Average citizens, working-class and low-income individuals in particular, have little, if any, impact on the formulation of educational policies that affect the schools in which their children are enrolled.Yet there are instances in which these typically disenfranchised citizens become politically active and are able to effect change in the educational policy arena.This study will focus on the process of transformation of marginalized and politically disempowered parents into citizens active in the formulation of educational policy. BACKGROUNDSchools tend to be the governmental institution with which the average citizen has the most contact.Ironically, most community members have little voice in the day-to-day operations of schools and tend to have insignificant influence on educational policy at the district, state, or federal level.In Tinkering Toward Utopia, Tyack and Cuban (1995) explain that a variety of groups have entered school politics, but that this apparent pluralism is misleading.They feel the politics of education has not been conducted on a level playing field.Members of the policy elite-people who manage the economy, who have privileged access to the media and to political officials, who control foundations, and who lead our city and state education agencies and universities-have disproportionate authority over educational reform.The authors go on to say: Policy elites often claimed to be "taking the schools out of politics."They sought to do this by centralizing control of schools and delegating decisions about education, wherever possible, to "experts."In the process they did not, of course, eliminate politics, but they acquired formidable powers: to set the agenda of reform, to diagnose problems, to prescribe solutions, and often to influence what should not [italics in original] be on the agenda of reform.(p.8) Stone, Henig, Jones and Pierannunzi (2001) explain that in addition to being controled by elites, educational policy occurs in subsystems and is decentralized, taking place "out of the limelight of public opinion" (p.100).This type of decentralization (toward the elites) occurs despite vocal support for parental involvement (decentralization toward the community) from the U.S. Department of Education and many state departments of education (Epstein, 2001).In Stone et al.'s (2001) words: "urban parents are scarcely visible as active [italics in original] stakeholders in the current school improvement movement" (p.83).Not only do the elites control the policymaking environment, but they also perceive problems differently.For example, the author's research determined that, in some cities, elites are likely to say that no educational problems exist while in others they may identify poor teaching and governance as concerns while other groups cite financing and social issues as key school problems.Issues of race, class, gender, education, and political knowledge further exacerbate this lack of power (Conway, 2000;Gee, 2001).In addition, the democratic environment in which these citizens live also affects their ability to act.As Greider (1992) points out, American democracy is in much deeper trouble than most people wish to acknowledge.Behind the reassuring faade, the regular election contests and so forth, the substantive meaning of self-government has been hollowed out.What exists behind the formal shell is a systemic breakdown of the shared civic values we call democracy.(p.11)
Innocent Semali, Don de Savigny, M Tanner, C. Akim
Following successful establishment of Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) in the 1970's as vertical program, the burden of disease for many of the vaccine preventable diseases was pushed to low levels. The current round of health reforms in Tanzania calls for decentralization and integration of vertical programs. This has the potential to assist or erode generally good performance of EPI. Reforms on the programme have been undertaken in Tanzania since 1996, and have included 1) integration of the procurement, storage, and distribution of vaccine and related equipment into the operations of a quasi-autonomous drug procurement agency. 2) government financing of procurement of the oral polio vaccine, cold chain kerosene, and 3) the integration of kerosene and vaccine distribution, supervision and monitoring to district health system. Our analysis shows that the integration of the procurement and distribution of vaccines into the operations of the drug procurement agency, and privatization of the distribution of the cold chain kerosene initially stalled EPI reforms for several reasons and had an adverse effect on EPI decentralization and coverage. The major cause of the problems was opposition from the EPI providers at district level who had to accept decreased income consequent to the reforms. We conclude that greater involvement of all stakeholders in the planning of the programme, would have presented an opportunity for forecasting the opposition and developing mitigating strategies.
The Baltic countries’ local governments have been functioned during the last decade in a permanently changing environment. Like other transition countries, they inherited from the past extremely centralized administrative system. Along with radical reforms, administrative system was decentralized and various functions were devolved from central to lower levels of government. Despite that, municipalities are still fiscally strongly dependent from central authorities. Often their fiscal capacity is not adequate to act in accordance with functions stipulated by laws. Many local governments’ revenues from taxes and user-charges are insufficient to finance efficiently their expenditures. Disparities in municipalities’ fiscal situation are correlated with unbalanced regional growth, social degradation in the low-income regions and growing differentiation by municipalities’ residents on access to education and healthcare. Membership of the European Union brings new tasks and responsibilities for the Baltic local governments. Municipalities should increase their economic sustainability and enhance administrative capacity to explore EU accession funds and implement EU policies. Considering the above-mentioned problems, the paper focuses on current fiscal situation of local governments in the Baltic countries. The main interest is to analyze local municipalities’ revenue level and structure, expenditure composition and fiscal autonomy conditions
In this contribution, we analyse the pattern of the so-called PIP (Partnerships and Public Initiatives) that have been approved between 2000 and mid-2003 in the POE1 framework. In particular, we will evaluate the extent of decentralisation that this new instrument has generated in competitiveness policy. Partnership approaches are a relatively recent phenomenon, but partnerships have received widespread attention and support from economic and political agents, including policy makers at national, regional and local levels. In fact, the term “public-private partnership” covers a wide range of concepts and practices. In our contribution, we will focus on partnerships in a competitiveness policy framework. In a first section, we discuss briefly the meaning and the extent of what we call competitiveness policy. Then, in a second section, we focus our attention in public-private partnerships as a specific instrument for policy. In particular, we make a first assessment on the distinctive principles that differentiate public-private partnerships from more traditional instruments such as direct investment in public agencies or direct subventions to firms. We follow the perspective that these principles, mainly decentralization of policy, may contribute to a greater effectiveness of policy, because a more decentralised policy is supposed to increase focus and accountability and to involve agencies with specialized skills and a more narrow range of objectives. But, also, we will refer that some inefficiencies and some lack of equity may arise from the use of private-public partnerships instrument. Finally, in the main section of this contribution, we will analyse the above-mentioned questions considering the case of the 131 PIP projects approved and financed by the POE between 2000 and mid-2003. As the major part of the variables used are nominal, and in order to define the decentralization pattern induced by this new instrument, we will use multivariate data analysis techniques in order to establish associations between several variables linked to decentralisation criteria and, also, to identify clusters of projects.
Even in the wake of the most sweeping campaign finance reform law to be enacted in three decades, further significant reform is inevitable. Special interest money continues to flow through loopholes in the Act, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund is near collapse. The next reform should encourage broader participation in the political process by individual citizens, both to dilute the power of special interests and to serve independent democratic values that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has identified as vital to meaningful reform. We propose adopting a refundable tax credit of $100/taxpayer for political contributions to federal candidates and national parties; the credit would be targeted to lowerand middle-income Americans. A refundable tax credit is equivalent to giving each eligible citizen up to $100 annually to use for political contributions. We also present data about the relative importance of political contributions by special interests (corporate, labor and other PACs) and individuals that undermine many of the assumptions on which past reform has been based and that have not been discussed in the legal literature. The data clearly show that small contributions by individuals are the dominant source of money in campaigns, and that the influence of special interest money is subtle, appearing to “purchase” benefits like access, a place on the agenda, and minor policy details. Working from an accurate picture of who really pays for politics, and drawing from the experience at the federal and state levels with similar tax refund programs, we present the tax credit as a reform that is simple, easy to administer, and likely to improve political participation by average Americans. Thus, our proposal, unlike the complicated voucher plan with anonymity put forward by Ackerman and Ayres, is likely to be adopted by Congress; moreover, it will appeal to a bipartisan consensus because it mixes public funding with a decentralized allocation mechanism using a tax subsidy.
In order to strengthen the real ownership and leadership of the communities in rural water supply implementation the\nCommunity Development Fund (CDF) approach was developed in Rural Water Supply and Environmental Programme in\nAmhara Region. The purpose of the CDF approach is to create an alternative funding mechanism, which is separate from the\nconventional governmental funding mechanisms, which are many times slow and bureaucratic and cannot support natural\nprivate sector development. In this approach the funds for the water supply construction are not anymore channelled to\nthe implementing Water Office, instead the funds are transferred to the community using private credit institution in fund\nmanagement. In CDF the community elects an executive body called WATSANCO, which manages the funds, construction\nand material management as well as the management of the water point after construction. Amhara Credit and Savings\nInstitution (ACSI), a share company, which has branches in each Woreda (District) carries out the fund management with\n2% commission only. The CDF project coordination at the Woreda level is carried out by the Woreda Community Development\nFund Board (CDFB) having members from government offices and local organizations and private sector. CDF\napproach in funding will support the decentralization of responsibilities, i.e. initiating and implementing water supply\nprojects by communities and user groups themselves, which will have a significant impact on the ownership issue from the\nvery start. This approach has had enormous impact on the community’s capacity and it has also increased the rural water\nsupply implementation pace. The approach builds the community capacity to take the lead of their own development with\nother sector development projects as well.
National governments often choose to delegate tasks and burdens to lower levels in a comprehensive system of administration. Local and regional governance thereby becomes an important factor in policy implementation. This paper focuses on the incentive problem that follows from such a delegation of competences to collect taxes and do lending at the local level in a multi-level geo-administrative system. The paper uses the Danish administrative system to illustrate the actual outcomes from such incentive problems. A two-step estimation procedure will be used to derive results on the importance of incentive problems in multi-level geo-administrative systems. Setting up elaborate administrative systems will introduce agency problems that lead to inefficiencies in both local and national governance.
Twelve years into the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, it is but opportune to assess how the key features of this landmark legislation has contributed to (or detracted from) achieving the balance between local autonomy and accountability. The literature on fiscal decentralization suggests that these two goals are not incompatible. In fact, real autonomy (in the sense of subnational governments being able to link their spending decisions with their revenue/tax decisions) promotes fiscal responsibility. In the context of the ongoing debate in the Philippines, however, local autonomy has been equated (by many LGUs officials) with the independence of LGUs from central government interference. As such, LGU officials have focused more on securing even higher levels of block grants in order to address the widely perceived vertical fiscal imbalance. However, closer scrutiny of the problem indicates that greater_x000D_ tax decentralization coupled with a well designed intergovernmental transfer system that includes elements of fiscal equalization and categorical grants conditional on the achievement of minimum service standards would better enhance the gains that are forthcoming from the decentralization process while minimizing the risks of macroinstability.
The distribution of competencies between the different levels of a federal system may have remarkable effects on economic growth, because mainly the regions of a country contribute to national economic development. Thus, a governments economic policy is reasonably shaped along regional lines. The theoretical discussion in economics focuses however on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision and financing of public services; rarely the argument is raised that decentralization or federalism increases growth through a higher ability of the political system to innovate and to carry out reforms. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments on federalism and growth, we address the empirical question in this paper how important the assignment of decision making competencies and the design of fiscal federalism are for economic development. Finally, on the basis of existing theoretical and empirical studies on economic growth and federalism, open questions and possible ways of answering them are presented.
Laura B. Rawlings, Lynne Sherburne-Benz, Julie Van Domelen
The study seeks to answer four questions that summarize the fundamental issues in the international debate about the capacity of social funds to improve beneficiaries' living conditions: o Do social funds reach poor areas and poor households? Do social funds deliver high-quality, sustainable investments? Do social funds affect living standards? How cost-efficient are social funds and the investments they finance, compared with other delivery mechanisms? The findings and lessons from this research reflect a specific moment in the evolution of six social funds and therefore may not fully predict the future impact of current investments. The evaluation assesses subprojects identified and implemented between 1993 and 1999, a period when longer-term objectives-such as increasing access to and utilization of basic services-began to supplant the funds' original emergency mandates. The time period selected allowed enough elapsed time following the implementation of the social fund subprojects to make measurement of impact and sustainability possible. The evaluation does not consider the effects of social fund projects on employment or on income generation-the original objectives of the first generation of social funds, which were introduced in Latin America. It also does not discuss the effect of social fund investments on capacity building-a more recent emphasis of social funds seeking to assist decentralization and community development.
Waste Processors Management, Inc. (WMPI), along with its subcontractors Texaco Power & Gasification (now ChevronTexaco), SASOL Technology Ltd., and Nexant Inc. entered into a Cooperative Agreement DE-FC26-00NT40693 with the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) to assess the techno-economic viability of building an Early Entrance Co-Production Plant (EECP) in the United States to produce ultra clean Fischer-Tropsch (FT) transportation fuels with either power or steam as the major co-product. The EECP design includes recovery and gasification of low-cost coal waste (culm) from physical coal cleaning operations and will assess blends of the culm with coal or petroleum coke. The project has three phases. Phase I is the concept definition and engineering feasibility study to identify areas of technical, environmental and financial risk. Phase II is an experimental testing program designed to validate the coal waste mixture gasification performance. Phase III updates the original EECP design based on results from Phase II, to prepare a preliminary engineering design package and financial plan for obtaining private funding to build a 5,000 barrel per day (BPD) coal gasification/liquefaction plant next to an existing co-generation plant in Gilberton, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. The current report covers the period performance from July 1, 2003 through September 30, 2003. The DOE/WMPI Cooperative Agreement was modified on May 2003 to expand the project team to include Shell Global Solutions, U.S. and Uhde GmbH as the engineering contractor. The addition of Shell and Uhde strengthen both the technical capability and financing ability of the project. Uhde, as the prime EPC contractor, has the responsibility to develop a LSTK (lump sum turnkey) engineering design package for the EECP leading to the eventual detailed engineering, construction and operation of the proposed concept. Major technical activities during the reporting period include: (1) finalizing contractual agreements between DOE, Uhde and other technology providers, focusing on intellectual-property-right issues, (2) Uhde's preparation of a LSTK project execution plan and other project engineering procedural documents, and (3) Uhde's preliminary project technical concept assessment and trade-off evaluations.
Latin American social medicine (LASM) emerged as a movement in the 1970s and played an important role in the Brazilian health care reform of the 1980s, both of which focused on decentralization and on health care as a social right. The dominant health care reform model in Latin America has included a market-driven, private subsystem for the insured and a public subsystem for the uninsured and the poor. In contrast, the Mexico City government has launched a comprehensive policy based on social rights and redistribution of resources. A universal pension for senior citizens and free medical services are financed by grants, eliminating routine government corruption and waste. The Mexico City policy reflects the influence of Latin American social medicine. In this article, I outline the basic traits of LASM and those of the prevailing health care reform model in Latin America and describe the Mexico City social and health policy, emphasizing the influence of LASM in values, principles, and concrete programs.
Koko Warner, Georg Ch. Pflug, Leslie Martin, J. Linnerooth‐Bayer · 6 authors
This report was commissioned by the Natural Disasters Network of the Regional Policy Dialogue. This report constitutes Phase 2 of this project. While the first phase of the study discusses the components of a national system, the second focuses on instruments for financing reconstruction after a disaster. The research compares centralized, government-directed management systems with those that are localized and decentralized, and also analyzes the factors affecting the financial and political stability of alternative approaches. As natural disasters may result in major resource gaps for governments facing the task of financing reconstruction, the report presents case studies of four countries-Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador-to highlight the various policy options. Alternative sources of ex ante funding are identified, including reserve funds, contingent credit, and insurance. These innovative methods of funding are compared with ex post funding possibilities through international aid, loan diversions and increased external debt, budget reallocations, and tax increases.
This note presents the methodology and \n findings of a field study on the financing needs of \n Madagascar's communes-the country's lowest but \n most institutionally advanced level of subnational \n government. Following a first round of municipal elections \n in 1995, more than 1,500 communes are now formally \n responsible for maintaining basic administrative services \n and social and economic infrastructure, including local \n waste disposal and sanitation. In addition, communes are \n responsible for identifying and coordinating local \n investments and for supporting implementation of the \n national Poverty Reduction Strategy at the local level. To \n finance these activities, communes receive population-based \n transfers and small conditional transfers, and can collect \n revenue from property, market, and consumption taxes as well \n as user charges. Yet little is known about how much these \n fiscal assignments satisfy local needs. As part of its \n policy dialogue with the government of Madagascar, the World \n Bank is engaged in extensive research that includes \n geographic mapping of social spending and a review of \n opportunities and obstacles to fiscal and sectoral \n decentralization. This research generated the following \n analysis of local and cross-sectoral service needs and \n available financing.
This article discusses the adjustment of large firms in France, in particular how they regionalized their production structures in the 1980s. Throughout the ‘Golden Age’, large firms had geographically reorganized their activities: strategic planning remained in Paris, while the actual production was decentralized into the provinces, primarily to address cost and labour conflict issues. When the large firms faced a profitability crisis in the 1980s, and the traditional state‐financed way out of the problems was no longer available, they saw in these proto‐regional production systems a chance to become more competitive. They relied on the decentralization policies of the governments in the 1980s, and used the second‐order effects of the new policies as a means to modernize their own operations. L'article examine l'adaptation des grandes entreprises françaises, notamment la régionalisation de leurs structures de production dans les années 1980. Durant ‘l'Age d'Or’, les grosses entreprises avaient réorganisé géographiquement leurs activités: la planification stratégique restait à Paris, tandis que la production réelle se décentralisait en province, principalement pour résoudre des problémes de couûts et de conflits sociaux. Lorsque ces grandes entreprises se heurtèrent à la crise de rentabilité des années 1980, alors que la solution traditionnelle de financement étatique n'existait plus, elles virent dans ces systèmes de production proto‐régionaux une chance d'améliorer leur compétitivité. Elles s'appuyèrent donc sur les politiques de décentralisation des gouvernements de l'époque, profitant des effets secondaires de ces initiatives pour moderniser leur propre fonctionnement.
First, the study is defined first that the welfare finance is a financial system executed by the public responsibility for the welfare user who have the livelihood problem to do human life. Secondly, the welfare finance in the contemporary society clarifies contradiction to which a quasi-surplus value has been raised while a quasi-value of usability of social welfare has been decreased. Finally, the problem of the decentralization type finance to improve the contradiction of the welfare finance is discussed. In a word, the problems are to be expanded local taxes and to construct a local sovereignty and financial system.
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Diverse Approaches in Healthcare and Education Studies
Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen den verschiedenen Gebietskörperschaftsebenen eines föderativen Staates kann sich erheblich auf das Wirtschaftswachstum auswirken, da es insbesondere die Regionen eines Landes sind, die zu seiner gesamten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung beitragen. Dies legt einen regionalen Zuschnitt der staatlichen Wirtschaftspolitik nahe. Aus ökonomischer Sicht wird in der theoretischen Diskussion hingegen vornehmlich auf die Effizienzaspekte einer dezentralen Bereitstellung und die Finanzierung öffentlicher Leistungen abgehoben. Selten findet sich das Argument, dass Dezentralität oder Föderalismus – vermittelt über eine höhere Innovationsund Reformfähigkeit des politischen Systems – zu einer Steigerung des Wachstums führen. Nach einer Diskussion der theoretischen Überlegungen zu Föderalismus und Wachstum wenden wir uns in diesem Beitrag der empirischen Frage zu, welche Bedeutung die Zuordnung von Entscheidungskompetenzen und die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des fiskalischen Föderalismus für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung eines Landes haben. Auf Basis der bisher existierenden theoretischen und empirischen Studien zu Wirtschaftswachstum und Föderalismus werden offene Fragen und mögliche Ansätze zu ihrer Beantwortung formuliert. <bold>Abstract</bold> The assignment of competencies in a federal state can have a strong impact on economic growth, because the regions of a country particularly contribute to its total economic development. Hence, public policy should be tailored to regional needs. Public economists however mainly focus on the efficiency of decentralized public goods provision and financing; seldom arguments concerning political innovation due to a decentralized experimentation of policies and its impact on economic growth are considered. After a discussion of theoretical arguments on federalism and economic growth, the empirical question is addressed in this paper whether the assignment of autonomy and the institutional design of fiscal federalism influence economic development of a country. On this basis, open question and potential routes of research are formulated.
John Grundy, Valentine Healy, L Gorgolon, E Sandig
INTRODUCTION: In 1991 the Philippines Government introduced a major devolution of national government services, which included the first wave of health sector reform, through the introduction of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Code devolved basic services for agriculture extension, forest management, health services, barangay (township) roads and social welfare to Local Government Units. In 1992, the Philippines Government devolved the management and delivery of health services from the National Department of Health to locally elected provincial, city and municipal governments. AIM: The aim of this review is to (i) Provide a background to the introduction of devolution to the health system in the Philippines and to (ii) describe the impact of devolution on the structure and functioning of the health system in defined locations. METHOD: International literature was reviewed on the subjects of decentralization. Rapid appraisals of health management systems were conducted in both provinces. Additional data were accessed from the rural health information system and previous consultant reports. RESULTS: Subsequent to the introduction of devolution, quality and coverage of health services declined in some locations, particularly in rural and remote areas. It was found that in 1992-1997, system effects included a breakdown in management systems between levels of government, declining utilization particularly in the hospital sector, poor staff morale, a decline in maintenance of infrastructure and under financing of operational costs of services. CONCLUSION: The aim of decentralization is to widen decision-making space of middle level managers, enhance resource allocations from central to peripheral areas and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of health services management. The findings of the historical review of devolution in the Philippines reveals some consistencies with the international literature, which describe some negative effects of decentralization, and provide a rationale for the Philippines in undertaking a second wave of reform in order to 'make devolution work'.