Blockchain Papers

Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra

No abstract is available for this record.

Jesús Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell, Miguel Ángel García Díaz

In Spain, as a consequence of the persistence of the economic crisis, the deficit and debt of the public administrations have become a main issue on the current economic and political debates In the case of a highly decentralized scenario, such it is the Spanish one, even if we recognize the principal role of Central Government´s debt, a large part of the increased Autonomous Communities’ deficit and indebtedness is explained by the difficulties they have to face in financing services they have to cover. The paper describes the main characteristics of public accounts’ disequilibria in Spain and the regulatory limits established to make use of public debt. Also, the article offers different explanations of those disequilibria, putting the emphasis on those linked to the crisis: i.e. the increasing weight of basic welfare services covered by the Autonomous Communities (such as public health and as education); as the expansive policies implemented to fight the initial effects of the crisis; as the existence of previous and large “extraordinary” resources coming from the housing sector and its consequent collapse; as growth of the debt of the autonomous-community quangos and as the lack of effective accountability mechanisms addressed to control the expenditures of the autonomous communities.

Carmo, Manuela Santos Nunes do, 1981-

Orientador: Francisco Luiz Cazeiro Lopreato

Yulya Yevdokymova

This paper explores school finance management in the context of two different organizational models, rather decentralized Norwegian school management and highly centralized school management in Ukraine. Based on the both cases, the paper analyzes the experience of the school leaders in Norway and Ukraine regarding their budget efforts, and challenges they have met within the framework of the national contexts. It is argued that greater budget autonomy in schools in Ukraine might provide resource and time efficiency. It is discussed that formula-based allocation of money might increase accountability and transparency to the Ukrainian customers of educational services. The study involves deliberations on the possibility to apply greater school autonomy on budget matters in socio-economic context of Ukraine, and a series of policies is proposed, aimed at decentralization of the educational sector.

Андреас Каппелер, Albert Solé‐Ollé, Andreas Stephan, Timo Välilä

No abstract is available for this record.

Izabella Barati-Stec

After 1990, Hungary took steps toward decentralizing public administration and decision-making power. Administrative decentralization, however, was not matched by the same level of fiscal decentralization, creating tension and disparities among Hungarian municipalities. The revenue-raising ability of local governments in Hungary—especially after the economic downturn in 2008—is very low. The debt service of municipalities is also considerably higher than before 2008, a situation that can be explained in part by the change in the value of Hungarian forint relative to the Euro and the Swiss franc, the currencies in which half of Hungarian local debt is denominated. This situation is sharpened by unhealthy municipal financing practices, such as financing operating expenses from investment revenues or from loans. The indebtedness of the municipal sector increased 12.6 times from 2001 to 2007, and in 2007 about 83 percent of municipal borrowing was not backed by immobile assets or any revenue stream. This paper examines the system of municipal finance in Hungary with special attention to the current changes in the regulation and finance of Hungarian municipalities and the change in central control over municipal finances in general after 2008 (in part precipitated by the failure of borrowing rules created during the transitional period to prevent the current crisis in municipal finance), and suggests possible reforms to solve the financing problems of Hungarian municipalities.

Žan Jan Oplotnik, Boštjan Brezovnik, Borut Vojinović

This research paper focuses on the compliance of the actual system of financing local selfgovernment in Slovenia with the basic principles of the theory of decentralization and guidelines of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. It addresses the level of costs coverage within the municipal competence by using the allocated appropriate expenditure resources calculated according to the Law of Financing Municipality Act. The purpose of the paper is, therefore, to look for an answer to the question whether and to what extent the obtained funds correspond to the actual workload that municipalities have for performing statutory tasks and for exercising their competences. Analysis shows that, on an aggregate level, these actual systems ensure enough resources for local governments to cover their actual costs and current expenditures; some groups of municipalities, e.g. larger urban municipalities, municipalities with large proportions of elderly people etc. are faced with lack of funding, according to the actual costs data available, while other groups of municipalities receive more funds than they need.

Arindam Das-Gupta, Richard M. Bird

A “good” tax system for developing countries was once considered one based on progressive income taxes. More recently, the emphasis has been placed on securing revenues from broader bases at lower rates from consumption as well as income taxes. A framework for evaluating public finance structures and institutions in terms of revenue and spending as well as the fiscal balance is set out, and some key areas such as VAT, earmarking, tax evasion, and administration, and non-tax revenues are discussed. Increased globalization challenges national tax bases and makes it even more important to improve local fiscal expertise and institutions in developing countries. Finally, if local governments are sufficiently reliant on own revenue to promote fiscal discipline, decentralization may produce gains in both efficiency and local accountability that may outweigh any costs that might arise from the loss of some macroeconomic control and altered investment priorities.

Gustav Ranis, Ranis, Gustav

Vertical decentralization, either at the deconcentration, delegation or, more rarely, the devolution level, has been instituted in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. It usually has the effect of increasing the quantity as well as the quality, in terms of health and education, of public goods. More neglected in the literature is the issue of horizontal decentralization, shifting the decision-making power from the central ministry of finance to the ministries of education and health, as well as strengthening the legislative and judicial branches of government. We examine the relationship between horizontal decentralization with its important ethnic dimension and vertical decentralization. Local governments are accountable to the center under vertical and to democratic forces and civil society under horizontal decentralization. Smaller local units are more likely to be more homogeneous ethnically, leading to a larger quantity and higher quality of public goods.

Pablo Simón, Santiago Lago Peñas, Alberto Vaquero García

This paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008. First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy. National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are competitive regional elections. Moreover, we show that earmarked grants are allocated in those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and, especially, in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both strategies are complementary rather than exclusive.

Yinghua Jin, Jenny E. Ligthart, Mark Rider

In this article, we compare and contrast the design and performance of China and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. We find that there are remarkable similarities in the design and performance of China and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. More specifically, both countries have highly decentralized expenditures assignments and highly centralized revenue assignments. As a result, sub-national governments in both countries must rely on fiscal transfers to finance their assigned functions. Finally, there is considerable off the books and hidden borrowing by sub-national governments in both countries. We also find that there are considerable and growing disparities in the rate of expenditure decentralization among sub-national governments within each country. Lack fiscal discipline and growing fiscal disparities among sub-national governments create risks to future economic growth and to social cohesion, absent policy reforms to address these issues.

Rita Rahmawati

Part of Regional Otonomy in finance is giving local government to arrange regional receipt to purchase expenses bugget. Government genuine Receipt is one regional receipt that shows how stronger local goverment finance can handled all the expenditure, not only depend on Central Government. Metro and Lampung Timur same with another local government in Indonesia, wants the higher regional otonomy espescialy in finance. The higher decentralization indicate higher ability on local government to fulfill all expenditure. In can be analized from share of Government Genuine Receipt and Tax and non Tax Share compare Total Regional Receipt and Total Regional Expenditure. Higher fiscal Desentralization needed by Metro and Lampung Timur to get higher Regional otonomy.

Luc Eyraud, Lusine Lusinyan

In many countries the decentralization of spending responsibilities has outpaced the decentralization of revenue powers. Sub-national governments have then to rely on transfers from the center and borrowing to finance their spending. When this occurs, we find that the overall fiscal deficit tends to increase. This result is based on cross-country econometric evidence from OECD countries, and is particularly strong in the presence of regional disparities. Fiscal discipline can be strengthened by ensuring that sub-national taxing powers are adequate to meet spending obligations.

Dodescu Anca

Romania's integration in the European Union implies, apart the complex process of policy transfer, the learning of new modes to make policies characteristic to a multi-level governance and partnership culture. Of the different levels of governance of the European model, the regional level ("regional governance") most faithfully reflects, in our opinion, the complexity of reconfiguring the role of state in economy, at the beginning of this new millennium, in the European Union space and presents the highest practical importance for Romania, as a new Member State of the European Union, for, at the regional level, the structures are more flexible and the good practices are more rapidly assimilable. The selection of the best regional growth and development economic policies, the choosing of the objectives out of a series of competing options, the calibration in time and space of powers, roles, capabilities, and responsibilities and the encouragement of the win-win solutions call upon the choice and combination of some appropriate and efficient instruments. Representative for the new context, the regional growth and development policy must integrate, in Romania too, more knowledge, more creativity, new combinations of capabilities and new fields of expertise. This paper presents preliminary research results afferent to the post-doctoral research project: "Growth and regional development economic policies. Challenges for Romania in the context of economic-financial crisis and European model integration", carried out in the project "Economic scientific research, reliance of human welfare and development in European context", the Romanian Academy, "Costin C. Kiriţescu" National Institute for Economic Research, project financed for the 2010-2013 period from the European Social Fund (EFS) and implemented by the Romanian Academy, Costin C. Kiritescu National Institute for Economic Research, in the period of time 1 December 2010 - 30 November 2012, coordinator: Professor Dr. Valeriu Ioan Franc. The question we intend to answer, in the present phase of our research, based on the comparative analysis of the decentralisation systems of several Member States of European Union, respectively on the analysis of the regional disparities existing at the European Union level and of the effects of the economic integration, is- to what extent the capabilities of the regional policy should rather be concentrated in the hands of regional authorities or of the European Union than to be left individually to the Member States which should conceive their own regional policy? What we intend in this paper, based on the analysis of some experiences to decentralize the capabilities of economic policy at the European Union level, is to identify the regional implications of the interconnection of decentralization, centralization, respectively supra-nationalization tendencies and, implicitly, the analysis of the way to reconfigure the role of state in economy at the regional level, in the context of integration in the European model. The examination of the way to reconfigure the role of state in economy at regional level requires the review of the allocative, distributive, and regulating roles of the state from a regional perspective, the analysis, on one side, of the decentralization of economic policy capabilities from the national level to the regional level (for example, national level: pure public goods supply, for instance, national defence and the centralization of fiscal policy capabilities in order to achieve macroeconomic stability and revenue redistribution; regional level: mixed public goods supply, for instance, waste collection and community policy), on the other hand, the centralization/decentralization of regional capabilities at the European Union level.

Fabio Fiorillo, Agnese Sacchi

We hereby propose a model to analyze the provision of environmental protection activities (United Nation 2005) with positive interregional externalities in order to verify - at least in theory - whether this kind of policy is better accomplished through centralized policymaking, which implies a coordinated solution among local representatives, or a decentralized system, whereby local authorities independently finance and implement their environmental protection policy. The research question concerns the identification of criteria on how to allocate powers and functions to environmental management at different tiers of government. Moreover, modelling interregional externalities as a mechanism contributing to lowering the cost of financing environmental policy in each region (production externality), we can assume that different environmental policies are allowed across regions. Given this general framework, considerations favouring either institutional setting in terms of individuals’ welfare seem to involve interaction among these key elements: the extent of the inter-jurisdictional spillovers, the size of local jurisdictions and the regional preferences for environmental protection policy.

International Monetary Fund

Conventional wisdom postulates that there are benefits from decentralizing government finances but there is little empirical evidence about actual country practices. This paper presents data on fiscal decentralization for about 80 countries over a period of about 20 years (1990-2008) from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY), the only global database with fiscal data for several levels of government. The data show that in many countries, revenue collection remains relatively more centralized than expenditures and that employment tends to be concentrated in lower levels of government. Except for transition economies, the levels of decentralization are relatively stable over the time period. The findings are shown by degree of economic development, constitutional power arrangements, and geographic area, broadly confirming key factors identified in the literature as determining the extent of fiscal decentralization.

Jorge Martínez-Vázquez

This publication discusses the decentralization issues faced by countries of Asia and the Pacific. It includes practical suggestions on how to proceed in this area to achieve economic growth, macroeconomic stability, poverty and income distribution, services delivery improvements, and political accountability. This note elaborates on adequacy of local revenues and autonomy, expenditure management and clear service delivery mandates, horizontal imbalances and limited use of incentives in intergovernmental transfers, financing needs and local government borrowing, and local management capacities as the major challenges in a decentralized fiscal architecture. The recommendations to address the above challenges also note the long- term nature of these reforms.

昌孝 田代, Masayuki Tashiro

Decentralization will increase economic efficiency because local government are better positioned than the national government to deliver public services as a result of information advantages (Oates' Decentralization Theorem). Consequently, it was thought that decentralized finance would appear to have a potentially useful role to play in economic development (Oates [1993]). From the empirical viewpoint, however, it remains controversial whether there is any relationship between decentralization and economic growth. For example, as pointed out by Ebel and Yilmaz [2002] and Iimi [2005], it has been argued that fiscal decentralization can serve as a means to promote economic growth. On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with economic growth (e.g., Davoodi and Zou [1998], Zhang and Zou [1998]). Various reasons can be given for the differences in empirical estimations. In particular, the selection of fiscal decentralization variables is thought to be a cause of differences. A widely accepted measure of fiscal decentralization is the subnational share of total government spending. However, this is an imperfect measure of fiscal decentralization because it does not identify the degree of local expenditure autonomy. Ebel and Yilmaz [2002] defined the degree of local expenditure autonomy as the share of subnational own-revenues in total revenues. Though this indicator might capture subnational autonomy, it is difficult to represent the empowerment of people and communities through fiscal decentralization. However, it is important to be able to define fiscal decentralization as the empowerment of people and the community through fiscal empowerment of their local government. People and the community must be able to direct their subnational government officials to use their financial resources in accordance with local needs and preferences (Bahl [2005]). Boex and Simatupang [2008] develop a measure of fiscal empowerment to quantify fiscal decentralization as the gain in empowerment due to the devolution of fiscal power. However, this study does not examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. This paper sets the stage for a renewed effort to compute alternative measures of decentralization that take into account the degree of subnational autonomy and the empowerment of people and the community, and examines how fiscal decentralization viewed in terms of the empowerment of people and the community can affect economic growth.

Moch, Abduh

In mid 1997, Indonesia was seriously affected by the Asian economic crisis. This quickly spread into monetary, political, and social crises. Following a new presidential appointment, pressures and demands from the grass-roots to reform government systems become stronger and more persistent. Several provinces, particularly those having rich natural resources, pressed for greater autonomy. They felt that their natural resources were being taken by the central government but only a small part came back to them. If the central government did not respond to their pressures and demands, they threatened to proclaim independence from Indonesia. <br><br>Education in Indonesia has been a decentralized system since the issuance of Law Number 22/1999 on Local Government. This law was reviewed in 2004 and became Law Number 32/2004 on Local Government. The essence of Law Number 22/1999 was that education was devolved mostly to local government which in Indonesia is at the district level. As a consequence, education was no longer dominated by the central government; local government had voices in policy, planning, management, finance and delivery of education. Law Number 32/2004 revised some earlier decisions and provided more authority to Provinces. <br><br>Despite an initial impression that the Ministry of National Education (MONE) has real power, its reach is limited and constrained by political and bureaucratic structures and the capacity of those working in the system at all levels. It is worth noting that the MONE’s role is rendered even more complex by the fact that education in Indonesia falls under three ministries: MONE, Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). While MONE has the responsibility for coordinating education, each ministry has its own political and administrative agenda and processes, complicating the already complex and demanding tasks associated with decentralization. <br><br>Implementation of education decentralization in Indonesia is not easy because of its political dynamics and geographic and administrative complexity. The dynamics and complexity of Indonesia can be seen in its demography – population size and variations in density and ethnicity, and its geography – the 13,000 islands causing serious communication problems. From the political perspective, issues such as bureaucratic complexity, complex processes of decentralization due to it being driven by political and donor forces, and implementation complexity involving a range of actors and arenas have also contributed to the challenges. From the administrative view point, the challenges included rapid implementation (big bang), simultaneous political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization, and delays in establishing legal frameworks stipulating the divisions of obligatory functions between central, provincial, and district levels. In addition, the lack of capacity amongst local managers to do their jobs created real problems at the district level. <br><br>Decentralization of education in Indonesia has brought a lot of changes and one of the most important of them is community participation in education. The community must now take part in the quality improvement of educational services, which includes planning, monitoring, and evaluation of educational programs through Boards of Education.<br>

Benedictus Raksaka Mahi

Decentralization policy in Indonesia has given an increase of authority to local government in managing their own local finance. One of the characteristics of the decentralization policy is to increase local taxing power, with the objective to optimize local own revenue in supporting local spending. Given the current data observation, it is obvious that many local governments do not have significant local own revenue to support their local spending. This paper-adopting tax elasticity method-attempts to evaluate the present local own revenue optimization. Furthermore, by adopting a decomposition of tax elasticity, this paper also attempts to elaborate factors affecting local own revenue collection. The estimated local own revenue elasticity show that most taxes and user charges, which are the main sources of local own revenue, are considered not a buoyant tax. More analysis using a decomposition of tax elasticity shows that tax to base elasticity is weak, suggesting that local governments need to improve discreationary tax changes at local level, such as local base changes, collection changes, and enforcement changes. The analysis also shows that some local tax bases are not responsive to the economic growth, which leads to the recommendation to improve local business environment, such as streamlining local regulations and reducing harmfull local taxes and user charges. Keywords: local finance, local government owned revenue, fiscal decentralization, local tax elasticity, local tax base, nuisance local taxes, local economic growth

Franca Dumitru

Financial decentralization, along with financial globalization, are currently two of the phenomena that concern professionals involved in reforming the local government finance and accounting systems, that are trying hard to become a language of communication for those interested in knowing the position and financial performance of local communities in Romania, as well as internationally. To meet the need of informing the taxpayers interested in knowing the methods of incorporation and usage of resources, of training financial creditors in administering their capacity for repaying any loans, as well as all the interest parties (including central government), local communities have turned to instruments they have at hand: budget and accounting.

Emília Balážová

This contribution is aimed at comparing fiscal autonomy of self-governing units after fiscal decentralization in the Slovak republic. Evaluated and compared are budgets of selected Slovakian towns with the accent on the budget incomes creation. The contribution evaluates the level of self-financing as the share of own incomes to current expenditure, and also the level of self-sufficiency as the share of own incomes (including local taxes and fees) to total incomes.

Veronica Herrera

The dissertation examines the political challenges of public utility reform through the analysis of urban water and sanitation services in Mexico. Decentralization of services to municipal governments was coupled with promotion of "market-based" policies in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the unpopularity of these policies provided political obstacles for mayors now charged with reforming the sector because many consumers were not accustomed to paying for water services. These policies--increased water prices, rigorous fee collection practices, and service suspension for non-payment--were political costs felt in the short-term, whereas the benefits of reform were long-term service improvements in water quality and quantity, reduced environmental pollution, and increased economic and social development. This problem of time inconsistency is a challenge even for pro-reform mayors because mayors in Mexico have a narrow window of time within which to enact policy. Mayoral administrations are three years long with no immediate re-election, and bureaucratic administrators follow the electoral cycle, which further exacerbates the challenge of long-term policymaking.Based on a comparative analysis of nine Mexican municipalities, I argue that mayors whose constituent base is primarily composed of middle and upper income consumers and business are more likely to reform because these groups are more able to pay short-term costs for long-term service improvements than the urban poor. With the support of a pro-reform mayor, reform is likely under two conditions: a) the presence of a water intensive industry and b) institutional support from the state government. Water intensive industry prioritizes improvement in service delivery, calculates costs based on the long run, and, further, has long-term financial and professional ties in the community. Water intensive industry is well positioned to support the policy process over time by participating in the leadership of the water utility board of directors. Also, water intensive industry can help offset the costs of reform because it pays more per cubic meter through a block tariff pricing scheme, a policy that subsidizes domestic consumers and helps to finance the reform agenda. Therefore, water intensive industry can lengthen the political problems of imposing costs in the short-term for mayors, lowering the costs to consumers before the long-term benefits of service improvements appear. Finally, state governments can provide legal, fiscal and technical resources that can help shorten the learning curve of incoming mayoral administrations. As such, state government can shorten the long-term planning of the reform process to make it more consistent with the shorter electoral cycle found at the municipal level. This research advances debates on policy adoption and implementation, highlighting the importance of political-business coalitional support as well as the role of inter-tier relations in maintaining policies over time.

Jorge Gutiérrez Goiria, Unai Villena, Eduardo Malagón Zaldúa

No abstract is available for this record.