It feels like the country, and the world, is in ferment, from Occupy Wall Street actions around the United States, to pitched battles in Europe over austerity measures that would mandate impoverishment, to unbelievably brave uprisings for an expansion of democracy in the Arab world. In New York these days our classroom examples have noticeably changed: We discuss the moral agency of New York Police Department officers over the use of tear gas and pepper spray, we talk of the transvaluation of values in Zucotti Park, and we explain the feminist process of horizontalism behind the General Assemblies. Some express concern about the term occupation, but it connotes an old trope used by Latin Americans to enact Montezuma's Revenge, which is not just a reference to the diarrhea inflicted on tourists in Mexico City but, rather, the overrunning of conquered territories by mestizo and indigenous peoples, to reoccupy their own lands. This is our land, as someone once said.Philosophical ideas are all over the movement. Libertarianism is a constant nuisance—the Ayn Rand crowd refuses to go away—but assorted worthwhile ideas are discussed in small groups. One of the most important of these is the idea of horizontalism, or horizontalidad, a concept often credited to the protest movements of Argentina from 2001 in which workers and the unemployed resisted impoverishment policies with bodies, cooking pots, and factory occupations (Sitrin 2006). The exact origin of the concept of horizontalism is disputed, but it has clear connections to autonomous Marxism, anarchism, and the feminist critiques from the 1960s of hierarchical structures. Several months in, there are still no named leaders of Occupy Wall Street, no Mario Savio, or Abbie Hoffman, or Stokely Carmichael. Mayor Bloomberg has been struggling to set up sidebar negotiations with a “leadership” committee that exists only in his own mind. Horizontalism is an attempt to operate in an organized fashion, so that plans can be made and publicized, and statements can be agreed upon and issued to the press, but without a head that can be cut off, or bought off, or scared off. Thus horizontalism works through affinity groups and with rotating facilitators rather than sustained leaders, working groups rather than standing committees, and with spokes-councils organized as fishbowls for maximum transparency. Activists repudiate delegate assemblies, representational governance, and any decision-making structure that blocks direct democracy and limits participation. Whoever shows up to the General Assemblies takes part. The corporate media and the older generation of politicians and political theorists shake their heads, scoff, and criticize. Meanwhile the younger generation, using this supposedly ineffective decentralized methodology, has already changed the public domain of discourse, giving us all permission, as Jennifer Uleman wrote in an essay on the Feminist Wire, “to want things that it might otherwise seem childish or absurd to want (you know: fairness, justice, truth, beauty, love, music, sky, rest—that kind of thing).”1Horizontalism is an interesting concept through which to reflect on feminism—its practice as well as its theory—then and now. Then, feminists were the ones, of course, who insistently raised issues of process, developed consciousness-raising in the form of epistemic working groups to generate new knowledge without experts or leaders or trained therapists, articulated the problems with identity-based authority (or lack of authority), and invented the form of the “affinity group” for direct action and civil disobedience as a way to intensify mutual support through emotional engagement. There was a lively debate, of course, and there were a number of feminists who also developed trenchant critiques of these new methods, pointing to the potential “tyranny of structurelessness,” as Jo Freeman called it, arguing that open systems opened doors to charismatic leaders who could escape accountability. (As one young activist says to me today—in reality horizontalism always has hills and valleys, stronger and weaker players, in-groups and out-groups). Yet the demand that we pay attention to process, to the subtle and unstructured ways in which power operates to organize authority, and the demand that we consider the distribution of epistemic authority as a central political problematic, has remained (or survived) to influence contemporary movements despite these internal critiques. There is no question that feminism profoundly influenced the processes and organizing styles used in movements against corporate globalization and the occupations of today.In terms of theory, the notion of horizontalism resonates with Con-tinental feminist philosophy in multiple ways. Recall Teresa de Lauretis's early 1990s exploration of the Milan Women's Bookstore Collective as the site of a new form of egalitarian practice that came directly from these feminist debates over process. The collective attempted to formulate a democratic process that acknowledged power differences rather than pretending they didn't exist (de Lauretis 1990). Toward this end they made use of the concept of affidamento, or entrustment, to signal an idea they associated with maternal power, in which differences of age, experience, knowledge, and authority could be recognized and honored without debilitating political effect. 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Núria Vergés Bosch, Mateu Espasa, Albert Solé Ollé
Contents: Preface 1. Inter-regional Fiscal Flows: Introduction to the Issues, Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa Queralt and Albert Sole Olle PART I: COUNTING MONIES: MEASUREMENT AND PRACTICE OF INTER-REGIONAL FISCAL FLOWS 2. Regional Fiscal Flows: Measurement Tools, Giuseppe C. Ruggeri 3. Regional Fiscal Flows: Determinants, Measurements and Meanings, Francois Vaillancourt Comment by Nuria Bosch and Antoni Zabalza 4. Constitutional Reforms, Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Fiscal Flows in Italy, Maria Flavia Ambrosanio, Massimo Bordignon and Floriana Cerniglia 5. Measurement and Practice of Fiscal Flows: The Case of Belgium, Paul Von Rompuy 6. Balance Sheet Federalism: Canada, Giuseppe C. Ruggeri Comment by Francois Vaillancourt 7. Balance Sheet Federalism: Methodologies, Results and their Determinant Factors for Spain, Marta Espasa Queralt and Nuria Bosch Comment by Guillem Lopez Casasnovas and Ramon Barberan PART II: BEYOND THE DATA: WHY SOME REGIONS GET MORE MONEY? 8. Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Jonathan Rodden Comment by Carles Boix 9. Decentralization by Politicians: Creation of Grants-financed Local Jurisdictions, Stuti Kehmani 10. The Political Rationale of Regional Financing in Spain, Sandra Leon Comment by Santiago Lago 11. The Determinants of Regional Transport Investment Across Europe, Achim Kemmerling and Andreas Stephan 12. The Determinants of the Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment in Spain, Albert Sole-Olle Comment by Germa Bel PART III: IN OR OUT? REGIONAL REDISTRIBUTION AND THE STABILITY OF FEDERATIONS 13. Federalism, Regional Redistribution and Country Stability, Enrico Spolaore Comment by Massimo Bordignon 14. The Costs and Benefits of Constitutional Options for Quebec and Canada, Francois Vaillancourt 15. Staying Together? Scotland and the Rest of the United Kingdom, David Bell 16. The Costs and Benefits of Staying Together: The Catalan Case in Spain, Elisenda Paluzie Index
Serge‐Paul Eholié, François Eba Aoussi, Ismael Songda Ouattara, E. Bissagnené · 5 authors
Many successes have been achieved in HIV care in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC): increased number of HIV-infected individuals receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART), wide decentralization, reduction in morbidity and mortality and accessibility to cheapest drugs. However, these successes should not hide existing failures and difficulties. In this paper, we underline several key challenges. First, ensure long-term financing, increase available resources, in order to meet the increasing needs, and redistribute the overall budget in a concerted way amongst donors. Second, increase ART coverage and treat the many eligible patients who have not yet started ART. Competition amongst countries is expected to become a strong driving force in encouraging the least efficient to join better performing countries. Third, decrease early mortality on ART, by improving access to prevention, case-finding and treatment of tuberculosis and invasive bacterial diseases and by getting people to start ART much earlier. Fourth, move on from WHO 2006 to WHO 2010 guidelines. Raising the cut-off point for starting ART to 350 CD4/mm(3) needs changing paradigm, adopting opt-out approach, facilitating pro-active testing, facilitating task shifting and increasing staff recruitments. Phasing out stavudine needs acting for a drastic reduction in the costs of other drugs. Scaling up routine viral load needs a mobilization for lower prices of reagents and equipments, as well as efforts in relation to point-of-care automation and to maintenance. The latter is a key step to boost the utilization of second-line regimens, which are currently dramatically under prescribed. Finally, other challenges are to reduce lost-to-follow-up rates; manage lifelong treatment and care for long-term morbidity, including drug toxicity, residual AIDS and HIV-non-AIDS morbidity and aging-related morbidity; and be able to face unforeseen events such as socio-political and military crisis. An old African proverb states that the growth of a deep-rooted tree cannot be stopped. Our tree is well rooted in existing field experience and is, therefore, expected to grow. In order for us to let it grow, long-term cost-effectiveness approach and life-saving evidence-based programming should replace short-term budgeting approach.
In many applications, the password is sent as cleartext to the server to be authenticated thus providing the eavesdropper with opportunity to steal valuable data. This paper presents a simple protocol based on zero knowledge proof by which the user can prove to the authentication server that he has the password without having to send the password to the server as either cleartext or in encrypted format. Thus the user can authenticate himself without having to actually reveal the password to the server. Also, another version of this protocol has been proposed which makes use of public key cryptography thus adding one more level of security to the protocol and enabling mutual authentication between the client & server.
This dissertation examines local governments’ efforts to promote economic development in Latin America. The research uses a mixed method to explore how cities make decisions to innovate, develop, and finance economic development programs. First, this study provides a comparative analysis of decentralization policies in Argentina and Mexico as a means to gain a better understanding of the degree of autonomy exercised by local governments. Then, it analyzes three local governments each within the province of Santa Fe, Argentina and the State of Guanajuato, Mexico. The principal hypothesis of this dissertation is that if local governments collect more own-source tax revenue, they are more likely to promote economic development and thus, in turn, promote growth for their region. By examining six cities, three of which are in Santa Fe—Rosario, Santa Fe (capital) and Rafaela—and three in Guanajuato—Leon, Guanajuato (capital) and San Miguel de Allende, this dissertation provides a better understanding of public finances and tax collection efforts of local governments in Latin America. Specific attention is paid to each city’s budget authority to raise new revenue and efforts to promote economic development. The research also includes a large statistical dataset of Mexico’s 2,454 municipalities and a regression analysis that evaluates local tax efforts on economic growth, controlling for population, territorial size, and the professional development. In order to generalize these results, the research tests these discoveries by using statistical data gathered from a survey administered to Latin American municipal officials. The dissertation demonstrates that cities, which experience greater fiscal autonomy measured by the collection of more own-source revenue, are better able to stimulate effective economic development programs, and ultimately, create jobs within their communities. The results are bolstered by a large number of interviews, which were conducted with over 100 finance specialists, municipal presidents, and local authorities. The dissertation also includes an in-depth literature review on fiscal federalism, decentralization, debt financing and local development. It concludes with a discussion of the findings of the study and applications for the practice of public administration.
1. Look as shit as an asset, the beginning of a whole sanitation value chain 2. Emphasize the role of the private sector in sanitation, in particular small scale private enterprises 3. Pay attention to the economics of investing in sanitation 4. Increase the efficiency of the sanitation value chain 5. Look at advantages of small scale decentralized versus large scale centralized waste water treatment (WWT) plants 6. Considering sanitation as a multi-governance challenge 7. Consider the economics of different technological options for sanitation 8. Incorporating informality in the sanitation sector 9. Tap alternative sources of finance for sanitation 10. Be aware of the politics of sanitation
INTRODUCTION: In recent years, the country of Mongolia (population 2.8 million) has experienced rapid social changes associated with economic growth, persisting socio-economic inequities and internal migration. In order to improve health access for the urban poor, the Ministry of Health developed a "Reaching Every District" strategy (RED strategy) to deliver an integrated package of key health and social services. The aim of this article is to present findings of an assessment of the implementation of the RED strategy, and, on the basis of this assessment, articulate lessons learned for equitable urban health planning. METHODS: Principal methods for data collection and analysis included literature review, barrier analysis of health access and in-depth interviews and group discussions with health managers and providers. FINDINGS: The main barriers to health access for the urban poor relate to interacting effects of poverty, unhealthy daily living environments, social vulnerability and isolation. Implementation of the RED strategy has resulted in increased health access for the urban poor, as demonstrated by health staff having reached new clients with immunization, family planning and ante-natal care services, and increased civil registrations which enable social service provision. Organizational effects have included improved partnerships for health and increased motivation of the health workforce. Important lessons learned from the early implementation of the RED strategy include the need to form strong partnerships among stakeholders at each level of the health system and in the community, as well as the need to develop a specific financing strategy to address the needs of the very poor. The diverse social context for health in an urban poor setting calls for a decentralized planning and partnership strategy, but with central level commitment towards policy guidance and financing of pro-poor urban health strategies. CONCLUSIONS: Lessons from Mongolia mirror other international studies which point to the need to measure and take action on the social determinants of health at the local area level in order to adequately reduce persistent inequities in health care access for the urban poor.
CertiCrypt is a framework that enables the machine-checked construction and verification of cryptographic proofs in the Coq proof assistant. CertiCrypt instruments the code-based game-based approach to cryptographic proofs, and builds upon many areas, including probability and complexity theory, algebra, semantics of programming languages, and program optimizations. In this thesis, we illustrate the application of CertiCrypt on two examples: the Hashed ElGamal encryption scheme and zero-knowledge protocols. Like previous case studies in CertiCrypt, these examples demonstrate the feasibility of formalizing complex cryptographic proofs. However, using CertiCrypt requires a high level of expertise in Coq, and is time consuming. In order to ease the adoption of formal proofs by the cryptographic community, we develop a semi-automated tool, called EasyCrypt, for elaborating security proofs of cryptographic systems from proof sketches. Proof sketches are checked automatically using SMT solvers and automated theorem provers, and then compiled into verifiable proofs in the CertiCrypt framework. We illustrate the application of EasyCrypt with two examples: the Hashed ElGamal encryption system, and the Cramer-Shoup encryption system. Finally, we extend the language of CertiCrypt with a formalization of polytime functions.
Financing of local authorities is currently at the Centre of the political discourse is a daily concern. Romania faces, usually with an attempt to offset the need for control and reduction of public spending with greater financial autonomy of local authorities. At the time, it was searched and searches for a path, a means to achieve a fair distribution of financial resources between the various levels of administration, budget reductions to all of them. If strengthening democracy means to strengthen local autonomy, then it means you have created a system for financing local authorities to be efficient, fair and pointing towards the economic needs of States. In other words, decentralization and local financing and the principle of subsidiarity are mutually dependent. Rightly, the decentralisation of financial management is considered to be the "backbone" of the administrative system of decentralisation, the financial resources being those which are operational link between the needs of local communities and the rules necessary to satisfy them. Thus, the lack of financial resources of the local self-government can result in failure to meet the needs of its members, which at the same time failure of administrative decentralization. The decentralisation of financial management can also be seen as the Government of some specific functions on the line of management authority and the tax revenue to the local public authorities.
Privacy-preserving set operations are useful for many data mining algorithms as building tools. Protocols for privacy-preserving set operations have considered semi-honest and malicious adversarial models in cryptographic settings, whereby an adversary is assumed to follow or arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. Semi-honest model provides weak security requiring small amount of computation, on the other hand, malicious model provides strong security requiring expensive computations like homomorphic encryption. However, efficient computation of such set operations are desirable for practical implementations. In this paper, we build efficient and private set operations avoiding the use of expensive tools like homomorphic encryption, zero knowledge proof, and oblivious transfer. Our protocol is constructed in game-theoretic model. In other words, instead of being semi-honest or malicious, the parties are viewed as rational and are assumed (only) to act in their self-interest. We show that our protocol satisfies computational Nash equilibrium.
Will President Bashar al-Asad make it to 2013? Chances are he will. Despite his regime's rapid loss of legit-imacy, its growing isolation and tanking economy, no countervailing force has yet emerged that can take it down. Many opposition and foreign leaders are predicting that the regime will fall within months. Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Riad al-Shaqfa stated that Bashar would fall “in the next few months.”1 The U.S. State Department has called President Asad a “dead man walking.” Israel's defense minister has insisted that Asad will fall in a matter of weeks. Certainly, the revolutionary process that began to sweep the Middle East a year ago is powerful; most Syrians want change, and many are willing to fight for freedom and dignity. One cannot envision the Asad family retaining power in the long run; all the same, predictions of its rapid demise may be wishful thinking. Four elements are important in assessing the regime's chances of surviving to 2013: its own strengths, the opposition's weaknesses, the chances of foreign intervention, and the impact of sanctions and economic decline. First, let's place the regime in regional perspective. The Asads stand atop the last minoritarian regime in the Levant and thus seem destined to fall in this age of popular revolt. When they do, the postcolonial era will draw to a final close. Following World War II, minorities took control in every Levant state, thanks to colonial divide-and-rule tactics and the fragmented national community that bedeviled the states of the region. It is estimated that, due to their over-recruitment by the French Mandate authorities, Alawis already by the mid-1950s constituted some 65 percent of all noncommissioned officers in the Syrian military.2 Within a decade, they took control of the military leadership and, with it, Syria itself.3 Unique among the Levant states was Palestine, where the Jewish minority was able to transform itself into the majority at the expense of Palestine's Muslims. Neither the Christians of Lebanon nor the Sunnis of Iraq were so lucky or ambitious. Nevertheless, both clung to power at the price of dragging their countries into lengthy civil wars. The Lebanese war lasted 15 years; the Iraqi struggle between Shiites and Sunnis, while shorter, has yet to be entirely resolved. The Alawis of Syria seem determined to repeat this violent plunge to the bottom. It is hard to determine whether this is due to the rapaciousness of a corrupt elite, to the bleak prospects that the Alawi community faces in a post-Asad Syria, or to the weak faith that many in the region place in democracy and power-sharing formulas. Whatever the reason, Syria's transition away from minority rule is likely to be lengthy and violent. Even though the Alawis make up a mere 12 percent of the total population, the regime continues to count on support from other minorities who fear Islamists coming to power and from important segments of the Sunni population who fear civil war. The Asads have been planning for this day of popular insurrection all their lives. Hafiz al-Asad did not make the mistake of Hosni Mubarak, allowing his sons to go into private business, while leaving the military in the hands of others, who ultimately turned against him. The Asads were less trusting, and for good reason. Syria's urban Sunnis looked at the Alawis as interloping aliens when they first took power —muwafidiin, as they were called. It was not long before the Muslim Brotherhood took up arms against them, labeling them as non-Muslim and non-Arab (shuubiyun) — only to be crushed brutally after the notorious Hama uprising in 1982. The use of excessive force was then a clear sign of the regime's determination and sectarian nature; the forces sent to retake Hama were largely Alawi. The Asads tutored their children in the arts of war so they could take command of the military and police their population. They marshaled in-laws, cousins and coreligionists into the upper ranks of the security forces. Despite the rhetoric of Arab nationalism, the Asads were keenly aware that only the traditional loyalties of family, clan and sect could cement their rule. In essence, they upheld the notion that it takes a village to rule Syria, a formula that successfully brought an end to political instability. For over two decades following independence, Syria had been known as the banana republic of the Middle East because of its frequent coups and changes of government. Under the Asads, loyalty quickly became the ultimate qualification for advancement into the upper ranks of the security forces. They packed sensitive posts with loyal Alawis and Baathists. Some analysts estimated that as many 80 percent of Syria's officer corps is Alawi. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration, but it underscores the sectarian safety measures the regime has taken.4 The main strike forces, such as the Republican Guard led by Bashar's brother, are overwhelmingly Alawi. Many of the divisions made up of enlisted Sunnis have not been deployed to quell the uprising. Instead, the regime has built up special forces and irregulars, often called shabiha, which are heavily Alawi or Sunnis of known loyalty. Policing loyalty in order to coup-proof the regime has been a paramount concern. Alawis were placed in strategic ministries other than defense. The foreign ministry is a case in point. Recently a Syrian ambassador who has sought refuge in Turkey told Hurriyet, “There are 360 diplomats within the Syrian Foreign Ministry. Of these, 60 percent are Nusayri [Alawi].” He added, “The number of Sunni diplomats does not exceed 10 percent.”5 Even if these numbers are an exaggeration, there is little doubt that the regime has been careful to staff the upper ranks of important ministries with loyalists and coreligionists. This attention to staffing is a key reason that major defections have not occurred in the top ranks of government and why we have yet to see a repeat of the Libya example, where whole sections of the country fell out of central control and turned to the rebel cause within weeks of the uprising's debut. Ironically, the minoritarian character of the regime makes it more durable than its republican counterparts in North Africa, where the population is largely homogeneous. The sectarian nature of the regime may protect it from major desertions when economic difficulties make paying for the far-flung patronage networks impossible. Patronage serves as essential glue, binding the interests of disparate social groups to the regime. Just as important, patronage frustrates the emergence of corporate groups that might compete with the government. The regime has skillfully doled out jobs and benefits to fragment the opposition and buy off opponents.6 For this reason, opposition leaders hope that sanctions will promote the collapse of the regime. They reason that, once government money runs out, widespread defections will take place, a coup by top-ranking Alawi officers may occur, or a Tahrir Square moment will overwhelm security forces in the major cities. Such hopes have not been fulfilled in 10 months of growing violence and protest. There is little reason to think they will be in the coming months. Despite increasing defections among the military's rank and file, the elite units, special forces and intelligence agencies may have little choice but to rally around the Asad regime, given their bleak prospects in a post-Asad Syria. Heavily Alawite elite units with sizable numbers of loyal Sunnis will likely see no alternative. The broader Alawi community is also likely to remain loyal to the regime, even as the economy deteriorates.7 Almost all Alawi families have a least one member in the security forces as well as additional members working in civilian ministries, such as education or agriculture. Most fear collective punishment for the sins of the Baathist era. Not only do they assume that they will suffer from wide-scale purges once the opposition wins; many also suspect that they will face prison or worse. Opposition leaders have tried to calm Alawi anxieties provoked by hotheaded sheikhs. The most notorious is Adnan Arur, who threatened, “We shall mince [the Alawis] in meat grinders and feed them to the dogs.”8 The head of the Muslim Brotherhood has assured ordinary Alawis that they will be protected. Those guilty of crimes will face proper courts and be tried according to the law.9 Such assurances only go so far in calming Alawi anxieties. Many do not expect an orderly transition of power, just as many remain convinced that a spirit of revenge may guide the opposition, which has been so badly abused. In short, because the Syrian military remains able and willing to stand by the president, whether out of loyalty, self-interest or fear, the regime is likely to endure for some time. The strength of Asad's rule is relative and can only be measured in relation to that of the opposition. Many analysts point out that his regime is brittle, narrow and ideologically bankrupt. All the same, the opposition is weaker. The regime has been able to count on the factionalism and bickering of its opponents to survive. Syria's feeble sense of political community has been the regime's greatest asset. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) being assembled in Turkey under the leadership of Colonel Riyadh al-Asaad is no match for the Syrian Army. Although armed opponents of the regime are an important development, their size, structural limitations and predominantly Sunni character make them a minimal threat. They have limited command and control, no dependable communications, and offensive capabilities that are restricted by their lack of heavy weapons. They do not yet present a real danger or alternative to the Syrian military. In fact, Western authorities have been pleading with the Syrian opposition not to militarize, for fear that the insurgency will actually weaken the opposition rather than strengthen it.10 The political leadership of the Syrian opposition remains divided. The SNC to for the opposition but has been to divisions within its own ranks as well as to with opposition The main political of the Syrian opposition, the Syrian to have control over the which in to have control over some and armed elements in Syria. This by most or the opposition in Syria The has been the to Most doubt that the has the number of it or is for many of the against the Syrian groups in Syria are on civilian as well as from the and do not take from Colonel or other they of the The has in disparate groups is to the regime and protect Syrian from the The SNC did not the leaders of the to its in a to the it has been to the The political leadership of the Syrian opposition remains divided. The SNC to for the opposition but has been to divisions within its own ranks as well as to with opposition The and the SNC as the leader of the opposition and have sought to up its and but they to their hands over its It is of main The Muslim the — members to from elite Syrian families — and members of the who are Syria and cannot their There are also many a of of the and a few of other Alawis seem to be of the SNC often that the Muslim Brotherhood is the real power the there is little for The is a Sunni who at the in Although he is and leadership is but When the SNC was first the could not on the were in a the more members as the because he is an in the but limited his as to months. He told The in only weeks before his was due to that he did not whether he would be given a was for a but the and process for its remain The SNC has to other opposition groups who have its In between the SNC and the for a of led by a of led the with in He stated that the two groups would forces on but his from the more and SNC Even some of in the of the Muslim Brotherhood for being a because he the to the SNC before quickly away from the it a and the SNC leadership against with the The SNC leadership the for being willing to with the regime, for to the Free Syrian and for against foreign number of SNC members and his of working for Asad's For its the the Syrian of Syrians by military that would in widespread a would the regime's which would to heavy civilian Even they that foreign will in an of Syria to the U.S. military in Iraq after the of regime in “The SNC the to and protect them against this a member of the The and many and opposition members to that they may by the as Islamists as in and more opposition and groups are For example, a and member of the most the of a political the itself in in The are on the They do not which has been the nor do they who that for and are but a to an for The minorities remain of the of in the region. Many see the Arab to be a of the the most important among the opposition is not that between the and which but rather the between and on the who are the on the and armed groups are in Most use the in their but few They to Some of this is for are One of the main has been so is that the that their to were being by One opposition that their ranks had been with Opposition is to be The Asad regime and most of civil and for that Syrians it hard to All the same, is a the Syrian opposition can and could be and because their turned against their In Syria, the military is by the and at the All the same, the opposition is more more and armed with Syrians are of the Asad regime. Even many Alawis the in a as he remains convinced he will the uprising and continues to that Syria will be the for Many ordinary Syrians who are on their hands even as they government will not support the opposition they are assured it can a real alternative to the regime and order on the want to the of the uprising on in a opposition leaders are the of their capabilities and to foreign its in on the a to the community the of and In the and the Arab there is only limited support for in Syria. the could also have been in the to in weeks after of that, if had told two months that the U.S. military would be in he would have them they were Although of State has an of Syria and the Western and Arab against it, has the notion that the will Syria will be a to than In some it remains in the of to One U.S. military intelligence officer who in Iraq to that, if Iraq into civil war at the as Syria the region would face a of a is by its and President is his in U.S. from the Middle East as of his He will not want to on his own of by U.S. military and are from an for fear of their Turkey has little to from intervention, democracy and Bashar's is on the and Iraq is less does not a war with Syria. Most important, foreign are to if Syrians cannot and a military force of at the a of Syria on its Many ordinary Syrians who are on their hands even as they government will not support the opposition they are assured it can a real alternative to the regime and order on the want to the of Many that President was when he to on the of the of the Arab have a of percent to be national percent to be and at least 10 percent to be There are in which the might support Arab and to an might be convinced to from if Middle states to The of from Iraq has many the and of the in the of strategic with in Syria with the to regional to weaken or the leadership of one of its key and to the in the the of Syria away from the the Sunni leadership of and Turkey is as it might that it has into All the same, the Syrian opposition is likely to in the and the have stated in no that they will not in Syria. is and have in the to Syria. For these Syria's opposition may be for in at least for the Syria's opposition foreign remain in over the of to Syria is a case of the of the Arab Many have on the economic the Arab and their Syria. the and Arab whether or turned to measures to their rule. In for political and minimal education and The was a and government ministries of of and and a measures but at a They Arab states and them with and population as a that in an of This was Syria the to and more than most Middle Bashar to up the Syrian economy and the were than his the but by measures and All the same, he private and He with private and use of the in an to private and foreign even as Asad sought to private he its the emergence of a that would be largely Sunni and not to the regime, Asad turned to his who became of the Syrian He a majority in many major and and that the Asad family control over the at every rank of the this of by the of from the of major regime — called the of — has notorious for its and economic The has been an of and at the growing and of Syrian The of the last Syrian and an estimated one off the and into urban of which has to jobs or economic security to the has has been in of the The the have been This was the social that the of support for the but it is up in The have in Syria has been on the even as the upper has with from percent to percent between and to the between and the both the and have been on the has the of the Baathist regime and is a in the Syrian uprising. It also why the most of the Syrian have been in such as and Syria's growing is due to The first is the of the last which Syrian and an estimated one off the and into urban a some percent of Syria's is estimated to have been built and in with no or The is estimated to have Syrians in the of the country into according to a The is the price of have been The of Syrian in price by to percent in led by which by Syria's who over their on have been hard by which 15 percent in has been by government to price for In were in its price to percent between and the of the Syrian uprising in has This is a of main foreign the percent on all coming from the of the government to for and The is increasing The Syrian economy has been to jobs for the growing population. The of the Arab is well and Syria has been The last has an the population of the Arab is under the age of Syria is off than than the population is under the age of percent of the population is in the 15 to the one in Arab was with the in and being even Syria's have been the Arab Syrian placed at a In the minister of and social that in the country between and The of the have sent The Syrian has sent the economy but quickly real economic can to regime is the of the many of economic have to of the of Syria, the as in He the the economy is is are and government is In where there are there is no economic — so paying they they are not their — so the are in all this is the Syria's has by percent in the of — from to — as the Syrian has from to to a on the of a to percent fall in as and on all but the most essential has to a a loss of on by in and the in is Syria a have also their on the Syrian economy in with Iraq has been by 10 percent because of is to be to percent of the in This will it well the danger for estimated to be 10 percent of an at the of that next year will be less than of and will for only 60 percent of government He that the will be Syrian out of a total of to or percent of a of The government has no to in order to make up for its it to a it can no This will force the government to to foreign such as or Iraq or to Syria's Some are already that the government special on and President such in to for the war in The government has all ministries to by which have been estimated to the government to have been The government has most of to the and have and in most is off for on end a “The whole has been — and One Syrian that no one in Syria is paying his are to make to on their or of expect will Many are to the is even more he is that some are to make to private they make For are as but the day of cannot be When it will the Syrian can it The on the government are the of the the government was already heavily in order to both the of its and no to the government will have to by remain and by it will on the Syrians of It will also which will to and the collapse of the Syrian one Syrian “The will be with a of at both the corporate and as can no be The economy is not to collapse Even as it the Asad regime may for some if no alternative forces to and It may be able to off the of the for a It is in that regime did not fall due to the economic brought on by war and sanctions in the the of some according to of Syria is not It does not have its and its are in All the same, Syria continues to have Most of its are to its after the is so is Even to Some of are likely to as a for Syrian The Asad regime it will to other such as and for and will undoubtedly so long as its own economy can stand up to Western and the to into the hands of the opposition. The regime the and a of the and it can All the same, the Baathist regime will be a to Alawis and minorities the of the regime with do Sunni and who fear the is the opposition. lack of leadership was an the first months of the but it is a it, the opposition will have difficulties more Syrians to take the of and the of already there is no force that has the or leadership to the regime, at least that is yet One that the Asad regime will remain in power such a force
During the past decade, Indonesia has \n transformed itself from centralized governance to \n decentralized local governance. Local governments were given \n extensive expenditure responsibilities while keeping the tax \n system centralized. To finance decentralized \n provincial-local expenditures, Indonesia implemented a new \n system of intergovernmental finance. This paper provides a \n review of the equity and efficiency implications of the \n current system of central-provincial-local transfers. It \n finds that the system of intergovernmental finance \n represents one of the most complex systems ever implemented \n by any government in the world. The system is primarily \n focused on a gap-filling approach to provincial-local \n finance to ensure revenue adequacy and local autonomy but \n without accountability to local residents for service \n delivery performance. This is done through a great degree of \n academic rigor using highly complex procedures. The \n complexity leads to a lack of transparency, inequity and \n uncertainty in allocation as well as creating incentives for \n jurisdictional fragmentation and reducing own-tax effort. \n Simpler alternatives are available that have the potential \n to address equity objectives while also enhancing efficiency \n and citizen-based accountability. Such alternatives would \n represent a move away from complex gap filling and special \n allocation approaches to simple, output based transfers to \n finance operating expenditures. These would be complemented \n by capital grants to deal with infrastructure deficiencies, \n and fiscal capacity equalization as a residual program with \n an explicit standard to ensure that all local jurisdictions \n have adequate means to deliver reasonably comparable levels \n of public services at reasonably comparable levels of tax \n burdens across the country. The paper argues that such an \n alternative system of intergoveernmental finance would \n preserve autonomy, while enhancing equity, simplicity, \n objectivity, transparency and accountability.
The aim of this paper is to present a frozen image of the current Spanish system of fiscal federalism, in light of the tensions that the economic situation, has brought about. With this purpose, I will first broadly offer an outline of how decentralized Spain actually works, and how the decentralization process was brought about. Then I will focus on how the financing system works for most Autonomous Communities. Finally, I will attempt a preliminary analysis of the recent constitutional reform. A main conclusion of this paper is that fiscal federalism in Spain is, in fact, a work in progress. This paper has been previously published at the eJournal of Tax Research, (Australia); Volume 10, N. 1/2012.
Cloud computing dynamically provides high quality cloudbased secure services and applications over the internet. The efficient sharing of secure cloud storage services (ESC) scheme which allows the upper-level user to share the secure cloud storage services with multiple lower-level users. In hierarchical identity-based architecture, the sender needs to encrypt a file only once and store only one copy of the corresponding ciphertext in a cloud. The lower-level user needs to decrypt a file which will increase the computational overhead, because the lower-level user does not perform any partial decipherment. In this paper, we propose a Trapdoor commitment scheme that enables a lower-level user to send a short trapdoor to the cloud service provider before retrieving files. This scheme allows the CSP to participate in the partial decipherment, so as to reduce computational overhead on the users without leaking any information about the plaintext. If a lower-level user wants to retrieve a file with limited bandwidth, CPU and memory, the trapdoor which will largely helps to reduce computational power.
This thematic edition of Policy & Society contains a set of seven articles about transport infrastructure policy in the People’s Republic of China. Though they all revolve around this central topic, they cover different facets, such as the influence of Confucian values on decision-making, its impact on macro-economic development and regional distribution, power relations within Public Private Partnerships, organizational and contractual relations in subway construction, the duration of decision-making processes and the viability of developing Transit Oriented Development in Chinese cities. This first contribution will sketch a general overview of two driving forces behind China’s motorization process (economic growth and urbanization), what the impact has been on the expansion of the transport networks and hubs and what social and policy problems Chinese authorities currently have to tackle as a consequence of these developments. It ends with a small prospectus of the other six contributions to this volume. As it has transformed from a centrally planned economy to a market economy since the late 1970s with the “opening-up” policies brought forward by Deng Xiaoping, China has experienced rapid economic growth of almost 10% per annum on average (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009; OECD, 2010). Over the past three decades, China has regarded economic growth as a national priority to improve human welfare and eradicate poverty, while GDP as a primary economic growth indicator has been extensively used to assess the success of national or regional economic policies (Wen & Chen, 2008). National GDP increased from 455 to 39,798 billion RMB between 1980 and 2010. In the same period, per capita income rose from 463 to 29,940 RMB. Given the impressive growth performance, three globalized regional economies, those of the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and the Bohai Rim Bay Area, have continued to outperform all other regions in China (Fig. 1). These three regions, which together account for only 1.6% of China’s total land area, have contributed 12.3%, 27.4% and 26.3% respectively to China’s national GDP in recent years on average (Tuan, Ng et al., 2009). China’s geography. Capital investment (including domestic investment and foreign direct investment), international trade and capital accumulation are three key determinants for China’s rapid economic growth (Tuan et al., 2009; Whalley & Xin, 2010). China’s institutional reforms have fundamentally transformed the economic system through introducing decentralization and privatization: the transfer of economic-decision power from the central government to local authorities and the permission of (foreign) private investment in public infrastructures, which provides significant incentive for local authorities to build and expand the fixed assets of their localities with widening financial sources. This has resulted in large scale fixed-asset investment over the past three decades. According to the official statistics, fixed-asset investment relative to GDP rose from 20.0% in 1980 to 69.9% in 2010. On the other hand, the opening-up development strategy, together with preferential policies for foreign investors and outward-looking industries, has vigorously promoted China’s absorption of foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade. Since the restriction on FDI inflows into China was removed in 1979 and a new foreign investment law was enacted in 1984, China has received a large amount of FDI flows and become the largest FDI recipient among developing countries. Usually, the FDI inflows are realized by establishing foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) in China, which are often joint ventures between foreign companies and Chinese enterprises. These FIEs account for about 20–40% of China’s GDP in recent years and without them China’s overall GDP growth rate could have been around 3.4% points lower (Whalley & Xin, 2010). Furthermore, international trade has produced a continuously growing trade surplus since 1978. China’s remarkable economic growth has been concomitant with an almost equally rapid growth in urban expansion (Deng, Huang et al., 2008; Ho & Lin, 2004; Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009; Lin, 2001, 2007; Zhou & Ma, 2000). Urban expansion, on the one hand, refers to the situation of spreading spatially outwards from the city to its outskirts, and on the other hand, it refers to the process of in situ urbanization of rural areas, i.e. the gradual abandonment of agriculture as a way of life in favor of work in rural industries (Friedmann, 2005; Yusuf & Saich, 2008). On a national scale, China’s urban land area increased by 817,000 ha in the period of 1990–2000 and sprawled even faster in the period of 2001–2005 by 849,400 ha (Han, 2010; Lin & Ho, 2005). And the most significant expansion often occurred in coastal city-regions (e.g. Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, etc.), especially in those large cities whose urban centers are surrounded by secondary cities and rural townships (Deng & Huang, 2004; Wei & Zhao, 2009). On a local scale, individual cities have been adding huge amounts of suburban land to their already urbanized areas. For instance, large cities such as Beijing and Guangzhou experienced growth in urban land use of 30–50% in the past 15 years (Han, 2010; Wu, Li et al., 2006; Yu & Ng, 2007). City agglomerations including the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region and the Pearl River Delta region expanded more than 70% in the 1990s (Li & Yeh, 2004; Tan, Li et al., 2005). In addition, small cities expanded even more rapidly than the large ones. In the Beijing–Tianjin–Tangshan region the urban area of small cities increased by 80% in the same decade (Tan et al., 2005). One widely discussed reason leading to the urban expansion in China is the growth of the urban population (Liu, Zhan et al., 2005; Tan et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2006). From 1978 to 2010, China’s urban population increased from about 172 million to 666 million and the level of urbanization rose from 18% to 49.7% (Han, 2010). Because of the growing difference in living standards between urban and rural areas, the pressure of urbanization is bound to increase further in the future. Urban expansion is therefore taking place in order to accommodate this population growth. Similarly, the economic growth and changes in the industrial structure naturally extend urban activities to the peripheral areas, and make rural areas industrialized. In addition, the rapid urban expansion is also a result of local government’s policy for economic development. New projects such as industrial parks in the urban fringe areas reflect the intention of the local government to promote regional economic growth by constructing infrastructures and setting up ancillary facilities to improve the competitive edge of the locality and attract outside investors (Deng & Huang, 2004; Wu, Xu et al., 2007). Such urban expansion necessitates changes in land use in Chinese cities (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009; Lin, 2002; Wei & Zhao, 2009; Yang & Gakenheimer, 2007). While expanding outward, cities do not simply replicate their old fabrics in the new areas: fundamental structural transformation takes place. Traditionally, the pre-reform urban settlement in China included state and collectively owned enterprises that contained their own housing and commercial facilities along with their production activities. With the advent of the land and housing reforms introduced in early 1980s, the urban fabric has been altered in many different ways. Most evidently, many state-owned enterprises have moved their production activities to new suburbs while leaving the employees still living in the same localities to enjoy various urban amenities. And in most cases, new enterprises no longer stick to the traditional model of mixing workplace and residence. Housing supply has been subjected to the market mechanism. In addition, the centers of Chinese cities, formerly occupied by working class families, are transferred to business offices, retail stores and the governmental sector constituting Central Business Districts (CBDs). And households seek suburban locations with lower densities, less traffic and noise, and larger, more modern housing. Furthermore, when urban expansion is limited by urban boundaries set by the Chinese central government, Chinese cities start to develop anchor-institutions and satellite communities as new development zones which are connected with inter-regional railways or expressways. Additionally, the evolution of land use in large Chinese cities is towards a multi-centered city layout in order to avoid high traffic density in the urban core. China’s staggering developments in terms of economic growth and urban expansion have far-reaching impact on and pose challenges for its transport sector. This mainly refers to the ever growing traffic demand from individual users and the business sector, requiring constant network construction and expansion and involves almost countless amounts of land and funding. In the next section, we present the state-of-the-art knowledge on transport infrastructure development under these twin forces. Fig. 2 shows that almost all the transport modes have experienced rapid growth in passenger traffic demand from 1980 to 2010 after China’s economic reforms. The traffic flows concentrated on railways and roads, while the trend of road transport has exceeded rail since 1995. In addition, the volume of passengers who traveled by air in recent years is also increasing, given that more Chinese can now afford air travel with higher personal incomes, and under its economic boom an increasing number of foreign tourists and business travelers come to the country. In contrast, less and less people travel by ship because of the relatively low accessibility of inland waterways and long travel times. Therefore, over the past 30 years a tremendous transition took place among the transport modes in terms of their market shares. As we can see in Table 1, the share of railway transport for passengers has fallen by 29%, while the share of roads has increased roughly by 23%. In the same period, the share of air transport for passengers increased from 2% to 13.8%, and the share of waterway transport declined from 6% to 0.2%. Passenger traffic flows (in 100 million passenger-km). Transitions of market shares of different transport modes (1980–2010). Transitions of market shares of different transport modes (1980–2010). Apart from the long-distance inter-city transport, Fig. 3 shows that the numbers of passengers traveling with the urban bus system and urban metro system also experienced steady growth in the past decade. Passenger numbers travelling by bus increased from 24.6 billion people in 1995 to about 60 billion in 2010, while in the same period passengers using the metro system for trips grew from 0.45 to around 4 billion. Since 2000 urban subways and light rail received massive investments and the total metro length in the whole country reached 1469 km in late 2011. The growth rate of passenger flows by metro exceeded that of buses. However, the increase in the traffic flows by bus and metro does not imply that public transit enjoys a higher modal split relative to private vehicles. Rising per capita income among citizens in China and removing the restrictions imposed by the Chinese government on private car ownership have already led to a highly problematic level of motorization. During 1985–2010 the private car ownership in China increased from 284,900 to 86,060,000 (Fig. 4). As a result, mobility depending on automobiles in large Chinese cities accounts for more than 60% compared with the mobility by public transit. Urban traffic flows by bus and metro (1995–2010, in billion passengers). Private car ownership in China (1978–2010, in million). Table 2 shows the status of investment in transport infrastructures in China from 2001 to 2009, and we can see that the scale of the investment shows a massive increase from 243.2 billion RMB in 2001 to 2327.1 billion RMB in 2009. Grouped by mode, a majority of the investment was spent on road and railway constructions while only a small part was invested on urban, air and waterway transport. If grouped by different sources of financing, total investment from the fiscal budget of the central government ranged from 18.3% to 30.4%, and the remaining part came from local governments that may use their local fiscal budget, obtain loans from banks or otherwise attract private capital. When differentiating the investment by ownership, we can see that more than 90% of the investment was from public sources, only around 4–6% was private and a very tiny part from collective sources. Investments in transport infrastructures (2001–2009). Investments in transport infrastructures (2001–2009). Since the mid-1980s, China has invested massively in road infrastructure. The resulting expansion of the road network, has contributed greatly to, and has also been strongly stimulated by, China’s continuing economic development and the reduction of rural poverty (Fan & Chan-Kang, 2008). By the end of 2009, the total length of the road network was about 3,860,800 km, of which 65,100 km are expressways, compared with a figure of 1,698,000 km in total and 19,437 km for expressways in 2001. However, relative to the breadth and length of China’s geographical area and its large population size, its road network still ranks among the sparsest in the world in terms of density and coverage. Focusing only on expressways, the fast construction and expansion originated from the first approved “National Trunk Road System Plan” in the late 1990s. The plan was originally designed for a 35,000-km network including 5 north-south expressways and expressways. And the was billion RMB. By the end of of the planned roughly km, However, by the continuously traffic demand for roads, the Chinese central government expanded the plan into a Plan” in late to build Beijing north-south expressways and expressways, km (Fig. The is in and the total is 2 RMB. more than km have been network are to China’s economic development and social and railway transport is still the most used and for the of passengers and in large and long The length of railways in has increased from km in 1980 to about km in 2009. This expansion of the railway network up in recent years because of the of the and Plan” in (Fig. in the plan are to in when the total length of railways in roughly In to network expansion, the of this plan are to km passenger as as to of the to and the end of 2010, China has around km that are with new and and with the of foreign China has with a of in this plan new are planned in China. and railway network The air transport has been of in the 30 years as a result of and Over the same period, air transport in China has also been significant transformation the “opening-up” policies since In passengers and the only million passengers and million while the figure in has to million and Such rapid growth in air traffic of passengers and have been a result of the increase in leading to an increase in of air passenger transport, and the trend in the of which China has become a has been growing demand for air as China’s infrastructure has and 2009, the Chinese governments all invested billion RMB in constructing and By China has with a density of per are international of which have of and a of of for as as more than that could accommodate and regions, coastal and cities have modern In addition, areas, regions and areas with transport infrastructures also have Urban transit an in transport within urban areas as cities in China. And among the to traffic and huge investments in urban rail in Chinese have been to 1980 when urban rail could in Chinese cities, the total length of urban rail in reached km (Fig. And bus transit have also been from km in 1995 to km in 2009. In addition, the urban trips by Chinese citizens have also increased from billion in 1995 to around billion in 2009. Such an increase in urban traffic demand urban rail Urban rail are currently in Chinese cities. for and rail and new in 15 other Chinese cities. Transit are also or expanded in and The cities of and also on city subway constructions in Chinese cities. along with the twin developments of economic growth and urban expansion, China has experienced rapid transport infrastructure development in recent Such in terms of network expansion, has for accessibility the regional and the local This has been by various Li and the projects and their impact on the accessibility of individual and and and et the accessibility impact of the development of the and railway Xu et the impact of railways on the accessibility on the and a more by taking into account rail and road transport in the of regional accessibility in the Yangtze River However, while the huge are a of the transport sector has Since most of the transport projects are concentrated in central and regions in China, people new transport infrastructure will more regional accessibility or more development & Statistics have that large regional in the density and of road infrastructure in China, for The region is by roads compared to the central and coastal In only and km of roads for of land in and of China, compared to more than km per of land in and central all and are in roads, with a density of only km per of In addition, road is also the in the roads expressways, and class roads account for less than 6% of the road network (Fan & Chan-Kang, 2008). the especially for the passenger most have that their construction will increase the between cities and their et al., For after the of cities connected to this system while cities to this Xu et al., 2010). Apart from the in China’s transport infrastructure around the motorization and the that with it in urban areas. While cities most of them are changes in transport which in the growth of long-distance the trend of mobility and the increase in urban traffic demand Zhao, 2010). The growth of private car ownership in China, which has for people to their of and other has led to the of cities and to travel which impact on the urban problems in Chinese cities especially in large can by very low average and high of driving spent and and & 2009; & 2010). In the of the increase in including those of and air transport, not only in China also in other developing According to the the growth rate in by the transport sector in developing is 3.4% 2006; Zhao, 2010). In China’s motorization the transport use of increased from in 2001 to in of total and it is to in & 2008; et al., 2007; & 2009; & 2010; Zhao, 2010). This situation is more in large Chinese cities & 2008). Beijing as an the number of private in Beijing 4 million in and will still increase an rate of in the trips by private increased by while trips by public transport only increased by The transport sector in Beijing for of total urban and air to road transport was of total air behind the from industrial production 2009). In to the the travel also to higher numbers of traffic The that in the as a consequence of road traffic was that in and And in the same the of China was higher than in & 2009). As the in the points many impressive developments have place in the three when it to transport infrastructure many challenges still in terms of regional and income and and the and to with these In the remaining six contributions to this recent on transport infrastructure in China will and its In the next and will the into the of Confucian values and their modern impact on decision-making on transport infrastructures in China. are Confucian what are their and and to what can they for of infrastructure development in the most This amounts to for and who to the of their own also to Chinese and public for very have a In the and a into on infrastructure investments in China and make an to their impact on economic development that the economic impact of transport infrastructure investments is and after especially in the more of China. also come of regional within that large country and that it was a for the various governments to on investments in the of the that the macro-economic of on the central may very more than those forward the The by and takes to the of Public Private as to road construction and in China. It the power relations between the government, the private sector and which the process in for infrastructure. It that the institutional and power and The is to in a road in China, it is the with more power (in this the local was to to the the users and the private sector. is the geographical for the in the it is as a city and by the now it is the for a subway construction with a many Ma, and a account of the leading to the of an subway the they the in terms of organizational and contractual which the of the more direct more they do not use the power it is that large and to their and financial while and problems to The is also on the construction of a this on the and duration of the and process of the and the of policy network as in the international as a of and that the success as to fast decision-making in China are not by the such as the process took to and construction of the first has only also that in of the that the Chinese and significant institutional with those in of a given by authorities have to through very is seven in Chinese city of this Yu and Yang has long been as one of China’s cities, in not a small share to its modal many people use its high public transport. growing motorization has a impact on this situation and they a number of to the the one among the and of the public transport model is to the of in transit And the that the modal split after system is to more strongly towards while as to users
Western countries with strong primary care systems organize their health services around this healthcare modality, which serves as a gateway to the system and is characterized by multidisciplinary teamwork, management transferred to the teams and a broad services portfolio. The contractual relationship between professionals and the public health system is a useful tool to modulate the efficiency of services and their ability to meet the expectations of citizens and professionals. Some countries choose to contract professionals directly, either individually or through a professional organization, an option known as a self-management system. Others opt to contract public or private entities, which in turn recruit health professionals as employees. In the latter countries, the concept of management decentralization and managerial autonomy has arisen. In Spain, only Catalonia has enabled professional entities to be hired to provide public health services, through commercial formulas, i.e. in a competitive market relationship. This relationship allows the use of corporate governance mechanisms that are not subject to public control through state intervention. The other forms of management promoted in Spain to avoid the controls of state intervention - foundations or associations - have been unsuccessful, except in the autonomous region of Valencia and some models in the autonomous region of Madrid.
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Healthcare Policy and Management
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
Internet and digital technologies have been discussed recently by Addiction contributors in relation to the delivery of efficient computer-delivered brief interventions [1,2], online methodologies for recruiting and surveying illicit drug users [3] and the internet's role in facilitating the spread of information and sale of emerging drugs such as mephedrone [4] and synthetic cannabinoids [5]. Here, I introduce readers to a novel use of the internet in the drugs field. The anonymous online drug market-place Silk Road was first revealed in June 2011 [6]. Silk Road is accessible only to people who are using Tor anonymizing software [7]. Tor uses encryption to make it impossible for anyone to trace IP addresses (the electronic code assigned to each computer on the internet). The front page of Silk Road looks a great deal like the front page of eBay. Goods and services for sale are categorized and all manner of drugs are available under the following categories: ecstasy, cannabis, dissociatives, psychedelics, opioids, stimulants, benzodiazepines and other. Sellers receive ratings from buyers and comments about the quality of their products, how fast they ship and the level of professionalism and discretion of the transaction. Trust in sellers is built on reputation. Silk Road traders use the anonymous currency Bitcoin [8]. This decentralized international currency operates through peer-to-peer technologies. At the time of writing (October 2011), Silk Road is still online and continuing to expand. Facilitated by a combination of the internet and encryption technologies, buying and selling illegal products is now possible and may increase dramatically in the future. What may stop an exponential increase in the use of anonymous online drug market-places is the hurdle of delivery. At the end of the transaction, the physical product still needs to be sent to the buyer. Sending products between countries allows law enforcement the opportunity to intercept packages and potentially attempt to arrest the would-be importer. Sending products within the same country may make arrest less likely. There are also numerous barriers to entry for people who might want to use Silk Road. Installing and using Tor, buying and using Bitcoins in a secure way and taking the risk of fraud or arrest upon delivery may deter the majority of would-be users. Nevertheless, for the minority who master these concerns and are willing to take the risk, Silk Road has revolutionized how the internet can be used to source drugs. After all, buying drugs in the real world also involves considerable risk. For some, the online equivalent may prove more convenient and secure than arranging a standard deal. There are many unanswered questions about Silk Road. The extent to which law enforcement can stop and disband a site such as this is yet to be seen. The extent to which drug users will use this new technology is also unknown. Needless to say, if anonymous online drug markets do end up expanding into mainstream drug markets, they will pose a real challenge to existing drug laws and policies. We should definitely watch this space. None.
The current Albanian Constitution (1998) defines communes and municipalities (local governments) as the basic units of local governments. Local governments are legal entities and perform all the duties of self-government, with the exception of those that the law gives to other units. There are a total of 373 local governments units, consisting of 65 municipalities and 308 communes. While municipalities govern urban areas and the communes rural areas, there is no substantive legal distinction between them. The fiscal decentralization reform in Albania has addressed the issue of adequate local recourses proportional to the competences. The decentralization of functions were supported with an increase of financing opportunities either through the increase of transfers from the state budget or by adopting the new system of local taxes and fees, the latter one by providing total discretion to the local government in setting local tariff policies to cover the cost of their services. Unfunded mandates can represent a risk if not addressed in an appropriate manner. In this article we are going to discuss about the local resources as instruments to increase the autonomy of the local governments versus the resources from the central government. The balance between the resources from the central government and the local own revenue should be, as much as possible equal.
This paper focuses on efforts to build what policymakers call the “smart grid,” involving 1) improved remote monitoring and automatic and remote control of facilities in high-voltage electricity transmission networks; 2) improved remote monitoring, two-way communications, and automatic and remote control of local distribution networks; and 3) installation of “smart” metering and associated communications capabilities on customer premises so that customers can receive real-time price information and/or take advantage of opportunities to contract with their retail supplier to manage the consumer's electricity demands remotely in response to wholesale prices and network congestion. I examine the opportunities, challenges, and uncertainties associated with investments in “smart grid” technologies. I discuss some basic electricity supply and demand, pricing, and physical network attributes that are critical for understanding the opportunities and challenges associated with expanding deployment of smart grid technologies. Then I cover issues associated with the deployment of these technologies at the high voltage transmission, local distribution, and end-use metering levels.
Under traditional health insurance arrangements, citizens were covered by some insurance scheme.When sick, insurance arrangements allowed citizens to go to a health care provider, pay the price of the care received and be reimbursed later.Alternatively, the care provider would be owned by the insurer (like in integrated national health systems) and the patient paid nothing at the moment of consumption.In such arrangements, providers would freely set their prices or have no price to set at all (in an NHS-like system).Recent developments in health care financing include independent institutions that negotiate the prices with the financing institution.This is true with respect to health maintenance organizations (HMOs), managed care in general, but also in national health systems where decentralization and the split between provision and financing is implemented.In this scenario, negotiation over contractual terms, including prices as one major element, becomes a relevant issue in the analysis of performance of health care systems.Both empirical and theoretical analyses have been produced, and are reviewed below.This chapter reflects our views and preferences.It does not aim to be an encyclopaedic view of the existing literature on bargaining in health care.Instead, we try to highlight the new developments associated with explicit bargaining between third-party payers and providers of health care (a relation which is, in itself, only one of many that exist in the health care sector).Bargaining theory has a long tradition in the economics literature.However, it is only recently that this approach has found space in the analysis of the health care sector.The recognition of the strategic interaction among agents in the health care sector (patients, providers and third-party payers) came with the application of models borrowed from the industrial organization tradition dating from the 1970s.It was in the early 1990s when a step forward was taken with the eruption of the models of bargaining (see for example, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990, for a nice presentation) In many situations the health care sector has the structure of a bilateral monopoly/oligopoly.In this context, bargaining becomes the natural way to approach the interactions among agents.Most economic analyses of contract design in health care in fact assume that the party that moves first, typically the payer, proposes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the provider.We take here a broader view, looking at other types of negotiation procedures.We do not discuss issues related to contract design, which are taken up in chapter 22 by Chalkley in this Companion.We focus here on models of explicit bargaining between two parties, which we call the payer and the provider.On theoretical grounds, simple bargaining models can have their results transposed in a straightforward way: higher bargaining power and higher M2835-JONES9781849802673PRINT.
In a wide-ranging look at many aspects of health care financing and delivery, the concepts of glasnost and perestroika are used as a framework for presenting ideas from the American system that may have value for European health care planners. These include more uniform approaches to data collection and cost reporting, patient outcome studies, evaluation of service and access standards, publication of information, quality assurance review, decentralization and independent institutions, prepaid group practice, demonstrations and experiments, and managed competition. Suggestions are offered for making health care systems on both sides of the Atlantic more manageable, efficient, and responsive.
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Healthcare Policy and Management
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
This thesis is entitled ’Fiscal policy and economic growth in the presence of intergenerational transfers’. It is composed of four self-contained chapters and focusses on the growth and welfare effects of taxation and public spending. The common denominator of all four chapters is that they incorporate an endogenous growth process in an overlapping generations model to evaluate long-term policy implications when different generations are affected in different ways by fiscal policy. In the first and second chapter the implications of capital income taxation for the growth process are discussed. The analysis emphasizes the role of public and private intergenerational transfers in form of public pensions and bequests as well as intergenerational redistribution induced by public policies. Among other results, it turns out that the presence or absence of such transfers critically determines whether an increase of capital income taxes with additional revenue being devoted to cut wage taxes may enhance economic growth. In the third chapter, the focus of the analysis is on social security funding and its implications for economic growth. Whereas a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, as considered in chapter one, naturally includes intergenerational transfers from the current working generation to retirees, a fully funded social security system does not. Still, the presence of such transfers within the economy in form of private educational spending and bequests turns out to play a key role in deter- mining the impact of funded social security on economic growth. More specif- ically, it is shown that a funded pension scheme may harm growth if there are operative bequests within the family, and parents thus face a trade-off between educating their children and leaving bequests. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, the Ricardian equivalence holds and an increase in forced savings is exactly offset by a reduction in private savings leaving capital accumulation and educational spending unchanged. Chapter four discusses the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth in the context of education funding. While the traditional theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization focusses mainly on efficiency issues, empirical evidence for a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth turns out to be mixed. Some studies can confirm the positive impact of higher degrees of decentralization on economic growth, whereas others face difficulties in establishing a positive relationship and, in fact, obtain either no dependency or a negative one. The aim of the fourth chapter is therefore to further evaluate the theoretical linkage and, at the same time, to give an ex- planation for the discrepancy between the empirical literature. The analysis reveals that there exists a growth maximizing degree of fiscal decentralization. Furthermore, it is shown that some degree of fiscal decentralization is always superior (in terms of long-run growth and welfare) to a system where either local or central governments exclusively finance educational investments.