Blockchain Papers

Christopher Alan Lewis, Adaner Usmani

Since 2014, viral images of Black people being killed at the hands of the police—Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Breonna Taylor, and many, many others—have convinced much of the public that the American criminal legal system is broken. In the summer of 2020, nationwide protests against police racism and violence in the wake of George Floyd’s murder were, according to some analysts, the largest social movement in the history of the United States.2 Activists and academics have demanded defunding the police and reallocating the funds to substitutes or alternatives.3 And others have called for abolishing the police altogether.4 It has become common knowledge that the police do not solve serious crime, they focus far too much on petty offenses, and they are far too heavy-handed and brutal in their treatment of Americans—especially poor, Black people. This is the so-called paradox of under-protection and over-policing that has characterized American law enforcement since emancipation.5The American criminal legal system is unjust and inefficient. But, as we argue in this essay, over-policing is not the problem. In fact, the American criminal legal system is characterized by an exceptional kind of under-policing, and a heavy reliance on long prison sentences, compared to other developed nations. In this country, roughly three people are incarcerated per police officer employed. The rest of the developed world strikes a diametrically opposite balance between these twin arms of the penal state, employing roughly three and a half times more police officers than the number of people they incarcerate. We argue that the United States has it backward. Justice and efficiency demand that we strike a balance between policing and incarceration more like that of the rest of the developed world. We call this the “First World Balance.”We defend this idea in much more detail in a forthcoming book titled What’s Wrong with Mass Incarceration. This essay offers a preliminary sketch of some of the arguments in the book. In the spirit of conversation and debate, in this essay we err deliberately on the side of comprehensiveness rather than argumentative rigor. One of us is a social scientist, and the other is a philosopher and legal scholar. Our primary goal for this research project, and especially in this essay, is not to convince readers that we are correct—but rather to encourage a more explicit discussion of the empirical and normative bases of some pressing debates about the American criminal legal system. Even if our answers prove unsound, we hope that the combination of empirical social science and analytic moral and political philosophy we contribute can help illuminate what alternative answers to those questions might have to look like to be sound. In fact, because much of this essay (and the underlying book project) strikes a pessimistic tone, we would be quite happy to be wrong about much of what we argue here.In the first part of this essay, we outline five comparative facts that contradict much of the prevailing way of thinking about what is distinctive about the American criminal legal system. In the second part, we draw out the normative implications of those facts and make the case for the First World Balance.In one sense, prisons and police are complements. It would be impossible to have many people in prison without the police, since, to put people in prison, the police usually have to apprehend and arrest them first. It would also be difficult to have police without prisons, since the threat of imprisonment is one of the typical sanctions wielded by police around the world. Given this, and given the exceptionally high incarceration rate in the United States, many people assume that the United States must also have an exceptionally high number of police officers.But that is not in fact the case. Figure 1 plots the police and incarceration rates of a sample of developed countries.6 The graph illustrates the chief fact that has animated the iterature on mass incarceration: America is a developed-world outlier in its use of incarceration. Yet it also illustrates the much less-well-known fact that America is not at all an outlier in its rate of policing. The United States has around 212 police officers for every 100,000 total residents, which ranks it in the forty-first percentile of today’s developed world.Yet this way of putting things in fact understates the magnitude of what has been misunderstood. Figure 1 denominates the scope of incarceration and policing by population. By that metric, the United States has an exceptionally high incarceration rate but a relatively normal number of police officers given the total size of its population. But we think it is more informative to denominate punishment and policing by the level of serious crime in a country. By doing so, it is possible to make inferences about cross-national differences in how countries manage serious crime.Here one runs into some difficulties. For several reasons, it is challenging to compare levels of serious crime across countries. Some countries criminalize acts that are perfectly legal in others. Countries define many criminal acts, such as “assault,” differently from one another.7 And countries vary widely in their ability to measure the incidence of criminal acts. The result is that many international patterns in reported data are obviously misleading. Data collected by the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, for instance, suggest that the rate of violent crime is higher in Belgium, France, and Canada than in El Salvador, Russia, or Rwanda.8 Our solution to this problem is to measure the rate of serious crime by the rate of homicides.For the comparisons that anchor this piece—the United States to the developed world—this immediately raises a problem. Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have argued that “[r]ates of crime are not greatly different in the United States from those in other developed nations. … [O]ur extremely high rates of lethal violence are a … a distinct social problem.”9 If America has more lethal violence than Europe, but not more crime, the relatively high homicide rate in the United States would be a biased estimate of the rate of serious crime.We have two kinds of reasons for thinking that this is wrong and that the homicide rate is the right (or best) measure. First, given the reliability issues that bedevil the police or victim survey data on which Zimring and Hawkins and others rely, this is an area in which one has to take some cues from theory and other data. Consider, then, the following trilemma.Concentrated disadvantage is the root cause of most serious crime in developed societies.America has significantly more concentrated disadvantage than European countries.America has the same amount of serious crime as other developed countries.One of these three statements must be false. Criminological theory and existing social science evidence strongly support (1).10 And we think there is good evidence to support (2).11 The main theoretical reason to believe (3) is that the United States has far more guns per capita than European countries. But while firearm availability no doubt has some impact on the level of violence, we think the is to be would be difficult to with other patterns across and Consider, for that while the United States has times as many guns as El Salvador, the homicide rate there is roughly times higher than it is And that in the United States are much more to a than Given this and given the reasons to believe and we think (3) is most to be the of this second not on the that homicide for a of the total by as of the crime rate to by the state, they are with a petty and one murder has much serious crime than a with a and one petty the crime rate would be the same in measure has to for the or of is difficult to measure how different kinds of crime are with but the a first estimate the social of different kinds of crime by people how much they would be to to their of being a victim of this and that the of a murder is around the of an than the of a around and the of around homicide is much than other it is much more that it for about of the total of This that it is a much estimate of the rate of serious than of the rate of Figure the same but this by homicide rather than by immediately level of incarceration relatively is a higher than the developed-world but not by is the fact that its if by the level of serious crime, America is not but rather America has about the number of police per than the developed of the of police has been that American police are inefficient. people argue that American Black been and they by this that the of American police are focus too much on petty and too on serious This is the of for on the fact that of a typical police is to violent it is that in comparative the police in the United States do not solve many serious rate is the of all as Figure The developed around one arrest per homicide that In the United States, the is this not to as because police in the United States are exceptionally on one measure of police the number of homicide per police The rate is the of police focus and the police The of policing in the United States that the problem with rate is that is but focus is In fact, as Figure the is is but focus is way of much of what we have far is to that the United States to the of punishment the of The high and the level of police per homicide suggest that the United States on long rather than the of arrest to One way to estimate and more is to the into the of to homicide and the of to Figure plots these two across the developed world. The result our the United States has relatively levels of but relatively high levels of of and to measure these two is that we can about how and are the United Figure also while all from an exceptional balance of and it is Black people in the United States are especially to police killed around people in In the rest of the developed the number of police is around per the is It that to the level of police violence, we must the of the Yet comparisons suggest the opposite Figure there is a and cross-national between the rate at which police and the number of police officers per with of police per homicide are countries in which police are much to as compared to countries with police per The countries of the developed world on the right of this graph levels of police while the countries of the world the The is the United be a is not that levels of cause the police to be more possible might the of high levels of police and homicide It is that the in the levels of police cause public demand for police is and our data are poor, is there are some theoretical reasons to believe that this is in fact violence police police make with a of those these the treatment of a of have a the American combination of police and is of the the of and the of the is but of can be the most way to with the in police to with rates of violence and are more to police officers are more to out of for their such as this since, such a there are for to take to and on and rather than to crime make the of policing more And this might in make with the police more these inferences are empirical research is to But we think the cross-national between police and the number of police officers per with the theoretical reasons to believe those might be as a It is not at all that the number of police officers on the would the of police violence and And it to that the to police argue that police officers be as rather than But the that and the be of United States is with much more serious crime than other It to this exceptionally high level of serious crime with an exceptional combination of relatively police and long this its in the way it most people. is to be comparative we have suggest an the United States, like the rest of the developed to policing and penal rather than incarceration and penal the United States to from incarceration to policing the balance between the two more like the balance in the rest of the developed world. The implications of such a we call the First World be The United States has three times as many as police If it no but the by prison to police officers the the same as the in the developed world times as many police officers as the United States would have about and police the First World if in the United States, would be a with about and half a more police we this United States would not be a police to the First World would in fact the rate of policing in the United States with the rest of the developed of to that to the First World would the United States with other countries is not to have that this would be a good One reason to normative from comparative empirical make these one has to fact to the First World be our it be to three about our it to our in questions like this one that the two of us to about questions but are to from the normative implications of their It is no that many of them do since it is those implications that their But social of in moral and political philosophy that these are too on or rather than normative Some are in moral and political theory to that on But a of social many of them to answers to these questions (or of those that do not empirical our is to empirical evidence and social theory with explicit normative we to be as as In we do not to the theory of or political (or the theory of out the implications of that we the implications of a of In we that do not have implications for which that our hands about these issues not be the it We think that the combination of empirical and normative one would have to to our are of that our case for the First World be as our to a about how the United States to a of penal readers we the in our by the this a of And a between prisons and police, kinds of social or are to We more about we the in this way in our forthcoming book What’s Wrong with Mass but some is in think that in the long a of social would crime by its root and in the and demand for policing and In other we argue that of or efficiency that the United States social But a of social from to of this magnitude would the to some kind of the Given the of the American movement and the of the American we doubt we like this Our in this essay is to about what be in the world in which we in the world in which we would like to about that we to that are prisons and the the existing of from prisons and police to social as many have we argue in What’s Wrong with Mass this is because social is by what we call the the root of crime would be to the for the most people in do this by social would since the of are not most people. penal is in a way that social is it about a to the developed most penal but like to its most there is good evidence that social that are at the and be at But the same that these social also it for to them at The more the the more we can be that these the of the and the social is but for crime while social can be but is it is not to the root of crime with to public Yet some might argue that we from policing and incarceration if this would result in more policing and concentrated imprisonment and on rather than on incarceration in can social in and political and can and And arrest can be a disadvantage in the and the fact that many of those are have their are all by the the with the many of incarceration and policing to a in crime is serious crime has those same crime can social and and concentrated disadvantage at the in a violent to do things that are for social and violence can be and of and and are of in crime is without to and for public and other of which the and of disadvantage in those And as a criminal or an arrest can be a on the of crime can be in extremely can become a that serious crime the same kinds of as policing and concentrated we argue that and an and between the of crime, and policing. The have to the of these no how and to make The fact that of this are is an It is an of our But we think some of these are more and more than we think that the us is how to strike the right penal to be about the level of incarceration and the level of policing in today’s United in the in Figure the United States how a might this that the how to strike the balance between incarceration and policing by that in this that we different of the balance between policing and incarceration to in the what we take to be the of to in this what it would for the level of homicide and crime, the number of people in prison, and the number of people killed and by the would to of these if the United States to the First World homicide and other kinds of serious crime would The empirical on is that the size of police is a much more way to crime than the of prison for those are and The for this is in and do not make the way than the of the they are people to the of their much more than in the It is by 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those people of how to strike the balance between policing and how they to do be by the of crime, of police and and those all to be from the ranks of the are Black and are most to be of the kinds of the same people are most to be or killed by the And they are also those are at the of in these are not Figure Black people are more murder the and those for serious than they are in the ranks of those have been for petty or killed by the police in given In fact, Black people to be those been in their are far more in the incarcerated than they are those have been in their make of the but of the (and of the total support to the case for the First World The of the which the United States on long prison to more on Black people and the poor, and especially the Black poor, than do the to the First World would not to the with the penal system but also to the it would the number of of crime and those for serious offenses, and those killed by the police, it would also the from a more to the can the for the First World as people the those people of incarceration and homicide are more by the than the of arrest and police we the of incarceration and homicide more than the of arrest and police First World the of incarceration and homicide (and police while the of The the case for the First World what we have argued in this We have that the United States, developed especially on penal to the of penal This is in the fact that it has roughly three for every police while every other developed has about police officers for every The United States would have to the incarcerated by around people and half a more police officers to its officer in with the rest of the we called the First World first the First World on We that it would be a more way to use the of America to penal The and of incarceration would be homicide and other serious crime would and police violence might also The main of our would be the with a significantly number of But these in to the that a more of people than crime or incarceration. of police violence to be than the is but more than those are incarcerated or of a according to which we have reasons to on people the they this the case for the First World Balance.In What’s Wrong with Mass we a more normative case for the First World than we can in this We think that the First World is on a of But we do think that some of out our might without or some in police on the that violence or is different violence by of this would that no amount of violence the use of by the But a in would be to law and and to not public or a social this of is a kind of political And we doubt many are in fact to this of if there is no moral between that the and it to do to one one might think that the is than the as a of We think there are reasons to be of this between the and of But we defend a about these moral questions In What’s Wrong with Mass we that one would have to much more than to different In our this fact the same in the more that we in the we argued serious crime runs in it has number of on and in to the one like the think that the to be from violence or is more than the of or political of this to those on the especially in of the fact by international the United States the First World be a police Figure the in this United States would be roughly to the in today’s and in with the rest of the developed world. the in policing and the in there would be about police officers per homicide in the United This would be the in the developed world the this of from incarceration to one make the case that it would be relatively also that the First World the United States would be a of about three and roughly This would make it the in the developed the in this world would be about as Figure would be the countries. if the First World is one might it is and of the kind of normative and we have given that there are to the balance that and strike between the arms of law reasons that the United States has its penal But our is that the First World is more than the kinds of things that to demand In the America in which we at to a of with than to the is we assume it is to the United States to a in the of the social to use social to the root of crime are we have to be a social must the of those most to Yet an that the of those in this the of the and political readers not think of the First World as an alternative to social Justice and efficiency demand that and in the United States balance the of between the two arms of law enforcement differently from the way they do at would be if this more we think it is that more do what we have in this

Mohammed Sadik Abdullah

AI collaboration increasingly spans untrusted, heterogeneous nodes from edge devices to multi-clouds raising acute concerns around privacy, integrity, and verifiability of shared models and updates. This paper proposes a secure distributed computing framework that unifies privacy-preserving learning, verifiable coordination, and incentive-aligned governance for decentralized AI model sharing. The architecture composes federated and peer-to-peer training with secure aggregation, differential privacy, and hardware-backed confidential computing to prevent data leakage while mitigating gradient inversion risks. Model provenance, access control, and policy enforcement are anchored via a lightweight, append-only ledger with decentralized identifiers, enabling auditability without central authorities. To counter poisoning, backdoors, and Sybil attacks, the framework integrates robust aggregation, reputation-weighted participation, and update attestation with zero-knowledge proofs for selective disclosure. A resource-aware scheduler adapts to edge variability using gossip-based dissemination, opportunistic bandwidth utilization, and erasure-coded checkpoints to preserve liveness under churn. Interoperability is ensured through portable model artifacts (e.g., ONNX), secure enclaves for cross-framework execution, and privacy budgets tracked as first-class governance assets. We outline threat models, compliance hooks for jurisdictional constraints, and a token-free contribution accounting mechanism that rewards data quality and validation work. Simulated and real-world deployments illustrate improved end-to-end trust, reduced coordination overhead, and resilient performance under adversarial conditions, positioning the framework as a practical substrate for open, secure, and accountable AI collaboration in decentralized environments

Geoffroy Couteau, Maryam Zarezadeh

No abstract is available for this record.

Reza Alimoradi, Fateme Amjadi, Seiied-Mohammad-Javad Razavian, Mohommad Hosein Noorallahzadeh

Nowadays, sensor networks are one of the hottest scientific issues. A lot of research has been done to improve their efficiency. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are applied as an important and efficient technology in many industries such as military operations, security systems, intelligent transportation systems, medics, agriculture, and many others. Key agreement is a challenging point in the security of these networks. Sensor nodes connect to each other using cryptography techniques, however, use of the classic key management techniques such as key distribution center is inefficient because of resource-constrained nature of the sensor nodes. This paper proposes a hierarchical multiple key agreement scheme. In the proposed scheme, two nodes can produce multiple session keys, just with only one run of the key agreement protocol by two nodes in the hierarchical system. As well as its efficiency, this new scheme is based on identity and non-interactive protocol. Being zero-knowledge proof is another advantage of the scheme.

Sai Srinivas Matta, Manish Bolli

This study conducts a meta-analysis of scholarly and policy literature on blockchain as an enabler of decentralized digital identity with a specific focus on cross-border authentication and immigration contexts. The analysis integrates evidence from more than 200 reviewed publications spanning information systems, cryptography, law, governance, and humanitarian studies published between 2000 and 2022. Findings reveal a sharp increase in academic and policy attention since 2015, reflecting the growing recognition of identity as a critical application of blockchain beyond finance. Decentralized identity frameworks demonstrate substantial advantages over centralized and federated systems, including reductions in cyber vulnerabilities, improved privacy through zero-knowledge proofs and selective disclosure, and operational efficiency gains such as a 45 percent average reduction in authentication time. Evidence from pilot projects highlights measurable benefits in humanitarian contexts, where blockchain-based systems reduced aid distribution costs by up to 98 percent and provided refugees with portable credentials that preserved continuity of healthcare, education, and financial services across borders. Despite these advances, significant gaps persist in interoperability, scalability, governance, and inclusivity. Divergent national regulations and fragmented technical standards continue to limit cross-border adoption, while usability challenges and risks of digital exclusion hinder accessibility for vulnerable populations. The study concludes that blockchain-driven identity systems can deliver transformative improvements in security, privacy, and portability but require harmonized global standards, stronger governance frameworks, and inclusive design strategies to ensure equitable adoption. By synthesizing evidence across disciplines, this research contributes a comprehensive assessment of the current state and limitations of decentralized digital identity in cross-border contexts.

Rabimba Karanjai, Lei Xu, Zhimin Gao, Lin Chen · 7 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Priyanka Dutta, Dung Hoang Duong, Willy Susilo, Kazuhide Fukushima · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Karim Baghery, Navid Ghaedi Bardeh

No abstract is available for this record.

Yiming Li, Shengli Liu, Shuai Han, Dawu Gu · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Yongli Tang, Yuanhong Li, Qing Ye, Ying Li · 5 authors

Although the existing group signature schemes from lattice have been optimized for efficiency, the signing abilities of each member in the group are relatively single. It may not be suitable for complex applications. Inspired by the pioneering work of Bellare and Fuchsbauer, we present a primitive called policy-based group signature. In policy-based group signatures, group members can on behalf of the group to sign documents that meet their own policies, and the generated signatures will not leak the identity and policies of the signer. Moreover, the group administrator is allowed to reveal the identity of signer when a controversy occurs. Through the analysis of application scenarios, we concluded that the policy-based group signature needs to meet two essential security properties: simulatability and traceability. And we construct a scheme of policy-based group signature from lattice through techniques such as commitment, zero-knowledge proof, rejection sampling. The security of our scheme is proved to be reduced to the module short integer solution (MSIS) and module learning with errors (MLWE) hard assumptions. Furthermore, we make a performance comparison between our scheme and three lattice-based group signature schemes. The result shows that our scheme has more advantages in storage overhead and the sizes of key and signature are decreased roughly by 83.13%, 46.01%, respectively, compared with other schemes.

Yuyu Wang, Jiaxin Pan

No abstract is available for this record.

Michele Ciampi, Emmanuela Orsini, Luisa Siniscalchi

No abstract is available for this record.

Xiao-Xu Zhang, Runhua Shi, Wan-Peng Guo, Peng Wang · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Robi Pedersen, Osmanbey Uzunkol

No abstract is available for this record.

Yunjia Quan

This paper proposes a novel lattice-based aggregate signature (LAS) scheme that bring post-quantum security to the Bitcoin system without sacrificing its transaction efficiency. Bitcoin currently employs Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), which is insecure against the emerging quantum technology, so post-quantum signature schemes like the proposed LAS will become necessary in the near future. However, most of the post-quantum signatures schemes have large signature sizes which decrease Bitcoin’s efficiency while our proposed scheme does not have this negative side effect. Our LAS scheme is based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium and a zero-knowledge Scalable Transparent Arguments of Knowledge (STARK) protocol. CRYSTALS-Dilithium is the most prominent algorithm chosen by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), yet it still has an adverse limitation: it would cause Bitcoin’s transaction efficiency to fall by 17 times due to its relatively large signature size. On the other hand, the proposed LAS scheme takes full advantage of signature aggregation using the STARK protocol and Dilithium’s easy and fast implementation, thus generating signatures with post-quantum security and small signature sizes which are critical to transaction efficiency. Our proofs convey the correctness, compactness, and post-quantum security of our construction in the quantum random oracle model, and our implementation conveyed that the proposed scheme would only decrease Bitcoin’s transaction efficiency by 3 times, a significant improvement from using Dilithium and other lattice-based aggregate signature schemes. Our proposed scheme has many advantages over the existing schemes and may become very valuable to Bitcoin.

Bertalan Zoltán Péter, Imre Kocsis

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) systems are being developed around the world and production solutions can be expected in the near future. Should a central bank allow handling of CBDC on a ledger that is not under its supervision (via platform bridging), it may wish to specify certain conformance requirements regarding the transactions. We propose a novel audit scheme based on Zero-Knowledge Proofs, which allows the operator of the bridged ledger to prove its compliance to such requirements, without revealing details about the transactions (such as the exact participants, the direction of the transfer, or the transferred value). This scheme aims to resolve the conflict between banks having to audit how CBDC is used on the bridged blockchain and consortia trying to keep sensitive data private.

Jelle Don, Serge Fehr, Christian Majenz, Christian Schaffner

Commit-and-open Sigma-protocols are a popular class of protocols for constructing non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments and digital-signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. Instantiated with hash-based commitments, the resulting non-interactive schemes enjoy tight online-extractability in the random oracle model. Online extractability improves the tightness of security proofs for the resulting digital-signature schemes by avoiding lossy rewinding or forking-lemma based extraction. In this work, we prove tight online extractability in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), showing that the construction supports post-quantum security. First, we consider the default case where committing is done by element-wise hashing. In a second part, we extend our result to Merkle-tree based commitments. Our results yield a significant improvement of the provable post-quantum security of the digital-signature scheme Picnic. Our analysis makes use of a recent framework by Chung et al. [arXiv:2010.11658] for analysing quantum algorithms in the QROM using purely classical reasoning. Therefore, our results can to a large extent be understood and verified without prior knowledge of quantum information science.

Jiamin Cui, Kai Hu, Meiqin Wang, Puwen Wei

No abstract is available for this record.

Giuseppe Vitto, Alex Biryukov

No abstract is available for this record.

Alex Chinco

No abstract is available for this record.

Valeh Farzaliyev, Jan Willemson, Jaan Kristjan Kaasik

Abstract Mix‐networks were first proposed by Chaum in the late 1970s–early 1980s as a general tool for building anonymous communication systems. Classical mix‐net implementations rely on standard public key primitives (e.g., ElGamal encryption) that will become vulnerable when a sufficiently powerful quantum computer will be built. Thus, there is a need to develop quantum‐resistant mix‐nets. This article focuses on the application case of electronic voting where the number of votes to be mixed may reach hundreds of thousands or even millions. We propose an improved architecture for lattice‐based post‐quantum mix‐nets featuring more efficient zero‐knowledge proofs while maintaining established security assumptions. Our current implementation scales up to 100,000 votes, still leaving a lot of room for future optimisation.

Guanxiong Ha, Chunfu Jia, Xiaowei Ge, Jiawei Yuan · 6 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Chaya Ganesh, Hamidreza Khoshakhlagh, Markulf Kohlweiss, Anca Nitulescu · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Kristian Gjøsteen, Thomas Haines, Johannes Müller, Peter B. Rønne · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.