With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of āInitial Coin Offeringsā, public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in recent years. Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries. But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination. It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By drawing upon HLA Hartās Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology.
The technology of blockchain (āBlockchainā) realises a more efficient, equitable, and transparent distributed ledger system. An important characteristic of Blockchain is its automated, de-centralized, and neutral ledger system which could be useful to carry out Corporate Social Responsibility (āCSRā) initiatives. Part I of this paper suggests that the Blockchain will evolve to become a permanent ādisruptorā with the potential to transform corporationsā CSR practices. Part II introduces the Blockchain and identifies its significance to CSR, both in the United States (āU.S.ā) and internationally. Part III explains how the Blockchain can help demonstrate that a corporation is a āresponsible businessā through good corporate governance, effective supply chain management, and exercise of the triple bottom line ā people, profit, and planet. Part IV examines how the Blockchainās disruptive role influences corporate decision-making, especially its implications for corporate investors, financial institutions, and the practice of law as well as its impact on intellectual property and data privacy functions. Part V discusses the U.S. current regulatory landscape and growing trends relating to the Blockchain. Finally, Part VI recommends lawmakers and corporations consider adopting a legislative framework that aligns with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (āUN SDGsā) to demonstrate responsible investment and good corporate governance. Accordingly, the Blockchain can help corporations transform CSR practices and assist lawmakers to regain public trust through effective rulemaking that demands corporate accountability on domestic and international issues.
This article entails an innovative approach to smart grid technology implementation, as it connects governance research with legal analysis. We apply the empirico-legal āILTIAD frameworkā, which combines Elinor Ostromās Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework with institutional legal theory (ILT), to an empirical case study of a local smart grid project. Empirical data were collected in an exploratory, descriptive example study of a single case, focusing on the Action Situation and interactions towards establishing a local Smart Grid. The case was chosen because of its complexity, following the ālogic of intensity samplingā. Data triangulation took place combining participatory observation, semi-structured interviews, and document analysis. Through an exploratory case study, we showed how the ILTIAD framework can help reduce complexity in local decision-making processes on smart grid implementation, as it allows for analytical description and prescriptive design of local smart grid systems. In the analysis we addressed ownership arrangements and contracts and identified barriers and opportunities for realizing a local smart grid system. The design part includes a scenario which revealed the prescribed patterns of behaviour (liberties and abilities) and the consequential aspects that apply to each situation. Analysing and designing normative alignment ex ante to the planning and implementation of a smart grid system provides clarity to stakeholders about their current opportunities. For this reason, the ILTIAD framework can be used as a design guideline for establishing new and integrated smart grid projects.
Abstract Regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe have wellādeserved reputations for fixating on the total benefits and costs of proposed and final regulatory actions, without doing any more than anecdotally mentioning the subpopulations and individuals who may bear disproportionate costs or reap disproportionate benefits. This is especially true on the ācostā side of the costābenefit ledger, where analysts exert little effort to even inform decisionmakers and the public that the costs of regulations might be distributed either regressively or progressively. Many scholars and advocates have observed that regulation can increase the efficiency of market outcomes, but caution about its untoward (or suboptimal) effects on equity. Here, we argue that without considering distributional information about costs and benefits, regulatory policies in fact can also cause violence to notions of efficiency , for two reasons: (i) society cannot hope to approach Paretoāefficient outcomes without identifying those who must lose so that others can gain more; and (ii) because the harm experienced by involuntary risks and by imposed regulatory costs is likely nonālinear in its magnitude (at the individual level), efficiency is, in fact, a strong function of the shape of the distribution of these effects. This article reviews evidence about the distribution of regulatory costs and benefits, describes how agencies fail to incorporate readily available distributional information, and sketches a vision for how they could analyze costs and benefits to promote more efficient regulatory choices and outcomes.
Open access
Regulation and Compliance Studies
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
This chapter critiques environmental agencies' use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the context of a concrete case study: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) recent regulation of mercury emissions from coal-fired utilities under the Air Mercury Rule (CAMR). It identifies seven issues for regulatory impact analysis (RIA) that the CAMR brings to the fore. Rather than informing the decisionmaking process, the CAMR RIA served to obscure the range and contours of the regulatory options on the table. Rather than providing a neutral tally of are obviously and of the rule, the CAMR RIA enlisted value judgments to assign the impacts of mercury contamination to one side of the ledger or the other. Rather than permitting a complete accounting of these impacts, the CAMR RIA provided an accounting that was partial - in both senses of the term. Rather than laying bare the answer to the question what is at stake, for whom?, the CAMR RIA assessed only those impacts that had been monetized. Its bottom line, moreover, told us nothing about how the costs and benefits would be distributed. Rather than affording enhanced oversight by elected officials and the public, the CAMR RIA dazzled with detail but often obfuscated the considerations relevant to EPA's decision. Finally, rather than helping EPA satisfy its legal mandates, the CAMR RIA provided information that was unconnected to the relevant Clean Air Act provisions, treaties with the fishing tribes, and other legal obligations that constrained EPA's decision. Having identified these shortcomings, the chapter closes with recommendations for reforming regulatory impact analysis - suggestions that echo other recent efforts to envision a more pragmatic orientation for analysis of health, safety, and environmental regulations.
While industrialists are discovering the hidden costs of minimal compliance with environmental regulation, environmentalists assert that EPA regulations contain too many loopholes. Since government regulation pleases neither environmentalists nor the regulated industries, we have to think in new directions. Can financing alternative technology be superior to monitoring pollution? Can local communities play a role in creating cohesion out of decentralization? What are the best new strategies both on the level of local communities and alternative technologies?