The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a major pillar of the European energy policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, the reportedly pervasive frauds in this market are constraining the beneficial role of the EU ETS. In this conceptual paper, we propose to digitalize the EU ETS by distributed ledger technology (DLT), enabling the verification of authenticity and provenance, proof of ownership, and lifecycle traceability of carbon certificates and assets. Our platform allows verifiable credentials to validate emission allowances, real-time tracking of trading participants’ emissions, and the audit trail reporting of the decentralized trading records. Furthermore, we complement the DLT application concept with a structured interdisciplinary evaluation framework. Our framework and analysis aim to stimulate further interdisciplinary research in this area to support regulators, such as the European Commission, in designing effective digital emissions trading systems.
Tobias Guggenberger, Johannes Sedlmeir, Gilbert Fridgen, André Luckow
Private permissioned blockchains are deployed in ever greater numbers to facilitate cross-organizational processes in various industries, particularly in supply chain management. One popular example of this trend is Hyperledger Fabric. Compared to public permissionless blockchains, it promises improved performance and provides certain features that address key requirements of enterprises. However, also permissioned blockchains are still not as scalable as centralized systems, and due to the scarcity of theoretical results and empirical data, their real-world performance cannot be predicted with the necessary precision. We intend to address this issue by conducting an in-depth performance analysis of Hyperledger Fabric. The paper presents a detailed compilation of various performance characteristics using an enhanced version of the Distributed Ledger Performance Scan (DLPS). Researchers and practitioners alike can use the various performance properties identified and discussed as guidelines to better configure and implement their Hyperledger Fabric network. Likewise, they are encouraged to use the DLPS framework to conduct their measurements.
Dataset retrieved with an Ethereum client, and used by the code hosted here for this paper published in the Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021 (WWW ’21) Abstract: Cryptoassets such as cryptocurrencies and tokens are increasingly traded on decentralized exchanges. The advantage for users is that the funds are not in custody of a centralized external entity. However, these exchanges are prone to manipulative behavior. In this paper, we illustrate how wash trading activity can be identified on two of the first popular limit order book-based decentralized exchanges on the Ethereum blockchain, IDEX and EtherDelta. We identify a lower bound of accounts and trading structures that meet the legal definitions of wash trading, discovering that they are responsible for a wash trading volume in equivalent of 159 million U.S. Dollars. While self-trades and two-account structures are predominant, complex forms also occur. We quantify these activities, finding that on both exchanges, more than 30% of all traded tokens have been subject to wash trading activity. On EtherDelta, 10% of the tokens have almost exclusively been wash traded. All data is made available for future research. Our findings underpin the need for countermeasures that are applicable in decentralized systems.
This paper presents the current state of the gaming industry, which provides an important background for an effective serious game implementation in mobile crowdsensing. An overview of existing solutions, scientific studies and market research highlights the current trends and the potential applications for citizen-centric platforms in the context of Cyber–Physical–Social systems. The proposed solution focuses on serious games applied in urban water management from the perspective of mobile crowdsensing, with a reward-driven mechanism defined for the crowdsensing tasks. The serious game is designed to provide entertainment value by means of gamified interaction with the environment, while the crowdsensing component involves a set of roles for finding, solving and validating water-related issues. The mathematical model of distance-constrained multi-depot vehicle routing problem with heterogeneous fleet capacity is evaluated in the context of the proposed scenario, with random initial conditions given by the location of players, while the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction model provides an alternative to the centralized task allocation strategy, subject to the same evaluation method. A blockchain component based on the Hyperledger Fabric architecture provides the level of trust required for achieving overall platform utility for different stakeholders in mobile crowdsensing.
Modern mathematics is built on the idea that proofs should be translatable\ninto formal proofs, whose validity is an objective question, decidable by a\ncomputer. Yet, in practice, proofs are informal and may omit many details. An\nagent considers a proof valid if they trust that it could be expanded into a\nmachine-verifiable proof. A proof's validity can thus become a subjective\nmatter and lead to a debate, which may be difficult to settle. Hence, while the\nconcept of valid proof is well-defined, the process to establish validity is\nitself a complex multi-agent problem.\n We introduce the SPRIG protocol. SPRIG allows agents to propose and verify\nsuccinct and informative proofs in a decentralized fashion; the trust is\nestablished by agents being able to request more details in the proof steps;\ndebates, if they arise, must isolate details of proofs and, if they persist, go\ndown to machine-level details, where they are automatically settled. A\nstructure of bounties and stakes is set to incentivize agents to act in good\nfaith.\n We propose a game-theoretic discussion of SPRIG, showing how agents with\nvarious types of information interact, leading to a proof tree with an\nappropriate level of detail and to the invalidation of wrong proofs, and we\ndiscuss resilience against various attacks. We then analyze a simplified model,\ncharacterize its equilibria and compute the agents' level of trust.\n SPRIG is designed to run as a smart contract on a blockchain platform. This\nallows anonymous agents to participate in the verification debate, and to\ncontribute with their information. The smart contract mediates the\ninteractions, settles debates, and guarantees that bounties and stakes are paid\nas specified.\n SPRIG enables new applications, such as the issuance of bounties for open\nproblems, and the creation of derivatives markets, allowing agents to inject\nmore information pertaining to proofs.\n
Over the past decade, blockchains and distributed ledger technologies have rapidly evolved. With increasing transaction volumes and the proliferation of decentralized applications based on smart contracts, a need for a deeper understanding arises. We structure the field that we term distributed ledger analytics.
Sam M. Werner, Daniel Pérez, Lewis Gudgeon, Ariah Klages‐Mundt · 6 authors
Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a blockchain powered peer-to-peer financial system, is mushrooming. Two years ago the total value locked in DeFi systems was approximately 700m USD, now, as of April 2022, it stands at around 150bn USD. The frenetic evolution of the ecosystem has created challenges in understanding the basic principles of these systems and their security risks. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) we delineate the DeFi ecosystem along the following axes: its primitives, its operational protocol types and its security. We provide a distinction between technical security, which has a healthy literature, and economic security, which is largely unexplored, connecting the latter with new models and thereby synthesizing insights from computer science, economics and finance. Finally, we outline the open research challenges in the ecosystem across these security types.
Financial regulators have long-standing concerns about fully decentralized exchanges that run 'on-chain' without any obvious regulatory hooks. The popularity of Uniswap, an automated market makers (AMM), made these concerns a reality. AMMs implement a lightweight dealer-based trading system, but they are unlike anything on Wall Street, require fees intrinsically, and are susceptible to front-running attacks. This leaves the following research questions we address in this paper: (1) are conventional (i.e., order books), secure (i.e., resistant to front-running and price manipulation) and fully decentralized exchanges feasible on a public blockchain like Ethereum, (2) what is the performance profile, and (3) how much do Layer 2 techniques (e.g., Arbitrum) increase performance? To answer these questions, we implement, benchmark, and experiment with an Ethereum-based call market exchange called Lissy. We confirm the functionality is too heavy for Ethereum today (you cannot expect to exceed a few hundred trade executions per block) but show it scales dramatically (99.88% gas cost reduction) on Arbitrum.
This paper presents EDSC, a novel smart contract platform design based on the event-driven execution model as opposed to the traditionally employed transaction-driven execution model. We reason that such a design is a better fit for many emerging smart contract applications and is better positioned to address the scalability and performance challenges plaguing the smart contract ecosystem. We propose EDSC's design under the Ethereum framework, and the design can be easily adapted for other existing smart contract platforms. We have conducted implementation using Ethereum client and experiments where performance modeling results show on average 2.2 to 4.6 times reduced total latency of event triggered smart contracts, which demonstrates its effectiveness for supporting contracts that demand timely execution based on events. In addition, we discuss example use cases to demonstrate the design's utility and comment on its potential security dynamics.
Stefan Dziembowski, Grzegorz Fabiański, Sebastian Faust, Siavash Riahi
Blockchain is a disruptive new technology introduced around a decade ago. It can be viewed as a method for recording timestamped transactions in a public database. Most of blockchain protocols do not scale well, i.e., they cannot process quickly large amounts of transactions. A natural idea to deal with this problem is to use the blockchain only as a timestamping service, i.e., to hash several transactions tx_1,…,tx_m into one short string, and just put this string on the blockchain, while at the same time posting the hashed transactions tx_1,…,tx_m to some public place on the Internet ("off-chain"). In this way the transactions tx_i remain timestamped, but the amount of data put on the blockchain is greatly reduced. This idea was introduced in 2017 under the name Plasma by Poon and Buterin. Shortly after this proposal, several variants of Plasma have been proposed. They are typically built on top of the Ethereum blockchain, as they strongly rely on so-called smart contracts (in order to resolve disputes between the users if some of them start cheating). Plasmas are an example of so-called off-chain protocols. In this work we initiate the study of the inherent limitations of Plasma protocols. More concretely, we show that in every Plasma system the adversary can either (a) force the honest parties to communicate a lot with the blockchain, even though they did not intend to (this is traditionally called mass exit); or (b) an honest party that wants to leave the system needs to quickly communicate large amounts of data to the blockchain. What makes these attacks particularly hard to handle in real life is that these attacks do not have so-called uniquely attributable faults, i.e. the smart contract cannot determine which party is malicious, and hence cannot force it to pay the fees for the blockchain interaction. An important implication of our result is that the benefits of two of the most prominent Plasma types, called Plasma Cash and Fungible Plasma, cannot be achieved simultaneously. Besides of the direct implications on real-life cryptocurrency research, we believe that this work may open up a new line of theoretical research, as, up to our knowledge, this is the first work that provides an impossibility result in the area of off-chain protocols.
When economic agents have private information, the agents will be incentivised to use this information advantage by acting in a manner that does not always coincide with production and social efficiency, or the interests of the principal. This thesis investigates details specific to designing a contract with blockchain technology and smart contracts that consistently elicit efficiency and good behaviour with the best possible outcome for participating agents. We use the lens of the principal agent theory to show that implementing blockchain technology and smart contracts in contractual agreements can alleviate problems associated with information asymmetry that arise when one party holds its information private. Information asymmetry has a significant economic impact in principal agent relationships.
Using data from one of the first and most popular decentralized lending protocols, MakerDao, we study whether computer-language-based information lends itself for the efficient use of information in a market that features real-time transparency. We first find that there is persistent cross-sectional difference in performance, where persistence increases with investors sophistication. We then study how different types of processing costs affect the extent to which investors use past loan performance to mimic experts in real time (i.e., efficient mimicking). Our results show that awareness costs, proxied by loan activity level, hinder efficient mimicking. More importantly, acquisition and integration costs associated with translating code-based information into useful trading signals impedes investors’ ability to take advantage of information embedded in smart contracts. Our paper has important implications for regulators and practitioners aiming at more efficient use of information in smart contracts and on blockchain.
How might modern settlement systems with distributed ledger technology achieve zero settlement risk? We consider the design of settlement systems that satisfies two integral features: information-leakage proof and zero settlement risk. Legacy settlement systems partition private information but are vulnerable to settlement fails. A token system with dynamic ownership representation, or a dynamic ledger, can be designed to achieve both, as long as it employs a protocol that enforces two restrictions: programs must be immediately implemented and must involve transactions based on verifiable claims. We show how such a system can support various arrangements, including insurance, derivatives, collateralized loans, and securitization.
Suppose that Alice plans to buy a physical good from Bob over a programmable Blockchain. Alice does not trust Bob, so she is not willing to pay before the good is delivered off-chain. Similarly, Bob does not trust Alice, so he is not willing to deliver the good before getting paid on-chain. Moreover, they are not inclined to use the services of a trusted third-party. Traditionally, such scenarios are handled by game-theoretic escrow smart contracts, such as BitHalo. In this work, we first show that the common method for this problem suffers from a major flaw which can be exploited by Bob in order to extort Alice. We also show that, unlike the case of auctions, this flaw cannot be addressed by a commitment-scheme-based approach. We then provide a much more general result: assuming that the two sides are rational actors and the smart contract language is Turing-complete, there is no escrow smart contract that can facilitate this exchange without either relying on third parties or enabling at least one side to extort the other.∗∗A preprint of this work appeared in [1].
In the high-stakes race to develop more scalable blockchains, some platforms (Binance, Cosmos, EOS, TRON, etc.) have adopted committee-based consensus (CBC) protocols, whereby the blockchain's record-keeping rights are entrusted to a committee of elected block producers. In theory, the smaller the committee, the faster the blockchain can reach consensus and the more it can scale. What's less clear, is whether such protocols ensure that honest committees can be consistently elected, given blockchain users typically have limited information on who to vote for. We show that the approval voting mechanism underlying most CBC protocols is complex and can lead to intractable optimal voting strategies. We empirically characterize some simpler intuitive voting strategies that users tend to resort to in practice and prove that these nonetheless converge to optimality exponentially quickly in the number of voters. Exponential convergence ensures that despite its complexity, CBC exhibits robustness and has some efficiency advantages over more popular staked-weighted lottery protocols currently underlying many prominent blockchains such as Ethereum.
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract can commit a player to act irrationally in specific subgames, making credible otherwise non-credible threats. This is further complicated by considering the interaction between multiple contracts which can reason about each other. This changes the nature of the game in a nontrivial way as choosing which contract to play can itself be considered a move in the game. Our model generalizes known notions of equilibria, with a single contract being equivalent to a Stackelberg equilibrium, and two contracts being equivalent to a reverse Stackelberg equilibrium. We prove a number of bounds on the complexity of computing SPE in such games with smart contracts. We show that computing an SPE is \(\textsf {PSPACE}\)-hard in the general case. Specifically, in games with k contracts, we show that computing an SPE is \(\varSigma _k^\textsf {P}\)-hard for games of imperfect information. We show that computing an SPE remains \(\textsf {PSPACE}\)-hard in games of perfect information if we allow for an unbounded number of contracts. We give an algorithm for computing an SPE in two-contract games of perfect information that runs in time \(O(m\ell )\) where m is the size of the game tree and \(\ell \) is the number of terminal nodes. Finally, we conjecture the problem to be \(\textsf {NP}\)-complete for three contracts.
Vincenzo Botta, Daniele Friolo, Daniele Venturi, Ivan Visconti
In this work, we consider executions of smart contracts for implementing secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols on forking blockchains (e.g., Ethereum), and we study security and delay issues due to forks. In this setting, the classical double-spending problem tells us that messages of the MPC protocol should be confirmed on-chain before playing the next ones, thus slowing down the entire execution. Our contributions are twofold: For the concrete case of fairly tossing multiple coins with penalties, we notice that the lottery protocol of Andrychowicz et al. (S&P ’14) becomes insecure if players do not wait for the confirmations of several transactions. In addition, we present a smart contract that instead retains security even when all honest players immediately answer to transactions appearing on-chain. We analyze the performance using Ethereum as testbed.We design a compiler that takes any “digital and universally composable” MPC protocol (with or without honest majority), and transforms it into another one (for the same task and same setup) which maintains security even if all messages are played on-chain without delays. The special requirements on the starting protocol mean that messages consist only of bits (e.g., no hardware token is sent) and security holds also in the presence of other protocols. We further show that our compiler satisfies fairness with penalties as long as honest players only wait for confirmations once. By reducing the number of confirmations, our protocols can be significantly faster than natural constructions.
In the high-stakes race to develop more scalable blockchains, some platforms (Cosmos, EOS, TRON, etc.) have adopted committee-based consensus protocols, whereby the blockchain's record-keeping rights are entrusted to a committee of elected block producers. In theory, the smaller the committee, the faster the blockchain can reach consensus and the more it can scale. What's less clear, is whether this mechanism ensures that honest committees can be consistently elected, given voters typically have limited information. Using EOS' Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) protocol as a backdrop, we show that identifying the optimal voting strategy is complex and practically out of reach. We empirically characterize some simpler (suboptimal) voting strategies that token holders resort to in practice and show that these nonetheless converge to optimality, exponentially quickly. This yields efficiency gains over other PoS protocols that rely on randomized block producer selection. Our results suggest that (elected) committee-based consensus, as implemented in DPoS, can be robust and efficient, despite its complexity.
Eric Alston, Wilson Law, Ilia Murtazashvili, Martin B. H. Weiss
Abstract Institutional economists have analyzed permissionless blockchains as a novel institutional building block for voluntary economic exchange and distributed governance, with their unique protocol features such as automated contract execution, high levels of network and process transparency, and uniquely distributed governance. But such institutional analysis needs to be complemented by polycentric analysis of how blockchains change. We characterize such change as resulting from internal sources and external sources. Internal sources include constitutional (protocol) design and collective-choice processes for updating protocols, which help coordinate network participants and users. External sources include competitive pressure from other cryptocurrency networks. By studying two leading networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, we illustrate how conceptualizing blockchains as competing and constitutional polycentric enterprises clarifies their processes of change.
Due to counterparty risks, some Bitcoin trading platforms allow users to rate the level of trust they have in others. We examine users' feedback behaviour on two Bitcoin trading platforms and provide statistically strong evidence that the feedback behaviour of Bitcoin users is dependent on how they are rated themselves, that is, they retaliate. In addition, user's reputation is strongly and positively associated with the scores they deliver, and there is a certain persistence in the scores a user gives to others. We find that peers deliver negative feedback relatively quickly to users with bad reputation. Moreover, well-reputed users withhold negative feedback longer and give positive feedback faster than users with bad reputation.