This paper introduces quantum analogues of non-interactive perfect and statistical zero-knowledge proof systems. Similar to the classical cases, it is shown that sharing randomness or entanglement is necessary for non-trivial protocols of non-interactive quantum perfect and statistical zero-knowledge. It is also shown that, with sharing EPR pairs a priori, the class of languages having one-sided bounded error non-interactive quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof systems has a natural complete problem. Non-triviality of such a proof system is based on the fact proved in this paper that the Graph Non-Automorphism problem, which is not known in BQP, can be reduced to our complete problem. Our results may be the first non-trivial quantum zero-knowledge proofs secure even against dishonest quantum verifiers, since our protocols are non-interactive, and thus the zero-knowledge property does not depend on whether the verifier in the protocol is honest or not. A restricted version of our complete problem derives a natural complete problem for BQP.
[I]t is the transformation of custom into customary law—into something that State courts will recognize, enforce and require—that disrupts the continuity of the indigenous systems. In pre-colonial times … [the settlement of disputes] … depended … on the mutual processes of negotiation and compromise. There is no need to romanticize these processes…. But the important point in this context is that norms play a very different part in negotiations to that which they play in legal processes. They may be used to stake out negotiating positions as a starting point from which to proceed or as a sounding board as to the correct procedure in the cultural and symbolic sense, but they cannot be cited as rules or conditions that will be imposed. 1
The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and the Second World War – preliminary notes on the influence of ideology on the relationship between Church and StateVery little has been written on this specific topic. The period and topic under discussion represents a highly emotional one and many of those who experienced it are still alive. We are therefore aware of our responsibility regarding objectivity since this field of study is still young in historiographical sense. This article can only be regarded as an exploration in this field with the purpose to focus on the effect of ideology on the role the church or at least church leaders played in relationship to the state. This article will also proof evident that Church Historiography cannot be practised in isolation. In this regard the interaction between sosio-political and ecclesiological matters are at stake.
The competitive position of companies is increasingly linked to their capacity to attract and retain competent personnel. Human resources management, in particular compensation, is a crucial component of this quest for competencies. Yet companies must choose between several types of compensation policies. They must determine on which basis to select a policy so as to maximize the effectiveness of the compensation system. These choices may be linked to external strategies of the company, e.g. diversification, differentiation, or internal strategies such as autonomous work teams, total quality and participative management. This article therefore attempts to analyze the extent to which external and internal strategies identified by companies dictate their choice of compensation policies. In other words, do companies that adopt particular external and internal strategies also opt for differentiated compensation policies?The data were collected by a questionnaire mailed to vice-presidents and human resources managers of Quebec companies in competitive sectors. We received 252 usable questionnaires, equal to an 11.4% response rate. The variables have been grouped into four main categories: compensation policies, external strategies, internal strategies and control variables. By means of a multiple regression analysis using the forced entry method we have tested the contribution of each category of variables, thus allowing for verification of the hypotheses formulated. The control variables were entered first in a single block, followed by the external strategies and internal strategies. Utility tests were performed to verify whether the order of entry of the variables influenced the results obtained.The principal findings suggest that internal strategies dictate the choice of compensation policy to a much greater extent than do external strategies. In effect, companies seek above all to create internal coherence among their HR policies and organizational development strategies. For example, companies that rely heavily on autonomous work teams, engage in more participative management and promote quality management have compensation systems that are less traditional and characterized by a greater emphasis on performance, transparency of information provided to employees and, to a lesser extent, leader pay policies and decentralization of decision-making, which is consistent with the literature. Regarding the impact of external strategies, our results are more mitigated. Only competitive strategies emanating from business units exert a slight influence on the choice of compensation policies. Moreover, corporate strategies such as degree of diversification do not affect the choice of compensation policies. This type of strategy is apparently too far removed from the concerns of HR managers. Lastly, of the control variables examined, unionization plays the most determining role in the choice of compensation policies. In fact, this variable is the most consequential in our analytical model. This result raises important questions about the importance of the strategic approach to human resources management and reinforces the relevance of exploring institutional approaches to compensation policies.
Abstract. This paper examines the process of mass democracy as the fundamental cause of transfer seeking and the centralization of governance, using Austrian-school theory and methodology such as decentralized knowledge, disaggregated phenomena, and the structure of capital goods. The alternative of decentralized, small-group gov-ernance reduces the demand for campaign financing and makes more effective use of decentralized knowledge. In addition, when public revenues originate in the local districts and are passed on to higher levels of governance, it provides incentives for revenue sources which do not have an excess burden on production. The governance struc-ture of cellular, bottom-up, multi-level voting, with public revenue flowing up from the lower to the upper levels, provides a contrast for a comparative systems analysis that can yield insight into the transfer seeking endemic in mass democracy.
In the course of the present transition in Russian society, a new system of social security has been developed. The previous Soviet system has been replaced by a system of four more or less independent social funds, covering the main branches of social security. These funds are supposed to be run according to insurance principles and to be financed by contributions, mainly from employers. Given the difficult economic and social situation of the country, there have been increasing demands for effectiveness in the management of the different funds and also in the management of the whole social security system. The results of this study show that the social funds have developed different organizational structures with different degrees of centralization and decentralization. Only one of the funds seems to be relatively well‐functioning and effective, while the others have experienced more or less serious problems in fulfilling their main tasks and functions. The most serious problems, however, seem to stem from the structure of the social security system as a whole, which is perceived as fragmented and badly coordinated. In order to improve the coordination of the system, there have been proposals to merge two or more funds into a unified social security organization. This strategy is open to question, however, since it would increase the bureaucracy of the system. There are other ways in which the structure of the social security system might be advanced. Such developments should be based on an analysis of the system from the perspective of the individual client or patient.
We provide a model incorporating features of local public finance in Japan, including close fiscal ties between different levels of government as well as bureaucratic determinations of intergovernmental transfers. The discretionary nature of transfers softens local budgets ex post, which exerts perverse incentive effects on local governments ex ante. Fiscal decentralization that assigns more revenue responsibility to the local level serves to counteract this moral hazard incentive. The emphasis is on the endogenous nature of regional fiscal capacities at the local level. Fiscal devolution motivates local jurisdictions to become fiscally independent wherever possible.
In this paper we propose a definition for (honest verifier) quantum statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof systems and study the resulting complexity class, which we denote QSZK. We prove several facts regarding this class that establish close connections between classical statistical zero-knowledge and our definition for quantum statistical zero-knowledge, and give some insight regarding the effect of this zero-knowledge restriction on quantum interactive proof systems.
Since Cuba began to decentralize its foreign trade and allow foreign investment, European companies have been its principal economic partner. They provide a large proportion of the products, the financing and the technology which the country requires and generate a very large proportion of the income from exports and tax revenues. Their commitment to the development of the island is a long term one since they wish to continue to help it to integrate itself with the rest of the world and to modernize its system of production. In this commitment and objective, the Embassies of the Member States of the European Union support them as a demonstration of our Government's interest in Cuba and in its future.
The paper has two parts: in the first one, economic aspect of regionalization is considered, in the second a financial one. Regionalization, like every type of decentralization, represents a serious reform of a state and brings upon several expected as well as unexpected although significant effects on political, social, and economic life. Its goal is an improvement of political, social, and economic functions of a state, not their deterioration. Unfortunately, experience of other countries does not support overwhelming optimism. Most frequently, regionalization is done due to political considerations; economic considerations are of secondary importance or even neglected. Such a dominance of political reasoning neglects fundamental principles and arguments of the economic science, standards of rational approach to decentralization, and even economic efficiency and equality between citizens. Because of that, the emphasis in this paper is on economic and financial aspects of regionalization in Serbia. In the first part the author explores economic aspects of regionalization; four state functions (regulation, stabilization, redistribution, and allocation) in decentralized setting; relations between regionalization, deregulation, and privatization; vertical distribution of functions (exclusive functions by the state, exclusive functions by regions, shared functions). After that he explores advantages of the selected model of creating regions and distribution of authorities in Serbia, particularly economic authorities of regions (1. land planning, urban land use, housing; 2. development and maintenance of infrastructure of regional importance and coordination of public utilities in municipalities; 3. agriculture; 4. tourism; 5. forestry 6. hunting and fishing; 7. vocational training and employment; 8. ecology; 9. public works). Separate section is devoted to social protection (financial transfers and institutions). In the second part of the paper (Financing the Regions) the author first examines certain issues in principle (fiscal revenues, vertical and horizontal balance, debts and moral hazard) and then considers topics of financing regions in Serbia, such as revenues subsidies, and debts.
The objective of this article is to discuss alternatives to finance investments by municipalities. In general, current revenues are insufficient to finance large investments, what brings about the necessity of municipal indebtedness. These could assume different manners, according to the nature of the investment: if it is typically public or if it offers private return. For the first case, we discuss the possibilities of a municipal bond market and, for the second, we discuss project finance and the participation of the private sector.
David S. McCauley, Robert Bruce Anderson, Richard L. Bowen, Ibrahim Elassiouty · 6 authors
Egypt seems to be on the brink of a new era in water management. The country suppose to follow a different operational mode that is “water conservation oriented, decentralized, environmentally sensitive, private sector oriented, equitable and operationally efficient” The focus of this study was on market-based instruments (MBI’s) as complements to traditional command and control measures for managing water quantity and quality. Prior to evaluating potential water MBIs, it was necessary to identify the water management problems and challenges that need to be addressed through policy adjustments. \nThese challenges were threat of water shortages, service delivery in municipal water supply, lake Nasser pollution, Irrigation service delivery challenges, Nile River pollution above Cairo, Insufficient irrigation system upkeep, water pollution in the Nile Delta, Pollution of lakes , low user contribution to irrigation system upkeep, groundwater contamination, and Weak attention to in-stream flows. \nSuch challenges have impacts on: (1) Nonrenewable groundwater management, (2) Adverse effects on human health, (3) Subsidies affecting water use efficiency, (4) Reduced agricultural productivity, (5) Rainfall capture and flash flood protection. The impacts generated some Threats to aquatic ecosystems, particularly, Negative consequences of rising water tables and Negative impacts on aesthetics (incl. tourism) \nA two-step screening process was developed and utilized to evaluate the likely success of alternative market-based policy instruments in response to one or more of water management challenges. The instruments were screened based on economic efficiency and equity and other economic factors relating to the nature of the instrument itself. They also were evaluated based on criteria that considered the specific social, cultural, political, and institutional context in which the instrument will be applied. \nThereon, the study explored the applicability of economic instruments to help address Egypt’s current water management challenges. It resulted in an initial evaluation of twenty instruments that seemed most promising. Screening criteria were developed and applied to assess the merits of each, and direction also was received from nearly 60 participants who attended the study’s concluding Workshop on Economic Incentives for Water. The most promising policy instruments that concluded from the study were: \nWoith respect to the water quantity management deemed of highest priority for follow-up analysis and possible policy action were: Groundwater Extraction Charges, Tariff Reductions for Imported Water Meters and Water Conserving Equipment, Several other measures were identified as warranting careful further analysis. These include area-based irrigation service charges; volumetric water delivery charges for large agricultural enterprises; and increased user fees for the supply of urban and industrial water services. \nLikewise, the most promising policy measures identified to address water quality \nproblems were: Increased User Fees for Wastewater Treatment, Increased Subsidies to Finance Wastewater Treatment Facilities, Subsidized Rural Sanitation, and Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment \nTo achieve such model four approaches to positive change have been identified. These include Creating incentives and disincentives for water management to protect its quality. In addition to Institutionalizing the role private participation; environmental protection and identifying mechanisms to ensure appropriate benefits for participating private sector partners, decentralizing decision making, institutionalizing environmental protection, changing the role of government and improving personnel policies at macro-level decision making regarding uses of the Nile River, and improving awareness of water resources and associated environmental issues.
During the past decade, many countries throughout the world have attempted to improve their generally poor performance record of agency-managed irrigation systems by designing and implementing institutional policy programs. This thesis analyses the institutional viability and the local impact on irrigation performance of two such institutional intervention programs. This is done in the context of the Alto Río Lerma irrigation district (ARLID), a large-scale irrigation system with a command area of more than 112,000 hectares located in the State of Guanajuato, Central Mexico. The central notion that runs through this study is the recognition that new institutional arrangements do not necessarily follow institutional design principles and top-down directives from policy makers and government interveners, but rather are created in a process of local negotiation between water users, farmer leaders and irrigation managers. This requires detailed observations on local practices, strategies and interactions on how users, leaders and managers cope with building and transforming irrigation institutions.The first intervention program analyzed in this thesis aims to transfer management responsibilities from the irrigation agency (CNA) to local newly established water user organizations (WUAs) and to make them responsible for cost-recovery. The neoliberal belief behind this program is that greater farmer involvement in irrigation management and financing would eventually lead to a reduction in public investments in irrigated agriculture as well as to higher levels of irrigation performance. The second institutional intervention program that is analyzed in this thesis deals with the introduction of water markets, aiming at re-allocating water use to uses of higher economic value. Both intervention programs clearly embark on the 'less state, more market' approach to design and implement institutional arrangements for more use and cost-effective management of scarce resources such as water and funds. The central theme of this thesis is to study how water users and local water managers deal with the problems that result from these interventions and arrangements.In 1992, ARLID was one of the first of Mexican districts were irrigation management transfer (IMT) was introduced. The Mexican IMT program is worldwide considered to be the most successful and ambitious institutional programs in its kind, both because of its scale and the speed with which the policy was designed and implemented. The claims on the successes of these and similar programs are generally ideologically driven, and empirical evidence to support the policy claim that these institutional interventions have achieved these goals remain largely undocumented. This thesis fills some of this empirical void.This thesis comprises ten chapters. After the conceptual and methodological introduction in chapter 1, two contextual chapters follow. Chapter 2 introduces the research site, and chapter 3 presents the political economic history and context in which the institutional interventions took place. Chapter 4 to 9 provide the empirical data from the intensive case study in ARLID. Chapter 10 evaluates the main empirical, conceptual and methodological findings and discusses possible implications for policy and research orientations.The first chapter provides a review of the conceptual approaches and methodologies used to study the viability of new institutional arrangements in the context of market-oriented reforms. This thesis explores the kind of conditions, processes and mechanisms that help to create viable institutions. These mechanisms do not only refer to institutional and economic relationships, but also to the relationship between institutions, and water scarcity and irrigation technology. In that sense the thesis follows the notion that irrigation technology is a sociotechnical phenomenon, with institutional requirements for use.A key concept used for analyzing the viability of new irrigation institutions is accountability. This study shows that four forms of accountability can be separated: operational, financial, political and administrative accountability. Studying these forms of accountability (and the relationship between them ) demonstrates that practices and strategies of decision making in water management are only partly influenced by rational choice and (economic) incentives for utility maximization. They are also influenced by socio-political factors.The methodological concern of this thesis is to develop a set of tools and indicators that help to assess the impacts of institutional interventions, both in terms of changes in irrigation performance levels, and in qualitative terms of processes of institutional viability. Two sets of performance indicators are presented. The first set comprises indicators that measure actual performance against set performance targets. The second set compares performance levels over time and across different system levels. The field work for this thesis comprised a wide set of methods and research techniques, ranging from intensive observations of practices and strategies for coping with the new institutional arrangements, to daily measurements of water flows in two selected WUA areas and several canals and fields in the irrigation district. Field research took place during the period from early 1995 to mid-1998.Chapter 2 provides background information on the location, history, water availability and layout of ARLID. It also introduces the two main groups of farmers that now jointly are organized in the new WUA: ejidatarios and private growers. It shows how these two groups have historically and economically been separated for almost 70 years. The chapter also provides a brief description of the Cortazar and Salvatierra module areas, their canals and WUAs that were selected for the intensive case study.Two important notions form the basis of the chapter 3, in which a detailed description of the historical and political economic context of IMT and water marketing is given. The first notion is that the legitimization for institutional interventions should be viewed in the political economic context of privatizing the Mexican country-side through dramatic constitutional revisions in the way distribution of land and water rights are organized. These reforms and revisions were started in the 1980 as a result of both a political and an economic crisis and were accompanied by wave of programs on the liberalization, decentralization and technocratization of the economy. Institutional intervention programs like the Mexican IMT program do not come on their own, but are preceded, accompanied and followed by other intervention programs that share the same neoliberal legitimization for restructuring the political and economic control over resources. The second notion is that to achieve the economic goals of these neolibral programs, the Salinas and subsequent administrations needed intervention policies such as IMT and water marketing as these would help to recover costs from the users. However, to improve greater involvement of farmers in water management, neoliberal programs are not a necessity.Chapter 4 shows how IMT and water markets were implemented, both at the national level and in ARLID. The IMT program is a typical example of institutional engineering, comprising detailed prescriptions on institutional design and a top-down approach for implementing these designs. Yet, farmers and local managers do not fully disregard these proposed arrangements. Rather than using them as prescriptive dictates, the new principles and arrangements served as a strategic starting point for the WUAs for negotiating irrigation fee levels, water marketing, mode of user representation, maintenance programs, and redistribution of O&M responsibilities between the WUAs and CNA. Local recipients have partly adopted and accommodated the new institutional arrangements. The IMT program allowed local irrigation managers, new leaders of WUAs and farmers to jointly create room and institutional flexibility to alter the proposed arrangements. This was made possible mainly because from the initial stage of implementation, CNA officials in ARLID have shown to users that they are credible and willing to share knowledge and information in a transparent way. Credibility, transparency, institutional flexibility and probity were among the most important factors to explain how operational accountability from CNA to WUAs, and from WUAs to water users, was earned in a continuous process of negotiating institutional arrangements. Furthermore, given the wider set of market-oriented reforms and constitutional revisions that farmers had become familiar with, they realized that they could hardly resist IMT.Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of practices, results and operational accountability for local water management. It demonstrates that official post-transfer arrangements for O&M in ARLID do not always reflect actual irrigation practices. As result, outputs of these practices in terms of relative water supply and land and water productivity remained unchanged after IMT. The main reason for this is the conflict in forms of accountability, which could not be resolved under the new institutional arrangements. Rather than adhering to new principles of using water as an economic good, farmers and local managers adhered to pre-IMT arrangements and practices of distributing water. Daily measurements of water flows and observation of irrigation practices revealed that ditch tenders (who are now employed by the WUAs) generally report planned water deliveries rather than actually supplied volumes. In that sense, they continued the practice of being administratively accountable to both users and CNA. This runs counter to the idea of encouraging efficient water use through water pricing and cost-recovery and hence being both financially and operationally accountable. Com
This project provides an evaluation and analysis of the Education Financing and Management Reform Project. Among the few larger-scope reform projects designed for more expansive changes in the education system of Armenia, Education Financing and Management Reform Project is the most Important, in terms of both its financial aspects and the scale of targeted changes. The project provides an evaluation and analysis of the Education Financing Management Reform Project from two points of view: the choice of textbook and publication/provision and achieving successful decentralization of schools. It will also try to find out to what extent the proposed changes match the general development of the country, thus evaluating the chances of success also from this aspect. With a rather pessimistic attitude regarding the effectiveness of the project, the two project questions will be put in the negative: (i) why is this project irrelevant for achieving improvement of the quality of the general education system in Armenia? and (ii) why this project cannot achieve its concrete goals - improved textbook publication and provision and successful school decentralization? The project comprises of two chapters, each of which covers one of the two questions stated above. The first chapter provides an analysis of the textbook and decentralization components as tools for quality improvement in the general education system. The second chapter analyzes the actual chances of the project to achieve its concrete objectives - successful textbook publication and provision, and school decentralization. For avoiding complication and setting a logical line of analysis, each of the chapters is divided into several sections (some of these having also subsections).
This paper investigates a model where a decentralized manager gathers private information about the profitability of an investment project that must be financed internally. The choice of information acquisition effort depends on a tradeoff between her expected marginal information rent and the associated private effort cost. Expected information rents are higher if asymmetric information arises endogenously rather than being exogenous. Therefore, the manager puts in too much information-gathering effort and headquarters reacts with a sharp rationing of capital. Monitoring the manager's information acquisition mitigates underinvestment but even increases the manager's information gathering activity. Finally, efficiency unambiguously rises if headquarters can commit to an investment budget before the manager gathers the information.
In this paper we examine the role of Identification Protocols in the field of Cryptography. Firstly, the rationale behind the need for Identification Protocols is discussed. Secondly, we examine, in detail, challenge-response protocols, based upon zero-knowledge proofs, that form a subset of Identification Protocols in general. Thirdly, the mathematical tools necessary for the understanding of how these protocols work is given. Finally, we discuss four main Identification Protocols: Fiat-Shamir, Feige-Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr and Guillou- Quisquater. This discussion includes the theory, practical examples and the security aspects of each protocol.
T he National Education Program states that creating distance between private and public education is not its intention, nevertheless, the scheme it has adopted, inherited from previous governments, discriminates private higher education and has monopolized education surveillance through the Secretariat of Public Education. Such task must be in the hands of the civil society and in its capacity to accredit self-financed higher education institutions, with the same autonomy and scope as those of public universities, the relationship between the civil society and the government will remain unchanged in the Program. It will still perceive the public university as a decentralized entity created, financed and ruled by a Hegelian State and, at the same time, it will still see the private university as if it had a governmental concession to render a public service to be academically controlled by the State. This posture inhibits the undertaking of actions by universities because the Program has chosen not to analyze the prevailing behavior.
In this paper we analyze the optimal degree of centralization for the supply of public goods. We identify the reliance on an exclusion mechanism as a central feature of the decentralized provision of public goods. An exclusion mechanism induces a contest between users of the public goods who want to free ride and the providers who want to exclude free riding. This contest explains the costs of decentralization. A centralized contribution does not rely on an exclusion mechanism to finance the public goods but on taxation which induces different types of transaction costs. A comparison of the relevant distortions explains the optimal degree of centralization of the supply of public goods.
Abstract. Artin’s braid groups currently provide a promising background for cryptographical applications, since the first cryptosystems using braids were introduced in [2, 3, 18] (see also [22]). A variety of key agreement protocols based on braids have been described, but few authentication or signature schemes have been proposed so far. We introduce three authentication schemes based on braids, two of them being zero-knowledge interactive proofs of knowledge. Then we discuss their possible implementations, involving normal forms or an alternative braid algorithm, called handle reduction, which can achieve good efficiency under specific requirements. 1.
Musgravian" externalities, formulated and illustrated by Musgrave in a 1966 paper on "social goods" are seen in this paper as one form of the interactions that occur between the components of a federation.The original formal apparatus is first exposed briefly.In that context, it is then considered whether and how alternative forms of federal structures are likely to achieve efficiency.Following suggestions from the literature, three such forms are dealt with: "planned", "cooperative" and "majority rule" federalisms.Next, the relevance of non cooperative equilibria is examined, in the light of an interpretation of them as "fall back" positions when disagreement occurs among members of a federation.Finally, the question is evoked of what economics and public finance may have to say on the limits to institutional decentralization, i.e. on the choice between federal, confederal and secessional structures.
From Introduction: "The first part of this paper describes the political changes, which induced technical and institutional evolutions of the RRD water-control systems, as the organization of the operation and even the technological nature of water-control systems, were influenced by national political choices. The second section describes the management framework and the financial organization of the RRD water-control systems. In-depth studies conducted at local level allow a better understanding of the present situation. Water management in the RRD appears to be strongly organized by the State into successive nested levels, from the central level of the Ministry of Agriculture to the local level of the cooperatives. This structure was challenged by the emergence of local pumping stations and water management practices, which superimposed themselves upon the officially existing structure. It is shown how the mismatch between administrative and hydraulic units adds to the complexity of the definition of both the financing and the management of hydraulic operations. The third and last section of the paper examines the financing of the different operators, the amount and the use of the water fees paid by farmers and questions the process of water management decentralization and privatization in the RRD."