Despite the predominance of liberal ideology in the United States since its formation as an independent nation, the US has consistently expanded its capacity to finance and support the efforts of the private sector to create and commercialize new technologies in strategic sectors. As such, this study aims to identify and describe the characteristics of interventions by the American state to foster economic development. It also seeks to analyze how these characteristics fit within the different typologies of the Developmental State. A case study was conducted on the nanotechnology sector in the US, complemented by mini case studies on the computation, semiconductor, and biotechnology sectors. The empirical findings were compared to the ideal types of the Regulatory State, the Developmental Bureaucratic State, and the Developmental Network State. These ideal types were constructed using the Weberian model using concepts from the literature pertaining to the Developmental State. This study concludes that the American Developmental State has adopted a model that is closely related to the Developmental Network State, acting in a fragmented and decentralized manner, dedicated to promoting collaboration and joint action with the private sector. This is in line with the triple helix model (industry, academia, and government) with the intention of fostering development and growth of high-technology sectors, which are considered economically, scientifically, or militarily strategic. Furthermore, the State also carries out various actions designed to facilitate transforming technological innovations into commercialized products, with the idea of ensuring the country's scientific and technological leadership, its international competitiveness, the vitality of its domestic industry, and the dynamism of the national economy.
This thesis is entitled ’Fiscal policy and economic growth in the presence of intergenerational transfers’. It is composed of four self-contained chapters and focusses on the growth and welfare effects of taxation and public spending. The common denominator of all four chapters is that they incorporate an endogenous growth process in an overlapping generations model to evaluate long-term policy implications when different generations are affected in different ways by fiscal policy. In the first and second chapter the implications of capital income taxation for the growth process are discussed. The analysis emphasizes the role of public and private intergenerational transfers in form of public pensions and bequests as well as intergenerational redistribution induced by public policies. Among other results, it turns out that the presence or absence of such transfers critically determines whether an increase of capital income taxes with additional revenue being devoted to cut wage taxes may enhance economic growth. In the third chapter, the focus of the analysis is on social security funding and its implications for economic growth. Whereas a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, as considered in chapter one, naturally includes intergenerational transfers from the current working generation to retirees, a fully funded social security system does not. Still, the presence of such transfers within the economy in form of private educational spending and bequests turns out to play a key role in deter- mining the impact of funded social security on economic growth. More specif- ically, it is shown that a funded pension scheme may harm growth if there are operative bequests within the family, and parents thus face a trade-off between educating their children and leaving bequests. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, the Ricardian equivalence holds and an increase in forced savings is exactly offset by a reduction in private savings leaving capital accumulation and educational spending unchanged. Chapter four discusses the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth in the context of education funding. While the traditional theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization focusses mainly on efficiency issues, empirical evidence for a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth turns out to be mixed. Some studies can confirm the positive impact of higher degrees of decentralization on economic growth, whereas others face difficulties in establishing a positive relationship and, in fact, obtain either no dependency or a negative one. The aim of the fourth chapter is therefore to further evaluate the theoretical linkage and, at the same time, to give an ex- planation for the discrepancy between the empirical literature. The analysis reveals that there exists a growth maximizing degree of fiscal decentralization. Furthermore, it is shown that some degree of fiscal decentralization is always superior (in terms of long-run growth and welfare) to a system where either local or central governments exclusively finance educational investments.
Decentralization will increase economic efficiency because local government are better positioned than the national government to deliver public services as a result of information advantages (Oates' Decentralization Theorem). Consequently, it was thought that decentralized finance would appear to have a potentially useful role to play in economic development (Oates [1993]). From the empirical viewpoint, however, it remains controversial whether there is any relationship between decentralization and economic growth. For example, as pointed out by Ebel and Yilmaz [2002] and Iimi [2005], it has been argued that fiscal decentralization can serve as a means to promote economic growth. On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with economic growth (e.g., Davoodi and Zou [1998], Zhang and Zou [1998]). Various reasons can be given for the differences in empirical estimations. In particular, the selection of fiscal decentralization variables is thought to be a cause of differences. A widely accepted measure of fiscal decentralization is the subnational share of total government spending. However, this is an imperfect measure of fiscal decentralization because it does not identify the degree of local expenditure autonomy. Ebel and Yilmaz [2002] defined the degree of local expenditure autonomy as the share of subnational own-revenues in total revenues. Though this indicator might capture subnational autonomy, it is difficult to represent the empowerment of people and communities through fiscal decentralization. However, it is important to be able to define fiscal decentralization as the empowerment of people and the community through fiscal empowerment of their local government. People and the community must be able to direct their subnational government officials to use their financial resources in accordance with local needs and preferences (Bahl [2005]). Boex and Simatupang [2008] develop a measure of fiscal empowerment to quantify fiscal decentralization as the gain in empowerment due to the devolution of fiscal power. However, this study does not examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. This paper sets the stage for a renewed effort to compute alternative measures of decentralization that take into account the degree of subnational autonomy and the empowerment of people and the community, and examines how fiscal decentralization viewed in terms of the empowerment of people and the community can affect economic growth.
We construct a model of endogenous investment specific techological change in which the stock of public capital influences the real price of capital goods. We show that the growth and welfare maximizing tax rates coincide in the planned economy. When factor income taxes finance public investment infintely many tax-subsidy combinations can decentralize the planner's allocations. The optimal capital income tax can be positive in this environment. We then augment the model to incorporate administrative costs. A unique combination of factor income taxes now decentralizes the planner's allocations. A simple calibration exercise suggests that changes in factor income taxes does not cause a significant change in the optimal growth rate or welfare. Our framework broadens the environment in which investment specific technological change occurs, and characterizes the role of optimal factor income taxation in raising long run growth and welfare.
In OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria in general
fail to achieve optimality because individuals accumulate amounts of physical capital that differ from the one that maximizes welfare along a balanced growth path (the Golden Rule). With human capital, a second potential source of departure from optimality arises, related to education decisions. We propose to recover the Golden Rule of physical and also human capital accumu-
lation. We characterize the optimal policy to decentralize the Golden Rule balanced growth path
when there are no constraints for individuals to finance their education investments, and show that
it involves education taxes. Also, when the government subsidizes the repayment of education
loans, optimal pensions are positive
Aleksander Berentsen, Mariana Rojas Breu, Shouyong Shi
Many countries simultaneously suffer from high inflation, low growth and poorly developed financial sectors. In this paper, we integrate a microfounded model of money and finance into a model of endogenous growth to examine the effects of inflation on welfare, growth and the size of the financial sector. A novel feature is that the innovation sector is decentralized. Financial intermediaries arise endogenously to provide liquidity to this sector. Consistent with the data but in contrast to previous work, reducing inflation generates large growth gains. These large gains cannot be easily reproduced by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint in the innovation sector.
This paper studies the effects of stock market valuation on research investment, the rate of innovation, and welfare. In the presence of financing constraints for R&D investment, episodes of high market valuation can ease these constraints and raise the economy-wide investment in R&D and the rate of innovation. If the decentralized equilibrium rate of innovation is inefficiently low, then such episodes may lead to an increase in aggregate welfare even if the higher valuation is not entirely justified by fundamentals. We present a Schumpeterian-style growth model with a costly financial intermediation process to characterize the relationship between market value, entry of new firms, and the aggregate rate of innovation. We use the model to measure the welfare consequences of a stock market run-up that may only partly be justified by fundamentals. In particular, we apply the model to the US economy in the 1990s and calibrate the impact of the NASDAQ boom on the rate of innovation, growth and welfare. The welfare effect depends on the underlying change in fundamentals. We find that with an acceleration in US trend productivity growth from a pre-1995 rate of 1.4% to a rate of 2.0% per annum, the NASDAQ boom will have resulted in a net welfare gain of 0.55%. If the new growth rate is as high as 3%, the net gain was 1.35% of the present discounted value of consumption.
This paper develops a two‐period overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents aiming at analysing how decentralization in the provision of public education affects growth and personal inequality via human capital investment. Education is financed by a tax levied by either national or local authorities. The tax rate is chosen according to a median voter mechanism. During their working period of life, individuals look after their offspring by providing them with a high level of school education stemming from taxation. In addition parent's contributions to the social security system provide them with retirement income. Heterogeneity accounts for the differences in the optimal taxation mechanism, linking the income distribution to the tax rate, and hence to human capital accumulation, growth and income inequality. In this way we relate differences among agents to the tax rate. We show that decentralization induces growth rate disparities among local communities but it can be ruled out by a proper fiscal substitution between social security and locally provided education. Unlike in the literature, this type of fiscal design allows local economies to grow faster and more equally than the national design.
ABSTRACT Cross-country studies of education and economic prosperity often reach conflicting results when using growth rates as the measure of economic development. However, growth rates lack persistence over time and may not accurately measure long-term economic success over relatively short economic horizons. To overcome this potential specification problem, we estimate the relationship between key education variables and the capital to physical labor ratio. Using both cross-sectional and panel specifications, we find that both the primary-pupil–teacher ratio and decentralized education finance are associated with a larger capital to physical labor ratio. The relationship between human capital and expenditures, private education, and test scores are less robust.
Open access
Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Intergenerational and Educational Inequality Studies
We analyze Georgian education finance and show that it is embedded in the overall structure of Georgian rayon finances, reflecting all their weaknesses: inequalities, lack of transparency, unmanageability, room for corruption. The budgetary and political independence of rayons is very limited. The steep fiscal inequalities between rayons are only partially and ineffectively addressed by the system of transfers. The transfers moreover are heavily negotiated and non-transparent. Thus education finances depend on general income of the rayons, which effectively determines the level of financing. At the same time, however, the role of the rayons in the management of the sector is very limited. The actual spending patterns for Georgian general education schools are very closely related to per capita income of the rayons without the transfers (about 75% of education spending), and to student teacher ratio (about 25% of education spending). The dependence of the education system on rayon wealth is our main empirical finding, and it contradicts widespread belief among Georgian education professionals. It is not surprising therefore that the education sector in poorer and in mountainous rayons with very low student teacher ratio has to adapt to this situation. It responds by reducing the number of teachers per class, thus lowering standards of service delivery despite high per student costs. The first step required to change this situation is to increase budgetary independence and education management role of rayons. Without strong local governments it will not be possible to decentralize Georgian education. Moreover the influence of fiscal inequalities on education finance should be broken by taking it out of general rayon income and by basing it on a per student education grant to rayons (education subvention). This would lead to significant redistribution of public funds in Georgia. Such a move needs to be carefully prepared. It is necessary to subject education subvention to buffer mechanisms, in order to protect rayons from drastic changes to their present education spending patterns. Moreover, Georgia should begin thinking about a per student formula for education subvention, which recognizes unavoidable higher per student costs of providing education in different geographical and social settings.
Through analyzing the softness and hardness of budgeting constraints in research and development (R&D) investment under different institutions, we develop a theory of optimal R&D financing. Our theory not only provides a clear comparison of investment efficiency between centralized economies and market economies but also extends the analysis of soft budget constraints to firms in market economy. Based on this theory, we characterize optimal choices of R&D project financing in centralized and decentralized economies. Our results explain why some projects are financed internally by a large firm but others are cofinanced externally by several firms. We also explain what makes a centralized economy inefficient in R&D.
Government financing of schooling is necessitated by capital market imperfections. Governments are also res ponsible for maintaining a stock of public capital that enters private production function. In this paper the welfare implications and politics of these investments are examined in a version of Diamond (1965) growth model. It is argued that in decentralized environments where the working generation is decisive each period significant underinvestment in both schooling and in frastructure will be observed relative to the Ramsey equilibrium.
In the 1980's, in the US across the board, domestic manufacturers have have faced foreign competition with an increased disadvantage with imports. Domestic businesses, including those in rural areas, have had to struggle with restructuring their businesses, decentralizing them, outsourcing, relocating overseas, go out of business altogether or to reduce their business size or workforce numbers. Economic initiatives like 'Growing North Dakota' attempted to educate North Dakota citizens to the necessity of their state increasing it's growth in manufacturing and in ways they could help these industries grow such as financing these industries at favorable terms, aiding in the transfer of technology commercialization or assisting such technologies. By aiding the manufacturing sector this was deemed as aiding in the diversification of the North Dakota economy.
This article constructs a decentralized growth model with two production sectors, one having competitive firms and the other oligopolists. Since capitalized pure profits for the latter sector constitute an asset which household savings must finance, we show that imperfect competition can reduce steady-state national output through both a "static effect" on allocative efficiency and a "dynamic effect" on aggregative capital accumulation. After presenting a theoretical analysis, we generate several numerical examples. The latter suggest that the "dynamic effect" of monopoly may be significantly larger than the "static effect" in practice.