An important virtue of distributed ledger technologies is their acclaimed higher level of decentralisation compared to traditional financial systems. Empirical literature, however, suggests that many systems tend towards centralisation as well. This study expands the current literature by offering a first-time, data-driven analysis of the degree of decentralisation of the platform Hedera Hashgraph, a public permissioned distributed ledger technology, employing data directly fetched from a network node. The results show a considerably higher amount of released supply compared to the release schedule and a growing number of daily active accounts. Also, Hedera Hashgraph exhibits a high centralisation of wealth and a shrinking core that acts as an intermediary in transactions for the rest of the network. However, the Nakamoto index and Theil index point to recent progress towards a more decentralised network.
Financial Literacy plus new purchasing power can drive rapid and environmentally sustainable, local-to-global, economic development. Historically, new technologies promote new forms of money and commerce that usher in new economic eras. This chapter is for leaders and innovators in financial services and sustainable economic development. It reveals an emerging era of sustainable prosperity for all. The world can now eradicate centuries-old poverty and inequality at the pace of mobile apps and social media. The funding for this paradigm shift is a next-generation financial instrument and not higher taxes, deeper debt, or redistribution of wealth schemes. The chapter introduces the first token-less ledger currency that is distributed through a public Business-Community Wealth Ledger (BCWL). Dual Currency transactions integrate fiat currencies with wealth-backed ledger currencies, monetizing and mobilizing currently underutilized business resources and increasing profits for participating businesses.
This chapter considers how DLT could be used in connection with derivatives transactions and the English law and cross-border conflict-of-laws issues that may arise from such use. The chapter addresses more simple use cases for DLT, such as acting as a record keeping function in respect of payments under a transaction or in respect of transfers of collateral, and why conflict-of-laws issues are less likely to arise from such use. The chapter then looks at more complex use cases, in particular the potential use of tokens housed on a DLT system as collateral in respect of derivatives transactions. The chapter considers a number of different types of tokens, from tokens that are backed by a real-world asset to tokens that are native to the DLT system, and addresses the conflicts-of-laws issues that may arise from taking security over such tokens. The chapter also addresses how the law could be developed so as to provide greater legal certainty on these issues.
В. С. Петренко, Алла Карнаушенко, Kateryna Melnykova
In today's world, the finance and investment sector is becoming increasingly dynamic and diverse.One of the key trends is the growing interest in alternative sources of financing, which provide businesses and individual investors with new opportunities to obtain and provide financial support.This article provides a detailed analysis of alternative sources of financing, including crowdfunding, venture capital and cryptocurrency initial public offerings (ICO).It also discusses the role and importance of alternative sources of financing in modern business and the impact of technological innovations on this sector.Alternative sources of finance encompass a wide range of financial instruments and platforms that allow businesses and individuals to raise and invest funds outside of traditional banking and financial institutions.One of the most popular categories is crowdfunding, which requires raising funds from a large number of individual investors through an online platform.Another important category is venture capital, which has evolved into investing in start-ups and innovative businesses with high risk but significant return potential.ICOs are another aspect of alternative sources of funding that is proving popular.This method allows startups and projects to raise funds by issuing cryptocurrency tokens.The article compares the categories of alternative sources of financing and identifies crowdfunding, venture capital and ICO as three key categories of alternative sources of financing with their unique features and advantages.Crowdfunding allows mass investors to invest in various projects, venture capital business is aimed at supporting innovations and start-ups, and ICO allows issuing tokens to raise funds.The impact of the development of Internet technologies and blockchain, which have changed the landscape of alternative finance, is also identified.Online platforms and distributed ledgers can create secure and accessible channels for attracting investment.This makes alternative sources of finance more attractive to investors and businesses.Technological innovations are also helping to improve risk assessment and credit scoring processes, making alternative finance more predictable and efficient.
In this study, the five most well-known cryptocurrencies in the blockchain-based decentralized financing structure were compared with the centralized market interest rates, and it was examined whether there is a significant relationship between the changes in market interest rates and the prices of cryptocurrencies. Key findings indicate a significant relationship between most cryptocurrencies, such as Dash, Litecoin, Ethereum, and Bitcoin, with market interest rates. However, XRP emerges as an exception. In addition to the comparative analysis between cryptocurrencies and market interest rates, this study delves into the underlying mechanisms that govern these relationships. It explores the role of blockchain technology in shaping the decentralized financing structure and highlights the intricacies of various cryptographic algorithms. The research also emphasizes the need for specialized accounting practices that cater to the unique challenges posed by cryptocurrencies. This study bridges the understanding between conventional economic mechanisms and the innovative world of cryptocurrencies, offering inferences that are important for investors, financial analysts, and accountants in the digital age.
Nipun Agarwal, Pornpit Wongthongtham, Neerajkumari Khairwal, Kevin Coutinho
Blockchain technology has emerged as a transformative force in the financial industry, offering the potential to streamline and enhance financial markets’ clearing and settlement processes. This paper explores the application of blockchain technology in these critical areas. We examine traditional clearing and settlement procedures, the challenges they pose, and how blockchain can address these issues. Through case studies and technical insights, we illustrate the benefits and limitations of implementing blockchain solutions. This paper utilizes the PRISMA method to survey papers related to blockchain-based clearing and settlement systems, while using Science Direct to identify papers that have been published in this area. These papers were reviewed to identify themes that relate to extending blockchain development for clearing and settlement system in financial markets. As a result, this paper also shows how the Layer One X (L1X) blockchain can be applied to develop financial markets clearing and settlement systems.
To what extent does the collapse of a commercial bank spread contagion across cryptocurrency markets? How do markets behave around bankruptcy if digital assets remain stuck within the bank and cannot be withdrawn? We use a BEKK model to examine contagion effects across major digital assets during the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) collapse period in early March 2023. We find evidence of contagion across major stablecoins and Bitcoin. We also examine the price action when nearly all withdrawals at SVB were prohibited. We find substantial abnormal movements in stablecoin cumulative returns and volumes, indicating a “flight to safety” from less to more authoritative and trusted stablecoins. The implications for practitioners and policymakers are discussed.
Decentralized finance (DeFi) built on public blockchain technology has introduced groundbreaking financial innovation through disintermediated peer-to-peer transactional architectures. By eliminating centralized intermediaries, DeFi expands access to an open ecosystem of decentralized financial services including lending, trading, derivatives, insurance, savings, asset management, crowdfunding and more. However, DeFi's disruptive nature also introduces significant regulatory challenges worldwide. Most DeFi platforms operate autonomously outside existing policy frameworks crafted around regulated entities in traditional finance. The pseudo-anonymous execution of transactions via non-custodial wallets and smart contracts risks enabling illicit activities like money laundering at unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the complexity of cross-border DeFi structures stresses traditional financial oversight dependent on fragmented national regimes. As innovation continues outpacing governance adaptation, regulators across jurisdictions grapple with crafting balanced oversight solutions without constraining beneficial advancement. This paper undertakes a comparative legal analysis of emerging legislative approaches to governing Decentralized finance (DeFi) across major developed and developing economies. It examines key tensions between DeFi's unique technical architecture and regulations designed around centralized intermediaries. Challenges are identified in combating illicit finance, protecting consumers, ensuring stability and promoting fair competition in the rapidly evolving DeFi ecosystem. The analysis assesses risks including money laundering, investor protection, systemic threats and blockchain immutability. It also reviews regulatory initiatives and debates involving global standard-setters and national authorities in jurisdictions like the United States, European Union, China, Singapore, Switzerland and United Arab Emirates. While most countries remain at early stages of tailored DeFi governance, recommendations are presented on crafting international regulatory strategies and oversight coalitions to harness DeFi’s opportunities while safeguarding public interests. Promising policy directions include regulating activities over entities, proactive developer engagement, leveraging regulatory technologies, incentivizing accountability, enabling pilot programs, and nurturing open-source collaboration. With prudent regulatory modernization centered on multi-stakeholder collaboration and industry consultation, DeFi has the potential to fulfill its promise of expanding financial access, efficiency and resiliency for the benefit of economies and communities worldwide.
Pham Thi Ngoc Dung, Long Luong, Le Ngoc Thuy Trang, Do Thi Thanh Nhan
This study aims to analyze the role of bitcoin and gold as safe haven assets against Asian equity markets during periods of high market uncertainty related to the global COVID-19 pandemic, high volatility, and extreme stock market conditions. Empirical analysis employ the DCC-GARCH methodology to estimate the time-varying relationship between bitcoin/ gold and the Asian stock market from 2016 to 2023. Our findings reveal that bitcoin serves as a strong hedge for Taiwan and Pakistan, whereas gold can be considered as a strong hedge for Japan, Singapore, India, Thailand and Vietnam. Interestingly, we observed that bitcoin does not exhibit safe haven properties in any of the Asian countries observed. In contrast, gold demonstrates strong safe haven abilities for Singapore, India, and Thailand. These results remain consistent across various measures of market turmoil, including the volatility index, COVID-19-related periods, and low quantiles in the stock market. Furthermore, our results suggest that the perception and adoption of gold as a safe haven asset in Japan and Vietnam is mainly influenced by global events and uncertainties, rather than localized stock market conditions. These findings offer valuable information for investors, financial institutions, as well as policy makers and regulators, on how cryptocurrency and gold evolved as hedge and safe haven assets in Asia during uncertainty periods.
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) are a cornerstone of decentralized finance (DeFi), allowing users to trade cryptocurrencies without the need for third-party authorization. Investors are incentivized to deposit assets into liquidity pools, against which users can trade directly, while paying fees to liquidity providers (LPs). However, a number of unresolved issues related to capital efficiency and market risk hinder DeFi's further development. Uniswap V3, a leading and groundbreaking DEX project, addresses capital efficiency by enabling LPs to concentrate their liquidity within specific price ranges for deposited assets. Nevertheless, this approach exacerbates market risk, as LPs earn trading fees only when asset prices are within these predetermined brackets. To mitigate this issue, this paper introduces a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) solution designed to adaptively adjust these price ranges, maximizing profits and mitigating market risks. Our approach also neutralizes price-change risks by hedging the liquidity position through a rebalancing portfolio in a centralized futures exchange. The DRL policy aims to optimize trading fees earned by LPs against associated costs, such as gas fees and hedging expenses, which is referred to as loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR). Using simulations with a profit-and-loss (PnL) benchmark, our method demonstrates superior performance in ETH/USDC and ETH/USDT pools compared to existing baselines. We believe that this strategy not only offers investors a valuable asset management tool but also introduces a new incentive mechanism for DEX designers.
In this paper, we explore the aftermath of the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) collapse, with a particular focus on its impact on crypto markets. We conduct a multi-dimensional investigation, which includes a factual summary, analysis of user sentiment, and examination of market performance. Based on such efforts, we uncover a somewhat counterintuitive finding: \textit{the SVB collapse did not lead to the destruction of cryptocurrencies; instead, they displayed resilience.}
Babajide Oluwaseun Olaogun, Adaobu Amini-Philips, Ahmed K. Ibrahim
Efficient and accurate settlement processes are central to the operational integrity of financial institutions, particularly in the context of cross-border transactions and high-volume trading environments. Traditional reconciliation methods often involve time-consuming manual processes, delayed settlements, and operational inefficiencies, exposing institutions to settlement risk, liquidity risk, and compliance challenges. This proposes a Blockchain Settlement Impact Model designed to enhance institutional reconciliation processes while reducing operational and financial risks through distributed ledger technology (DLT). The model leverages the transparency, immutability, and real-time validation capabilities of blockchain to provide a secure and auditable framework for transaction settlement and reconciliation. The conceptual framework of the model integrates blockchain-enabled settlement layers with institutional accounting and treasury systems, enabling automated matching of debits and credits, immediate confirmation of transaction status, and streamlined exception management. Smart contracts are employed to enforce predefined settlement rules and automate conditional fund transfers, reducing manual intervention and minimizing the potential for human error. By providing a single source of truth for all settlement activity, the model improves operational efficiency, accelerates transaction finality, and enhances regulatory compliance. Quantitative and qualitative analyses within the model assess the impact of blockchain adoption on reconciliation speed, error rates, liquidity utilization, and risk exposure. Key performance indicators include settlement latency reduction, operational cost savings, and enhanced transparency in multi-party financial processes. The model also addresses risk mitigation by providing real-time visibility into settlement gaps, anomalous transactions, and counterparty exposures, enabling institutions to proactively manage liquidity and credit risk. Overall, the Blockchain Settlement Impact Model demonstrates the potential of distributed ledger technologies to transform institutional reconciliation practices. By combining automated settlement, real-time monitoring, and risk reduction mechanisms, the model enhances operational resilience, reduces systemic vulnerabilities, and provides a scalable solution for financial institutions navigating increasingly complex, high-volume transaction environments. Its adoption promises significant improvements in efficiency, transparency, and financial stability across global settlement networks.
Monetary systems comprise various layers of real and financial assets arranged hierarchically. Due to its properties, Bitcoin is a suitable asset to become the base money of a monetary system once its price has stabilized and people see it more like a medium of exchange than an investment. We review Bitcoin’s characteristics and explain their effect on its intra- and inter-temporal liquidity. We argue that Bitcoin will lower its bid-ask spread once users adopt financial assets convertible to Bitcoin. We propose the use of three financial assets working as Bitcoin derivatives to reduce Bitcoin’s demand shocks and lower its volatility: real bills, private scrip and cash notes. We explain when will this process take place and why people would have an incentive to rely on credit even under a Bitcoin standard.
Abstract The tokenization of financial assets using blockchain technology is a transformative process that allows for the fractionalization of ownership, thereby creating more accessible investment opportunities compared to traditional financial assets. Recent research has shown that token offerings are subject to moral hazard and fraud. In response to these challenges, we propose a novel token design that is compliant with the legal framework of Switzerland. Our design is characterized by its flexibility and can represent any yield or dividend-bearing asset, such as stocks, bonds, or rental income from real estate. Further enhancing its compatibility, the token conforms to the Ethereum ERC-20 standard, enabling seamless integration with existing decentralized finance solutions. Another contribution of our token design is its innovative approach to dividend distribution. Unlike traditional models that distribute dividends based on ownership at the time of payment, our token design distributes dividends based on holding times. This distinctive approach promotes smoother asset prices between dividend payouts by eliminating the need for compensation payments. Our token prototype represents a potential starting point for future research on leveraging the opportunities of decentralized finance.
There is a noted rise in research examining the influence of digital transformation-specifically the application of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) on the progression of the financial sector.This paper presents conclusions from a study on participants' awareness, understanding, and intentions regarding cryptocurrencies and the Digital Euro.Participants have a relatively high awareness of digital assets and Digital Euro, but better understanding is needed through effective communication and educational initiatives.While recognizing cryptocurrencies as valuable investments, participants are skeptical about their use for payments due to concerns about illicit activities.Regulatory frameworks are deemed important to address these concerns.Participants support the introduction of the Digital Euro and intend to use it for various purposes, suggesting potential demand.Desired characteristics include privacy, ease of use, and cross-border usability.These findings inform the strategies for introducing and accepting the Digital Euro, promoting financial inclusion, and enhancing accessibility in Europe's digital economy.
Financial markets have recently suffered from an increased interest of users of cryptocurrencies and decentralized finance solutions. Although Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has been designed based on smart contracts and leave out third-party intermediaries, these platforms sometimes require information from the outside world, such as exchange rates or prices. DeFi Oracles are the link solution between the on-chain world and the off-chain universe. This article describes the oracles, including taxonomy, governance and use cases. Thereafter, it considers their potential and, at the same time, addresses the possible risk that they present, which could impact the future DeFi space.
Money is money, securities are securities, and banking is banking. Their fundamentals are not changed by whether technology rails are centralized (classic) or pseudo-decentralized (virtual assets) – the song remains the same. As such, this paper does not reinvent the wheel on why we should regulate cryptoasset centralized exchanges (CEXs), as there is enough bibliography from today to the XVII century to go around on that. Instead, we focus on how to regulate the CEXs, which comes into play in a world where their distributed ledger technology (DLT) rails are off-the-grid and hinder regulators from: (i) collecting market data (information asymmetry); and (ii) practical enforcement (technology/operational asymmetry). After revising current regulatory practices from various countries, we identify grounds for a practical approach – we propose that regulators might enforce full trading/financial intermediation obligations on the CEXs by enacting an indirect regulation/gatekeeper scheme, as inspired by the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). In this model, regulators would restrict traditional institutions (i.e., banks, broker-dealers, clearings, funds) from transacting with CEXs which do not provide adequate evidence of material compliance with their trading/financial intermediation obligations. On a final remark, we narrate a growing movement which aims to insulate non-compliant crypto from the financial systems altogether, avoiding risks of contagion.
Türkiye, Brezilya, Hindistan, Güney Afrika ve Endonezya'nın ekonomik büyümelerini finanse etmek için istikrarsız yabancı yatırımlara olan yüksek bağımlılıkları nedeniyle, bu ülkeler “Kırılgan Beşli” ülke olarak adlandırılmıştır. Aynı zamanda Global Crypto Adoption Index'e göre, bu ülkeler kripto para birimlerine yatırım yapma konusunda oldukça aktiflerdir. Bu çalışmada “Kırılgan Beşli” ülkeler dikkate alınarak Bitcoin ve finansal varlıklar arasındaki uzun dönemli asimetrik ilişki Ağustos 2010 - Temmuz 2022 dönemine ait aylık veriler baz alınarak ARDL ve NARDL yöntemleri ile incelenmiştir. Pozitif ve negatif Bitcoin şoklarından kaynaklanan dinamik çarpanların doğrusal kombinasyonu, beş ülkenin tümü için NARDL üzerinden Dinamik çarpan testine başvurarak grafikleri çizilmiştir. Sonuçlar, Bitcoin'in tüm borsa endekslerine olumlu bir etkisi olmasına rağmen, yalnızca Türkiye ve Hindistan'daki değişkenlerin eş bütünleşik olduğunu göstermektedir. Bitcoin'in olumsuz şoklarının Türkiye'de daha derin ve baskın etkiye sahip olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Ancak, Bitcoin’in olumlu şoklarının Hindistan'da daha baskın olduğu sonucuna rastlanmıştır.
This article will look at the financial geographies and legacies of neo-colonialism to critique the emergence of blockchain financialization in the developing world. Blockchain “financialization” advances through the interplay of crypto imaginaries, new platform economies, and the trading infrastructure for highly leveraged financial products. The largest cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, has presented itself as a champion of the blockchain for development paradigm in Africa. Its success in the region relies on the use of community leaders, hackathons, and the lobbying of governments for regulatory concessions. Binance operates on two scales. Firstly, it is part of a fintech vanguard attempting to dismantle New Deal financial regulatory systems in the Global North (Omarova, Yale Journal on Regulation, 2019, 36, 735–793; Allen, H, DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?, 2022). Secondly, it as an agent of financialization in the developing world, promoting DeFi to map the speculative micro-financial practices of the Global South. Crypto and blockchain thus represent extensions of “subprime empire” (Schuster, Current Anthropology, 2021, 62, 389–411) in which marginal economic activities in fragile developing world contexts feed into the North-South extraction of value. This article will outline Binance’s forays into Nigeria as an example of the micro and macro scales of neocolonial finance and the interplay of infrastructure, territory, and the social imaginary in blockchain.
Abstract Bitcoin enthusiasts argue that it is free from central banks decisions and it is a hedge against inflation. Using high-frequency monetary surprises associated with decisions made by the Fed and the ECB, I show that these claims are not supported by the data. Bitcoin systemically reacts to monetary and central bank information shocks. I find that these reactions vary over time: not only by changing the magnitude but sometimes sign of reaction. Fed’s disinflationary shocks increase Bitcoin price, while the ECB’s decrease, hence providing little support for it as an inflation hedge.
Ze Chen, Ruichao Jiang, Javad Tavakoli, Yiqiang Q. Zhao
In this article we show that Theorem 2 in Lie et al. (2023) is incorrect. Since Wombat Exchange, a decentralized exchange, is built upon Lie et al. (2023) and Theorem 2 is fundamental to Wombat Finance, we show that an undesirable phenomenon, which we call the robbed withdrawal, can happen as a consequence.
DEX, or decentralized exchange, is a prominent class of decentralized finance (DeFi) applications on blockchains, attracting a total locked value worth tens of billions of USD today.This paper presents the first large-scale empirical study that uncovers unfair trades on popular DEX services on Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain (BSC). By joining and analyzing 60 million transactions, we find 671, 400 unfair trades on all six measured DEXes, including Uniswap, Balancer, and Curve. Out of these unfair trades, we attribute 55, 000 instances, with high confidence, to token thefts that cause a value loss of more than 3.88 million USD. Furthermore, the measurement study uncovers previously unknown causes of extractable value and real-world adaptive strategies to these causes. Finally, we propose countermeasures to redesign secure DEX protocols and to harden deployed services against the discovered security risks.
Lioba Heimbach, Eric Schertenleib, Roger Wattenhofer
The transaction ordering dependency of the smart contracts building decentralized exchanges (DEXes) allow for predatory trading strategies. In particular, front-running attacks present a constant risk for traders on DEXes. Whereas legal regulation outlaws most front-running practices in traditional finance, such measures are ineffective in preventing front-running on DEXes. While novel market designs hindering front-running may emerge, it remains unclear whether the market's participants, in particular, liquidity providers, would be willing to adopt these new designs. A misalignment of the participant's private incentives and the market's social incentives can hinder the market from adopting an effective prevention mechanism. We present a game-theoretic model to study the behavior of sophisticated traders, retail traders, and liquidity providers in DEXes. Sophisticated traders adjust for front-running attacks, while retail traders do not, likely due to lack of knowledge or irrationality. Our findings show that with less than 1% of order flow from retail traders, traders' and liquidity providers' interests align with the market's social incentives - eliminating front-running attacks. However, the benefit from embracing this novel market is often small and may not suffice to entice them. With retail traders making up a larger proportion (around 10%) of the order flow, liquidity providers tend to stay in pools that do not protect against front-running. This suggests both educating traders and providing additional incentives for liquidity providers are necessary for market self-regulation.