We design and implement the first private and anonymous decentralized crowdsourcing system ZebraLancer, and overcome two fundamental challenges of decentralizing crowdsourcing, i.e., data leakage and identity breach. First, our outsource-then-prove methodology resolves the tension between the blockchain transparency and the data confidentiality to guarantee the basic utilities/fairness requirements of data crowdsourcing, thus ensuring: (i) a requester will not pay more than what data deserve, according to a policy announced when her task is published via the blockchain; (ii) each worker indeed gets a payment based on the policy, if he submits data to the blockchain; (iii) the above properties are realized not only without a central arbiter, but also without leaking the data to the open blockchain. Second, the transparency of blockchain allows one to infer private information about workers and requesters through their participation history. Simply enabling anonymity is seemingly attempting but will allow malicious workers to submit multiple times to reap rewards. ZebraLancer also overcomes this problem by allowing anonymous requests/submissions without sacrificing accountability. The idea behind is a subtle linkability: if a worker submits twice to a task, anyone can link the submissions, or else he stays anonymous and unlinkable across tasks. To realize this delicate linkability, we put forward a novel cryptographic concept, i.e., the common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication. We remark the new anonymous authentication scheme might be of independent interest. Finally, we implement our protocol for a common image annotation task and deploy it in a test net of Ethereum. The experiment results show the applicability of our protocol atop the existing real-world blockchain.
Atin Angrish, Benjamin Craver, Mahmud Hasan, Binil Starly
With product customization an emerging business opportunity, organizations must find ways to collaborate and enable sharing of information in an inherently trust-less network. In this paper, we propose – “FabRec”: a decentralized approach to handle manufacturing information generated by various organizations using blockchain technology. We propose a system in which a decentralized network of manufacturing machines and computing nodes can enable automated transparency of an organization’s capability, third party verification of such capability through a trail of past historic events and automated mechanisms to drive paperless contracts between participants using ‘smart contracts’. Our system decentralizes critical information about the manufacturer and makes it available on a peer-to-peer network composed of fiduciary nodes to ensure transparency and data provenance through a verifiable audit trail. We present a testbed platform through a combination of manufacturing machines, system-on-chip platforms and computing nodes to demonstrate mechanisms through which a consortium of disparate organizations can communicate through a decentralized network. Our prototype testbed demonstrates the value of computer code residing on a decentralized network for verification of information on the blockchain and ways in which actions can be autonomously initiated in the physical world. This paper intends to expose system elements in preparation for much larger field tests through the working prototype and discusses the future potential of blockchain for manufacturing IT.
Jing-Zhong Wang, Mengru Li, Yunhua He, Hong Li · 6 authors
Crowdsensing applications utilize the pervasive smartphone users to collect large-scale sensing data efficiently. The quality of sensing data depends on the participation of highly skilled users. To motivate these skilled users to participate, they should receive enough rewards for compensating their resource consumption. Available incentive mechanisms mainly consider the truthfulness of the mechanism, but mostly ignore the issues of security and privacy caused by a “trustful” center. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving blockchain incentive mechanism in crowdsensing applications, in which a cryptocurrency built on blockchains is used as a secure incentive way. High quality contributors will get their payments that are recorded in transaction blocks. The miners will verify the transaction according to the sensing data assessment criteria published by the server. As the transaction information can disclose users’ privacy, a node cooperation verification approach is proposed to achieve$k$-anonymity privacy protection. Through theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, we show the feasibility and security of our incentive mechanism.
A number of information and resource sharing systems arise and become popular with the rapid development of communication technologies and mobile smart devices. The interactions between humans and machines are intense and their synergistic reactions have attracted special attention for the reason of forming so called Human–Machine Networks (HMN). HMNs refer to these networks where humans and machines work together to provide synergistic effects on their payoffs. Game theory, which can capture the interactions among players dexterously, has been widely used in solving various problems in HMN systems from the view of economics. In this paper, we extensively review the literature about game theoretical methods in HMNs, in particular focusing on its typical systems such as crowdsourcing, an elemental HMN and Internet of Things (IoT), a hybrid HMN, as well as Bitcoin. We propose a series of requirements to evaluate existing work. For reviewing and analyzing each system, we specify application purposes, players, strategies, game models and equilibria based on our proposed requirements. In the sequel, we identify a number of common and distinct open issues in HMNs and point out future research directions.
Haoyan Wu, Zhijie Li, Brian King, Zina Ben Miled · 6 authors
Supply chains (SC) span many geographies, modes and industries and involve several phases where data flows in both directions from suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, to customers. This data flow is necessary to support critical business decisions that may impact product cost and market share. Current SC information systems are unable to provide validated, pseudo real-time shipment tracking during the distribution phase. This information is available from a single source, often the carrier, and is shared with other stakeholders on an as-needed basis. This paper introduces an independent, crowd-validated, online shipment tracking framework that complements current enterprise-based SC management solutions. The proposed framework consists of a set of private distributed ledgers and a single blockchain public ledger. Each private ledger allows the private sharing of custody events among the trading partners in a given shipment. Privacy is necessary, for example, when trading high-end products or chemical and pharmaceutical products. The second type of ledger is a blockchain public ledger. It consists of the hash code of each private event in addition to monitoring events. The latter provide an independently validated immutable record of the pseudo real-time geolocation status of the shipment from a large number of sources using commuters-sourcing.
The wisdom of the crowd is a valuable asset in today’s society. It is not only important in predicting elections but also plays an essential role in marketing and the financial industry. Having a trustworthy source of opinion can make forecasts more accurate and markets predictable. Until now, a fundamental problem of surveys is the lack of incentives for participants to provide accurate information. Classical solutions like small monetary rewards or the chance of winning a prize are often not very attractive for participants. More attractive solutions, such as prediction markets, face the issue of illegality and are often unavailable. In this work, we present a solution that unites the advantages from classical polling and prediction markets via a customizable incentivization framework. Apart from predicting events, this framework can also be used to govern decentralized autonomous organizations.
Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security system, has been applied in many applications, such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet-of-Things. However, running the mining process may cost too much energy consumption and computing resource usage on handheld devices, which restricts the use of blockchain in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider deploying edge computing service to support the mobile blockchain. We propose an auction-based edge computing resource market of the edge computing service provider. Since there is competition among miners, the allocative externalities (positive and negative) are taken into account in the model. In our auction mechanism, we maximize the social welfare while guaranteeing the truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. Based on blockchain mining experiment results, we define a hash power function that characterizes the probability of successfully mining a block. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance of our auction mechanism which shows that our edge computing resources market model can efficiently solve the social welfare maximization problem for the edge computing service provider.
Public blockchain networks using proof of work (PoW)-based consensus protocols are considered as a promising platform for decentralized resource management with financial incentive mechanisms. In order to maintain a secured, universal state of the blockchain, PoW-based consensus protocols financially incentivize the nodes in the network to compete for the privilege of block generation through cryptographic puzzle solving. For rational consensus nodes, i.e., miners with limited local computational resources, offloading the computation load for PoW to the cloud/fog providers (CFPs) becomes a viable option. In this paper, we study the interaction between the CFPs and the miners in a PoW-based blockchain network using a game theoretic approach. In particular, we propose a lightweight infrastructure of the PoW-based blockchains, where the computation-intensive part of the consensus process is offloaded to the cloud/fog. We formulate the computation resource management in the blockchain consensus process as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the profit of the CFP and the utilities of the individual miners are jointly optimized. In the first stage of the game, the CFP sets the price of offered computing resource. In the second stage, the miners decide on the amount of service to purchase accordingly. We apply backward induction to analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For uniform pricing where the same price applies to all miners, the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium is validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied, the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved by capitalizing on the variational inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.
Mining for Bitcoins is a high-risk high-reward activity. Miners, seeking to reduce their variance and earn steadier rewards, collaborate in pooling strategies where they jointly mine for Bitcoins. Whenever some pool participant is successful, the earned rewards are appropriately split among all pool participants. Currently a dozen of different pooling strategies (i.e., methods for distributing the rewards) are in use for Bitcoin mining. We here propose a formal model of utility and social welfare for Bitcoin mining (and analogous mining systems) based on the theory of discounted expected utility, and next study pooling strategies that maximize the social welfare of miners. Our main result shows that one of the pooling strategies actually employed in practice--the so-called geometric pay pool--achieves the optimal steady-state utility for miners when its parameters are set appropriately. Our results apply not only to Bitcoin mining pools, but any other form of pooled mining or crowdsourcing computations where the participants engage in repeated random trials towards a common goal, and where "partial" solutions can be efficiently verified.
Ubiquitous sensing enabled by Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technologies cuts across many areas of modern day living. This offers the ability to measure, infer and understand environmental indicators, from delicate ecologies and natural resources to urban environments. The proliferation of these devices in a communicating-actuating network creates the Internet of Things (IoT), wherein, sensors and actuators blend seamlessly with the environment around us, and the information is shared across platforms in order to develop a common operating picture (COP). Fuelled by the recent adaptation of a variety of enabling wireless technologies such as RFID tags and embedded sensor and actuator nodes, the IoT has stepped out of its infancy and is the the next revolutionary technology in transforming the Internet into a fully integrated Future Internet. As we move from www (static pages web) to web2 (social networking web) to web3 (ubiquitous computing web), the need for data-on-demand using sophisticated intuitive queries increases significantly. This paper presents a Cloud centric vision for worldwide implementation of Internet of Things. The key enabling technologies and application domains that are likely to drive IoT research in the near future are discussed. A Cloud implementation using Aneka, which is based on interaction of private and public Clouds is presented. We conclude our IoT vision by expanding on the need for convergence of WSN, the Internet and distributed computing directed at technological research community.
Matthias Stuermer, Gabriel Abu-Tayeh, Thomas Myrach
The modern age has heralded a shift from the industrial society, in which natural resources are crucial input factors for the economy, towards a knowledge society. To date, sustainability literature has treated knowledge-and in particular digital artifacts-mainly as a means to the end of achieving sustainable development. In this conceptual paper, we argue that digital artifacts themselves ought also to be considered as resources, which also need to be sustainable. While over-consumption is a problem facing natural resources, with sustainable digital artifacts, underproduction, and underuse are the biggest challenges. In our view, the sustainability of digital artifacts improves their potential impact on sustainable development. A theoretical foundation for digital artifacts and their ecosystem allows us to present the relevant research on digital information, knowledge management, digital goods, and innovation literature. Based on these insights, we propose ten basic conditions for sustainable digital artifacts and their ecosystem to ensure that they provide the greatest possible benefit for sustainable development. We then apply those characteristics to four exemplary cases: Linux kernel development, Bitcoin cryptocurrency, the Wikipedia project, and the Linking Open Drug Data repositories. The paper concludes with a research agenda identifying topics for sustainability scholars and information systems academics, as well as practitioners. A number of suggestions for future studies on digital sustainability are also put forward.
In Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS), the power of the crowd, jointly with the sensing capabilities of the smartphones they wear, provides a new paradigm for data sensing. Scenarios involving user behavior or those that rely on user mobility are examples where standard sensor networks may not be suitable, and MCS provides an interesting solution. However, including human participation in sensing tasks presents numerous and unique research challenges. In this paper, we analyze three of the most important: user participation, data sensing quality and user anonymity. We tackle the three as a whole, since all of them are strongly correlated. As a result, we present PaySense, a general framework that incentivizes user participation and provides a mechanism to validate the quality of collected data based on the users' reputation. All such features are performed in a privacy-preserving way by using the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. Rather than a theoretical one, our framework has been implemented, and it is ready to be deployed and complement any existing MCS system.
The Internet of Things and Services (IoTS) has encouraged the development of service provisioning systems in respect to Smart City topics. Most of them are operated as heterogeneous systems which limits end customers’ access and contradicts with IoTS principles. In this paper, we discuss and develop a reference model of an interconnected service marketplace ecosystem. The prototypical implementation incorporates findings from an empirical study and lessons learned from research projects. The elaborated ecosystem enables service request roaming between different parties across system boundaries. The paper presents a feasible centralized architecture, introduces involved parties and parts of a developed message protocol. Why a contracting mechanism is indispensable for request roaming is also outlined. The model’s feasibility is demonstrated by means of a current electric mobility use case: providing access to foreign charging infrastructure without multiple registrations. This work contributes to simplify the data exchange between service platforms to improve Smart City solutions and to support travelers with intelligent mobility applications.
Web2 and the evolving vision of Web3 have a great effect on facilitation of information sharing, information aggregation, interoperability, user-centered design, collaboration on the World Wide Web, and crowd-centered services. New concept of Web is the intuition that drives crowdsourcing, crowd servicing, and crowd computing. With crowdsourcing emergence people get motivated to work through internet without being limited by time or geographical location. On the other hand employers could have their jobs done faster and cheaper. This paper is going to introduce an innovative approach for Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) crowdsourcing marketplace. In current AMT marketplace, workers especially new ones need to qualify themselves for each requester that has submitted Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) in AMT, and there is lack of shared reputation system; some workers may cheat on tasks in order to maximize their income, as a result requesters are uncertain of the quality of results, so they offer lower rewards and consequently qualified workers leave the marketplace.
Ubiquitous sensing enabled by Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technologies cuts across many areas of modern day living. This offers the ability to measure, infer and understand environmental indicators, from delicate ecologies and natural resources to urban environments. The proliferation of these devices in a communicating-actuating network creates the Internet of Things (IoT), wherein, sensors and actuators blend seamlessly with the environment around us, and the information is shared across platforms in order to develop a common operating picture (COP). Fuelled by the recent adaptation of a variety of enabling device technologies such as RFID tags and readers, near field communication (NFC) devices and embedded sensor and actuator nodes, the IoT has stepped out of its infancy and is the the next revolutionary technology in transforming the Internet into a fully integrated Future Internet. As we move from www (static pages web) to web2 (social networking web) to web3 (ubiquitous computing web), the need for data-on-demand using sophisticated intuitive queries increases significantly. This paper presents a cloud centric vision for worldwide implementation of Internet of Things. The key enabling technologies and application domains that are likely to drive IoT research in the near future are discussed. A cloud implementation using Aneka, which is based on interaction of private and public clouds is presented. We conclude our IoT vision by expanding on the need for convergence of WSN, the Internet and distributed computing directed at technological research community.
Ubiquitous sensing enabled by Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technologies cuts\nacross many areas of modern day living. This offers the ability to measure,\ninfer and understand environmental indicators, from delicate ecologies and\nnatural resources to urban environments. The proliferation of these devices in\na communicating-actuating network creates the Internet of Things (IoT),\nwherein, sensors and actuators blend seamlessly with the environment around us,\nand the information is shared across platforms in order to develop a common\noperating picture (COP). Fuelled by the recent adaptation of a variety of\nenabling device technologies such as RFID tags and readers, near field\ncommunication (NFC) devices and embedded sensor and actuator nodes, the IoT has\nstepped out of its infancy and is the the next revolutionary technology in\ntransforming the Internet into a fully integrated Future Internet. As we move\nfrom www (static pages web) to web2 (social networking web) to web3 (ubiquitous\ncomputing web), the need for data-on-demand using sophisticated intuitive\nqueries increases significantly. This paper presents a cloud centric vision for\nworldwide implementation of Internet of Things. The key enabling technologies\nand application domains that are likely to drive IoT research in the near\nfuture are discussed. A cloud implementation using Aneka, which is based on\ninteraction of private and public clouds is presented. We conclude our IoT\nvision by expanding on the need for convergence of WSN, the Internet and\ndistributed computing directed at technological research community.\n
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar
Many large decentralized systems rely on information propagation to ensure their proper function. We examine a common scenario in which only participants that are aware of the information can compete for some reward, and thus informed participants have an incentive not to propagate information to others. One recent example in which such tension arises is the 2009 DARPA Network Challenge (finding red balloons). We focus on another prominent example: Bitcoin, a decentralized electronic currency system. Bitcoin represents a radical new approach to monetary systems. It has been getting a large amount of public attention over the last year, both in policy discussions and in the popular press. Its cryptographic fundamentals have largely held up even as its usage has become increasingly widespread. We find, however, that it exhibits a fundamental problem of a different nature, based on how its incentives are structured. We propose a modification to the protocol that can eliminate this problem. Bitcoin relies on a peer-to-peer network to track transactions that are performed with the currency. For this purpose, every transaction a node learns about should be transmitted to its neighbors in the network. The current implemented protocol provides an incentive to nodes to not broadcast transactions they are aware of. Our solution is to augment the protocol with a scheme that rewards information propagation. Since clones are easy to create in the Bitcoin system, an important feature of our scheme is Sybil-proofness. We show that our proposed scheme succeeds in setting the correct incentives, that it is Sybil-proof, and that it requires only a small payment overhead, all this is achieved with iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We complement this result by showing that there are no reward schemes in which information propagation and no self-cloning is a dominant strategy.
Raluca Ada Popa, Andrew J. Blumberg, Hari Balakrishnan, Frank H. Li
A significant and growing class of location-based mobile applications aggregate position data from individual devices at a server and compute aggregate statistics over these position streams. Because these devices can be linked to the movement of individuals, there is significant danger that the aggregate computation will violate the location privacy of individuals. This paper develops and evaluates PrivStats, a system for computing aggregate statistics over location data that simultaneously achieves two properties: first, provable guarantees on location privacy even in the face of any side information about users known to the server, and second, privacy-preserving accountability (i.e., protection against abusive clients uploading large amounts of spurious data). PrivStats achieves these properties using a new protocol for uploading and aggregating data anonymously as well as an efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol we developed from scratch for accountability. We implemented our system on Nexus One smartphones and commodity servers. Our experimental results demonstrate that PrivStats is a practical system: computing a common aggregate (e.g., count) over the data of 10,000 clients takes less than 0.46 s at the server and the protocol has modest latency (0.6 s) to upload data from a Nexus phone. We also validated our protocols on real driver traces from the CarTel project.