Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are critical elements of public finance in decentralized countries. In the context of Indonesia’s decentralization reforms, their design and implementation have significant impacts on the potential revenue and fiscal capacity of basic public service provision. The case of Indonesia’s 2001 Big Bang decentralization illustrates the challenges associated with implementing significant reforms in the intergovernmental fiscal system. The practice of decentralization policy in Indonesia since the time has not generally improved local development performance yet. This study evaluates fiscal decentralization, focusing on fiscal capacity as the impacts of the intergovernmental fiscal equalization transfers, in the case of Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta. The study shows a low percentage of its own revenue compared to its total budget. It indicates the failure of fiscal decentralization policy in improving local government fiscal capacity.
This paper focuses on the fiscal decentralization in the Philippines after the 1991Local Government Code. It first examines the intergovernmental fiscal relationshipbetween central and local governments by using fiscal decentralization indicators,and then investigates its impact on local finance. After fiscal decentralization, thelocal expenditure responsibility is expanded while the local fiscal capacity is notstrengthened in the Philippines. Local governments consequently comes to dependheavily on fiscal transfers from the central government, internal revenue allotments(IRAs), which has a substantial influence on local finance. The heavy dependence onIRAs makes local finance unpredictable and unstable. The distribution of IRAs alsoaffects the horizontal balance between provincial governments.
Every regions government must be able increasing their own regional income. The finance of resources in fiscal decentralization era, such as: regional original income, general allocation funds and natural resources revenue sharing and tax revenue sharing This research aims to analyze the fiscal decentralization impact to economic growth at regional district in sub province Semarang. The tool of analisis is regression using panel data with Generalized Least Square (GLS) method and Fixed Effect model. It uses district-level data and supplied by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics during 2002 - 2006 The regression result shows that regional income, natural resources revenue sharing and tax revenue sharing, and labor forces have positive impact on economic growth at regional district in sub province Semarang. General allocation funds have negative effect towards economic growth at regional district in sub province Semarang. Fiscal decentralization brings more advantages for regions to manage their own fiscal capacities. The regions governments must be have informational advantages concerning resource allocation with optimal Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, economic growth, Fixed Effect Model
This project tries to look at decentralization of VAT revenue and administration to sub national governments in Ethiopia in light of the international practices. It used individual in-depth interview to collect primary data from Ethiopian revenue and custom Authority (ERCA), Addis Ababa regional city administration tax office and ministry of finance and economic development (MOFED). The methods used for analysis were both qualitative and quantitative. The project discusses the problems in connection with decentralization of VAT administration and assignment of VAT revenue. The project suggests that decentralization of VAT administration needs capable and autonomous regional government and strong central government that could monitor and evaluate decentralization; and the assignment of VAT revenue also needs the central governments' follow up to minimize the distortions and should be applied in consistent with the constitution
Abstract The analysis of urban governance in terms of networks, as developed in the UK by scholars including Rhodes and Stoker, can be applied to a context such as Mexico if due weight is given to macro‐level processes. In this article, careful attention is paid to the institutional legacies of Mexico's past authoritarian regime and how they are challenged by a new discourse of neoliberalization, decentralization and democratization. Corporatism, social segmentation and organizational fragmentation in the past have resulted in the continuing importance of hierarchical modes of governance alongside networks. Case studies of the public–private partnerships involved in the regeneration of the historic centres of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí show that new forms of governance entail a mix of continuity and change. Regeneration partnerships were initiated and largely funded by the local state, with the state retaining considerable power. Most of the non‐state participants were drawn from the old aristocracy and business and professional organizations, whilst the increasingly autonomous groups of street traders and ‘ordinary’ citizens concerned with the life in the city centre were excluded. Nevertheless, new discourses challenge the institutional legacies of the past, encouraging institutional change. Résumé L'analyse de la gouvernance urbaine en termes de réseaux, telle que des chercheurs comme Rhodes et Stoker la présentent au Royaume‐Uni, est applicable au contexte mexicain si on pondère correctement les macro‐processus. Une attention particulière est accordée ici aux héritages institutionnels du régime autoritaire qu'a connu le Mexique, et à la façon dont ils sont remis en cause par un discours nouveau de néolibéralisation, décentralisation et démocratisation. Dans le passé, corporatisme, segmentation sociale et fragmentation des organisations ont donné une importance constante aux modes de gouvernance hiérarchisés en parallèle aux réseaux. D'après des études de cas de partenariats public‐privé portant sur des projets de régénération des centres historiques de Querétaro et de San Luis Potosí, de nouvelles formes de gouvernance génèrent un mélange de continuité et de changement. Les partenariats liés à la régénération de quartiers ont été lancés et en grande partie financés par l'État local, l'État gardant une emprise considérable. Hormis l'État, les participants étaient issus, par la plupart, de la vieille aristocratie, ainsi que des milieux commerciaux et professionnels, alors qu'étaient exclus les groupes de plus en plus autonomes des marchands ambulants et des citoyens ‘ordinaires’ concernés par la vie dans le centre‐ville. Néanmoins les nouveaux discours, qui remettent en question les héritages institutionnels du passé, encouragent à une évolution des institutions.
Decentralization has the potential to lower corruption and alleviate poverty across the world. The true effects of this process are unclear since there are relatively few studies on decentralization and many of these studies, both theoretical and empirical, give conflicting results. One major problem in the literature for the effects of decentralization on corruption has been sample selection bias. The main cross-country dataset for decentralization, the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), has data for only about 40 countries, and most of these are developed. I attempt to mitigate this sample-selection problem by first estimating a Heckman model for decentralization in order to predict values for unobserved countries and then using these predicted values to estimate decentralization's impact on corruption. My results show that decentralization has an insignificant effect on corruption, suggesting that decentralization alone may not be a useful tool for mitigating corruption.
The paper intends to analyse a model of decentralization specific to Continental Europe, which shows that a transferof responsibility to the local authorities has not always been appropriately followed by a transfer of resource, the consequencebeing the appearance of budgetary imbalances at the level of local communities. In this situation, the local communities areforced to identify the funding source and, therefore, they have used the most rapid instruments provided by the law and thefinancial institutions – the borrowed sources. As long as the borrowed funding sources have been used to the restoration of thepublic infrastructure and, therefore, to the public investments, the solutions identified by the public manager are not to beblamed, the problem being the use of borrowed sources in order to cover certain consumerism needs which illegitimatelycharges, in our opinion, the public cost, the obligation to finance the maturity rates including the interest falling back on thefuture generations.
본 연구는 참여정부 복지분권화 개혁을 재정분권과 사무분권의 차원에서 평가하였다. 분권화 이후 복지분야 지방이양사업의 예산부족 현상이 발생하고 지방의 재정부담은 가중되는 한편, 서비스의 효율적 공급이나 지방의 자율성 신장 등의 긍정적 효과는 나타난다고 보기 어렵다. 재정분권의 측면에서, 분권교부세의 재원규모, 예산산정방식 등의 문제로 인해 지방비 부담이 크게 증가하였다. 사무분권의 측면에서, 지방이양 이후 노인, 장애인, 정신요양시설 등 생활시설 공급계획이 차질을 빚는 등의 문제가 발생하였다. 개선방안으로 사업 성격에 따른 국고보조/지방이양사업의 재분류, 서비스 사업의 장기적 지방이양, 소득보장과 취약계층 보호 목적 사업의 중앙정부 재정책임 강화 등을 제시하였다. There has been a continuous debate on decentralization of welfare. The proponents of decentralization argue that it will enhance the autonomy of local governments and the efficiency in the provision of service. However, the opponents argue that it will lead to the welfare reduction and the increased inequality among localities. This study attempts to deal with the question, focusing on the evaluation of decentralization reform of Roh Government. The main results are as follows: After the decentralization, local governments has undergone hardships in financing the welfare service, while there is no clear evidence that the local autonomy has enhanced. In respect of fiscal role-sharing, local duties has significantly increased because of the insufficient grants-in-aid for decentralization and inappropriate formula in assessing the grants. In respect of functional role-sharing, the decreased role of central government made it difficult for local governments to provide enough residential institution for the elderly and the disabled. To improve the decentralization reform, deliberate reclassification is needed to decide which item should be transferred to localities. Regarding the characteristic of the projects, social services could be transferred in the long run, while central government should take more responsibilities for the income guarantee and protection for the disadvantaged.
Every regions goverment must be able increasing their own regional income. The finance of resources in fiscal decentralization era, such as: regional original income, general allocation funds and natural resources revenue sharing and tax revenue sharing This research aims to analyze the fiscal decentralization impact to economic growth at regional district in sub provinsi Semarang. The tools of analisis is regression using panel data with Generalized Least Square (GLS) method and Fixed Effect model. It uses district-level data and supplied by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics during 2002 - 2006 The regression result shows that regional income, natural resources revenue sharing and tax revenue sharing, and labour forces have positive impact on economic growth at regional district in sub provinsi Semarang.General allocation funds has negative effect towards economic growth at regional district in sub provinsi Semarang. Fiscal decentralization brings more advantages for regions to manage their own fiscal capacities. The regions governments must be have informational advantages concerning resource allocation with optimal Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, economic growth, Fixed Effect Model
Decentralization of public responsibilities implies also financial decentralization. The effect of this process in EU countries’ budgets is important to be evaluated in order to correlate with macroeconomic indicators. From financial point of view, local revenues and expenditures and the balance of local budgets constitute the main research theme. Different experiences and realities reached under the same normative framework (European Charter of Local Self-Government) are analyzed in this paper.
The process of gradual administrative and political decentralization in Bulgaria started in 1991 with the adoption of the Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act, but the real financial decentralization process started in the beginning of 2003 with the adoption of a comparatively clear expenditure assignment and introduction of a transparent and predictable intergovernmental transfer system. Basically, a key issue in the design of fiscal federalism is the financing of subnational governments. Because of the advantages of taxation at the central level and spending at the decentralized level during the transition period Bulgaria has often ended up with vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances. In most of the fiscal years the decentralization of expenditures was not accompanied by equivalent revenue-raising responsibilities and the taxable base was unevenly distributed within the country territory. The purpose of this paper is to study and critically analyze the financial decentralization reform in Bulgaria, outlining the key achievements and basic weaknesses of the local taxation and the intergovernmental fiscal relations. Key words: financial decentralization, local finance, intergovernmental fiscal relations, local
The work paper highlights the evolution of the public financial decentralization in Romania, based on analysis of legislative changes that occurred after 1991.These changes have had an important impact on local budgets and on local government responsibilities. In the context of increasing local financial independence, local authorities had to demonstrate their ability to take on the tasks of local interest from central government powers. The effect is prompt and timely response to citizen needs.
Informal payments are a frequently overlooked source of local public finance in developing countries. We use microdata from ten countries to establish stylized facts on the magnitude, form, and distributional implications of this "informal taxation." Informal taxation is widespread, particularly in rural areas, with substantial in-kind labor payments. The wealthy pay more, but pay less in percentage terms, and informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes. Failing to include informal taxation underestimates household tax burdens and revenue decentralization in developing countries. We propose a simple model of information and enforcement constraints that parsimoniously explains the patterns in the data.
The objective of the three essays of this doctoral dissertation is to investigate the strategic choices of organizational forms by competing firms in various environments. The first essay, which is a joint work with Professor Guofu Tan, provides an alternative theory of divestitures that relies on product-line complementarities and product market competition. We consider a simple environment in which there axe two firms, each supplying a group of complementary products and the products across groups axe imperfect substitutes. We model the firms' choices of divesting and pricing as a two-stage game. The duopohsts simultaneously choose their divestiture strategies in the first stage of the game and the independent divisions compete by setting prices in the second. It is shown that, when competing with each other, firms with complementary product-lines have incentives to split into multiple independent divisions supplying complementary products and services. Such divestitures increase prices and the parent firms' values but reduce aggregate social welfare. Moreover, the degree of divestiture, as we illustrate in the linear demand case, depends on the severity of competition and the nature of product-lines. Then, intensified competition due to deregulation, trade liberalization and entry may trigger divestitures. We further show that if two firms axe able to coordinate their divestiture strategies, they can achieve the joint monopoly prices and profits in a non-cooperative price game. The second essay analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equiubrium, and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to further divide, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free entry equihbrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure strategy free entry equilibrium is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low. The third essay develops a game theoretic model to analyze strategic leasing behaviors of landowners in a nonexclusively owned common oil pool. The oil field development is modeled as two more-or-less independent one-stage noncooperative game. The landowners choose leasing strategies in the first stage, and independent lease operators choose extraction strategies in the second. It is found that, in a nonexclusively owned oil field, it is individually rational for a landowner to unilaterally subdivide his landholding and delegate production rights to multiple independent firms, even though more dispersed production control leads to heavier common pool losses. Moreover, the degree of landownership concentration determines the degree of production concentration. The more fragmented the land ownership, the lower is the degree of production concentration i n equilibrium. The analysis offers an explanation for the puzzling landowners' leasing behaviors in U . S . onshore oil fields.
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and pro-poor outcomes based on the role of fiscal incentives. The literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and pro-poor outcomes is not well established in this area. A conceptual model is developed to explore in more detail this relationship, while endeavoring to illuminate the complexity of the issues involved for policy makers in developing countries. Four types of fiscal incentives are explored: namely, resources, responsibility, autonomy, and accountability. The paper then assesses the effectiveness of the Vietnamese system of fiscal decentralization for achieving pro-poor outcomes through a devolved system of fiscal incentives. The paper suggests that evidence from the Vietnamese case indicates that fiscal decentralization may contribute to poverty reduction outcomes, but does not provide evidence that fiscal decentralization is in and of itself inherently pro-poor. Rather, the lesson from Viet Nam is that if poverty reduction is an explicit objective for government, the system of fiscal decentralization should target pro-poor outcomes through an appropriate system of fiscal incentives. Since 2002, budgetary reallocation and income redistribution linked to poverty outcomes has been more strongly associated with equalizing fiscal transfers than with devolved finances in general. This represents a broadly correct approach to target poverty outcomes in a territorially unbalanced country like Viet Nam. Targeted transfers contribute to pro-poor outcomes by increasing the level of resources available to finance poverty spending. However, increasing the level of fiscal transfers for poverty spending will not ensure that fiscal transfers are then spent efficiently. In order to better realize these efficiency objectives, the government can promote greater fiscal and administrative decentralization of resources and responsibility to district- and commune-level governments. Further gains in this area must also be supported by greater levels of fiscal autonomy and fiscal accountability at the local government level.
The paper examines the progress being made in local finance reforms and indicates pathways to advance those reforms. A summary of the effects of decentralization is given as a contextual background for the discussion of local finance reforms. The inefficient tax assignment has constrained the mobilization of local tax revenues even as local government units have become very dependent on the intergovernmental fiscal transfer, called the internal revenue allotment. The paper raises the importance of revisiting the internal revenue allotment formula. It identifies the local finance reforms currently being undertaken and reports the progress being made at the local and national level. The final section comments on the outstanding issues in local finance reform and gives some recommendations.
This book explores the important topic of fiscal decentralization in Asian countries, and focuses on how government finance and administration are being reformed to bring budgetary decisions closer to voters. The focus on Asia is especially important because all countries in this region have been undergoing serious fiscal reforms in the past decade. They include one of the biggest decentralization reforms in Indonesia, significant reforms in democratic Philippines and Vietnam which are in transition, and Japan, whose fiscal reconstruction program is covered extensively. India and China, which are also covered, are very special cases because of their size and because their policies must fit decentralization into a significant economic growth scenario.
Both theory and experience in a variety of circumstances around the world suggest strongly that if fiscal decentralization is to produce sustainable net benefits in developing countries, subnational governments require much more real taxing power than they now have. Students of public finance have studied the subject, and practitioners in developing countries have installed many different versions of subnational government tax. In most developing countries there are potentially sound and productive taxes that subnational governments could use: personal income tax surcharges, property taxes, taxes on the use of motor vehicles, payroll taxes, and even subnational value‐added taxes and local “business value” taxes may all be viable options in particular countries. Still, there is no general consensus about what works and what does not. In this review paper, we try and pull together enough evidence to suggest the way forward. We also develop the argument that given political realities one cannot usually decentralize significant revenues to subnational governments without having in place an intergovernmental transfer system to offset at least some of the disequalizing effects that would otherwise occur. Nor does it make sense to think of decentralizing exactly the same package of tax choices to all subnational governments regardless of their scale and scope of operations.
The 20th century has been called the era of centralized authoritarian rule.On the other hand, the 21st century is known as the era of devolution.In this lecture, I will first explain the reasons why a decentralized society, that is, devolution, has become necessary.Second, I will give a general outline on the OECD system of fiscal relations across government levels.Third, I will examine the present state of the reform for decentralization that has been undertaken in Japan in recent years, and fourth, I will investigate the situation of local government finance in the age of devolution in reference to the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
Observation of the first and second generation of literature on fiscal decentralization together with further branches of political economy, e.g. specifically on the political economy of intergovernmental grants and the widening literature on political business cycles leads to a puzzle: decentralization is a continuing policy trend however in reality there are downsides, institutional, political and other factors that do interfere with decision-making and can increase the chances for inefficient policy outcomes. Infrastructure investment finances at all levels of government are especially prone to election cycles and corruption. Driven from the above context the basic research question guiding my work is: whether local infrastructure policies in Hungary are really designed according to efficiency considerations? What politico-economic factors might affect central and local governments’ allocations on infrastructure investment? To complete this goal, a closer look at municipal capital investment financing in Hungary takes place. Related to the main research question several themes emerge and hypotheses are checked on the effects of the revenue base, local need and socioeconomic indicators on local investment strategies and financing constructions or grant allocations. Does grant financing mean a less careful financial planning? What is the importance of lobbying through different channels? I also search for - and in fact do find evidence of electoral cycle effects and partisan considerations (effect of similarities in political color of central and local governments) in intergovernmental grant distribution and in municipal investment activities. These issues to be researched call for a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. Some of my hypothesis are tested on limited data from a 2004 survey of city mayors in Hungary. Hypotheses on cycles, determinants of investment outlays of local governments and grant recipiency are tested with linear and Probit panel regressions respectively on a panel dataset comprehensive for all Hungarian local government budgets from 1993-2003, a period bridging three election cycles, linked with some demographic,socioeconomic data and local election data. Findings can add to the discussion on reforming local government finance system overall, on the agenda in Hungary for quite a while, but perhaps also to the new literature on the political economy of failures, delays in socially beneficial reforms. What this dissertation certainly does contribute to is the fairly small pool of international empirical evidences available on political budget cycles, especially at the sub-national level and the emerging literature on the political economy of intergovernmental grants providing the case of one transition country that irrespective of the fact of by now being an EU member sometimes shows certain similarities to the developing ones.
Open access
Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Regional Development and Policy
Hungarian Social, Economic and Educational Studies
The Czech Republic and Slovakia, like other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, have given significant lip service to fiscal decentralization and engaged in public administration reforms. But the subnational governments of their public finance systems still lack relative autonomy, which could be addressed partly through developing independent revenue sources for their municipalities and regions. Currently, such independent revenue sources include the proceeds of a strictly nominal property tax as well as those of a small set of local user fees and taxes designed and approved by the central governments. Together they represent only about 5 percent of total municipal budget revenues.