This study focuses on the subnational governmentsâ revenues, their productivity and contribution to the total budget of the region. In Ethiopia, the regions get significant amount of revenue from the central governmentâs block grant and their revenue sources generate very small amount of revenues and their tax bases are also very narrow. The study describes the revenue contribution of tax and non-tax bases separately and their trends throughout the periods. Moreover, it distinguishes specific revenue sources and their productivity, consistency of revenues from specific sources to finance local needs, and challenges in administration of their own revenue sources. Key w ords : Fiscal federalism, block grant, tax revenues, non-tax revenues, government budget.
Syftet med denna uppsats aÌr att undersoÌka Bitcoins egenskaper och funktioner samt diskutera dess eventuella paÌverkan paÌ dagens ekonomiska system. Den forskning som publicerats paÌ aÌmnet undersoÌker fraÌmst tekniska och saÌkerhetsmaÌssiga detaljer, det aÌr daÌrfoÌr intressant att analysera ur en ekonomisk synvinkel. Genom att anvaÌnda makroekonomisk teori ska jag foÌrsoÌka klargoÌra om Bitcoin kan konkurrera med dagens valutor. Bitcoins volatilitet i vaÌrde goÌr det tvivelaktigt, en volatilitet som inte kan kontrolleras. Bitcoin uppfyller delar av de funktioner och egenskaper som definierar en valuta enligt makroekonomisk teori, men inte lika maÌnga som fiatpengar och Bitcoin boÌr daÌrfoÌr inte kunna konkurrera med dagens valutor. Fiatpengar aÌr att foÌredra aÌven i andra omraÌden som acceptans och saÌkerhet. Bitcoin aÌr baÌttre ur ett kostnadsperspektiv, dock under specifika omstaÌndigheter som saÌllan uppfylls. Bitcoin kommer daÌrfoÌr tills vidare fungera som ett alternativ betalningssystem och valuta foÌr personer och foÌretag som aÌr villiga att ta de risker som medfoÌljer.
Jackson O Otieno, Paul A. Odundo, Charles M. Rambo
The Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) is an intergovernmental transfer system, supplementing the financing of service delivery within the framework of fisc0al decentralization. LATFĂąâŹâąs objectives are to improve service delivery, enhance financial management and accountability as well as reduce debts accumulated by local authorities. The purpose of this study was to establish the influence of LATF on service delivery by local authorities, focusing on Siaya Municipal Council. We gauged residentsĂąâŹâą perspectives about improvement of water supply, garbage collection, and sewerage services. We sourced primary data from 188 household heads and 202 market traders. The study found that 63.2% of the participants believed that there was no change in water supply consistency, while 69.5% reported the same about adequacy of water provided by the Council. Besides, 55.6% of the participants indicated that garbage collection had deteriorated, while 63.8% said the same about sewerage services. The findings suggest that access to LATF resources over the preceding decade had not improved service delivery in Siaya Municipality. Delivery of services was constrained by political interference (57.4%), procurement malpractices (44.1%), weak revenue base (38.7%), and understaffing (33.1%), among other factors. In view of this, local authorities should shape up to meet the current service demand, as well as gear up to address the needs of urban population, which is set to grow over the coming years.
Collect and analyse threat models to the Bitcoin ecosystem and its software. The create misuse case, attack trees, and sequence diagrams of the threats. Create a malicious client from the gathered threat models. Once the development of the client is complete, test the client and evaluate its performance. From this, assess the security of the Bitcoin software.
This paper uses a contract theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of eurozone financial governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. By constructing a Stackelberg game model with n Ministries of Finance as the first movers and the European Central Bank as the second mover, we show that each government can create growth in its own country (self-benefit) by increasing government spending, but that this will increase inflation, resulting in a decrease in the value of the euro. As these effects are shared equally by eurozone countries (cost sharing), an incentive to free-ride at the expense of other countries is present. We then analyze a penalty-based solution to the free-rider problem and derive a second-best solution where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. The optimal solution shows that ¥°limited sovereignty, ¥± that is, substantially constrained fiscal sovereignty, should be imposed as a high marginal cost for the issuance of public debt. Finally, we close the paper by discussing the possibility of Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Union).
Begreppet pengar har funnits sedan vi började anvÀnda varor och rÄvaror som betalningsmedel. I tusentals Är har mÀnniskor tagit för vana att anvÀnda pengar till att handla med varor och tjÀnster. Utvecklingen av pengar som ett verktyg för handel började med anvÀndandet av kakao frön, snÀckor och andra föremÄl som ansÄgs vÀrdefulla, som sen har utvecklats till anvÀndningen av Àdla metaller, som guld och silver. Under de senaste Ärhundradena har vi anvÀnt fiat valuta och nu, med utvecklingen av Internet, kan vi vara pÄ vÀg in i nÀsta steg i utvecklingscykeln av pengar. In kommer Bitcoin, som Àr den första decentraliserade digitala valuta som anvÀnder kryptering. Syftet med denna uppsats Àr att undersöka de positiva och negativa aspekterna av Bitcoin, och kommer att undersöka hur framtiden ser ut för uppfinningen av denna. kryptovaluta.
Bitcoin has become increasingly important in recent years. The exchange rate raised from $14 in January 2013 up to $240 in April 2013 and even $900 in early 2014. In this paper, we present novel insights about Bitcoin's peer-to-peer (P2P) network with a special focus on its distribution among distinct autonomous systems. We traversed Bitcoin's P2P network in a protocol-compliant manner and collected information about the network size, the number of clients, and the network distribution among autonomous systems. Our findings lead to conclusions about the resilience of the Bitcoin ecosystem, the unambiguousness of the blockchain in use, and the propagation and verification of transaction blocks.
The growing demands of users and industry have led to an increase in both size and complexity of deployed software in recent years. This tendency mainly stems from a growing number of interconnected mobile devices and from the huge amounts of data that is collected every day by a growing number of sensors and interfaces.\nSuch increase in complexity imposes various challenges -- not only in terms of software correctness, but also with respect to security. This thesis addresses three complementary approaches to cope with the challenges: (i) appropriate high-level abstractions and verifiable translation methods to executable applications in order to guarantee flawless implementations, (ii) strong cryptographic mechanisms in order to realize the desired security goals, and (iii) convenient methods in order to incentivize the correct usage of existing techniques and tools.\nIn more detail, the thesis presents two frameworks for the declarative specification of functionality and security, together with advanced compilers for the verifiable translation to executable applications. Moreover, the thesis presents two cryptographic primitives for the enforcement of cloud-based security properties: homomorphic message authentication codes ensure the correctness of evaluating functions over data outsourced to unreliable cloud servers; and efficiently verifiable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs convince verifiers of computation results without the verifiers having access to the computation input.
Since the seminal work of Oates (1972) on scal federalism, a central question of public finance has been which level of a federation should be as- signed the provision of public goods. In this paper we study the problem of a government that is to choose the optimal centralization/decentralization mechanism for the final treatment of municipal solid waste. We analyze incentives, equilibria and implications of the governance framework for the disposal of waste. The key decisions revolve around the mobility of waste and the externalities (pollution) associated with its disposal, be it incineration or landfill. Moreover, if the Regions are characterized by different levels of efficiency in the processes they apply to the final treat- ment of waste, in theory a certain degree of waste mobility across regions should allow to reap the benefits of higher efficiency. On the other hand, as transportation and other environmental costs implied by mobility and concentration are significant, a trade-off emerges. Our model evaluates the implications of that trade-off for the optimal degree of decentralization in waste management.
This paper uses simple monetary economic theory in order to extract implied BTC interest rates from exchange rates, interest rates and monetary supply data. Uncovered interest rate parity permits to derive a theoretical risk free BTC interest rate that is supposed to apply in a no arbitrage environment with rational expectations. Application to BTC/US$ exchange rates, Libor and Money supply US M2 data on the period September 2010 to January 2014 provides estimates, which illustrate what a risk free BTC interest rate could look like.
Over the past few years, virtual money has emerged via the Internet. Although currently unregulated, Internal Revenue System Notice 2014-21 will most likely cause virtual money to lose its mass appeal in the United States. Historically, other means of tax avoidance, including barter transactions and bearer bonds, have suffered the same fate. Virtual money will likely have more success as a technology than as a means of value.
Thesis: S.M. in Engineering and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, System Design and Management Program, 2014.
IntroductionThe Internet revolutionized the world like nothing before. It allowed for various forms of communication and connectivity, yet produced a number of social, legal, and economic challenges. Evidently, scholars began to theorize that the Internet would lead to the development of new forms of digital currency.1 And, they were right.This Note focuses on the regulatory status of a digital called Bitcoin.2 Specifically, it explores whether Bitcoin may be regulated as a security under various domestic securities laws. Part II summarizes the unique characteristics of Bitcoin and its current regulatory classification. Part III analyzes the securities laws of the United States, the United Kingdom (U.K.), Brazil, and Japan- four regional leaders in financial regulation. Part III also applies these laws to Bitcoin, arguing that Bitcoin does not fit squarely within the securities definitions of any country. Lastly, Part IV suggests a possible solution to regulating Bitcoin in the United States under a quasi-security framework. It recommends that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) define Bitcoin as a quasisecurity and pass regulations aimed solely at Bitcoin regulation, rather than trying to incorporate it into existing legislation. By promulgating new rules, the SEC can effectively spearhead the effort towards global Bitcoin regulation.I.Bitcoin's Unique Characteristics and Current Regulatory ClassificationThis Section explains what Bitcoin is and how it works. It discusses the unique characteristics of Bitcoin, and gives a brief overview of its varying legal status around the world.A.Entering the Bitcoin MarketBitcoin is the first digital currency that allows two parties to directly exchange single monetary units without going through a central payment system.3 The Bitcoin system is regulated entirely by computer software.4 It awards bitcoins to users through a program that solves various mathematical proofs and takes increasing amounts of computational power.5 Once users take time to download this program and use their computers to generate solutions, new bitcoins are issued.6 However, as the number of users in the system increases, the mathematical proofs become more difficult, which eventually slows down the production of bitcoins over time.7 Today, due to Bitcoin's popularity, few users acquire bitcoins through the mining process; rather, they acquire bitcoins in exchange for goods and services,8 or they purchase them directly through online exchanges.9B.Bitcoin TransfersOnce a user enters the Bitcoin market, he or she may choose to engage in Bitcoin transfers. Transfers occur through a network operated by thousands of computers, similar to a music-sharing system like iTunes or Spotify.10 Bitcoins are sent from one computer to another through individual messages. Each message has a personal identifier called an address,12 and each address has an associated pair of public and private keys, consisting of a string of numbers and letters.13 When an individual transfers bitcoins to a recipient, the recipient sends his or her address to the transferor.14 The transferor then adds the address and the amount of bitcoins to the transfer message.15 Finally, the transferor signs the message with his or her private key, and announces the public key to the recipient for signature verification.16In addition, the Bitcoin system provides a built-in mechanism to prevent individuals from copying and pasting the same digital addresses over and over again-a process that is often referred to as double spending.17 The traditional answer to the double-spending problem was a central clearinghouse, such as a bank, to keep a database of all transfers made in an account. However, Bitcoin found a way to alter this approach.18 After a transfer is completed, the system automatically broadcasts the time of the transfer and adds it to the Bitcoin block chain. âŠ
Secure two-party computation cannot be fair against malicious adversaries, unless a trusted third party (TTP) or a gradual-release type super-constant round protocol is employed. Existing optimistic fair two-party computation protocols with constant rounds are either too costly to arbitrate (e.g., the TTP may need to re-do almost the whole computation), or require the use of electronic payments. Furthermore, most of the existing solutions were proven secure and fair via a partial simulation, which, we show, may lead to insecurity overall. We propose a new framework for fair and secure two-party computation that can be applied on top of any secure two party computation protocol based on Yaoâs garbled circuits and zero-knowledge proofs. We show that our fairness overhead is minimal, compared to all known existing work. Furthermore, our protocol is fair even in terms of the work performed by Alice and Bob. We also prove our protocol is fair and secure simultaneously, through one simulator, which guarantees that our fairness extensions do not leak any private information. Lastly, we ensure that the TTP never learns the inputs or outputs of the computation. Therefore, even if the TTP becomes malicious and causes unfairness by colluding with one party, the security of the underlying protocol is still preserved.
European Social Fund has to be accurately implemented by Membersâ States authorities through projects developed by public and private national entities, according also to the principle of âsound financial managementâ, described as the expression of the appropriate mix of economy of assigned resources, efficient allocation of resources toward indicators and effectiveness of financed operations. As long as ESF funding is trusted for implementation through a decentralized management mechanism to the Membersâ State Authorities, those have to comply with reporting objectives to the EC, as set into the European Regulations, including compliance to the âsound financial managementâ principle whose three components are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely (SMART). Identifying the most appropriate quantitative methods that could be applied to the measurable elements may be seen as a first step in assisting both: management's decision towards implementation and reporting over the EC objectives. Our study tends to appropriate some quantitative models to the ESF implementation mechanisms, enhancing connections among ESF specific variables: project's budgets and number of individuals receiving labor market related services (also called project's indicators). Conclusions lead us to a series of quantitative models that may be practically used for assisting management's decision and reporting towards a sound ESF implementation in Romania.
Open access
Regional Development and Policy
Education, Management, Technology, Human Resources
The English version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2526472 . Italian Abstract: La grande diffusione dei bitcoin avvenuta negli ultimi due anni ha messo in luce una serie di questioni legate all'utilizzo degli strumenti di pagamento anonimo in internet. Se da un lato la rete vede in questa nuova utility una forma di moneta elettronica, l'analisi giuridica del fenomeno individua una concorrente natura di commodity, rispetto cui sono da sottolineare i risvolti di rischio legati all'uso degli strumenti derivati e al pericolo di bolla speculativa. Il forte incremento e la volatilitĂ che caratterizzano il cambio dei bitcoin contro le monete tradizionali sembrano infatti da considerarsi legati, piĂč che al grande successo riscosso in rete da questo efficiente strumento, alle attivitĂ di investimento di alcuni fondi hedge e a decisioni di tipo istituzionale intervenute nel corso del tempo. Nell'articolo che segue si analizzeranno i bitcoin nella loro duplice veste: la valutazione economica sarĂ relativa alle caratteristiche di volatilitĂ peculiari del target di analisi mentre le considerazioni espresse a livello strutturale saranno riferibili agli strumenti di questo genere in quanto tali. English Abstract: The considerable diffusion of bitcoins over the Internet that took place in the last two years has highlighted some important issue about the use of anonym tools of payment in e-commerce. Even though bitcoins are largely considered to be a digital currency, the legal and economic analysis draws the attention to a concomitant structure of financial commodity with risky features related to derivative instruments making the possibility of a bubble a case to consider. The significant growth in value and the intense volatility characterizing bitcoins are more likely to be the consequence of remarkable investments made by hedge funds and the effect of specific Institutional measures, than the outcome this efficient instrument has achieved on the Internet. The following article is analyzing bitcoins in their twofold nature: the structural considerations we will express are referred to virtual coins in general, whereas the financial evaluation is related to the specific volatility of our analysis target.