The innovation of supply chain financial services can alleviate the plight of SMEs financing difficulties. In the aspect of supply chain finance model, there is a credit guarantee financing model, which is different from the simple external financing and internal financing mode of supply chain. Based on this, this paper studies the decision-making of supply chain finance under the partial credit guarantee of core enterprises. First of all, the paper constructs a simple supply chain financing model, consisting of a bank, a core enterprise and a retailer. And then, considering the credit guarantee financing model, calculate the expected profit function. Stackelberg game model is used to give the optimal decision of each subject in decentralized system and the optimal decision in centralized system. Finally, in order to make a more specific and detailed study on the profit and decision-making based on the credit guarantee financing model, the important parameters of the model are analyzed. Through the calculation, it is proved that under the credit guarantee of the core enterprise, the retailer has the optimal ordering strategy, and the core enterprise has the best wholesale price. The influences of the partial credit guarantee coefficient and the retailer’s loan coefficient on the supply chain finance decision-making are also studied.
Affordable and reliable supply chain visibility is becoming increasingly important as the complexity of the network underlying supply chains is becoming orders of magnitudes higher compared to a decade ago. Moreover, this increase in complexity is starting to reflect on the cost of goods and their availability to the consumers. Optimizing the physical distribution phase in supply chain by providing increased visibility to trading partners can directly reduce product cost. Current supply chain information systems often lack the ability to cost-effectively relay ground truth information in near real time to all stakeholders and most importantly to the supplier and the customer during the transport of the shipment. This thesis presents a solution that addresses this gap through a distributed architecture. The solution enables small, medium and large businesses to interact in a dynamic and shipment-centric manner through a private blockchain sub-ledger that digitizes the transfer of custody for each shipment. Information in this private ledger is augmented by a public event ledger that reflects the movement of the shipment in real time. Third party monitors are engaged in the validation of the geolocation of the shipments by posting their physical proximity in the form of events to the public ledger.
Summary This paper investigates alternative configurations of different blockchain architectures that can be used for gathering and processing transactions in a range of different settings, including accounting, auditing, supply chain and other types of transaction information. Although there has been substantial focus on the peer‐to‐peer and public versions of blockchain, this paper focuses primarily on cloud‐based and private configuration versions of blockchains and investigates use configurations, advantages and limitations as firms bring blockchain‐based market mechanisms into their organizations. In addition, this paper investigates some emerging issues associated with blockchain use in consortium settings. Finally, this paper relates some proposed uses of blockchain for transaction processing to other technologies, such as data warehouses and databases.
Blockchain technology provides decentralized consensus and potentially enlarges the contracting space through smart contracts. Meanwhile, generating decentralized consensus entails distributing information that necessarily alters the informational environment. We analyze how decentralization relates to consensus quality and how the quintessential features of blockchain remold the landscape of competition. Smart contracts can mitigate informational asymmetry and improve welfare and consumer surplus through enhanced entry and competition, yet distributing information during consensus generation may encourage greater collusion. In general, blockchains sustain market equilibria with a wider range of economic outcomes. We further discuss the implications for antitrust policies targeted at blockchain applications. Received May 31, 2017; editorial decision May 29, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.
Apr 26, 2013·Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B))
Specific supply-chain investments are vital in achieving faster lead-time performance and more competitive costs. In practice, such as in the highly leveraged telecom sector, the coordinating original equipment manufacturers (OEM) often delegate the upstream coordination of suppliers to contract manufacturers. This can be justified by informational advantages or economies of scale. However, the rationale of such schemes has also been challenged by analytical work on three-stage chains, leading to open questions. In this paper, we study the organizational and contractual choice of a supply chain coordinator (say an OEM) to either control or delegate the investment decision of some shared resource (say dedicated machines, information or product standards, etc) to a contract manufacturer (CM) or to an upstream supplier in a three-stage supply chain. The analysis derives closed-form results for the economic performance of three scenarios under asymmetric information on investment cost: direct contracting with an integrated CM-supplier, decentralized contracting to tier-1 suppliers and centralized contracting to tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers. The results show that the observed practice to delegate investments to tier-1 and possibly tier-2 suppliers leads to relatively poor performance due to under-investments. The superior arrangement is the centralized conditional model, where the OEM forces coordination among upstream suppliers by offering conditional financing. We close the paper with an analogy to the Boeing 787 supply chain and some discussion about the assumptions and applicability of the model.
Modern engineering and social systems are often too complex to be managed by a centralized agent. Instead, such systems are commonly structured with multiple decentralized agents each responsible for managing a subset of the system, but the resulting system performance depends on the aggregate of the decisions made by decentralized agents. Local agents' decision makings often exhibit selfish behavior as they seek to optimize their own objectives under their localized models, which if left uncoordinated can lead to substantial loss of efficiency compared with the system that can be optimized by a single (hypothetical) centralized agent. In this dissertation, we seek to study the fundamental issues of how to efficiently manage large-scale and multi-agent stochastic dynamic systems, especially on how to device efficient coordination mechanisms that would optimize system performance under various constraints that are unique to decentralized systems.In the first part of this dissertation we study decentralized control of a general class of stochastic dynamic resource allocation problems that have many applications. We consider a stochastic system in which multiple decentralized agents allocate shared system resources in response to customer requests that arrive stochastically over time. Each agent is responsible for a subset of the allocation decisions which it makes according to a dynamic allocation policy obtained by maximizing his own expected profit subject to a potentially mis-specified model of the way in which shared resources are consumed by other agents. We introduce the notion of a transfer contract which specifies how agents compensate one another whenever resources are consumed and establish the existence of contracts under which the decentralized system has no efficiency loss relative to centralized optimality. We also show that this property is insensitive to mis-specification by each agent of the dynamics of resource consumption by others in the system. An explicit characterization of the optimal transfer contract and an iterative decentralized algorithm for computing it is also provided. In the language of duality, contracts are analogous to shadow prices and the iterative algorithm has the favor of a dual update method, but strong duality and convergence of the iterative algorithm to the set of optimal contracts are guaranteed without assumptions of convexity.In the second part of this dissertation we study a class of related decentralized control problems but specialize to portfolio and risk management. Many financial institutions typically trade in multiple correlated markets. While centralized portfolio optimization over all trading decisions is ideal, it is generally not possible due to the complexity of each market, and firms typically adopt a decentralized setup in which trading in each market the responsibility of a particular desk. Decentralized portfolio optimization, however, is complicated by the fact that different agents are commonly only well informed about their own investment universe (proprietary research and forecasts, etc) and prefer to keep this private, and have their own incentives which they optimize on the basis of their limited models. It is well known, however, that the aggregate performance of such a system can be extremely inefficient due to the loss of diversification. In this dissertation, we formulate a multi-agent dynamic portfolio choice problem and study how to improve its efficiency. We show that an internal system of swap contracts, which define internal cash transfers between agents, can be used to facilitate risk sharing and induce agents to choose portfolios that as a collection are optimal for the firm. Conceptually using swap contracts is similar to performance benchmarking that is often employed in the finance literature for decentralized portfolio management, but our new approach offers a significant advantage in that the swap contracts can be constructed in decentralized manner without requiring an all-knowing central agent. We provide an explicit characterization of the optimal swap contracts and an iterative algorithm for computing them that can be implemented without compromising proprietary agent level data.Throughout this dissertation, we also discuss various important issues surrounding decentralized control of stochastic dynamic systems, including but not limited to approximation methods, performance attribution, sensitivity analysis, and fairness issues, etc.
Daniel Roy, Didier Anciaux, Thibaud Monteiro, Latifa Ouzizi
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new approach for the supply chain management. This approach is based on the virtual enterprise paradigm and the used of multi-agent concept. Each entity (like enterprise) is autonomous and must perform local and global goals in relation with its environment. The base component of our approach is a Virtual Enterprise Node (VEN). The supply chain is viewed as a set of tiers (corresponding to the levels of production), in which each partner of the supply chain (VEN) is in relation with several customers and suppliers. Each VEN belongs to one tier. The main customer gives global objectives (quantity, cost and delay) to the supply chain. The Mediator Agent (MA) is in charge to manage the supply chain in order to respect those objectives as global level. Those objectives are taking over to Negotiator Agent at the tier level (NAT). These two agents are only active if a perturbation occurs; otherwise information flows are only exchange between VENs. This architecture allows supply chains management which is completely transparent seen from simple enterprise of the supply chain. The used of Multi-Agent System (MAS) allows physical distribution of the decisional system. Moreover, the hierarchical organizational structure with a decentralized control guaranties, in the same time, the autonomy of each entity and the whole flexibility.