In this article, the determinants of health care expenditure per capita in Spanish regions are analysed. The coexistence of several models concerning the degree of spending power decentralization and financing systems makes Spain a singular case and allows us to draw conclusions relevant for other countries decentralizing their health care systems. Analysing the Spanish case also serves to show a number of pitfalls affecting econometric estimation of the effects of income and demographic structure on health expenditure. Because the reliability of parameter estimates is a key issue in the literature on the determinants of health expenditure, these potential problems should be taken into account when estimating and interpreting results.
Both theory and experience in a variety of circumstances around the world suggest strongly that if fiscal decentralization is to produce sustainable net benefits in developing countries, subnational governments require much more real taxing power than they now have. Students of public finance have studied the subject, and practitioners in developing countries have installed many different versions of subnational government tax. In most developing countries there are potentially sound and productive taxes that subnational governments could use: personal income tax surcharges, property taxes, taxes on the use of motor vehicles, payroll taxes, and even subnational value‐added taxes and local “business value” taxes may all be viable options in particular countries. Still, there is no general consensus about what works and what does not. In this review paper, we try and pull together enough evidence to suggest the way forward. We also develop the argument that given political realities one cannot usually decentralize significant revenues to subnational governments without having in place an intergovernmental transfer system to offset at least some of the disequalizing effects that would otherwise occur. Nor does it make sense to think of decentralizing exactly the same package of tax choices to all subnational governments regardless of their scale and scope of operations.
The 20th century has been called the era of centralized authoritarian rule.On the other hand, the 21st century is known as the era of devolution.In this lecture, I will first explain the reasons why a decentralized society, that is, devolution, has become necessary.Second, I will give a general outline on the OECD system of fiscal relations across government levels.Third, I will examine the present state of the reform for decentralization that has been undertaken in Japan in recent years, and fourth, I will investigate the situation of local government finance in the age of devolution in reference to the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
The paper tries to shed some light on the problems of centralization and decentralization within an economic union and the federal member states. Integration and decentralization are not opposite policy strategies but both meaningful if the single public goods and services supplies are analyzed in more detail. Both strategies doubtlessly have advantages, which can be realized if the manifold possibilities are combined in an efficient approach of good governance. Best practice approaches in inter- or supra-national integration, fiscal federalism and taxation do exist and have to be successfully implemented. Obviously such a modern fiscal policy has to be accompanied by an appropriate monetary policy, which in an economic union has to be carried out by an independent central bank as one of the necessary countervailing powers in a democratic setting. A modern fiscal policy strategy efficiently controls budget deficits, which naturally have to be limited to finance reliable public investments. Such strategy has to be safeguarded through modern methods of budgeting and fiscal planning. Modern public management with a clear code of conduct for the government officials ensures corruption free administration.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia, like other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, have given significant lip service to fiscal decentralization and engaged in public administration reforms. But the subnational governments of their public finance systems still lack relative autonomy, which could be addressed partly through developing independent revenue sources for their municipalities and regions. Currently, such independent revenue sources include the proceeds of a strictly nominal property tax as well as those of a small set of local user fees and taxes designed and approved by the central governments. Together they represent only about 5 percent of total municipal budget revenues.
This paper covers network investment problems under decentralized control of regulation, infrastructure ownership and management. The model features two countries managing domestic infrastructures, used simultaneously for downstream international service provision. Initially, the welfare losses from non-cooperative investment financing policy and access pricing are derived. The impact of strategic interaction between the countries' access prices on the choice of financing policy is investigated. Under strict budget balancing, there are no incentives for efficiency improving investments. Further, investment coordination is shown useless in the absence of regulatory coordination. Illustrations from European network regulation policy for energy and rail are presented.
The Government of Ghana introduced the decentralization concept in 1988 as part of hereffort/determination to make local government administration autonomous in Ghana. Themain aim of the concept was to make the people at the grassroots part of the decision makingprocess with the view to ensuring total socio-economic transformation of the country. Untilthen, decentralization was not a new phenomenon in the politics of Ghana, however, it hassince 1988, assumed a new dimension. New structures and institutions such as the NationalDevelopment Planning Commission (NDPC), and the District Assemblies Common Fund(DACF) were established by law. These structures and institutions sought to transfer means,skills, power and competence to the districts. The DACF is believed to be the majorinnovation under the reform. The fund, which constitutes five percent of the National Income(NI), is disbursed by the central government to the districts through the Office of the CommonFund Administrator. In addition, each DA is required to generate revenues from local sourcesreferred to as Internally Generated Fund (IGF) to supplement the DACF to carry out socioeconomicdevelopment of the local areas.It is against this background that, this study was carried out to describe and explain theimplementation process of the Fiscal Decentralization Policy in the Akuapem South Districtof Ghana. The study set out to describe the assumption that inadequate bureaucratic resources,lack of political resources, poor economic and social resource and lack of inter-governmentalcommunication and enforcement agency may impede effective implementation of the fiscaldecentralization policy in the district. The Mixed method approach of social science researchand a case study approach were used in the study. Interviews and questionnaires were used tosolicit data for the study.The research found out among things that the fiscal decentralization policy is underway.However, the ability and capabilities of the DAs implement the policy is affected by variousseveral factors namely bureaucratic resource such as technical, managerial and financialresource; political resource which implies the acceptance by the bureaucrats of the policy;economic and social resource such as the social condition prevailing at the time of theimplementation; and the inter-organizational communication and enforcement agencieswhich refers to the relationship between the policy makers and the implementers. The studyconcludes that for effective implementation of fiscal decentralization in Ghana there is theneed to provide the necessary resources intended for the policy.2The study seeks to investigate the implementation of the fiscal decentralization policy in theAkuapem South District of Ghana. It aims to highlight some of the challenges confrontingthe district in the implementation of the policy and the strategies being employed to meetthese challenges.
Sonia Esteban Laleona, Pablo de Frutos Madrazo, María José Prieto Jano
Traditionally, the academic debates about the benefits that the existence of multilevel government structures provide have been directly related to the gains in efficiency that derive from the processes of decentralization of the Public Sector. However, as of the last decades, the Public Finance has broadened its analysis towards other questions, one of them being if the fiscal decentralization influences positively in the economic growth of a country. The objective of this document is to provide a "reading guide" for this new line of investigation on the influence of fiscal decentralization on regional economic growth.
The book is divided into two parts. The \n first part macro federalism provides a fresh look at \n emerging constitutional challenges arising from \n globalization and the information revolution, as well as the \n dynamic-efficiency and growth implications of existing \n federal constitutions. Several aspects of these systems are \n examined: (a) institutional design to achieve internal \n economic union; (b) policies for regional development; (c) \n conduct of monetary policy; (d) coordination of fiscal \n policies, with a special emphasis on tax harmonization; and \n (e) management of risks of insolvency from sub-national \n borrowing. The second part of the book local finance \n provides a comparative perspective on local finances and \n measures the progress of decentralized governance reforms in \n developing countries.
We consider the regulation of national firms in a common market. Regulators can influence the production of national firms but they incur in a positive cost of public funds. First, we show that market integration is welfare improving if and only if the efficiency gains compensate for the negative public finance effect (related to business stealing). We also show that supranational competition can have very different consequences on the rent seeking behaviour of firms, depending on cost correlation and ex-ante technological risk. Finally, we characterize the global optimum and show how it can be sustained in a decentralized bargaining solution.
The institutional environment of elementary education funding in Brazil suffered several modifications in the last decades, mainly during the 1990's. In order to join the prioritization of elementary education to the decentralization of educational public policies – leading it to local level – the federal government promoted a deep reform in the legal framework, even through constitutional amendments that became important rules for education funding. One of the major changes was the creation of the 'Elementary Education Development and Maintenance and Teachers Valorization Fund' (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e Valorização do Magistério – FUNDEF) destined to the financing of elementary education in Brazil. Despite these reforms, the situation of elementary education in Brazil is still extremely precarious: neither does it fulfills the needs of its people, nor is compatible with Brazilian State economical capacities. From the analytical standpoint, with basis on the 'New Institutional Economy' theoretical reference, the creation of earmarked revenues for education policies is considered the main financing rule for elementary education, and served to reduce several transaction costs. These costs are associated to the discontinuity of actions and to the opportunistic behavior of the players involved in the public policies’ scenario. Among these players are representatives of the executive, legislative and public powers, state bureaucracy and civil society. This thesis seeks to evaluate if this set of education financing strategies - created by earmarked revenues mainly for elementary education - is sufficient condition to achieve the efficiency required to carry out those education policies, or if other effects, linked to the strategy or not, contribute to the maintenance of inefficiencies. This thesis uses as theoretical reference the 'New Institutional Economy', which is mainly based in the works by North (1988 and 1990), Williamson (1985) and Miller (1992). This reference focuses on the central role of institutions in the evaluation of social-economical problems. Thus, the first session of the thesis aims at describing the core elements of this theory, such as the concepts of formal and informal rules, transaction costs and governance structures. Based on this initial structure, the theoretical model used in the thesis is built and can be considered as an adaptation of the New Institution Economy approach for organizations in the public sector. This model takes into consideration important elements and characteristics of institutions, players and governance structures that should be accounted for when analyzing public organizations. Under the light of this theoretical model, the institutional array developed for elementary education financing in Brazilian cities is analyzed into further detail; comprehending the institutional scenario, that is, the rules of the game, and the behavior of the players face to these rules. In order to empirically test the theoretical assumptions of this thesis, a case study is carried out in the city of São Paulo. The present thesis aims at contributing to the discussions on the necessary changes on education policies, with special emphasis in the institutional adequacy between the formal rules established to the policies and the characteristics, values and skills of the players involved in the implementation of these rules. The very institutional theory anticipates that the disregard of these factors implies the possibility of occurring transaction costs associated to public manager control costs and to the opportunistic behavior of the players involved in the public policies’ scenario. Therefore, even in the existence of earmarked revenues, the efficient conduction of public education policies will not be guarantied.
This paper develops a two‐period overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents aiming at analysing how decentralization in the provision of public education affects growth and personal inequality via human capital investment. Education is financed by a tax levied by either national or local authorities. The tax rate is chosen according to a median voter mechanism. During their working period of life, individuals look after their offspring by providing them with a high level of school education stemming from taxation. In addition parent's contributions to the social security system provide them with retirement income. Heterogeneity accounts for the differences in the optimal taxation mechanism, linking the income distribution to the tax rate, and hence to human capital accumulation, growth and income inequality. In this way we relate differences among agents to the tax rate. We show that decentralization induces growth rate disparities among local communities but it can be ruled out by a proper fiscal substitution between social security and locally provided education. Unlike in the literature, this type of fiscal design allows local economies to grow faster and more equally than the national design.
An important element in considering school finance policies is that households are not passive. Instead they respond to policies with a combination of modified residential choice and political choice of tax levels. The highly stylized decision models of most existing analyses, however, lead to concerns about the policy evaluations. In our general equilibrium model of residential location and community choice, households base optimizing decisions on commuting costs, school quality, and land rents. With both centralized and decentralized employment, the resulting equilibrium has heterogeneous communities in terms of income and tastes for schools. This model is used to analyze a series of conventional policy experiments, including school district consolidation, district power utilization, and different equalization devices. The important conclusion is that welfare falls for all families with the restrictions in choice that are implied by these approaches.
Development of the European integration through the European Union (EU) considers not only strengthening integration from the economic aspect (internal market). It also considers the political aspect of the integration i.e. strengthening political integration of member states and their citizens. Political segment of integration considers strengthening of the internal policies of the EU in which fiscal system, i.e. public finances have extremely important role. The EU fiscal system presents reflection of the extremely strong and often confronted interests between the economic and the political integration. These issues are closely related to the second component of the European politic and economic integration, that are the fiscal relations between the EU “central” level and the national “lower” levels which bring the all important decisions in the EU. According to the theory of public finance (fiscal federalism) and the criteria of economic efficiency, fiscal functions (allocation, redistribution, stabilization) and activities are assigned to the different levels of government, as well as certain resources for their financing. On the basis of fiscal functions carried out by national levels in the EU, and the manner of their financing, the EU is a prominently fiscally decentralized complex community. The traditional approach to the fiscal federalism that fiscal authorities are transferred from central to lover levels means that this is a process of decentralization, while in the case of the EU this means centralization of fiscal authorities from the level on national states to the EU as a supra-national level. The main goal of this paper is to analyze fiscal relations in the EU according to basic fiscal functions: allocation, redistribution and stabilization. Methodology would include analysis and comparison of positive EU aspect with normative aspect of public finances in multi-level community. Induction of gained results will confirm thesis that, because of political restraints, development of common (central) system of the EU public finances is based on alternative approaches of harmonization and cooperation.
In this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, as illustrated for instance by CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction's emissions depend upon the local stock of private capital. Capital is interjurisdictionally - mobile and may be taxed to help finance local public expenditures. We show that decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocations in important cases, even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher - level governments or coordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. In particular, even when the preferences and production technologies differ among the agents, the decentralized system can still result in globally efficient allocation.
Compared with most countries the Norwegian system of financing local governments is highly centralized. Grants make up a substantial part of revenues and local taxes are highly regulated by the center. The development of the system was motivated by a desire to equalize service provision throughout the country. The purpose of this paper is to analyze possible consequences of more decentralized financing with local tax discretion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom the analysis indicates that decentralized financing is likely to give more equal provision of local public services. In addition, substantial efficiency gains can be obtained.
Since South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994, it has given significant attention to building an effective system of decentralization including provincial and local government. While provincial governments are responsible mainly for the implementation of social services such as health and education, the provision of much of the urban infrastructure is the responsibility of local government. Although many challenges remain, the country has made significant progress over the past decade in addressing urban service backlogs in poor areas. At the same time, it has greatly improved macroeconomic fundamentals. The system of financing local government seeks to place accountability firmly at the local level, with most revenues in the larger urban centers raised locally through a combination of local taxes and fees for services, while poorer regions are predominantly grant funded. The objective has been to encourage the financing of capital infrastructure through local borrowing based on sustainable, transparent local finances rather than national repayment guarantees, which are outlawed. There is some indirect subsidization of loans through the state-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa. But the emphasis is on achieving redistribution through transparent, formula-based grants paid directly from national to local governments. While further bedding down of the system is needed, the approach is proving largely successful. The paper concludes by recommending that the existing division between provinces as providers of social services and local governments as the key locus of responsibility for services related to the built environment should be strengthened, particularly through the devolution of more urban transport related functions. A number of key risks are also highlighted, including issues related to the reform of local business taxes.
China has experienced more than 25 years of extraordinary economic growth. Underlying this growth has been a decentralized fiscal system, in which provinces and large cities are given the freedom to make infrastructure investments to stimulate local development, and are allowed to retain a large part of the fiscal revenues that are generated from economic activity. Although successful as a growth strategy, this policy created two problems for national fiscal management. First, it significantly reduced the central government's share of fiscal revenues, which fell from 34.8 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1992. Second, it widened economic and fiscal disparities between the rapidly growing urban coastal region and the rest of the country. Rapid growth in subnational debt (which rose 23-fold in a decade) and subnational nonperforming loans (estimated by the authors to range between US$100 billion and US$150 billion) has placed pressure on China's financial system. Traditionally, China has favored bank lending as a source of finance because the banking system has provided a vehicle for central political control over local debt. But as China's financial system matures, creditworthiness standards must become more important. The authors recommend greater use of the revenue streams from infrastructure assets as a financing source, and gradual relaxation of central political control over subnational debt. One step in this direction would permit leading cities to issue municipal bonds based on objective financial standards.
O sistema de financiamento da educação no Brasil se caracteriza por uma estrutura complexa, com problemas de eficiência, eficácia e eqüidade, ao tempo em que se apresentam algumas iniciativas novas como possíveis soluções para as dificuldades enfrentadas. Estas características têm sido objeto de interesse crescente por parte de estudiosos e formuladores de políticas, tanto pela percepção das limitações do sistema vigente como pelas mudanças administrativas e fiscais promovidas pela Constituição de 1988 e, mais recentemente, por alguns governos estaduais e municipais. Este artigo analisa o referido sistema, examinando cada um dos aspectos acima mencionados. O texto inicia descrevendo a organização e estrutura do sistema, fornecendo, a seguir, um panorama das despesas em educação; identifica os problemas principais e descreve algumas experiências recentes que, de forma ainda parcial, tentam solucioná-los. Na sua conclusão, os autores argumentam que, para que se efetive as recentes mudanças, há necessidade de implementar-se procedimentos de avaliação e acompanhamento de forma a saber em que medida os remédios combatem as doenças ou os primeiros podem ser aperfeiçoados. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: educação; finanças públicas; sistema educacional; despesas em educação; municipalização; descentralização. Financing public education in Brazil: A political-economical perspective The system of financing education in Brazil is characterized by a complex structure, with efficiency, efficacy and equity problems, while presenting some new initiatives as possible solutions for the difficulties that are being faced. These characteristics have been the object of growing interest on the part scholars and policy makers, in terms of the perceived limitations of the system, as well as by the fiscal and administrative changes promoted by the 1988 Constitution, and more recently by some state and municipal governments. This article analyses the system, beginning with its organization and structure, and then provides an overview of education expenditures. It identifies the major problems and describes some recent experiences, trying to solve them in a partial way. In its conclusion the authors discuss that to put the recent changes into practice it is necessary to implement evaluation and assessment procedures that enable the identification and improvement of the most effective initiatives. KEY WORDS: education; public finances; educational system; expenses on education; municipality issues; decentralization. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br
In the late 1990s the Indian state of Tamil Nadu experienced an unprecedented fiscal deterioration, which was part of the widespread fiscal deterioration in Indian states. This deterioration was troubling because current expenditure outgrew total revenue, leaving little fiscal space for infrastructure spending. The paper presents a framework for subnational fiscal sustainability analysis and applies it to Tamil Nadu where subsequent fiscal adjustment has been ambitious and politically challenging, but has promised to put state finance on a sustainable path and create fiscal space for infrastructure investment. The paper emphasizes the differences between fiscal sustainability analysis at the national and subnational levels, attempts to take into account uncertainty, and discusses the key components of the state's fiscal accounts and how they respond to reforms and shocks. Risks to Tamil Nadu's fiscal outlook include interest rate shocks, pressures on the primary balance, and contingent liabilities. Though the state's efforts to remove constraints to economic growth, minimize recurrent expenditures and maximize its revenue potential will be critical for fiscal sustainability, national policies feature prominently in subnational fiscal adjustment. Tamil Nadu's quest for fiscal sustainability is relevant for other countries. Decentralization has given subnational governments in developing countries significant spending and taxation responsibilities, and the capacity to incur debt. The fiscal stress of the Indian states echoed the fiscal crises of subnational governments in several other major emerging economies.
The 1971 ruling of the California Supreme Court in the case of Serrano v. Priest initiated a chain of events that abruptly ended local financing of public schools in California. In seven short years, California transformed its school finance system from a decentralized one in which local communities chose how much to spend on their schools to a centralized one in which the state legislature determines the expenditures of every school district. This paper begins by describing California's school finance system before Serrano and the transformation from local to state finance. It then delineates some consequences of that transformation and draws lessons from California's experience with school finance reform.