The aim of this research is to better understand the effects of a decentralized health system of the Philippines on public health care expenditures by investigating determinants of local government public health spending for year 2007. Within the context of the Philippines’ decentralized health system and health externalities that arise at the individual-level and manifest at the regional level, particular emphasis is given to spatial spillovers and fiscal interactions among municipalities. The research addresses these issues in an empirical spatial econometric framework utilizing public finance local government data for the Philippines. Competition for health resources including doctors and drugs, thereby bidding up the costs of health inputs is one of the potential causes for positive fiscal spatial dependence cited in this paper. It is also anticipated that this could be an outcome of yardstick competition, where local agents strategically compete with each other by spending higher in order to be re-elected, 2007 being an election year.
Local authority financing is currently at the heart of the political debate. All the states are faced with the challenge of reconciling the need to control and reduce public spending with greater financial autonomy in local government; they are accordingly seeking ways of achieving an equitable distribution of financial resources among the different levels of government in a context of budgetary cutbacks at every level of public administration. If strengthening democracy means strengthening local selfgovernment, this in turn means establishing systems of financing for local authorities which are at once efficient, fair and consistent with the state's economic imperatives. In other words, the principle of subsidiary, decentralization and local finances are all interdependent.In Romania this process started in 1990 and it is on the move even today. This paper is trying to find, by using economic instruments, what is the degree in which we succeed to create a real local financial selfgovernment.
A recent trend in decentralization in \n several large and diverse countries is the creation of local \n jurisdictions below the regional level -- municipalities, \n towns, and villages -- whose spending is almost exclusively \n financed by grants from both regional and national \n governments. This paper argues that such grants-financed \n decentralization enables politicians to target benefits to \n pivotal voters and organized interest groups in exchange for \n political support. Decentralization, in this model, is \n subject to political capture, facilitating vote-buying, \n patronage, or pork-barrel projects, at the expense of \n effective provision of broad public goods. There is \n anecdotal evidence on local politics in several large \n countries that is consistent with this theory. The paper \n explores its implications for international development \n programs in support of decentralization.
In this paper we study the optimal monetary and fiscal policies of a general equilibrium model of unemployment and money with search frictions both in labor and goods markets\nas in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010). We abstract from revenue-raising motives to focus on the welfare-enhancing properties of optimal policies. We show that some of the\ninefficiencies in the Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010) framework can be restored with appropriate fiscal policies. In particular, when lump sum monetary transfers are possible,\na production subsidy financed by money printing can increase output in the decentralized market and a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax even when the Hosios’ rule does\nnot hold.
Government spending on health has grown as a percent of GDP over the last 40 years in industrialized countries. Widespread decentralization of healthcare systems has often accompanied this increase in spending. In this paper, we explore the effect of soft budget constraints on subnational health spending in a sample of OECD countries. We find countries where subnational governments rely primarily on central government financing and enjoy large borrowing autonomy have higher healthcare spending than those with more restrictions on subnational government borrowing.
Fiscal federalism has been an important topic among public finance theorists in the last four decades. There is a series of arguments that decentralization of governments enhances growth by improving allocation efficiency. However, the empirical studies have shown mixed results for industrialized and developing countries and some of them have demonstrated that there might be a threshold level of economic development below which decentralization is not effective. Developing and transition countries have developed a variety of forms of fiscal decentralization as a possible strategy to achieve effective and efficient governmental structures. A generalized principle of decentralization due to the country specific circumstances does not exist. Therefore, decentralization has taken place in different forms in various countries at different times, and even exactly the same extent of decentralization may have had different impacts under different conditions. The purpose of this study is to investigate the current state of the fiscal decentralization in Mongolia and to develop policy recommendations for the efficient and effective intergovernmental fiscal relations system for Mongolia. Within this perspective the analysis concentrates on the scope and structure of the public sector, the expenditure and revenue assignment as well as on the design of the intergovernmental transfer and sub-national borrowing. The study is based on data for twenty-one provinces and the capital city of Mongolia for the period from 2000 to 2009. As a former socialist country Mongolia has had a highly centralized governmental sector. The result of the analysis below revealed that the Mongolia has introduced a number of decentralization measures, which followed a top down approach and were slowly implemented without any integrated decentralization strategy in the last decade. As a result Mongolia became de-concentrated state with fiscal centralization. The revenue assignment is lacking a very important element, for instance significant revenue autonomy given to sub-national governments, which is vital for the efficient service delivery at the local level. According to the current assignments of the expenditure and revenue responsibilities most of the provinces are unable to provide a certain national standard of public goods supply. Hence, intergovernmental transfers from the central jurisdiction to the sub-national jurisdictions play an important role for the equalization of the vertical and horizontal imbalances in Mongolia. The critical problem associated with intergovernmental transfers is that there is not a stable, predictable and transparent system of transfer allocation. The amount of transfers to sub-national governments is determined largely by political decisions on ad hoc basis and disregards local differences in needs and fiscal capacity. Thus a fiscal equalization system based on the fiscal needs of the provinces should be implemented. The equalization transfers will at least partly offset the regional disparities in revenues and enable the sub-national governments to provide a national minimum standard of local public goods.
Tax increment financing (TIF) is the most widely used local government program for financing economic development in the United States, but the proliferation of TIF is puzzling. TIF was originally created to support urban renewal programs and was narrowly focused on addressing urban blight, yet now it is used in areas that are plainly unblighted. TIF brings in no outside money and provides no new revenue-raising authority. There is little clear evidence that TIF has done much to help the municipalities that use it, and it is also a source of intergovernmental tension and a site of conflict over the scope of public aid to the private sector. Yet, the expansion of TIF makes sense in light of the basic structure of American local government law. Studying TIF can illuminate central features of our local government system. TIF succeeds -- in the sense of its widespread adoption and use -- because it, like local government more generally, is highly decentralized; reflects and reinforces the fiscalization of development policy; plays off the fragmentation of local governments and the resulting interlocal struggle for investment; and fits well with the entrepreneurial spirit characteristic of contemporary local economic development policy. A better understanding of TIF contributes to a better understanding of the political economy of American local government.
The essay provides support to the hypothesis that financing of provincial public spending through national transferences leads to overspending. We rest on persuasive economic and politicoinstitutional arguments. Fiscal illusion and the Leviathan model help to explain the overspending. And cartelization of tax collection helps to explain why governors are so reluctant to decentralize this task. We conclude that a fiscal organization closer to that of a confederation would be desirable. Two ways of organizing fiscal relations between the Nation and the provinces are considered. One way consists of paying for national spending by means of periodic provincial transferences; control of public spending by tax-payers would be the greatest possible in this scenario, though leaving national financing in provincial hands could be a risky affair. Another way consists of allowing the Nation some taxing power and incorporating constitutional restrictions as regards the kinds of public goods the national government is permitted to provide.
In OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria in general
fail to achieve optimality because individuals accumulate amounts of physical capital that differ from the one that maximizes welfare along a balanced growth path (the Golden Rule). With human capital, a second potential source of departure from optimality arises, related to education decisions. We propose to recover the Golden Rule of physical and also human capital accumu-
lation. We characterize the optimal policy to decentralize the Golden Rule balanced growth path
when there are no constraints for individuals to finance their education investments, and show that
it involves education taxes. Also, when the government subsidizes the repayment of education
loans, optimal pensions are positive
This paper focuses on the fiscal decentralization in the Philippines after the 1991Local Government Code. It first examines the intergovernmental fiscal relationshipbetween central and local governments by using fiscal decentralization indicators,and then investigates its impact on local finance. After fiscal decentralization, thelocal expenditure responsibility is expanded while the local fiscal capacity is notstrengthened in the Philippines. Local governments consequently comes to dependheavily on fiscal transfers from the central government, internal revenue allotments(IRAs), which has a substantial influence on local finance. The heavy dependence onIRAs makes local finance unpredictable and unstable. The distribution of IRAs alsoaffects the horizontal balance between provincial governments.
Every regions government must be able increasing their own regional income. The finance of resources in fiscal decentralization era, such as: regional original income, general allocation funds and natural resources revenue sharing and tax revenue sharing This research aims to analyze the fiscal decentralization impact to economic growth at regional district in sub province Semarang. The tool of analisis is regression using panel data with Generalized Least Square (GLS) method and Fixed Effect model. It uses district-level data and supplied by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics during 2002 - 2006 The regression result shows that regional income, natural resources revenue sharing and tax revenue sharing, and labor forces have positive impact on economic growth at regional district in sub province Semarang. General allocation funds have negative effect towards economic growth at regional district in sub province Semarang. Fiscal decentralization brings more advantages for regions to manage their own fiscal capacities. The regions governments must be have informational advantages concerning resource allocation with optimal Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, economic growth, Fixed Effect Model
Decentralization has the potential to lower corruption and alleviate poverty across the world. The true effects of this process are unclear since there are relatively few studies on decentralization and many of these studies, both theoretical and empirical, give conflicting results. One major problem in the literature for the effects of decentralization on corruption has been sample selection bias. The main cross-country dataset for decentralization, the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), has data for only about 40 countries, and most of these are developed. I attempt to mitigate this sample-selection problem by first estimating a Heckman model for decentralization in order to predict values for unobserved countries and then using these predicted values to estimate decentralization's impact on corruption. My results show that decentralization has an insignificant effect on corruption, suggesting that decentralization alone may not be a useful tool for mitigating corruption.
The paper intends to analyse a model of decentralization specific to Continental Europe, which shows that a transferof responsibility to the local authorities has not always been appropriately followed by a transfer of resource, the consequencebeing the appearance of budgetary imbalances at the level of local communities. In this situation, the local communities areforced to identify the funding source and, therefore, they have used the most rapid instruments provided by the law and thefinancial institutions – the borrowed sources. As long as the borrowed funding sources have been used to the restoration of thepublic infrastructure and, therefore, to the public investments, the solutions identified by the public manager are not to beblamed, the problem being the use of borrowed sources in order to cover certain consumerism needs which illegitimatelycharges, in our opinion, the public cost, the obligation to finance the maturity rates including the interest falling back on thefuture generations.
The paper deals with the equivalence between taxation and emission permits according to different viewpoints: the first one sets prices, the second one quantities. But equivalence is more formal than substantial: taxation is the generating fact, the market of permits does not exist spontaneously. Its price is unstable because supply is not independent from demand. It is manipulatable either ex ante when free allowances are allocated or ex post during the period of compliance through Walrasian tatonnement. A real economic determination of prices exists only when there are unit taxes or penalties on emissions exceeding the quotas. In order to avoid these drawbacks, pay-as-bid auctions must be used and free allowances avoided. Taxation or the price of emission permits are the real option value of changing techniques. An assignment rule is proposed : taxes are assigned to reduce average emissions and permits to reduce marginal emissions. In order to transform the cost into a real change of techniques, it is necessary to finance the sector of research and development of an amount greater than the taxes levied on pollution, which serve at paying the rent of innovation. These extra subsidies are used to move factors of production as capital from industry towards the innovation sector. The tax equivalence is ternary and concerns the taxes on pollution, capital and energy, because extracting fossil fuels is similar as innovation. Decentralization through market schemes induces that depollution has a marketable cost.
Decentralization of public responsibilities implies also financial decentralization. The effect of this process in EU countries’ budgets is important to be evaluated in order to correlate with macroeconomic indicators. From financial point of view, local revenues and expenditures and the balance of local budgets constitute the main research theme. Different experiences and realities reached under the same normative framework (European Charter of Local Self-Government) are analyzed in this paper.
The work paper highlights the evolution of the public financial decentralization in Romania, based on analysis of legislative changes that occurred after 1991.These changes have had an important impact on local budgets and on local government responsibilities. In the context of increasing local financial independence, local authorities had to demonstrate their ability to take on the tasks of local interest from central government powers. The effect is prompt and timely response to citizen needs.
Aleksander Berentsen, Mariana Rojas Breu, Shouyong Shi
Many countries simultaneously suffer from high inflation, low growth and poorly developed financial sectors. In this paper, we integrate a microfounded model of money and finance into a model of endogenous growth to examine the effects of inflation on welfare, growth and the size of the financial sector. A novel feature is that the innovation sector is decentralized. Financial intermediaries arise endogenously to provide liquidity to this sector. Consistent with the data but in contrast to previous work, reducing inflation generates large growth gains. These large gains cannot be easily reproduced by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint in the innovation sector.
Informal payments are a frequently overlooked source of local public finance in developing countries. We use microdata from ten countries to establish stylized facts on the magnitude, form, and distributional implications of this "informal taxation." Informal taxation is widespread, particularly in rural areas, with substantial in-kind labor payments. The wealthy pay more, but pay less in percentage terms, and informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes. Failing to include informal taxation underestimates household tax burdens and revenue decentralization in developing countries. We propose a simple model of information and enforcement constraints that parsimoniously explains the patterns in the data.
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and pro-poor outcomes based on the role of fiscal incentives. The literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and pro-poor outcomes is not well established in this area. A conceptual model is developed to explore in more detail this relationship, while endeavoring to illuminate the complexity of the issues involved for policy makers in developing countries. Four types of fiscal incentives are explored: namely, resources, responsibility, autonomy, and accountability. The paper then assesses the effectiveness of the Vietnamese system of fiscal decentralization for achieving pro-poor outcomes through a devolved system of fiscal incentives. The paper suggests that evidence from the Vietnamese case indicates that fiscal decentralization may contribute to poverty reduction outcomes, but does not provide evidence that fiscal decentralization is in and of itself inherently pro-poor. Rather, the lesson from Viet Nam is that if poverty reduction is an explicit objective for government, the system of fiscal decentralization should target pro-poor outcomes through an appropriate system of fiscal incentives. Since 2002, budgetary reallocation and income redistribution linked to poverty outcomes has been more strongly associated with equalizing fiscal transfers than with devolved finances in general. This represents a broadly correct approach to target poverty outcomes in a territorially unbalanced country like Viet Nam. Targeted transfers contribute to pro-poor outcomes by increasing the level of resources available to finance poverty spending. However, increasing the level of fiscal transfers for poverty spending will not ensure that fiscal transfers are then spent efficiently. In order to better realize these efficiency objectives, the government can promote greater fiscal and administrative decentralization of resources and responsibility to district- and commune-level governments. Further gains in this area must also be supported by greater levels of fiscal autonomy and fiscal accountability at the local government level.
The paper examines the progress being made in local finance reforms and indicates pathways to advance those reforms. A summary of the effects of decentralization is given as a contextual background for the discussion of local finance reforms. The inefficient tax assignment has constrained the mobilization of local tax revenues even as local government units have become very dependent on the intergovernmental fiscal transfer, called the internal revenue allotment. The paper raises the importance of revisiting the internal revenue allotment formula. It identifies the local finance reforms currently being undertaken and reports the progress being made at the local and national level. The final section comments on the outstanding issues in local finance reform and gives some recommendations.
This book explores the important topic of fiscal decentralization in Asian countries, and focuses on how government finance and administration are being reformed to bring budgetary decisions closer to voters. The focus on Asia is especially important because all countries in this region have been undergoing serious fiscal reforms in the past decade. They include one of the biggest decentralization reforms in Indonesia, significant reforms in democratic Philippines and Vietnam which are in transition, and Japan, whose fiscal reconstruction program is covered extensively. India and China, which are also covered, are very special cases because of their size and because their policies must fit decentralization into a significant economic growth scenario.