In this paper, we study methods for improving the utility and privacy of reputation scores for online auctions, such as used in eBay, so as to reduce the effectiveness of feedback extortion. The main ideas behind our techniques are to use randomization and various schemes to escrow reputations scores until appropriate external events occur. Depending on the degree of utility and privacy needed, these external techniques could depend on the number and type of reputation scores collected. Moreover, if additional privacy protection is needed, then random sampling can be used with respect reputation scores in such a way that reputation aggregates remain useful, but individual reputation scores are probabilistically hidden from users. Finally, we show that if privacy is also desired with respect to the the reputation aggregator, then we can use zero-knowledge proofs for reputation comparisons.
We propose a coin-flip protocol which yields a string of strong, random coins and is fully simulatable against poly-sized quantum adversaries on both sides. It can be implemented with quantum-computational security without any set-up assumptions, since our construction only assumes mixed commitment schemes which we show how to construct in the given setting. We then show that the interactive generation of random coins at the beginning or during outer protocols allows for quantum-secure realizations of classical schemes, again without any set-up assumptions. As example applications we discuss quantum zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and quantum-secure two-party function evaluation. Both applications assume only fully simulatable coin-flipping and mixed commitments. Since our framework allows to construct fully simulatable coin-flipping from mixed commitments, this in particular shows that mixed commitments are complete for quantum-secure two-party function evaluation. This seems to be the first completeness result for quantum-secure two-party function evaluation from a generic assumption.
Ivan Damgård, Jakob Funder, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Louis Salvail
Attacks on classical cryptographic protocols are usually modeled by allowing an adversary to ask queries from an oracle. Security is then defined by requiring that as long as the queries satisfy some constraint, there is some problem the adversary cannot solve, such as compute a certain piece of information. In this paper, we introduce a fundamentally new model of quantum attacks on classical cryptographic protocols, where the adversary is allowed to ask several classical queries in quantum superposition. This is a strictly stronger attack than the standard one, and we consider the security of several primitives in this model. We show that a secret-sharing scheme that is secure with threshold $t$ in the standard model is secure against superposition attacks if and only if the threshold is lowered to $t/2$. We use this result to give zero-knowledge proofs for all of NP in the common reference string model. While our protocol is classical, it is sound against a cheating unbounded quantum prover and computational zero-knowledge even if the verifier is allowed a superposition attack. Finally, we consider multiparty computation and show that for the most general type of attack, simulation based security is not possible. However, putting a natural constraint on the adversary, we show a non-trivial example of a protocol that can indeed be simulated.
Traditional electricity meters are replaced by Smart Meters in customers' households. Smart Meters collects fine-grained utility consumption profiles from customers, which in turn enables the introduction of dynamic, time-of-use tariffs. However, the fine-grained usage data that is compiled in this process also allows to infer the inhabitant's personal schedules and habits. We propose a privacy-preserving protocol that enables billing with time-of-use tariffs without disclosing the actual consumption profile to the supplier. Our approach relies on a zero-knowledge proof based on Pedersen Commitments performed by a plug-in privacy component that is put into the communication link between Smart Meter and supplier's back-end system. We require no changes to the Smart Meter hardware and only small changes to the software of Smart Meter and back-end system. In this paper we describe the functional and privacy requirements, the specification and security proof of our solution and give a performance evaluation of a prototypical implementation.
This paper describes a new protocol for authentication in ad-hoc networks. The protocol has been designed to meet specialized requirements of ad-hoc networks, such as lack of direct communication between nodes or requirements for revocable anonymity. At the same time, a ad-hoc authentication protocol must be resistant to spoofing, eavesdropping and playback, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The article analyzes existing authentication methods based on the Public Key Infrastructure, and finds that they have several drawbacks in ad-hoc networks. Therefore, a new authentication protocol, basing on established cryptographic primitives (Merkle's puzzles and zero-knowledge proofs) is proposed. The protocol is studied for a model ad-hoc chat application that provides private conversations.
The recent developments in the mobile technology (mobile phones, middleware) created a need for new methods of protecting the code transmitted through the network. The proposed mechanisms not only secure the compiled program, but also the data, that can be gathered during its "journey". The oldest and the simplest methods are more concentrated on integrity of the code itself and on the detection of unauthorized manipulation. Other, more advanced proposals protect not only the code but also the execution state and the collected data. The paper is divided into two parts. The first one is mostly devoted to different methods of securing the code and protecting its integrity; starting from watermarking and fingerprinting, up to methods designed specially for mobile agent systems: encrypted function, cryptographic traces, time limited black-box security, chained-MAC protocol, publicly-verifiable chained digital signatures The second part presents new concept for providing mobile agents with integrity protection, based on a zero-knowledge proof system.