Brent Kievit-Kylar, Chris Horlacher, Marc Godard, Christian Saucier
The registration, transfer, clearing and settlement of equities represents a significant part of economic activity currently underserved by modern technological innovation. In addition, recent events have revealed problems of transparency, inviting public criticism and scrutiny from regulatory authorities. A peer-to-peer platform facilitating the creation and exchange of directly registered shares represents a shift in equity markets towards more efficient, transparent operations as well as greater accessibility to the investing public and issuing companies. Blockchain technology solves the problem of transaction processing and clearing but the fungibility of their units pose a challenge in identifying the issuers and holders of specific equities. Furthermore, as the issuers are in a constant state of flux the benefits of a decentralized network are lost if a central manager is required to cancel equities from companies that no longer exist. We propose a solution to these problems using digital signatures, based on blockchain technology.
This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof-of-work “mining” process having no central party or trusted setup. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multilayered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows one to include a Pedersen Commitment in a ring signature. This construction results in a digital currency with hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the #bitcoin-wizards IRC channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
This paper discusses the game theory behind self-contained smart contract provably fair casinos, how they can be gamed by attackers with a large amount of money and computing power, as well as what are the necessary conditions to assure the system cannot be taken advantage of under various configurations.
With the widespread use of Internet, Web, and mobile technologies, a new category of applications and transactions that requires anonymity is gaining increased interest and importance. Examples of such new applications are innovative payment systems, digital notaries, electronic voting, documents sharing, electronic auctions, medical applications, and many others. In addition to anonymity, these applications and transactions also require standard security services: identification, authentication, and authorization of users and protection of their transactions. Providing those services in combination with anonymity is an especially challenging issue, because all security services require explicit user identification and authentication. To solve this issue and enable applications with security and also anonymity we introduce a new type of cryptographically encapsulated objects called BIX certificates. “BIX” is an abbreviation for “Blockchain Information Exchange.” Their purpose is equivalent to X.509 certificates: to support security services for users and transactions, but also enhanced with anonymity. This paper describes the structure and attributes of BIX certificate objects and all related protocols for their creation, distribution, and use. The BIX Certification Infrastructure (BCI) as a distributed public ledger is also briefly described.
Orphan risk for large blocks limits Bitcoin’s transactional capacity while the lack of secure instant transactions restricts its usability. Progress on either front would help spur adoption. This paper considers a technique for using fractional-difficulty blocks (weak blocks) to build subchains bridging adjacent pairs of real blocks. Subchains reduce orphan risk by propagating blocks layer-by-layer over the entire block interval, rather than all at once when the proof-of-work is solved. Each new layer of transactions helps to secure the transactions included in lower layers, even though none of the transactions have been con-firmed in a real block. Miners are incentivized to cooperate building subchains in order to process more transactions per second (thereby claiming more fee revenue) without incur-ring additional orphan risk. The use of subchains also diverts fee revenue towards network hash power rather than dripping it out of the system to pay for orphaned blocks. By nesting subchains, weak block verification times approaching the theoretical limits imposed by speed-of-light constraints would become possible with future technology improvements. As subchains are built on top of the existing Bitcoin protocol, their implementation does not require any changes to Bitcoin’s consensus rules.
This paper is placed in the context of a growing number of social and political critiques of blockchain technologies. We focus on the supposed potential of blockchain technologies to transform political institutions that are central to contemporary human societies, such as money, property rights regimes, and systems of democratic governance. Our aim is to examine the way blockchain technologies canbring about - and justify - new models of governance. To do so, we draw on the philosophical works of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Rawls, analyzing blockchain governance in terms of contrasting social contract theories. We begin by comparing the justifications of blockchain governance offered by members of the blockchain developers’ community with the justifications of governance presented within social contract theories. We then examine the extent to which the model of governance offered by blockchain technologies reflects key governance themes and assumptions located within social contract theories, focusing on the notions of sovereignty, the initial situation, decentralization and distributive justice.
Péter Juhász, József Stéger, Dániel Kondor, Gábor Vattay
Bitcoin is a digital currency and electronic payment system operating over a peer-to-peer network on the Internet. One of its most important properties is the high level of anonymity it provides for its users. The users are identified by their Bitcoin addresses, which are random strings in the public records of transactions, the blockchain. When a user initiates a Bitcoin transaction, his Bitcoin client program relays messages to other clients through the Bitcoin network. Monitoring the propagation of these messages and analyzing them carefully reveal hidden relations. In this paper, we develop a mathematical model using a probabilistic approach to link Bitcoin addresses and transactions to the originator IP address. To utilize our model, we carried out experiments by installing more than a hundred modified Bitcoin clients distributed in the network to observe as many messages as possible. During a two month observation period we were able to identify several thousand Bitcoin clients and bind their transactions to geographical locations.
The article discusses the history of cryptocurrency, its positive and negative sides, legal status, the evaluation of the prospects for its use and investigates the possibilities of obtaining cryptocurrency, mechanism of operation and its impact on the development of the shadow economy.
Ubiquitous sensing enabled by Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technologies cuts across many areas of modern day living. This offers the ability to measure, infer and understand environmental indicators, from delicate ecologies and natural resources to urban environments. The proliferation of these devices in a communicating-actuating network creates the Internet of Things (IoT), wherein, sensors and actuators blend seamlessly with the environment around us, and the information is shared across platforms in order to develop a common operating picture (COP). Fuelled by the recent adaptation of a variety of enabling wireless technologies such as RFID tags and embedded sensor and actuator nodes, the IoT has stepped out of its infancy and is the the next revolutionary technology in transforming the Internet into a fully integrated Future Internet. As we move from www (static pages web) to web2 (social networking web) to web3 (ubiquitous computing web), the need for data-on-demand using sophisticated intuitive queries increases significantly. This paper presents a Cloud centric vision for worldwide implementation of Internet of Things. The key enabling technologies and application domains that are likely to drive IoT research in the near future are discussed. A Cloud implementation using Aneka, which is based on interaction of private and public Clouds is presented. We conclude our IoT vision by expanding on the need for convergence of WSN, the Internet and distributed computing directed at technological research community.
Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget deficits to engineer an election-timed boom, known as the political business cycle. We challenge and contextualize this view by incorporating the financial constraints faced by governments into an electoral framework. We argue theoretically that the extent of ownership dispersion among creditors has important effects for governments’ policy autonomy. Specifically, we contend that when highly indebted governments become more reliant on international bond markets—as opposed to traditional bank lending—politicians alter the way they respond to domestic constituents. In an econometric test of 16 Latin American countries, from 1961 to 2011, we show that financial decentralization breeds austerity. More specifically, we find that politicians exhibit more fiscal discipline when they fund a greater share of their spending through decentralized bond markets. Furthermore, we find this disciplining effect to be particularly strong during election periods.
Johnny Dilley, Andrew Poelstra, Jonathan Wilkins, Marta Piekarska · 6 authors
Bitcoin, the first peer-to-peer electronic cash system, opened the door to permissionless, private, and trustless transactions. Attempts to repurpose Bitcoin's underlying blockchain technology have run up against fundamental limitations to privacy, faithful execution, and transaction finality. We introduce \emph{Strong Federations}: publicly verifiable, Byzantine-robust transaction networks that facilitate movement of any asset between disparate markets, without requiring third-party trust. \emph{Strong Federations} enable commercial privacy, with support for transactions where asset types and amounts are opaque, while remaining publicly verifiable. As in Bitcoin, execution fidelity is cryptographically enforced; however, \emph{Strong Federations} significantly lower capital requirements for market participants by reducing transaction latency and improving interoperability. To show how this innovative solution can be applied today, we describe \emph{\liquid}: the first implementation of \emph{Strong Federations} deployed in a Financial Market.
We present cryptocurrency-based lottery protocols that do not require any collateral from the players. Previous protocols for this task required a security deposit that is $O(N^2)$ times larger than the bet amount, where $N$ is the number of players. Our protocols are based on a tournament bracket construction, and require only $O(\log N)$ rounds. Our lottery protocols thus represent a significant improvement, both because they allow players with little money to participate, and because of the time value of money. The Ethereum-based implementation of our lottery is highly efficient. The Bitcoin implementation requires an $O(2^N)$ off-chain setup phase, which demonstrates that the expressive power of the scripting language can have important implications. We also describe a minimal modification to the Bitcoin protocol that would eliminate the exponential blowup.
Open access
3 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Cryptography and Data Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Pablo Lamela Seijas, Simon Thompson, Darryl McAdams
We give an overview of the scripting languages used in existing cryptocurrencies, and in particular we review in some detail the scripting languages of Bitcoin, Nxt and Ethereum, in the context of a high-level overview of Distributed Ledger Technology and cryptocurrencies. We survey different approaches, and give an overview of critiques of existing languages. We also cover technologies that might be used to underpin extensions and innovations in scripting and contracts, including technologies for verification, such as zero knowledge proofs, proof-carrying code and static analysis, as well as approaches to making systems more efficient, e.g. Merkelized Abstract Syntax Trees.
Jian Liu, Wenting Li, Ghassan O. Karame, N. Asokan
The surging interest in blockchain technology has revitalized the search for effective Byzantine consensus schemes. In particular, the blockchain community has been looking for ways to effectively integrate traditional Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols into a blockchain consensus layer allowing various financial institutions to securely agree on the order of transactions. However, existing BFT protocols can only scale to tens of nodes due to their $O(n^2)$ message complexity. In this paper, we propose FastBFT, a fast and scalable BFT protocol. At the heart of FastBFT is a novel message aggregation technique that combines hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) with lightweight secret sharing primitives. Combining this technique with several other optimizations (i.e., optimistic execution, tree topology and failure detection), FastBFT achieves low latency and high throughput even for large scale networks. Via systematic analysis and experiments, we demonstrate that FastBFT has better scalability and performance than previous BFT protocols.
Sending money in cryptocurrencies is majorly based on public keys or their hashed forms -- "addresses." These long random-looking strings are user unfriendly for transferring by other means than via copy-and-paste or QR codes. Replacing such strings with identifiers chosen by users themselves would significantly improve usability of cryptocurrencies. Such identifiers could be memorable, easier to write on paper or to dictate over phone. Main challenge lies in designing a practically usable decentralised system for providing these identifiers. Former solutions have been built as centralised systems or come with nonnegligible limitations. Our solution is reminiscent of a prevalent e-mail system, which is an already user friendly and desirably decentralised system. It is shown that our approach is directly applicable also to other systems that use long cryptographic identifiers.
Bitcoin is a digital currency currently being legalized throughout the European Union [2], whose operating rinciples were published publicly [5], but not in scientific or mathematical sources. The goal of this report is to encourage discussions about decentralization and security of the Bitcoin system, as well as about reasonableness of the Bitcoin network fees. Bitcoin is a fully decentralized peer-to-peer electronic currency system, which lets its users to send transactions directly from one user to another, without any thirdparties. Electronic signature ensures that transaction is sent by the person who owns the money, but the main problem of such a system is to ensure, without any third-parties, that the same money could not be spent twice. This problem in the Bitcoin system is solved using a peer-to-peer network. The Bitcoin network timestamps all transactions, by grouping them to an ongoing chain of transaction blocks, where each block must have a hash (SHA256) result which would meet certain conditions, thus ensuring that in order to cancel or modify a past transaction, one would need to find more hashes which meet the required conditions than the whole Bitcoin network combined since the time of transaction. This allows users to leave and rejoin the network at will, and always be sure which transaction history is the correct one.
Cryptocurrencies which evolved with bitcoin has a decentralized structure based on the ledger which is handled via proof of work mechanism, indeed generating a monetary supply. We all agree that decentralization save us from the cruel national political system but has a limitation of computational cost involved and problem related to scalability. The idea is to introduce a new cryptocurrency named UV Coin which is a cryptocurrency framework having control of the central banks but involves distributed set of authorities to prevent double spending. This coin will maintain enough transparency. The proof of the benefits is partial centralization such as elimination of wasteful hashing and involves a scalable system to avoid double spending attack.
Open access
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Ciara Brennan, James Rice, Rannveig Traustadóttir, Peter Anderberg
Article 19 of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities requires states to ensure that persons with disabilities have access to a range of support services, including personal assistance. The Convention is an agreement between state parties and the UN. However, in practice, disability services are often implemented at the local level. Drawing on the findings of qualitative research in Iceland, Norway and Sweden, this paper examines a paradox whereby states commit to ensure access to support services, but decentralize responsibility to autonomous and independent local governments. A multi-level governance framework is applied to analyse the findings of qualitative inquiry with policy-makers, local government officials and leaders of independent living organizations in all three Nordic countries. A multi-level analysis highlights the tensions and contradictions between decentralization and human rights commitments.
Ethereum represents new innovation in the fields of cryptocurrency which has become relatively stagnate, promising many things, including an entire programming language and development enviroment built into the network. However the current trend is to write implementations and proof of concepts before doing the rigor involved with proving security. Miller's recent thesis is an attempt to remedy this, and we apply his provable security techniques to the algorithm description of CASPER, the new "proof-of-stake" consensus protocol scheme to be implemented in ethereum. We conclude by stating it satisfies almost all the definitions, except one, leaving room for improvement.
Christopher D. Clack, Vikram A. Bakshi, Lee Braine
Smart Contract Templates support legally-enforceable smart contracts, using operational parameters to connect legal agreements to standardised code. In this paper, we explore the design landscape of potential formats for storage and transmission of smart legal agreements. We identify essential requirements and describe a number of key design options, from which we envisage future development of standardised formats for defining and manipulating smart legal agreements. This provides a preliminary step towards supporting industry adoption of legally-enforceable smart contracts.
Davide Frey, Marc X. Makkes, Pierre-Louis Roman, François Taı̈ani · 5 authors
To preserve the Bitcoin ledger's integrity, a node that joins the system must download a full copy of the entire Bitcoin blockchain if it wants to verify newly created blocks.
Luciano García‐Bañuelos, Alexander Ponomarev, Marlon Dumas, Ingo Weber
Blockchain technology enables the execution of collaborative business processes involving untrusted parties without requiring a central authority. Specifically, a process model comprising tasks performed by multiple parties can be coordinated via smart contracts operating on the blockchain. The consensus mechanism governing the blockchain thereby guarantees that the process model is followed by each party. However, the cost required for blockchain use is highly dependent on the volume of data recorded and the frequency of data updates by smart contracts. This paper proposes an optimized method for executing business processes on top of commodity blockchain technology. The paper presents a method for compiling a process model into a smart contract that encodes the preconditions for executing each task in the process using a space-optimized data structure. The method is empirically compared to a previously proposed baseline by replaying execution logs, including one from a real-life business process, and measuring resource consumption.
The decentralized cryptocurrency Bitcoin has experienced great success but also encountered many challenges. One of the challenges has been the long confirmation time. Another challenge is the lack of incentives at certain steps of the protocol, raising concerns for transaction withholding, selfish mining, etc. To address these challenges, we propose Solida, a decentralized blockchain protocol based on reconfigurable Byzantine consensus augmented by proof-of-work. Solida improves on Bitcoin in confirmation time, and provides safety and liveness assuming the adversary control less than (roughly) one-third of the total mining power.