Private BitTorrent trackers enforce upload-to-download ratios to prevent free-riding, but suffer from three critical weaknesses: reputation cannot move between trackers, centralized servers create single points of failure, and upload statistics are self-reported and unverifiable. When a tracker shuts down, users lose their contribution history and cannot prove their standing to new communities. We address these problems by storing reputation in smart contracts and replacing self-reports with cryptographic attestations. Peers sign receipts for received pieces; the tracker aggregates them via BLS signatures and updates reputation. If a tracker is unavailable, peers fall back to an authenticated distributed hash table (DHT): stored reputation acts as a public key infrastructure (PKI), preserving access control without the tracker. Reputation is portable across tracker failures through single-hop migration in factory-deployed contracts. We also address the privacy implications of publishing public keys and reputations tied to private trackers on a public ledger: we propose ephemeral session keys to prevent linking peer identities, zero-knowledge membership proofs for anonymous DHT participation, and confidential reputation using homomorphic commitments. We formalize the security requirements, prove four security properties under standard cryptographic assumptions, and evaluate a prototype. Measurements show that transfer receipts add less than 5\% end-to-end overhead with typical piece sizes. To minimize signing overhead, we adopt a hybrid signature scheme: ECDSA signs individual piece receipts at transfer time for low per-operation latency, while BLS serves as the overarching scheme, enabling compact aggregation of many receipts into a single proof at report time. This design reduces client-side signing cost by an order of magnitude compared to using BLS throughout.
Blockchain technologies underpin an expanding ecosystem of decentralized applications, financial systems, and infrastructure. However, the fundamental networking layer that sustains these systems, the peer-to-peer (P2P) layer, of all but the top few ecosystems remains largely opaque. In this paper, we present the first longitudinal, cross-network measurement study of 36 public blockchain networks. Over 9 months (since late 2024), we deployed 15 active crawlers, sourced data from two additional community crawlers, and conducted hourly connectivity probes (e.g., pings and protocol-level handshakes) to observe the evolving state of these networks. Furthermore, by leveraging Ethereum's discovery protocols, we inferred metadata for an additional 19 auxiliary networks that utilize the Ethereum peer discovery protocol. We also explored Internet-wide scans, which only require probing each protocol's default ports with a simple, network-specific payload. This approach allows us to rapidly identify responsive peers across the entire address space without having to implement custom discovery and handshake logic for every blockchain. We validated this method on Bitcoin and similar networks with known ground truth, then applied it to Cardano, which we could not crawl directly. Our study uncovers dramatic variation in network size from under 10 to more than 10,000 active nodes. We quantify trends in IPv4 versus IPv6 usage, analyze autonomous systems and geographic concentration, and characterize churn, diurnal behavior, and the coverage and redundancy of discovery protocols. These findings expose critical differences in network resilience, decentralization, and observability. Beyond characterizing each network, our methodology demonstrates a general framework for measuring decentralized networks at scale. This opens the door for continued monitoring, benchmarking, and more transparent assessments of blockchain infrastructure across diverse ecosystems.
To address the limitations of blockchain data storage capacity and uneven dis-tribution, this paper proposes a Chord dual-ring distributed storage method based on virtual nodes. Building upon the original Chord protocol, this approach introduces virtual rings to construct a âstorage ring-virtual ringâ dual-ring structure. Target virtual nodes are located through routing table lookups, and data is distributed across the storage ring via a name mapping mechanism. Sim-ulation experiments validate the proposed scheme's effectiveness by evalu-ating load balancing and query success rate across varying sharding granulari-ties. Results demonstrate that this approach not only efficiently achieves shard-ed storage for blockchain data but also ensures balanced distribution of block data.
Abstract Blockchain wallet manages decentralized identities in Web3, which allows users to identify themselves in a verifiable yet anonymous manner by digital signatures. However, native wallet scheme has been proven vulnerable to Sybil attacks in practice, where adversaries can easily create large numbers of controlled wallets at a low cost to undermine Web3 applications. To this end, many solutions are proposed for mitigating Sybil attacks. Nevertheless, they typically rely on either costly specialized biometric hardware or behavior-based heuristics that can be easily bypassed. In this paper, we introduce EdenDID, the first trinity-bound identity management system that uniquely binds human user, wallet address, and physical device into a unified framework. EdenDID combines edge-based video recognition, on-chain transactional activity analysis, and device computational power verification to establish a decentralized Proof-of-Trustworthiness consensus. The system provides compliant users with a trusted, verifiable credential to prove their unique identity. We prototype low-cost Eden Devices and deploy them on a Layer-2 blockchain network. Our experiments demonstrate the low end-to-end latency and robust resistance performance to Sybil attacks. Moreover, we present a case study to show how EdenDID can mitigate virtual-hardware fraud in DePIN, in which EdenDID successfully binds the user, wallet, and device uniquely, thus preventing users from binding multiple wallets or devices.
Decentralized storage is one of the most natural applications built on blockchains and a central component of the Web3 ecosystem. Yet despite a decade of active development -- from IPFS and Filecoin to more recent entrants -- most of these storage protocols have received limited formal analysis of their incentive properties. Claims of incentive compatibility are sometimes made, but rarely proven. This gap matters: without well-designed incentives, a system may distribute storage but fail to truly decentralize it. We analyze Shelby -- a storage network protocol recently proposed by Aptos Labs and Jump Crypto -- and provide the first formal proof of its incentive properties. Our game-theoretic model shows that while off-chain audits alone collapse to universal shirking, Shelby's combination of peer audits with occasional on-chain verification yields incentive compatibility under natural parameter settings. We also examine coalition behavior and outline a simple modification that strengthens the protocol's collusion-resilience.
This work focuses on the study of distributed ledger applications, presenting proposals of fair and decentralised applications to counter scenarios in which centralisation of wealth and power are the norm. The first contribution is a novel architecture for a decentralised data market, in which participants crowd-source data and receive a fair share of the reward. The market is shown to be resilient against a number of adversarial behaviours. Subsequently, an algorithm to prove one's location is presented. This algorithm is a key component necessary to the functioning of the data market. In contrast to prior approaches, the design does not require assumptions of honest participation, nor dependence on an external ground truth to identify malicious actors. It is fully peer-to-peer, robust in highly adversarial settings, and compatible with privacy-preserving techniques. The security and reliability of the algorithm are evaluated empirically and characterised mathematically. The protocol is then generalised into a consensus mechanism applicable beyond location verification. An extended mathematical model is developed for this case, and its performance under varying operational conditions is systematically characterised. Finally, a study of governance vulnerabilities in Distributed Ledger Technologies is presented. This work provides a taxonomy of formalised properties necessary for good governance, solutions to implement them and an evaluation of how the absence of these cause severe vulnerabilities. The analysis is then extended to realm of Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs), which are a class of applications implemented on Distributed Ledger Technologies. The findings anticipated several governance exploits that later materialised, incurring losses in the scale of millions for multiple DAOs. Overall, this thesis aims to contribute to the technological development of distributed ledger applications with the goal of furthering social good, presenting architectures, algorithms, and governance properties that prioritise fairness, decentralisation, and resilience.
This dissertation investigates how tokenised claims and algorithmic governance reshape interactions in Web3, with a particular focus on business-to-business (B2B) settings. Building on the insight that digital platforms and infrastructures are mutually entangledâplatforms acquiring infrastructural roles and infrastructures accumulating platform logicsâthe study examines how this entanglement reappears in blockchain-based systems and what it means for value creation, value distribution, and institutional control. Rather than assuming decentralization as an outcome, the dissertation asks how governance is actually assembled across code, organizations, and markets, and how these assemblies channel rights, risks, and rents over time. In this sense, the thesis extends platform/infrastructure scholarship into the Web3 domain, showing how infrastructuring and platformization remain co-constitutive under new technical conditions (e.g., programmable settlement, public ledgers, composability). The research is guided by the following question: How does algorithmic governance of tokenised claims affect dynamics of value creation and distribution in Web3? The thesis addresses a gap in extant work by analysing the combined economic and governance consequences of tokenisation in commercial contexts, rather than treating governance as either purely technical (smart contracts) or purely institutional (foundations, standards, regulators). Methodologically, this research adopts a qualitative, interpretive design centred on semi-structured interviews with founders and leads of Web3 projects oriented toward commercialization and enterprise use. Interview evidence is triangulated with document analysis (white papers, governance docs, upgrade logs) to trace how decision rights are allocated, which boundary resources act as chokepoints, and how incentives and accountability are engineered. The sample focuses on projects that tokenise rights and obligations to orchestrate inter-firm exchanges (e.g., guarantees, attribution, royalties), enabling a consistent comparison of governance choices and their distributional signatures. Theoretically, the thesis contributes a layered view of Web3 governance that differentiates transaction governance (smart-contract rules that execute exchanges) from platform governance (meta-rules that structure participation, evolution, and control)âlayers that are interdependent yet analytically distinct. Across cases, transaction governance supplies deterministic settlement (escrows, splits, auctions), while platform governance defines constitutional levers (eligibility schemas, listings, parameter updates, treasury policy, emergency powers). This distinction clarifies why âmore on-chainâ does not automatically imply âmore decentralisedâ: instruments can be automated while decision rights remain concentrated. The framing resonates with and extends platform governance scholarship that locates governance in the ongoing division of decision rights, control mechanisms, and incentives among interdependent actors. Empirically, the thesis identifies three governance modelsâmonocentric, moderately polycentric (P2), and highly polycentric (P1)âand analyses how each allocates rights and rents. Monocentric configurations recentre constitutional authority in a focal hub (firm, foundation, tightly bonded coalition), delivering speed, legal legibility, and coherent risk management, while concentrating surplus upstream via control of boundary resources (standards, registries, upgrade cadence, listings). Moderately polycentric arrangements disperse constitutional authority across overlapping venues (token voters, stewards, committees, standards groups), pairing automated execution at the edge with contestable meta-rules and auditable, replaceable discretion. Highly polycentric designs thin the platform layer and push coordination into markets and minimal, auditable rules (fee markets, open listings, plural oracles), improving neutrality and exit but requiring continuous work to diffuse emergent chokepoints (indices, bridges, relays). The patterns observed align with infrastructure/platform research on how control points shape innovation and value capture and with blockchain governance work emphasizing the allocation of decision and control rights. For B2B contexts, the analysis suggests a pragmatic equilibrium. Applications that demand auditability, finality, and accountable remediation (e.g., elections, trade guarantees) gravitate toward monocentric settlements; applications with heterogeneous actors and rapid iteration (e.g., creator and talent markets) benefit from moderately polycentric designs that preserve micro-level determinism with macro-level contestability. Across models, tokenisation expands what can be coordinated, but distributional outcomes hinge on who controls admission, measurement, and upgrade pathways. Accordingly, the thesis proposes design heuristics: separate transaction and platform governance, publish change logs and revocation paths, pluralise attestors at measurement junctions, time-box mandates, and keep credible exit technically and institutionally real. In sum, the dissertation advances an integrated account of Web3 as a political economy of programmable claims and layered governance. It shows how infrastructuring and platformization fold into one another under blockchain conditions, how distinct governance models redistribute rights and rents, and how B2B value propositions depend as much on constitutional design as on code. The framework equips scholars and practitioners to evaluate Web3 systems not by decentralisation rhetoric, but by the concrete allocation of decision rights, boundary resources, and incentives across layers and venues.
As blockchain technology advances, Ethereum based gambling decentralized applications (DApps) represent a new paradigm in online gambling. This paper examines the concepts, principles, implementation, and prospects of Ethereum based gambling DApps. First, we outline the concept and operational principles of gambling DApps. These DApps are blockchain based online lottery platforms. They utilize smart contracts to manage the entire lottery process, including issuance, betting, drawing, and prize distribution. Being decentralized, lottery DApps operate without central oversight, unlike traditional lotteries. This ensures fairness and eliminates control by any single entity. Automated smart contract execution further reduces management costs, increases profitability, and enhances game transparency and credibility. Next, we analyze an existing Ethereum based gambling DApp, detailing its technical principles, implementation, operational status, vulnerabilities, and potential solutions. We then elaborate on the implementation of lottery DApps. Smart contracts automate the entire lottery process including betting, drawing, and prize distribution. Although developing lottery DApps requires technical expertise, the expanding Ethereum ecosystem provides growing tools and frameworks, lowering development barriers. Finally, we discuss current limitations and prospects of lottery DApps. As blockchain technology and smart contracts evolve, lottery DApps are positioned to significantly transform the online lottery industry. Advantages like decentralization, automation, and transparency will likely drive broader future adoption.
The greatest advantage that Web3 applications offer over Web 2.0 is the evolution of the data access layer. Opaque, centralized services that compelled trust from users are replaced by trustless, decentralized systems of smart contracts. However, the public nature of blockchain-based databases, on which smart contracts transact, has typically presented a challenge for applications that depend on data privacy or that rely on participants having incomplete information. This has changed with the introduction of confidential smart contract networks that encrypt the memory state of active contracts as well as their databases stored on-chain. With confidentiality, contracts can more readily implement novel interaction mechanisms that were previously infeasible. Meanwhile, in both Web 2.0 and Web3 applications, the user interface continues to play a crucial role in translating user intent into actionable requests. In many cases, developers have shifted intelligence and autonomy onto the client, leveraging web technologies for computation, graphics, and networking. Web3âs reliance on such frontends has revealed a pain point though, namely that decentralized applications are not accessible to end users without a persistent host serving the web application. Here we introduce the Non-Fungible Program (NFP) model for developing self-contained frontend applications that are distributed via blockchain, powered by web technology, backed by encrypted databases, and controlled by confidential smart contracts. Access to frontend code, as well as backend services, is controlled and guaranteed by smart contracts according to the NFT ownership model, eliminating the need for a separate host. By extension, NFP applications bring interactivity to token owners and enable new functionalitiesâsuch as authorization mechanisms for oracles, supplementary web services, and overlay networksâin a secure manner. In addition to releasing an open-source software development kit for building NFPs, we demonstrate the utility of NFPs with an interactive Bayesian game implemented on Secret Network.
The conventional space title industry is overwhelmed by centralized recorders that force tall recharging expenses, limit possession rights, and show security vulnerabilities due to single focuses of disappointment.This paper presents Domyn, a decentralized space title commercial center leveraging blockchain innovation and NFTs (Non-Fungible Tokens) to empower genuine possession of advanced spaces.Built on the Ethereum blockchain, Domyn utilizes ERC-721 keen contracts to tokenize space names, permitting clients to mint, purchase, offer, and exchange proprietorship without mediators.Furthermore, IPFS (InterPlanetary Record Framework) guarantees decentralized capacity, making the framework censorship-resistant and tamper-proof [8].Through an in-depth investigation of its design, exchange stream, and savvy contract execution, we illustrate Domyn's capacity to supply security, straightforwardness, and productivity compared to conventional space enlistment centers.The paper assist presents execution measurements, test case comes about, and a security assessment to approve the viability of the proposed framework.We moreover investigate future upgrades, counting Layer 2 scaling arrangements and multi-chain interoperability, to progress gas proficiency and selection.
Introduction. Cryptocurrencies are gaining popularity among individuals, businesses, and financial institutions. They are used for various purposes, particularly to pay for goods and services. Selling goods and services for cryptocurrencies can help companies attract new customers, increase sales, expand market share, and more. This article explores whether cryptocurrencies today function as a means of payment similar to fiat money, and examines the risks faced by companies that accept cryptocurrencies for goods and services. While cryptocurrencies are approaching the fulfillment of the economic functions of money, they have not yet fully reached this level. Nonetheless, in many countries, cryptocurrencies can be used to pay for goods or services, exchanged for other currencies, and more. In Ukraine, some companies sell household appliances, tickets, fuel, and other goods and services for cryptocurrencies. Problem Statement. Cryptocurrency developers emphasize that it is an alternative, private form of digital money that is not issued by national governments or controlled by financial intermediaries such as banks. The National Bank of Ukraine notes that the complex legal nature of cryptocurrencies prevents them from being recognized as cash, foreign currency, electronic money, securities, or a monetary surrogate. Cryptocurrencies offer certain advantages over traditional money, such as reducing transaction costs. However, transactions involving cryptocurrencies also carry inherent risks. Purpose. The study identifies the main approaches to organizing the sale of goods and services for cryptocurrencies. Additionally, the article aims to identify the risks associated with the sale of goods and services for cryptocurrencies and outline ways to minimize these risks. Materials and methods. We employed various research methods, including historical and legal methods, which involve the study of the legislative framework surrounding cryptocurrency transactions, as well as the empirical method, which investigates different practices of selling goods and services for cryptocurrencies. This approach also helps in identifying the risks companies face when engaging in such activities. One of the primary risks associated with cryptocurrency transactions is significant fluctuations in their exchange rates, which can result in economic losses in the event of a sharp devaluation. To better understand the nature of the risks associated with using cryptocurrencies, we conducted a statistical analysis of fluctuations in the Bitcoin exchange rate and built a correlation model with other market indicators, such as the Nasdaq Composite index and the exchange price of silver, for the period from March 1, 2012, to February 29, 2024. Using the Group Method of Data Handling (GMDH), we identified a connection between Bitcoinâs value fluctuations and market indicators that differ in terms of technological orientation (Nasdaq Composite) and investment risk (silver). Results. More and more countries are legalizing cryptocurrencies. In Ukraine, however, legislation regarding cryptocurrencies is still in development, and the sale of goods and services for cryptocurrencies is treated similarly to barter agreements. Depending on market characteristics and the specifics of their business, sellers of goods and services choose between directly selling for cryptocurrencies or using third-party intermediaries. This raises the question of what risks sellers face when accepting cryptocurrencies and how to mitigate or reduce those risks, such as the risk of sharp devaluation. Our model reveals a connection between Bitcoinâs exchange rate and other market indicators, such as the Nasdaq Composite index and the price of silver. However, the potential risks associated with using cryptocurrencies as a means of payment warrant further exploration. The lack of a clear regulatory framework and consistent definitions also introduces uncertainty in cryptocurrency operations. In practice, varying definitions of cryptocurrencies can create additional risks, particularly regarding the taxation of income received in cryptocurrency. Therefore, selling goods and services via intermediaries and converting cryptocurrency into fiat money can help mitigate legal, financial, and tax risks for companies. Additionally, gove
Layer-2 protocols can assist Ethereum's limited throughput, but globally broadcasting layer-2 data limits their scalability. The Danksharding evolution of Ethereum aims to support the selective distribution of layer-2 data, whose availability in the network is verified using randomized data availability sampling (DAS). Integrating DAS into Ethereum's consensus process is challenging, as pieces of layer-2 data must be disseminated and sampled within four seconds of the beginning of each consensus slot. No existing solution can support dissemination and sampling under such strict time bounds. We propose PANDAS, a practical approach to integrate DAS with Ethereum under Danksharding's requirements without modifying its protocols for consensus and node discovery. PANDAS disseminates layer-2 data and samples its availability using lightweight, direct exchanges. Its design accounts for message loss, node failures, and unresponsive participants while anticipating the need to scale out the Ethereum network. Our evaluation of PANDAS's prototype in a 1,000-node cluster and simulations for up to 20,000 peers shows that it allows layer-2 data dissemination and sampling under planetary-scale latencies within the 4-second deadline.
The emergence of decentralized file-sharing platforms has introduced new challenges in ensuring secure data transmission, preserving node reputation, and preventing unauthorized access. This study presents an advanced peerto-peer (P2P) file-sharing system that integrates encrypted communication channels with blockchain-based consensus mechanisms to strengthen data confidentiality and trust evaluation. By employing protocols such as Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS), the proposed architecture establishes a tamper-resistant and verifiable ledger of interactions. Cryptographic techniques are used to protect data in transit and maintain privacy-preserving trust scores without revealing user identities. The system's reputation module continuously aggregates behavioural metrics, adjusting trust values through dynamic weighting and anomaly detection. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that this approach achieves high resilience against Sybil and eavesdropping attacks while preserving the integrity and confidentiality of shared content. The proposed model offers a scalable and secure foundation for next-generation decentralized file-sharing systems.
The paper presents a novel approach to enhancing the crypto-economic resilience of decentralized networks by employing a mechanism of Random Time Challenge Tokens (RTCT). Contemporary consensus mechanisms (Proof-of-Work, Proof-of-Stake, Proof-of-Burn) and their ability to deter 51% attacks and Sybil attacks are analyzed. It is shown that classical approaches secure the network by imposing substantial economic barriers to attackers â for example, miners are forced to invest in hardware and electricity, raising the cost of a 51% attack to a prohibitively high level. However, vulnerabilities remain: attackers can rent computational resources or exploit under-active validators. The proposed RTCT mechanism involves generating random cryptographic challenges at unpredictable time intervals, which network nodes must answer with a cryptographically verifiable token, followed by burning of that token. This process creates unpredictable load and continuous costs for network participants, significantly increasing the economic cost of attacks. The RTCT process is mathematically formalized and the dependence of attack cost on the challenge complexity parameter m is evaluated. The results confirm that as complexity m increases, an attack requires exponentially higher expenditures, making the network more resilient. The advantages and potential drawbacks of the RTCT approach are discussed, as well as possible directions for further research, including optimizing challenge frequency and integrating RTCT with existing consensus protocols.
The investigation of cryptocurrency crimes is still in its infancy with no standardised process or methodology to follow. This paper describes research that forms part of a broader project led by the second author (Botha, et al., 2025). The broader projectâs aim is to develop a methodology to follow when conducting cryptocurrency crime investigations. One of the steps in the proposed methodology is web scraping. The authors of this paper present a detailed exploration of web scraping techniques within the broader context of the proposed investigation methodology. In this paper, the focus is on developing a well-structured methodology for scraping social media platforms and online forums to gather data related to fraudulent activities; the goal is to find posts that include references to the wallet address of interest. This exploration uses an iterative approach; for every new cryptocurrency wallet address discovered or revealed through on-chain analysis, a parallel path is followed by scraping the Internet. If a mention of the cryptocurrency address should be discovered it is considered to be a key finding, creating a pivot point in the investigation. From a pivot point, further open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques will be applied, though this aspect falls beyond the scope of this paper. If no relevant information or link is found, the scraping path will not be pursued, and the investigation proceeds with on-chain analysis to identify additional wallet addresses. Additionally, challenges encountered in web scraping, such as handling platform restrictions, ensuring data accuracy, and managing large volumes of data, are addressed. The goal of the proposed methodology is to enhance data extraction and analysis efficiency contributing to the proposed methodology for investigating cryptocurrency scams.
Blockchain has been widely recognized as a trusted computing paradigm underpinning Decentralized Applications (DApps). However, low performance and poor scalability of the existing mainstream blockchain designs and implementations render their prospects unattainable, so-called trilemma . Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) emerged as an alternative blockchain architecture to address the performance and scalability issue. However, the capacity and feasibility of DAG-based blockchain systems still remain of concern, due to a lack of open source implementations and convincing published experimental results. In this article, we propose a DAG-based blockchain, named 3D-DAG , to greatly improve the scalability and performance without compromising security. The system addresses the trilemma of decentralization, scalability, and security. Technically, our 3D-DAG consists of two layers of chains: DAGchain and mainchain . The DAGchain organizes the transactions in DAG topology, without having to solve the forks. They select a small group of validators from a large number of miners to make up the committee for consensus procedures. The design of DAGchain improves scalability by enabling parallel transaction processing. Based on that, the mainchain plays the role of checkpoint, periodically packaging and recording received transactions from DAGchain for finality. We also provide a prototype implementation with detailed evaluations. Experimental results show our 3D-DAG can meet the performance (a peak value of \(9.82\times 10^{4}\) TPS) that is expected by DApps in the context of Web3.
Decentralized marketplaces in Web3 aim to protect against censorship, bias, and single points of failure that may exist in their centralized counterparts. Still, some mechanisms tend to remain centralized, for example the search mechanism that enables discovery of new assets in the market. Such vulnerabilities have been exploited in live marketplaces in recent years: it is all the more essential to provide protection mechanisms. In this thesis, we propose protocols to uphold the reliability and fairness of marketplace mechanisms, notably through resilience against colluding malicious actors. First, to address decentralized selection of a subset of participants among a population comprising malicious actors, we contribute a blockchain-based protocol to avoid malicious actors swaying selection to their benefit. Then, considering selected sets of participants that will work together on tasks in a decentralized computing marketplace, in an environment with no access to trustworthy or non-confidential monitoring information, we present an incentive mechanism that collectively punishes or rewards task participants based on the outcome of their tasks. We also describe and evaluate how to meet a target success rate for the marketplace's tasks: our proposed algorithm is able to meet such targets and to reduce the failure rate by 5 to 10 times compared to an unprotected system. Additionally, we show how providers of a marketplace's search mechanism can favor a subset of search consumers, granting them an unfair advantage in accessing information about the most recent state of the market. We protect decentralized marketplaces' search with our protocol COoL-TEE, which enables honest search consumers to avoid malicious search providers, who selectively delay responses to benefit colluding consumers. Honest consumers collaborate with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) inside the host providers, in order to select close, fast, and honest providers. Using simulations of consumers sending search requests from around the globe to geo-distributed providers hosted in datacenters, we illustrate how COoL-TEE reduces malicious advantage close to a scenario without attacks. Finally, many TEE and traditional protocols rely on trustworthy time measurements for their execution logic, including COoL-TEE. However, attackers controlling the operating system are capable of attacking the TEE's time perception and, in turn, of manipulating the protocols depending on the timestamps. We contribute a public implementation of the state-of-the-art but closed-source protocol Triad and empirically showcase attacks. Calibration can be manipulated to affect the TEE's perceived clock speed. Furthermore, attacks on a compromised machine could propagate to honest machines participating in Triad's trusted time protocol. We discuss mitigations to these vulnerabilities for higher resilience against such attacks.
Cryptocurrency mining, especially Bitcoin's Proof of Work (PoW), significantly impacts the environment through high energy consumption, carbon footprint, and e-waste. Ethereum's adoption of Proof of Stake (PoS) in 2022 offers a potential solution to reduce these effects. This study compares the environmental impacts of PoW and PoS, focusing on energy consumption, mining efficiency, hash rate, and carbon footprint. Using regression analysis and t-tests on data from Bitcoin (PoW) and Ethereum (before and after PoS) from 2017 to 2024, the results show that PoS significantly reduces energy consumption, carbon footprint, and e-waste, while improving mining efficiency. The findings highlight that transitioning to PoS can mitigate the environmental impact of cryptocurrency mining and encourage its broader adoption to align with global sustainability goals.
Web3 grant programs are evolving mechanisms aimed at supporting innovation within the blockchain ecosystem, yet little is known on about their effectiveness. This paper proposes the concept of maturity to fill this gap and introduces the Grant Maturity Framework (GMF), a mixed-methods model for evaluating the maturity of Web3 grant programs. The GMF provides a systematic approach to assessing the structure, governance, and impact of Web3 grants, applied here to four prominent Ethereum layer-two (L2) grant programs: Arbitrum, Optimism, Mantle, and Taiko. By evaluating these programs using the GMF, the study categorizes them into four maturity stages, ranging from experimental to advanced. The findings reveal that Arbitrum's Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program (LTIPP) and Optimism's Mission Rounds show higher maturity, while Mantle and Taiko are still in their early stages. The research concludes by discussing the user-centric development of a Web3 grant management platform aimed at improving the maturity and effectiveness of Web3 grant management processes based on the findings from the GMF. This work contributes to both practical and theoretical knowledge on Web3 grant program evaluation and tooling, providing a valuable resource for Web3 grant operators and stakeholders.
Online social platforms for digital communication necessitate an in-depth understanding of their evolving dynamics, especially after the renewal requests brought about by new paradigms, such as Web3. The dynamics within online social networks (OSNs) are influenced by numerous factors, encompassing user behavior, content generation, platform features, and technological advancements, with triadic closure standing out as a prominent and influential element. In this study, we focus on the temporal aspects of triadic closure and its role in the evolution of OSNs, especially after the advent of the Web3 paradigm. By analyzing networks with timestamped links from diverse platforms based on different architectures, including communication, Web3-based, and trade networks, we developed a comprehensive analytical pipeline to support the study of triadic closure patterns. This pipeline includes an algorithm for the census of time-ordered triads, a vector-based model for representing growing networks (growth triadic profile), the identification of triadic closure rules (TERs), and the evaluation of the speed of the formation of closed triads. Our findings reveal significant variations in the impact of triadic closure across different OSNs, marked by diverse growth triadic profiles and varying formation speeds of closed triads as well as diversity in the predictability of evolutionary patterns based on triads. This study not only enhances the comprehension of triadic closure in the temporal evolution of OSNs but also provides valuable insights to be taken into account for the design and administration of online social platforms.
In Ethereum, private transactions, a specialized transaction type employed to evade public Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network broadcasting, remain largely unexplored, particularly in the context of the transition from Proof-of-Work (PoW) to Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanisms. To address this gap, we investigate the transaction characteristics, (un)intended usages, and monetary impacts by analyzing large-scale datasets comprising 14,810,392 private transactions within a 15.5-month PoW dataset and 30,062,232 private transactions within a 15.5-month PoS dataset. While originally designed for security purposes, we find that private transactions predominantly serve three distinct functions in both PoW and PoS Ethereum: extracting Maximum Extractable Value (MEV), facilitating monetary transfers to distribute mining rewards, and interacting with popular Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications. Furthermore, we find that private transactions are utilized in DeFi attacks to circumvent surveillance by white hat monitors, with an increased prevalence observed in PoS Ethereum compared to PoW Ethereum. Additionally, in PoS Ethereum, there is a subtle uptick in the role of private transactions for MEV extraction. This shift could be attributed to the decrease in transaction costs. However, this reduction in transaction cost and the cancellation of block rewards result in a significant decrease in mining profits for block creators.
Middlemen handle disputes during the payment process to ensure that it remains seamless and efficient in systems that are highly distributed. It boils down to primarily addressing common challenges like fraud, transaction speed, and the need for transparency. This paper presents a web-based payment system designed to facilitate the transfer of cryptocurrency over the internet without relying on any intermediaries by leveraging ledger-based distributed technology, automated agreements, and protection measures. This ensures seamless operations with fewer intermediaries while maintaining efficiency and safeguarding transactions. Our implementation consists of a simple web application built using React, Node.js, and CSS for a responsive front end. The backend incorporates autonomous agreements and is tested using a simulated blockchain network, facilitating trustless record-keeping. MetaMask compatibility allows users to link wallets and securely execute digital asset exchanges, reducing transaction costs and ensuring visible, verifiable transfers. This paper contributes to the growing body of knowledge on open finance (DeFi) and serves as a cornerstone. Our website offers an operational example of these concepts, providing a realistic viewpoint on blockchain-based payments in real-world scenarios. While it establishes a protected structure, off-chain agreements are susceptible to coding flaws or exploitation. Poorly designed contracts can lead to financial losses if attackers identify and take advantage of weaknesses. Performing thorough security evaluations and adopting best practices in contract development are crucial to ensuring strong protection against potential threats. Key Words: Blockchain Payments, Cryptocurrency Transactions, Decentralized Finance (DeFi), Smart Contracts, Distributed Ledger Technology