Bitcoin, a virtual currency created in 2009 by an individual or group using the alias Satoshi Nakamoto, is based on a decentralized peer-to-peer system. Transactions are made with no intermediary. There are no banks involved, little to no transaction fees, and transactions are almost instantaneous. Transactions are verified by network nodes, and the network uses a public ledger called the block chain to record transactions. There is no central repository or administrator. Treasury categorizes it as a decentralized virtual currency. As public acceptance increases, so too does the number of merchants willing to accept bitcoin as a form of payment. But even though the public is slowly embracing bitcoin as a form of payment (thus giving it characteristics of a currency), public officials continue to struggle with the question of whether bitcoin is a currency — and therefore subject to appropriate currency regulations — or if it is simply property, making transactions in bitcoin more akin to barter.
An open distributed system can be secured by requiring participants to present proof of work and rewarding them for participation. The Bitcoin digital currency introduced this mechanism, which is adopted by almost all contemporary digital currencies and related services. A natural process leads participants of such systems to form pools, where members aggregate their power and share the rewards. Experience with Bitcoin shows that the largest pools are often open, allowing anyone to join. It has long been known that a member can sabotage an open pool by seemingly joining it but never sharing its proofs of work. The pool shares its revenue with the attacker, and so each of its participants earns less. We define and analyze a game where pools use some of their participants to infiltrate other pools and perform such an attack. With any number of pools, no-pool-attacks is not a Nash equilibrium. We study the special cases where either two pools or any number of identical pools play the game and the rest of the participants are uninvolved. In both of these cases there exists an equilibrium that constitutes a “tragedy of the commons” where the participating pools attack one another and earn less than they would have if none had attacked. For two pools, the decision whether or not to attack is the miner’s dilemma, an instance of the iterative prisoner’s dilemma. The game is played daily by the active Bitcoin pools, which apparently choose not to attack. If this balance breaks, the revenue of open pools might diminish, making them unattractive to participants.
Bitcoins and their use are a very actual issue, especially with high popularity and high cost of Bitcoins. Number of Bitcoin’s transactions increasing day to day. But many individuals and business owners do not understand what is Bitcoin, how it works and how could it be used in business. This article discusses the nature of Bitcoin, a decentralized, anonymous and largely unregulated virtual currency, its legal status and use in business. The article includes examination of both advantages and disadvantages of Bitcoin and international regulation of legal status and taxation of this currency.
This paper is concerned with the new Darwinism of the payment system. The researcher discusses the payment system to understand if Bitcoin would replace our cash-based society. The analysis is based on the technology S-curve and Schumpeter’s model of economic development. At present, there are problems hindering Bitcoin innovation to achieve a wide adoption as the innovation is not well received by the government central banks around the world. It is interesting to see that the swing of S-curves is not strong enough to cause a paradigm shift according to the Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction. The results have shown parallel S-curve trajectories of electronic money innovations signifying a move from a cash-based economy towards a less cash society. The study provides useful implications to support the diffusion of Bitcoin innovation.
This paper focuses on the evolution of cryptocurrencies. It traces the history of early cryptography, the ‘cypherpunk’ movement, and how the work of some cyber libertarians and cryptographers enabled the emergence of popular cryptocurrencies. The paper then focuses on Bitcoin. It delves into the technology behind the Bitcoin architecture and shows how exactly this technology works. The paper then does an analysis of security and regulatory considerations that affect the growth of Bitcoin-based businesses. The paper concludes with some suggestions for future work in the area.
Nicolas T. Courtois, Pinar Emirdag, Zhouyixing Wang
In this paper we study the question of centralisation in bitcoin digital currency. In theory bitcoin has been designed to be a totally decentralized distributed system. Satoshi Nakamoto has very clearly postulated that each node should be collecting recent transactions and trying to create new blocks (Satoshi08). In bitcoin transactions are aggregated in block in order to authenticate them and form an official ledger and history of bitcoin transactions. In practice as soon as expensive ASIC bitcoin miners have replaced general-purpose hardware, production of bitcoins and the validation of transactions has concentrated in the hands of a smaller group of people. Then at some moment in early 2012 an important decision was taken: the Stratum protocol was designed (Palatinus12) which took a deliberate decision to move the power of selecting which transactions are included in blocks from miners to pool managers. The growing difficulty of mining and large standard deviation in this process (Rosenfeld13; CourtoisBahack14) made that majority of miners naturally shifted to pooled mining. At this moment bitcoin ceased being a decentralized democratic system. In this paper we survey the question of a 51% attacks and show that there is a large variety of plausible attack scenarios. In particular we study one particularly subversive attack scenario which depends on non-trivial internal details of the bitcoin hashing process. How does it compare with the current mining practices? We have study the Stratum protocol in four popular real-life mining configurations. Our analysis shows that pools could very easily cheat the majority of people. However the most subversive versions of the attack are NOT facilitated and could potentially be detected.
Os mais diversos sistemas monetários foram experimentados pela socidade até chegarmos no modelo atual e há poucos indícios de que este deva ser o último e definitivo. Existe uma insatisfação com o sistema vigente e com o grande poder que as autoridades monetárias adquiriram nos últimos anos. Novos modelos vêm surgindo nas mais diversas áreas, e uma das alternativas que se desenha para o arranjo financeiro é o Bitcoin, um sistema monetário completamente descentralizado, que se utiliza da tecnologia pessoa-a-pessoa para transformar o modo como os indivíduos se relacionam. O trabalho se propõe a analisar a origem, as características, o funcionamento e as inovações trazidas pelo sistema Bitcoin, comparando a criptomoeda às outras moedas tradicionais estudadas na literatura econômica. Em especial, trata de analisar a factibilidade do Bitcoin enquanto moeda.
Despite a high volatility and the recent fall in price, more and more merchants and consumers adopt Bitcoin. The virtual currency might be standing at its critical point to reach the early majority of adopters. This paper examines whether an application called ChangeTip has the potential to catalyze the breakthrough of Bitcoin. We assume a strong linkage between the diffusion of ChangeTip and Bitcoin so that we can directly deduce the impact of this application on Bitcoin. Results from a conducted online survey of 210 potential early adopters indicate that the diffusion of ChangeTip has the potential to advance the diffusion of Bitcoin to mainstream markets. We found that performance expectancy is the key driver for the intention to recommend ChangeTip. Also, effort expectancy, social influence and facilitating conditions are important factors for recommending ChangeTip. Concerning the intention to use ChangeTip in the future, performance expectancy and social influence are the main drivers. Furthermore, facilitating conditions are important for using ChangeTip. In addition, an analysis of the non-user of Bitcoin and ChangeTip was conducted. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.
Cash in the real world allows for parties to exchange currency without the need to go through some sort of central authority. One person, Alice, can simply hand cash over to another person, Bob. In this transaction the only two people that have knowledge of this exchange are Alice and Bob. Until recently there was no electronic equivalent to this exchange. In 1982 David Chaum proposed a system of anonymous electronic cash based on blind signatures, and in 1990 founded DigiCash as an electronic cash company. There were a few banks that implemented electronic cash systems, but these banks and DigiCash ultimately went bankrupt in 1997 and 1998 despite the enthusiasm surrounding anonymous electronic cash. Between 1998 and 2008 there were no successful implementations of electronic cash that offer a decentralized, anonymous, and untraceable system.\nIn 2008 a paper was published by Satoshi Nakamoto on the cryptocurrency known as Bitcoin. A cryptocurrency is a form of electronic cash backed by mathematical and cryptographic constructs, unlike traditional currency which was historically backed by gold or silver. Cryptocurrencies have seen rising popularity in recent years due to their decentralized, distributed, peer-to-peer protocols. Part of this rising popularity is also attributable to the supposed anonymity of these protocols; however, due to the public transaction history required for these protocols and the fact that transactions are pseudonymous and not purely anonymous, this supposed anonymity does not exist. While the systems may achieve the goal of decentralized currency it does not achieve the goal of untraceability. In this thesis we analyze the technical implementations of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to determine the level of anonymity provided by these protocols. We also analyze proposed improvements for their feasibility.
Six assertions concerning the status of Bitcoin are formulated and defended: (i) Bitcoin is not and will not become a currency-like informational commodity, (ii) currency-like informational commodities that aren’t currencies must be frauds, (ii) specific BTC amounts may become monetized and thus may be turned into financial assets, (iii) currently no BTC amounts are monetized in any currency area and therefore none are financial assets, (iv) by means of burocratic steps only some BTC volumes can be turned in to an informational currency within a given currency area, modified client software is not required for that step, (v) if a specific amount of BTC qualifies as currency, it also qualifies as money, (vi) moneyness of Bitcoin, or rather of a specific occurrence of an amount of BTC, should be questioned only after one has agreed positively on its status as a financial asset, and negatively on its status as an amount of currency. Factions in the Bitcoin promoting movement are viewed from a perspective of organizational multi-threading. Different factions of the Bitcoin movement may wish to see status issues about Bitcoin settled in different ways. Overall consistency in these matters should not be expected from the union of factions in the Bitcoin movement.
Bitcoin is widely represented in the popular press, but far less so in serious academic inquiry. Researchers have analyzed Bitcoin from various discipline-specific perspectives using their own sets of theories and jargon. Yet cross-disciplinary research has been muddled by the inaccurate interpretation of terminology across fields of research. This results in polarized assessments. In an effort to examine the Bitcoin phenomenon in a more holistic and multidisciplinary manner, this paper compares Bitcoin with another innovative technology – the World Wide Web – as first envisioned by Tim Berners-Lee. By exploring the early development of the World Wide Web, we seek to compare and contrast its development with that of Bitcoin and blockchain technology. The goal of this study is to show similarities and differences in their historic development, in order to identify key success factors related to the adoption of these technologies. Through identification of these factors we seek to guide both academics and practitioners towards fruitful avenues of research and development.
This paper describes a study to understand what differentiates organization adopters of Bitcoin from nonadopters by comparing their IT-readiness, innovativeness and social media presence. The craze over cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin has been likened to a modern-day gold rush, yet academic research has not caught up. Governments are struggling with the very idea of cryptocurrency systems. After the price of Bitcoin fell from $1,200 to $300 in 2014, consumer interest flagged, leaving the future of Bitcoin adoption uncertain despite a slow and steady increase of organization adopters. Organization adoption is more important than consumer, because consumers can’t use cryptocurrency if organizations don’t accept them as payment. This research serves as a basis for future research on Bitcoins and Bitcoin adoption by highlighting some important hurdles to its adoption as a new innovation, in the hope that such endeavors move us ever closer to the vision of a true “people’s currency.”
Bitcoin is a new financial system that has the potential to have a big impact on the way the world does business. Its open ledger system and distribution network make it a valuable system. Although it is still in its infancy, as bitcoin becomes larger and more sophisticated, it may very well provide solutions to many of the current financial system’s problems.
Bitcoin has become the de facto 'gold' standard among cryptocurrencies as it is the most widely accepted in commerce, has the largest mining network, and greatest volume of transactions. Because of this, miners of other SHA-256 cryptocurrencies will tend to convert those altcoins into bitcoin in order to transact in a meaningful way with the real economy. The result is that bitcoin mining regulates that of all other SHA-256 blockchains. Specifically, what matters is the expected number of bitcoins produced per day given a unit of hashing (mining) power, whatever the equivalence in the coin being mined. If mining for a different coin would yield a greater return in bitcoins at the margin (per day) for a miner, an apparent arbitrage opportunity will exist to direct mining effort at that cryptocurrency and subsequently exchange those for bitcoin. These opportunities, once taken, quickly eliminate the profitable arbitrage and appear to operate in a fairly efficient and predictable manner. A model is developed in this paper to formalize this process where cryptocurrency miners seeking to maximize production in terms of bitcoins earned in a day will exploit any such opportunities. If no such opportunities exist, they will simply revert to mining bitcoins directly. There are some important implications to this process, such as a tendency for cryptocurrencies to fall in price relative to bitcoin over time, and for changes in bitcoin mining difficulty to indirectly influence the market prices of altcoins. Finally, it seems that those undertaking this process of miners' arbitrage do so at the expense of speculators and noise traders who make decisions regarding buy and sell trades without the use of fundamental data. These participants generally have poor timing, follow trends, and over-react to good and bad news. Altcoins are produced by miners and subsequently offered for sale in the market in order to obtain bitcoins; meanwhile noise traders serve as the only bid-side to the market, on average.
This paper assesses costs and benefits of regulating Bitcoin. A review of the main justifications for regulating it shows that scope for efficient regulation is limited. Private governance structures and fee-based services have already begun addressing many of the known problems. Furthermore, since a regulation would discourage use, the costs—in terms of technological gains forgone—are potentially high. Nonetheless, there is scope for regulation, to ensure one has recourse in the event of theft, as long as the following are addressed: 1) provide a clear regulatory framework; 2) supervise transactions to dissuade crime, without compromising the medium; 3) regulate exchanges, rather than users; 4) encourage technological progress by committing to an environment of permissionless innovation.
This paper aims to identify the likely determinants for cryptocurrency value formation, including for that of bitcoin. Due to Bitcoin’s growing popular appeal and merchant acceptance, it has become increasingly important to try to understand the factors that influence its value formation. Presently, the value of all Bitcoins in existence represent approximately $7 billion, and more than $60 million of notional value changes hands each day. Having grown rapidly over the past few years, there is now a developing but vibrant marketplace for bitcoin, and a recognition of digital currencies as an emerging asset class. Not only is there a listed and over-the-counter market for bitcoin and other digital currencies, but also an emergent derivatives market. As such, the ability to value bitcoin and related cryptocurrencies is becoming critical to its establishment as a legitimate financial asset.Using cross-sectional empirical data examining 66 of the most widely used cryptocurrencies, a regression model was estimated that points to three main drivers of cryptocurrency value: the level of competition in the network of producers, the rate of unit production, and the difficulty of algorithm used to “mine” for the cryptocurrency. These amount to relative differences in the cost of production of one digital currency over another at the margin, pointing to differences in relative cost of production – electricity goes in, cryptocurrency comes out. Using that as a starting point, a no-arbitrage situation is established for Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies followed by the formalization of a cost of production model to determine the fair value of a bitcoin.