficiency, or the interests of the principal. This thesis investigates details specific to designing a contract with blockchain technology and smart contracts that consistently elicit efficiency and good behaviour with the best possible outcome for participating agents. We use the lens of the principal agent theory to show that implementing blockchain technology and smart contracts in contractual agreements can alleviate problems associated with information asymmetry that arise when one party holds its information private. Information asymmetry has a significant economic impact in principal agent relationships.
Die Distributed Ledger- bzw. Blockchain-Technologie führt zu einer zunehmenden Dezentralisierung von Finanzdienstleistungen ("Decentralised Finance"), die weitgehend ohne die Einschaltung von Finanzintermediären angeboten werden können. Dazu trägt wesentlich die sog. "Tokenisierung" von Vermögensgegenständen, Zahlungsmitteln und Rechten bei, die verschlüsselt als "Kryptowerte" in verteilten Transaktionsregistern digital abgebildet werden können. Der vorliegende Beitrag erläutert die Grundlagen und Anwendungsfelder dezentraler Finanzdienstleistungen mit Kryptowerten, die mittelfristig die gesamte Architektur des Finanzsektors verändern könnten. Dieser Trend betrifft längst nicht nur die kontrovers diskutierten Zahlungsverkehrssysteme mit Kryptowährungen wie dem Bitcoin, sondern Handelsplattformen, Kapitalmärkte oder Unternehmensfinanzierungen. Es bildet sich ein rasch wachsendes Ökosystem aus Startups, Technologieunternehmen und etablierten Finanzdienstleistern, für das jedoch noch ein verlässlicher regulatorischer Rahmen fehlt. Die derzeit auf europäischer Ebene diskutierte Initiative "MiCA (Markets in Crypto Assets)" geht in die richtige Richtung, sollte aber im Interesse der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des europäischen Finanzsektors zeitnah umgesetzt werden.
On January 4, 2021 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a major regulator of financial institutions in the United States, announced that federally chartered banks and thrifts were now allowed to utilize stablecoins as payment instruments. Much research and many discussions have revolved around policies of governments worldwide in how to handle the new cryptocurrency phenomenon. The purpose of this short study was to observe the valuation impact of that announcement on the three largest cryptocurrencies and two others. Research findings show the altcoins with valuations not tied to the dollar had substantial increases in value while the stablecoins, which the announcement specified are now allowed to be used by banks, changed very little. Specifically, Bitcoin and Etherium increased over 20% in value within 5 days of the announcement while the stablecoins Tether and USDCoin changed in value by no more than 0.10% for the same event window. This shows that stablecoins lived up to their name even though they were promoted as an acceptable payment system in the US.
How might modern settlement systems with distributed ledger technology achieve zero settlement risk? We consider the design of settlement systems that satisfies two integral features: information-leakage proof and zero settlement risk. Legacy settlement systems partition private information but are vulnerable to settlement fails. A token system with dynamic ownership representation, or a dynamic ledger, can be designed to achieve both, as long as it employs a protocol that enforces two restrictions: programs must be immediately implemented and must involve transactions based on verifiable claims. We show how such a system can support various arrangements, including insurance, derivatives, collateralized loans, and securitization.
Few years after the development of Bitcoin (BTC), there was need to develop another blockchain that could support many applications, and consequently, the Ethereum Blockchain (EB) was developed. One of the key initiatives that was enabled by the development of the EB is that of Decentralised Finance (DeFi). Understanding the massive potential of DeFi, particularly in developing markets, many other developers are embarking on projects to develop their DeFi supporting blockchains. The Universal Money Instrument (UMI) team is one of the groups that embarked on this journey. Approximately 1.5 years after the launch of the UMI Blockchain (UMI B) and the UMI coin, the team recently released their DeFi manifest. Considering that Africa stands to benefit more from DeFi, it is expected that these two blockchains will compete for dominance in Africa. Hence, the main objective of this study was to determine the most suitable blockchain for the African continent. To achieve the above objective, a non-empirical, exploratory research was conducted in the form of an online desktop review. It was found that the UMI DeFi is ideal for Africa because the UMI B; is highly scalable, supports nearinstant transactions, offers free transactions, uses a superior consensus algorithm, took longer to develop, and safe from attacks like the 51% attacks.
Victor von Wachter, Johannes Rude Jensen, Omri Ross
Decentralized financial (DeFi) applications on the Ethereum blockchain are highly interoperable because they share a single state in a deterministic computational environment. Stakeholders can deposit claims on assets, referred to as 'liquidity shares', across applications producing effects equivalent to rehypothecation in traditional financial systems. We seek to understand the degree to which this practice may contribute to financial integration on Ethereum by examining transactions in 'composed' derivatives for the assets DAI, USDC, USDT, ETH and tokenized BTC for the full set of 344.8 million Ethereum transactions computed in 2020. We identify a salient trend for 'composing' assets in multiple sequential generations of derivatives and comment on potential systemic implications for the Ethereum network.