Based on the provincial panel data from China, this study explores the impact of digital finance on provincial carbon productivity. Further, the regional heterogeneity and spatial spillover effect, the moderating effects of financial supervision and environmental decentralization, and the mediating effect of green technology innovation are analyzed. The results show that digital finance can significantly improve provincial carbon productivity, and clearly promote carbon productivity in the underdeveloped provinces (i.e., central and western regions), but not in the economically developed provinces (i.e., eastern region). Digital finance has a positive spatial spillover effect on carbon productivity. In addition, financial supervision and environmental decentralization play moderating effects in the impact of digital finance on carbon productivity. Green technology innovation plays a partial mediating effect in the impact of digital finance on carbon productivity. This study provides a reference for improving carbon productivity and developing a low-carbon economy.
The global energy sector is undergoing a significant transformation, driven by the emergence of ‘prosumers’ - individuals who generate and consume energy. This shift is redefining traditional roles and is propelled by a growing demand for sustainable and renewable energy. Prosumers utilize decentralized energy sources, such as solar panels and wind turbines, enhancing energy independence by producing their own energy and selling any surplus back to the grid. However, this decentralized landscape presents challenges in accurately tracking carbon emissions and establishing equitable pricing mechanisms. In response to these challenges, we propose an innovative blockchain-based peer-to-peer (P2P) trading platform for carbon allowances. This novel approach gives prosumers a decisive influence over energy pricing, ensuring a more equitable distribution of energy resources. The blockchain framework benefits from decentralization, promoting transparency, security, and an immutable record of energy transactions and carbon emissions. To evaluate the platform’s effectiveness, we will initiate a real-world pilot project within the Education City Community Housing (ECCH) to gather empirical data over one year. The pilot will involve various participants—including prosumers and traditional consumers—and will meticulously monitor energy production, consumption, and trading activities. By comparing this decentralized system with traditional energy models, we aim to assess its impact on carbon emissions, user satisfaction, and overall economic viability, paving the way for a sustainable energy future. • Web-Based Energy and Carbon Trading Marketplace. • Collect and analyze energy and carbon trading market dynamics in a residential neighborhood market. • Blockchain platform to verify the feasibility of the use of a decentralized trading application.
This paper aims to comprehensively examine the impact of China's environmental decentralization on corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and investigate the underlying mechanisms. We analyze data from Chinese listed firms spanning from 2010 to 2020. The empirical findings demonstrate that: Firstly, environmental decentralization significantly inhibits corporate ESG performance. Secondly, fiscal decentralization acts as a moderating factor whereby an increase in its level strengthens the inhibitory effect of environmental decentralization on corporate ESG performance. Thirdly, heterogeneity analysis reveals that the impact of environmental decentralization varies across different types of firms in terms of their ESG performance. Privately-owned, high-polluting, and high-tech companies are particularly inclined to reduce their ESG performance with increasing levels of environmental decentralization. Finally, our mechanism analysis indicates that environmental decentralization curtails ESG practices by exacerbating financing constraints for firms and deregulating ecological environments. These conclusions remain robust after addressing potential endogeneity issues and conducting various sensitivity tests. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers to promote sustainable economic development.
Abstract State-of-the-art macroeconomic agent-based models (ABMs) include an increasing level of detail in the energy sector. However, the possible financing mechanisms of renewable energy are rarely considered. In this study, an investment model for power plants is conceptualized, in which energy investors interact in an imperfect and decentralized market network for credits, deposits and project equity. Agents engage in new power plant investments either through a special purpose vehicle in a project finance (PF) structure or via standard corporate finance (CF). The model portrays the growth of new power generation capacity, taking into account technological differences and investment risks associated with the power market. Different scenarios are contrasted to investigate the influence of PF investments on the transition. Further, the effectiveness of a simple green credit easing (GCE) mechanism is discussed. The results show that varying the composition of the PF and CF strategies significantly influences the transition speed. GCE can recover the pace of the transition, even under drastic reductions in PF. The model serves as a foundational framework for more in-depth policy analysis within larger agent-based integrated assessment models.
Professor Rebecca Willis in an interview with Josh Emden Josh Emden (JE): We've heard that the Labour government have talked about a ‘decade of national renewal' and has a very explicit clean growth mission. At the same time we know that the government will soon need to start decarbonising sectors (for example heat decarbonisation) that people will start to feel impacted by more directly in order to keep track with net zero targets. How do you maintain public support for what could be substantive policy interventions over a sustained period of time? “people have next to no confidence about government's ability to lead and to get things done” JE: On that point about showing it in their policies, we've seen how the government is moving quickly on things like planning reform to speed up developments like onshore wind and solar farm development. From your perspective, what would successful engagement actually look like in practice and how do you kind of encourage people to buy into a process that seems like it's moving so quickly? “Don't just present them with a wind turbine project where the only possible input is a yes or no” There might be some areas where that just might not be possible, the obvious one being the sightliness of pylons, since it costs a lot more to reroute or to go underground. But in those cases, you still need to explain to people properly why these pylons have to go here and reassure them that the government will do what they can to help the community. People should be involved as equal stakeholders alongside industry and government when discussing how the net zero goal should be achieved. JE: How would you get companies to commit to this? RW: So this is something that the new government could literally pick up off Ed Davey's old desk from when he was secretary of state for energy and climate change back in 2015. Just before the onshore wind ban, he set up a taskforce to get community energy players to talk to the renewables industry about how to offer shared ownership and I was co-chair of that taskforce. We negotiated that developers should be required to offer a stake in ownership to local communities, for example through enabling them to buy a 10 per cent stake of the site through a co-op. The way that we envisaged it was that it would initially be a voluntary agreement, but that it would move to legislation if the developers didn't make an effort. JE: We've talked about ways to engage with citizens but how do you also avoid a potential accusation of nimbyism and creating too much red tape? “the actual battle is, as the Labour party knows well, is for the centre ground” By taking concerns seriously, you can develop a really good working relationship with people, which then prevents that sort of unhelpful blanket opposition. We've been talking about wind turbines but it's exactly the same with other policy proposals, whether that's low traffic neighbourhoods or heat pumps. “just myth-busting is not going to do the job” RW: Engaging the majority of people who may worry about climate change but for whom it isn't front of mind is the key here because it gives you a social mandate for change. At the moment, reflecting their views is mainly done through polling, but polling's too much of a snapshot. A better way is through the kind of deliberative research we do, like climate assemblies and juries, where you're actively recruiting those people, asking them to spend a decent amount of time on learning and giving their views, and you're normally paying them for their role as well. This kind of work could be replicated by having a kind of standing panel or body, either at local or national level, ideally both. For example, at national level, you could have a citizens' climate panel, which worked alongside the same sort of timeline as the climate change committee. In this scenario, the climate change committee are the expert technocrats and the panel would work in conjunction with them to offer citizens' views. The climate change committee have actually already gone quite a long way down that route, and they are now using deliberative research as one of their ways of developing their carbon budget proposals. You could also institutionalise this model as a permanent panel that could sit within parliament. JE: How do you make sure a panel like that is not perceived to be superseding democratic processes? RW: You obviously have to recognise parliament as the sovereign body and so to be democratically sound, any kind of citizens' panel or deliberative forum would have to report to parliament. You can then put some safeguards in place, which require parliament to respond to it the same way that they do for the climate change committee, for example. “the absolute worst thing you can do as a policymaker is assume that your household is typical” It's also worth saying that getting citizens involved in co-design of policy is second nature for other policy areas like health. For example, if you're designing a new approach for the management of a chronic condition like diabetes, for instance, you would always ask patients and their families. The idea of designing a service for diabetes without engaging patients nowadays is crazily old fashioned and paternal. Citizens' engagement for climate change needs to be just as normal and routine. JE: How big or small should a citizens' climate panel be? RW: There's no reason why you have to go really big with these processes. It's often better to have small numbers and having detailed discussions in a deliberative format tells you all you need to know. We've actually tested this. We did some research on public attitudes towards advertising of high carbon products and services. We compared the findings from a citizens' jury of 25 people and a poll of 2,000 people. The results from each were really consistent with each other. JE: What are some examples of best practice you've seen when it comes to engaging citizens? RW: I'd point to the journey the climate change committee has been on to include social research and particularly deliberative research in their advice to government. This started with Chris Stark's engagement in Climate Assembly UK, the national climate assembly that parliament ran in 2019 to 2020. He was involved in that, was sceptical beforehand but he actually said that the process taught him the importance of going out and talking to people, giving them the time and space to develop their views, and as a result, the climate change committee changed the way that it gathers its evidence for its advice to government and is now including deliberative research and social research. So that is a really good model now and it allows them to give advice to government, which has been socially proofed and isn't competing against technical or economic analysis. “it allows them to give advice to government, which has been socially proofed” RW: There is a huge amount of climate misinformation online but to an extent that is filling a vacuum because for a long time politicians have not made the positive case for climate action and there hasn't been that kind of shared agenda. We've just done a meta-analysis of all the recommendations of all the citizens' juries and climate assemblies in the UK that have taken place and the number one recommendation by far is a desire from participants for more information, education and leadership on climate. And people really feel this strongly and often end up asking: If we are facing a climate emergency, why aren't people talking about it all the time? Rebecca Willis is a researcher with 20 years’ experience in environment and sustainability policy and practice, at international, national and local level. She is a professor in practice at Lancaster Environment Centre, and an expert lead for Climate Assembly UK, the national Citizens' Assembly commissioned by parliament. In 2009 Rebecca founded Green Alliance's Climate Leadership Programme, an initiative to support members of the UK parliament, and still supports Green Alliance's work in this area. Previously, she was a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee for the UKRI Energy Programme, council member of the Natural Environment Research Council, vice-chair of the UK Sustainable Development Commission, and director of Green Alliance.
Abdul Hamid Paddu, Indraswati Tri Abdi Reviane, Nur Dwiana Sari Saudi, Fitriwati Djam’an · 6 authors
This study investigates a fresh perspective on how natural resource rents (NRR) and quantity of natural resources (QNR) modulate the influence of fiscal decentralization (FD) and the Financial Development Index (FDI) on energy efficiency (ENE) and CO2 Emissions. We draw upon the Stochastic Impacts of Regression on Population, Affluence, and Technology framework, taking the BRICS countries as the subject of investigation from 1986 through 2021. Using a panel Method of Moments Quantile Regression with fixed effects, our results suggest that fiscal decentralization is favorable for environmental stability, particularly in BRICS countries with higher energy efficiency and CO2 Emission levels. Increased FDI proves environmentally harmful, with pronounced effects in more energy-efficient nations. Regarding direct influences, NRR and QNR hinder energy and CO2 efficiency, notably in countries with lower energy efficiency and CO2 emissions. Regarding indirect effects, NRR and QNR positively steer the impact of fiscal decentralization and the Financial Development Index on energy efficiency and CO2 Emissions, exhibiting stronger effects in energy-efficient nations. Among other control variables, Eco-Innovation (ECO_INNO), Solar energy production (SEP), Population (POP), and Economic Growth (GDP) foster environmental stability. We propose that fiscal decentralization should be based on a clear and responsible subnational government framework to counter rent-seeking behaviors and weak environmental conservation. Further, inclusive finance must strengthen the accessibility and cost-effectiveness of financial solutions for economic agents, promoting green consumption and investment initiatives to reach environmental stability and other Sustainable Development Goals.
Abstract This paper extends the climate literature by examining the feasibility of integrating sub‐national governance into global club governance for mitigating CO 2 emissions. Global climate clubs become an argument for having separate bundles of emission targets and incentive mechanisms in the form of opportunities for climate finance and technology sharing among the club members. An exploratory analysis is important to examine the role of import and export taxes and other channels, such as the clean development mechanism, in meeting the objective of nonmember countries to join the club. The crux, however, is how, after determining national‐level quotas, the mitigation responsibilities are shared with subnational entities. We propose a design of a carbon entry tax at the subnational level, namely states, districts, and municipalities. The carbon entry tax uses the nighttime luminosity data published by NASA as a measure of carbon, which constitutes the tax base. The carbon entry tax serves as a fiscal instrument of decarbonization in a decentralized framework.
Scheme of the CBDC: Ueda and Hay state that the e-CNY issued by the People's Bank of China (PBOC) “adopts a similar two-tier system in which the PBOC issues e-CNY and retail banks distribute it through wallets set up by users … the PBOC admits e-CNY as its liability. Similarly, the NBC should admit the Bakong as its liability.” In reality, the e-CNY and the Bakong adopt contrasting schemes. With the e-CNY, while private banks provide user interfaces and wallets for retail users, money within such wallets is a liability of the PBOC—not of private banks backed by CB reserves, which is the case for the Bakong. Readers would benefit from learning that, here, the provider of the wallets differs from the issuer of money, that is, whose liability money is. Without recognizing this, one cannot fully grasp the typical two-tier system that provides a retail CBDC. Quasi-retail CBDC: Ueda and Hay's statement that “the NBC has been emphasizing that the Bakong is not a liability of the NBC, which is not true from the viewpoint of the underlying technology and economics” needs further clarification and consideration. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) accommodates various types of money on a common platform. It does not equate tokenized deposits with a CBDC or transform the nature of tokenized deposits into a CB liability. Furthermore, DLT adoption is neither a prerequisite nor a general feature of a retail CBDC. Economic researchers should be mindful of the differences between a retail CBDC (a CB liability) and a quasi-retail CBDC backed by CB reserves (not a CB liability), as the latter could carry risks that affect user behavior. Economics viewpoints vary depending on how we define economics; oversimplification should be avoided. Future course: Finally, Ueda and Hay argue that “[i]f the demand continues to be low like this for a few more years, the NBC should stop offering the retail Bakong … the government should not provide services that the private sector can provide.” To begin with, abolishing the retail Bakong and leaving retail payments in the hands of the private sector would not prevent dollarization and ensure efficient and stable retail payments in emerging economies. These policy objectives ought to be pursued by the public sector, not the private sector. Assessing the long-term effects of the Bakong today would be a prejudgment. It is not uncommon for payment infrastructures to become widely adopted with a lag due to existing conventions. Additional policy actions therefore may well likely be taken in the future. A conceivable future might involve continued efforts to establish network effects of the Bakong while proceeding with structural reforms and conducting sound fiscal and monetary policies so as to increase the credibility of the KHR, then shifting into KHR payments when deemed appropriate.
In the context of the “dual carbon” strategy, how to leverage green finance to promote China's wind power industry is a hot topic. Unlike existing literature, this article uses a nonparametric additive model to investigate the impact and mechanism of green finance on wind power development. Research has found that green finance has an inverted U-shaped nonlinear impact on wind power development, indicating that green finance has a more prominent contribution to the wind power industry in the early stages. Further mechanism research indicates that green finance affects the wind power industry through foreign direct investment and green technology innovation. Specifically, with the relaxation of foreign direct investment conditions in the energy sector, the role of foreign direct investment in promoting the wind power industry more prominent in the later stages. In the early stages, government support was greater, and green technology patents grew rapidly, driving green technology innovation to have a more significant impact on the wind power industry. In addition, the impact of fiscal decentralization, wind power prices, and environmental regulations on the wind power industry also exhibits significant nonlinear characteristics. This article helps to comprehensively understand the mechanism and impact of green finance on wind power development, and provides a reliable basis for optimizing green finance policy and effectively promoting wind power.
Marco Schletz, Axel Constant, Angel Hsu, Simon J.D. Schillebeeckx · 6 authors
The Regenerative Finance (ReFi) movement aims to fundamentally transform the governance of global common pool resources (CPRs), such as the atmosphere, which are being degraded despite international efforts. The ReFi movement seeks to achieve this by utilizing digital monitoring, reporting, and verification (D-MRV); tokenization of assets; and decentralized governance approaches. However, there is currently a lack of a clear path forward to create and implement models that actually drive the “Re-” in ReFi beyond perpetuating the existing extractive economics and toward actual regeneration. In addition, ReFi suffers from growing pains, lacking a common interoperability framework and definition for determining what a ReFi project is and how the individual components align toward the grand ambition. This paper provides a definition of the ReFi stack of interconnected components and examines how it can address limitations in climate change accounting, finance and markets, and governance. The authors also examine the theory of regenerative economics and CPRs to encourage further discussions and advancements in the ReFi space. The crucial question remains if and how ReFi can drive a change in paradigm toward the effective regeneration of global CPRs.
The green transformation of the manufacturing industry is related to the low-carbon and green development of the economy. The study explored the impact mechanism of the implementation of green finance policy on the green transformation of China’s manufacturing industry from 2013 to 2021 from three aspects of capital formation and incentive, credit catalysis, integration and decentralization, and conducted a quasi-natural experiment using difference-in-difference (DID) model. Research finds that: (1) The implementation of green finance significantly promotes the green transformation of China’s manufacturing industry and has good sustainability. The mechanisms of fund formation and orientation, credit catalysis, integration and decentralization are the primary mechanism of green finance to promote the green transformation of the manufacturing industry, and the implementation effect of green finance has apparent heterogeneity; (2) The promoting effect of green finance on the green transformation of the manufacturing industry is solely vast in state-owned industries however now not enormous in non-state-owned industries; (3) The influence of green finance on the green transformation efficiency of manufacturing industry with a better information environment is more significant than manufacturing industry with a worse information environment; (4) Faced with the pressure of investing in green industries, the coping strategies adopted by enterprises in different industries are quite different. The promoting effect of green finance on the green transformation of the manufacturing industry is significant in low-competition industries but insignificant in high-competition industries. This study has enriched the research on the effect of green finance policies, explored solutions based on quasi-nature, and provided policy references for the green transformation of the manufacturing industry.
Nicolás Malz, Felipe Corral Montoya, Paola Yanguas-Parra, Pao-Yu Oei
Juxtaposing China’s current situation and policies toward coal and renewables at home and abroad, we argue that China remains in a paradoxical state of carbon lock-in. We analyze the techno-economic, institutional and political factors that contribute to China’s coal-related policies following a novel approach that blends different theories and frameworks to establish an interdisciplinary dialogue between various strands of research that were hitherto unconnected. This is accomplished by applying a political economy framework through the lens of techno-institutional carbon lock-in theory in three case studies encompassing China itself, as well as China’s climate and energy policy abroad in Pakistan and Mozambique. The article draws four major conclusions about China’s energy paradox: 1) An imperative for economic growth lies at the heart of the Chinese governance system’s incentive structure, which has resulted in a coal-based energy and industrial policy. 2) China’s government should use the experimental, decentralized nature of its regionally-decentralized regime and energy sector to their advantage by promoting disruption rather than incumbency. 3) To address the structural and institutional deficiencies that maintain or even strengthen carbon lock-in, energy governance should be shaped around the primary challenge of strengthening renewable energy advocates throughout all levels of government. 4) The discussion of coal financing abroad must now go beyond the discontinuation of new projects; the building of alternative cleaner projects should be considered and the ones in progress should be halted.
Naielly Lopes Marques, Leonardo Lima Gomes, Luiz Eduardo Teixeira Brandão
ABSTRACT This article proposes an investment model for a renewable energy generator that allows it to earn the right to issue Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) and sell them through quarterly sales auctions promoted by the blockchain. Blockchain technology can further promote the RECs market, as it enables tokenization and distribution of certificates. We did not find articles in the literature that analyze the decision to invest in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that have rules for issuing and trading RECs specified in smart contracts, which are executed and validated by the blockchain. This article contributes to the literature on blockchain technology applications in the renewable energy market by proposing issuing and selling RECs tokens through a DAO. The relevance of this research is that it shows that simple real option pricing methods can help decision-makers evaluate investment opportunities under uncertainty and flexibility. The tokenization and distribution of RECs via blockchain can promote transaction agility, reduce or eliminate bureaucracy in the means of payment, and increase the security and transparency of transactions. We propose a model for issuing and selling RECs in smart contracts. We assume that the generator has the flexibility to invest now or in one year to enter the platform, considering the energy generated in one year by a single typical 4MW wind turbine. Our model assumes that the price of the REC token follows an inverse demand function subject to stochastic shocks. The results contribute to the understanding of the performance dynamics of digital products under uncertainty and flexibility and show that distributed ledger technology (DLT) may be a viable alternative for renewable energy incentives.
Niccolò Bertuzzi, Federica Cittadino, Giada Giacomini, Alice Meier
Climate change represents a global problem and a challenge with manifold responses, which requires coordinated action at different levels. In this context, subnational governments play a significant – yet still understudied – role in the fight against climate change; they exercise powers in policy sectors that may have an impact on climate mitigation and adaptation objectives, such as transport, energy and water, and spatial planning. The research project “Climate change integration in the multilevel governance of Italy and Austria” (Research Südtirol/Alto Adige 2019) compares the Italian and Austrian legal systems with a particular focus on how climate change policy integration (CPI) is realized in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano and Trento in Italy and Länder Tyrol and Vorarlberg in Austria. The project hypothesizes that five factors play a particularly significant role in realizing CPI, namely coordination, participation, information, leadership and funding. In this contribution, we will focus on the dimension of coordination. Also in light of the different decentralization arrangements in Italy and Austria, coordination in the study areas analysed unfolds differently concerning both the type and the employed instruments of coordination, although certain common tendencies can also be observed. Drawing from the results of the empirical research (interviews) conducted in the study areas, this article argues that coordination is affected by the federal vs regional organization of the State only when it comes to vertical coordination. Furthermore, since climate change in not a unitary policy field, improving horizontal coordination among policy fields seems to be more crucial than improving vertical coordination.
Due to a lack of focus on China’s financial decentralization system, the existing research does not pay attention to the beneficial contribution of Chinese local governments to carbon emission reduction through their actions in the financial field. In this study, we collected 16 years of data from 30 provinces in China and utilized a two-way fixed-effects model to empirically test the impact of China’s financial decentralization on carbon emission reduction. The regression results show that China’s financial decentralization system has a significant carbon-emission reduction effect. A heterogeneity analysis shows that this effect is common in different regions of China and that fiscal decentralization will negatively moderate it. A mechanism analysis shows that under China’s financial decentralization system, the active intervention of local governments in local finance will significantly upgrade the energy consumption structure and ease the financing constraints of enterprises. The regression results of the spatial econometric model show that the carbon emission reduction effect of China’s financial decentralization still has a spatial spillover effect. Finally, we put forward corresponding policy recommendations.
Marco Schletz, Angel Hsu, Brendan R. Mapes, Martin Wainstein
The Paris Agreement’s decentralized and bottom-up approach to climate action poses an enormous accounting challenge by substantially increasing the number of heterogeneous national, sub-national, and non-state actors. Current legacy climate accounting systems and mechanisms are insufficient to avoid information asymmetry and double-counting due to actor heterogeneity and fragmentation. This paper presents a nested climate accounting architecture that integrates several innovative digital technologies, such as Distributed Ledger Technology, Internet of Things, Machine Learning, and concepts such as nested accounting and decentralized identifiers to improve interoperability across accounting systems. Such an architecture can enhance capacity building and technology transfer to the Global South by creating innovation groups, increasing scalability of accounting solutions that can lead to leapfrogging into innovative systems designs, and improving inclusiveness.
The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between supply, demand and price fundamentals of Ethereum. In the paper, daily data covering the period 20.05.2017-31.01.2019 was used. Hypotheses were explained using the Classical Unit Root and ARDL Test. Respectively, the supply of Ethereum is explained by the "Ethereum Energy Consumption Index" and the demand of Ethereum is explained by "Transaction Fee". As a control variable, "Hashrate" is included in the model. Hashrate also expresses a technology used. Ethereum price is considered in Ether/USD. First, stationarity of the variables was determined using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The long-term dynamics are characterized using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds Test. As a result of the analysis, it was found that there is a long-term relationship between Ethereum's supply, demand, price, and Hashrate. Additionally, Ethereum price and Hashrate affect the supply of Ethereum positively in the long-term.
Abstract This article consists of a critical review of the conceptual scholarship on the governance of climate finance and includes an overview of the institutional arrangements and governance logics that provide climate finance. New decentralized, polycentric structures allow for climate finance to more effectively reach the sub‐ and non‐state actors most directly implementing climate change governance. However, the expansion of climate finance into market‐inflected forms of blended finance, as well as debt‐based financing, express a neoliberal logic that shifts power to market actors. This may challenge the efficacy of climate finance. We suggest that further research is needed on polycentric systems in climate finance, since an apparent expansion in the diversity of providers is also accompanied by a counter‐intuitive concentration of decision‐making power with financial fund managers. We join others in suggesting that the weight of scholarship advocates for a strong return to public authored finance and governance, under the auspices of Green New Deal programs and more widely. This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance