Despite the past decade’s rapid innovation in adapting blockchain technology to new uses, financial intermediation remains elusive except in basic and highly collateralized forms. We introduce the concept of the technical frontier to delimit the kinds of interactions that can feasibly be structured algorithmically among pseudonymous agents, as on a blockchain, and show that lending and financial intermediation – unlike monetary exchange – lie outside it, even in simple forms. The path forward for truly blockchain-native financial applications, therefore, must involve the integration of real-world identity information in order to disincentivize defection. We discuss several potential technologies for doing so, and conclude that such integration is possible without compromising pseudonymity, provided real-world identity is available in the breach.
We analyze a two-country economy with complete markets, featuring two national currencies as well as a global (crypto)currency. If the global currency is used in both countries, the national nominal interest rates must be equal and the exchange rate between the national currencies is a risk-adjusted martingale. Deviation from interest rate equality implies the risk of approaching the zero lower bound or the abandonment of the national currency. We call this result Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization (CEMPS). If the global currency is backed by interest-bearing assets, additional and tight restrictions on monetary policy arise. Thus, the classic Impossible Trinity becomes even less reconcilable.
Do the rich always get richer by investing in a cryptocurrency for which new coins are issued according to a proof-of-stake (PoS) protocol? We answer this question in the negative: Without trading, the investor shares in the cryptocurrency are martingales that converge to a well-defined limiting distribution and, hence, are stable in the long run. This result is robust to allowing trading when investors are risk neutral. Then, investors have no incentive to accumulate coins and gamble on the PoS protocol but weakly prefer not to trade. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.
The development of new digital technologies in the areas of cryptography, distributed ledgers and mobile phones is affecting the way money is used for economic transactions. Electronic payments systems are rapidly replacing the use of cash. New powerful distributed ledger technologies, operated on a peer-to-peer decentralized basis is leading to the rapid expansion of digital money, with bitcoin being the most prominent digital currency (although there are more than one-thousand different crypto-currencies).
This essay examines in detail the properties of a well functioning monetary system - defined as money plus the mechanisms to execute payments - in both the short and long run, drawing on both theory and the lessons from history. It stresses the importance of trust and of the institutions needed to secure it. Ensuring price and financial stability is critical to nurturing and maintaining that trust. In the process, the essay addresses several related questions, such as the relationship between money and debt, the viability of cryptocurrencies as money, money neutrality, and the nexus between monetary and financial stability. While the present monetary system, with central banks and a prudential apparatus at its core, can and must be improved, it still provides the best basis to build on.
The cryptocurrency market is unique on many levels: Very volatile, frequently changing market structure, emerging and vanishing of cryptocurrencies on a daily level. Following its development became a difficult task with the success of cryptocurrencies (CCs) other than Bitcoin. For fiat currency markets , the IMF offers the index SDR and, prior to the EUR, the ECU existed, which was an index representing the development of European currencies. Index providers decide on a fixed number of index constituents which will represent the market segment. It is a challenge to fix a number and develop rules for the constituents in view of the market changes. In the frequently changing CC market, this challenge is even more severe. A method relying on the AIC is proposed to quickly react to market changes and therefore enable us to create an index, referred to as CRIX, for the cryptocurrency market. CRIX is chosen by model selection such that it represents the market well to enable each interested party studying economic questions in this market and to invest into the market. The diversified nature of the CC market makes the inclusion of altcoins in the index product critical to improve tracking performance. We have shown that assigning optimal weights to altcoins helps to reduce the tracking errors of a CC portfolio, despite the fact that their market cap is much smaller relative to Bitcoin. The codes used here are available via www.quantlet.de .
A Supply Chain Finance (SCF) system involving and a commercial bank and a capital-constrained retailer is designed in the imperfect capital market with non-zero bankruptcy costs. A decentralized borrower-lender game is analyzed, and the optimal centralized strategy is developed for SCF from the perspective of multi-attribute utility (MAU) maximization, including maximizing the expected profit and the service level, as well as minimizing the bankruptcy cost. Furthermore, we analytically and numerically explore the coordination condition for SCF and conclude that the bank financing scheme with a suitable combination of decision preferences can realize coordination, even super coordination. Through sensitivity analyses and numerical experiments, we discuss the impacts of the borrower's initial capitals on the upstream firm's pricing decision and dig out why he has incentives to support the retailer's choice of adopting SCF. The findings of this study reveal that the capital-constrained retailer would require more initial capital when maximizing MAU than maximizing the expected profit, and thus the equilibrium order quantity and the bankruptcy risk would also be higher. Moreover, based on a suitable combination of decision preferences, our proposed bank financing scheme can realize coordination, even super coordination.
In this note, I return to Coase (1937), on its 80th anniversary, to assess whether its logic and insight can be reconciled with the blockchain revolution. I argue that, indeed, it can, and propose the existence of a third method of organizing economic activity in a specialized exchange economy, in addition to the two that Coase considered. I call it the cryptographic stigmergy. If there be such merit in the argument here, let it be dedicated to the memory of Ronald Coase.
Optimization methods are used to determine equilibria of investment in cryptocurrencies. The basic assumptions involve existence of a core group (the "wealthy") that fears the loss of substantial assets through government seizure. Speculators constitute another group that tends to introduce volatility and risk for the wealthy. The wealthy must divide their assets between the home currency and the cryptocurrency, while the government decides on the probability of seizing a fraction the assets of this group. Under the assumption that each group exhibits risk aversion through a utility function, we establish the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. Also examined is the more realistic optimization problem in which the government policy cannot be reversed, while the wealthy can adjust their allocation in reaction to the government's designation of probability. The methodology leads to an understanding the equilibrium market capitalization of cryptocurrencies.
Stake systems which issue stakes as well as coins are proposed. Two subadditive stake systems are studied: one is the radical stake system, the other is the logarithmic stake system. Securities of both systems are analysed.
Recently, the notion of cryptocurrencies has come to the fore of public interest. These assets that exist only in electronic form, with no underlying value, offer the owners some protection from tracking or seizure by government or creditors. We model these assets from the perspective of asset flow equations developed by Caginalp and Balenovich, and investigate their stability under various parameters, as classical finance methodology is inapplicable. By utilizing the concept of liquidity price and analyzing stability of the resulting system of ordinary differential equations, we obtain conditions under which the system is linearly stable. We find that trend-based motivations and additional liquidity arising from an uptrend are destabilizing forces, while anchoring through value assumed to be fairly recent price history tends to be stabilizing.
Dionysios S. Demetis, Michael Mainelli, Matthew Leitch
Cryptocurrencies have the potential to become effective currencies that give a higher level of macroeconomic control, thanks to the information that is available about holdings and transactions, and the potential for automated control mechanisms. However, these cryptocurrencies need to be designed properly and tested before launch. This paper reports the early results of an economic model that simulates a variety of behaviors by economic agents and some simple control mechanisms. An economic simulation model is likely to be a valuable tool in developing effective cryptocurrency systems and interacting with regulators.
The evolution of the economic processes is reflected on the way the currency work. The recent development of new methods of payment based on the computer systems – and, in particular, the electronic-based systems used to register the debit\credit position, the operationalization of the market – have elicited the growth of the phenomenon of cryptocurrency, and bitcoin is nowadays the most common. There is still no precise definition of cryptocurrency at the moment, due to the complexity in matching the cryptocurrency with the proper related case in issue. That said, it is crucial as in the face of a growing interest in bitcoins, the predisposition of an adequate control mechanism, still missing, is assuming a more and more importance; and in such a critical context, this lack treats the potential traders in this new segment. The awareness of the effective consistency and diffusion of the phenomenon should encourage the authorities in taking actions against the potential risks, especially for those inexperienced operators that are not able to identify and evaluate them, attracted by the promise of high profits with low investments. One of the most critical aspect in subiecta materia is the fiscal treatment of those bitcoin operations with particular regard to money laundering and terrorism financing. The growing phenomenon of crypto currencies – in addition to introduce potential danger (with evident damages for those who use them improperly) – emphasizes the need to move forward new forms of regulation of such complex matter, so that it can be redefined under the competence of the public authority.
Can a monetary system in which privately issued cryptocurrencies circulate as media of exchange work? Is such a system stable? How should governments react to digital currencies? Can these currencies and government-issued money coexist? Are cryptocurrencies consistent with an e cient allocation? These are some of the important questions that the sudden rise of cryptocurrencies has brought to contemporary policy discussions. To answer these questions, we construct a model of competition among privately issued at currencies. We nd that a purely private arrangement fails to implement an e cient allocation, even though it can deliver price stability under certain technological conditions. Currency competition creates problems for monetary policy implementation under conventional methods. However, it is possible to design a policy rule that uniquely implements an e cient allocation by driving private currencies out of the market. We also show that unique implementation of an e cient allocation can be achieved without government intervention if productive capital is introduced.
Digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, have emerged as an alternative form of money, untethered to traditional money and largely unregulated. As such, digital currency represents a wild frontier for investors who might otherwise be shopping for gold or foreign currencies, with serious risks. The present work considers digital currency from a traditional asset pricing perspective. Setting aside risks of seller fraud or currency theft, we examine fluctuation and systematic risk in the price of Bitcoin. From this perspective, Bitcoin does not appear to carry much systematic risk -- despite its high volatility -- and so is a reasonable candidate for inclusion in investors’ portfolios. Some illustrative examples suggest that the optimal amount of Bitcoin to include in investor portfolios may be tiny or instead substantial - as high as 21 percent of total financial assets.
We develop a dynamic asset-pricing model of cryptocurrencies/tokens that allow users to conduct peer-to-peer transactions on digital platforms. The equilibrium value of tokens is determined by aggregating heterogeneous users' transactional demand rather than discounting cashflows as in standard valuation models. Endogenous platform adoption builds upon user network externality and exhibits an S-curve-it starts slow, becomes volatile, and eventually tapers off. Introducing tokens lowers users' transaction costs on the platform by allowing users to capitalize on platform growth. The resulting intertemporal feedback between user adoption and token price accelerates adoption and dampens user-base volatility.
The old school -which consists largely of middle-aged and elderly men- tend to claim that bitcoin is a "bubble", and seize on every downturn in the price of bitcoin as evidence that the bubble has burst or is about to burst. The bubble only gets fatter, and all of the anti-crypto arguments -notably the argument that currencies need themselves to possess, or to be based on something with "intrinsic" value, and cryptocurrencies lack intrinsic value- are fallacious. Here we propose that there are deep mathematical reasons why the conservatives are mistaken, and why cryptocurrencies will increasingly replace their traditional counterparts.
This paper studies the efficiency of the cryptocurrency market by looking at the distribution of bitcoin prices over time and across exchange-currency pairs. We document persistent differences in relative bitcoin prices (or discounts), with a half-life of 1 day, and a distribution which is leptokurtic, skewed to the right, with a standard deviation of 3.9%. The variability of discounts is larger in countries with tighter capital controls due to the combined effect of market segmentation and local supply and demand shocks, which we relate to location-specific mining activities and investor attention.