TWith the help of the available literature, the paper attempts to assess critically the main problems of municipal finances in India and to bring out the challenges that the municipalities face with respect to revenue generation and expenditure management. The main findings suggest that the urban local bodies in India are confronted with lack of proper decentralization of functions and finances, inadequate revenue generation, expenditure shortfalls leading to poor service delivery. It also analyses the suggestions and recommendations that have been offered in the literature to cope with these critical challenges relating to urban finance.
The year 2013 is already the ninth year of implementing fiscal decentralization in the Slovak Republic. The aim was to ensure independence as well as responsibility of subnational governments and improve the ability to finance their original competences from own sources. As decentralization leads to growth of imbalance intergovernmental transfers are the instruments used by central government to reduce fiscal disparities and fill the gap between the spending needs and fiscal capacity of some local authorities. Tax sharing system in Slovakia, is an important tool of horizontal fiscal imbalance equalisation. Despite the title, shared taxes play the role of unconditional grants if even they are formally labelled as local government own revenues under current legislation. In this paper we examine the allocation of personal income tax share as an instrument of regional policy and factors affecting interregional disparities in Slovakia. The paper presents some results of the research project VEGA1/0822/11 Redistribution of financial resources in the decentralized fiscal system in Slovakia.
The share of public investment spending at sub-national level has been slowly but steadily increasing over the past two decades across OECD countries. Degrees and forms of decentralization in infrastructure vary widely across countries, but all governments share a common objective, that is to mobilize authorities along shared infrastructure policy objectives. This involves managing a complex web of vertical (across levels of government) and horizontal (across sectors and across the same levels of government) interdependencies, which require substantial coordination among actors to ensure policy alignment and quality investments. Asymmetric information, multiple principal-agent relationships and significant differences in capacities across levels of government in financing and implementing infrastructure investments have posed important political economic obstacles to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public investment outcomes. This paper will look at persisting coordination challenges more closely by using the results of a recent OECD questionnaire and case studies. It will identify remedies OECD and some selected non-OECD countries have found that work to address coordination issues. This paper will demonstrate that ultimately systematic collection and sharing of information is the key to making coordination work.
This paper will review the key elements required for effective decentralized implementation of rural roads programs. It will review the range of options available and the evidence for successful implementation where it exists. Section 2 makes the case for the importance of rural roads and sets out the evidence for the socio-economic benefits. Section 3 addresses the responsibilities for implementation and critical importance of having clarity over network ownership. Section 4 highlights the difficulties of finance, particularly for longer term maintenance, and sets out options for improving allocations and the reliability of receipt for those allocations. Section 5 sets out the project cycle from planning, design, implementation, maintenance and subsequent evaluation. Section 6 summarizes the key issues and highlights the main policy considerations.
During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize public decision making. Such reforms have proved controversial. Critics of these reforms argue that decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption. Proponents of these reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by bringing decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers people to hold government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long run. They further state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading infrastructure to underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such decentralization is also expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local financing. These debates, nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on infrastructure provision is scant or non-existent. Empirical work is hampered by a lack of reliable data on the incidence of corruption. This paper presents conceptual underpinnings of the impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesizes scant available empirical evidence to make a case for further empirical research to document the real world experiences to update our current state of knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.
This paper proposes an economic logic for underpinning decentralization in the infrastructure sectors. It starts by detailing the definition of the infrastructure gap and the methodologies to calculate it. It provides some global trends for developing countries in terms of the gap and briefly discusses financing possibilities for developing countries to address the gap. Then it turns to the discussion of the link between the infrastructure gap and decentralization, providing a typology infrastructure subsectors and possible jurisdiction of service provision. It briefly discusses the potential for raising local finances for provision and the relationship between poverty and provision. While it is very difficult to provide blanket recommendations on decentralizing the various sectors and respective subcomponents of infrastructure services, the paper offers a set of guidelines to direct policymakers in their decision to decentralize or not. First, decentralization is intrinsically neither good nor bad for infrastructure; its impact depends entirely on the incentives facing the various decision-makers in the decentralization process; second, decentralization is most fruitful when the decision-makers bear the financial and political cost with respect to design, finance, operation and maintenance; and, finally, political leaders are accountable to their constituents for the manner in which they spend tax revenues and how they use and allocate transfers from the central government.
The subnational dimension of infrastructure emerges as one of the greatest challenges in contemporary public finance policy and management. Given the localized nature of most infrastructures, ensuring its efficient provision represents a challenge for all countries irrespective of their level of centralization or decentralization. This paper introduces the fundamental questions surrounding the provision of infrastructure in decentralized settings and summarizes the findings from a collection of original essays prepared for this volume by a set of worldwide experts on this subject with the objective of advancing our understanding of the interplay between decentralization and infrastructure. More specifically, the paper discusses the extent of infrastructure gaps and the quality of subnational spending; inquires how functional responsibilities, financing and equalization can be designed; discusses sector-specific arrangements; drills down to the key steps of the public investment cycle and management aspects; and analyzes the political economy and corruption challenges that typically accompany decentralized infrastructure projects. The paper also presents avenues for the strengthening of decentralized public investment and infrastructure provision processes, concluding that they need to be country-, sector- and place-specific. While it is clear that institutional arrangements for infrastructure management will vary across countries, in all cases several decision-making steps need to be coordinated across levels of government in order to ensure efficiency in delivery, equity in spending, and accountability over final results.
Johnatan Rafael Santana de Brito, João Ramos Matos Filho, Edward Martins Costa
the Brazilian tax structure has specific characteristics and the performance level of government. Although there was a better regulation of these transfers after the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, it is observed that the amount of resources transferred to the municipalities of Rio Grande do Norte is quite high. In light of the theory of federalism and fiscal decentralization, in particular, the theories related to intergovernmental transfers seek to diagnose the transfers from the systematization of information as to the origin, value and destination. We used the econometric model of Dynamic Panel System GMM in diagnosis and verification of the impact of transfers on public finances of municipalities in the RN, a dynamic econometric model that captures the lagged effects of variables making use of adjustment mechanisms based on a model differences distributed so that the dependent function is a concatenation of variable contemporary and out of phase. The data point to what is predicted in theory: an increasing trend of dependency. The paper presents some proposals for the transfer system and the composition of spending in order to contribute to greater tax efficiency.
The District Development Fund program or model was introduced in Lao People Democratic Republic in 2005, with the technical and financial support of United Nations Capital Development Fund, as a core part of the Governance and Public Administration Reform Programme, which was jointly supported by United Nations Capital Development Fund and United Nations Development Programme. The District Development Fund program was designed to be an effective approach and support methodology suitable for a low capacity environment in order to help deliver better public services to rural and remote communities in Lao PDR. The DDF has since been expanded to fifty two (52) Districts (of a total of 148 Districts) across the country. DDF aims to sustainably improve local public services delivery through the strengthening of capacity of local district administration and demonstrating improved financial management systems and procedures that can contribute positively in this objective. It does this by providing both discretionary development grants together with capacity development and support to improvements systems and procedures for local development. However, there has been little external research undertaken to date on “assessment of the District Development Fund program as an effective approach to strengthen public service improvement for decentralized and better service delivery in Lao PDR, and whether the District Development Fund program has positively affected the capacity of local authorities to delivery prioritized local public services”. This article addresses this by looking at the empirical results from the DDF program and draws on experiences on how DDF program has been operating and contributing on the ground in building local capacities, in financial management, planning and budgeting, to enhance the local authorities’ ability to finance local priority services. The DDF for government has become the viability and positive results of empowering local authorities and communities as part of public administration reform, that is not only a government fund transfer mechanism a form of fiscal decentralization but also has proven to be very well suited to the low capacity environment in Lao PDR A better people-focused service delivery has mostly been achieved by empowering sub-national administrations to take a more effective role in leading local socio-economic development, which is to bring about tangible improvements in public services to people and a real reduction in local poverty. The most significant lesson of the DDF experience in Laos has been its ability to achieve results that have led to improvements in pro poor service delivery combined with improvements in the capacity of local administration in planning, budgeting and monitoring services. A critical lesson in achieving these results has been ensuring that new systems and procedures fully align with existing government processes . This not only helps to improve capacity development but also ensures innovations, which is more cost effective and scalable in future by working through existing governance systems. Greater district and community oversight and accountability result in funds being well spent with minimum leakages. This article, to a large extent, is entering new ground where there is little other independent research or documentation available. Thus the approach relies on conducting structured evaluation dialogue with the direct stakeholders, including the Ministry of Home Affairs, Governance of Public Administration Reform /District Development Fund project team, national and local practitioners and representatives of the communities involved, combined with a review of the available documents and data. The methodological tools used were interviews, workshops, focus group discussions, data analysis and document review. Keywords: Service delivery, Building capacity, Financial management, Planning and budgeting management, Local authority, District development fund approach.
David Nyange, David Tschirley, Hussein Nassoro, Abeid Francis Gaspar · 8 authors
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Rural taxation policy is a major issue in many countries of Africa as they pursue more decentralized forms of governing and at the same time work to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of their tax systems. Tanzania has struggled with this issue since at least 1962, when it expanded countrywide the limited decentralization that had occurred under the colonial regime, then abolished LGAs in 1972 in favor of “Madaraka Mikoani,” only to reinstate them and enshrine them in the constitution in 1984. With wide powers to set tax policy and practice at local level, made possible by the Local Government Finance Act (LGFA) of 1982, Tanzania soon experienced a dizzying array of taxes and fees, with dramatically differing rates across LGAs. The situation became so extreme that some claimed that Tanzania by the late 1990s had “about 110 local authorities ... each with a different tax system” (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000). A sustained effort at reform culminated in 2003, when the “head tax” and a series of “nuisance taxes” were abolished, and the produce cess was limited to a maximum of 5% (compared to rates as high as 20% in the past). Though the resulting system of local taxation is substantially less complex, less variable across LGAs, and less onerous than it was prior to these reforms, important problems remain, and stakeholder demands for further reform have been growing. Since the produce cess became the most important source of local revenue after 2003, much of the demand for reform has focused on it. In response to these concerns, GoT included a commitment to “reduce or abolish” produce cess when it signed the G8’s “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” declaration. This study took advantage of a newly available database of LGA revenue and expenditure and complemented it with fieldwork in 27 LGAs with varying levels of reliance on the produce cess. Its overall purpose is to generate new empirical understanding that contributes to the on-going debate on produce cess and that informs the GoT on pros and cons of potential options for reform. Key new findings include: 1. Dependence on the produce cess varies widely among rural LGAs, from 0% of total locally generated revenue in Ngorongoro to 90% in Urambo; 2. Relative to the value of their marketed production, traditional export crops generate more than three times as much cess revenue as do food crops; 3. Much potential cess revenue goes uncollected: nationally, LGAs collect not more than one- quarter of the revenue potentially available from produce cess charges. This low level of collection reflects both limited human and institutional capacity at local level and widespread tax evasion, some of it likely featuring the collaboration of some local officials; 4. Because it is charged on the gross value of production, current cess rates can result in very high tax (even confiscatory) on net revenue among farmers that use a large amount of inputs but experience small net margins; Confirmed previous findings include: 1. With the reforms of 2003, local revenue fell sharply as a share of total LGA revenue, from 20% to a current level of 7%. Central government transfers provide the rest. Such a low share of locally generated revenue makes meaningful decentralization quite challenging. 2. Nationally, cess contributes only 1.8% of total LGA revenue, with other local taxes accounting for 5%; 3. Yet cess is the largest source of rural LGA own revenue, at 43%. Because this revenue is very flexible (it does not come with the spending dictates that accompany central government transfers), it is highly valued by local authorities, and is largely used for Councilor allowances and other “costs of doing business”; 4. Cess rates are highly variable across LGAs, varying by a factor of as much as four (Beans in Handeni at Tshs 1000/bag vs. Lushoto at Tshs 4000/bag); 5. Tax evasion is widespread and likely a more serious problem than tax avoidance; 6. But avoidance – farmers or traders or others changing their production and marketing behavior due to the tax (and especially due to the variation over space in tax rates) – can be a serious problem in particular instances. For example, some sugarcane growers in Mvomero are considering shifting their farming activities to Kilombero due to lower cess rates in the latter; and farmers and traders report that traders favor some districts over others in their food trade due to differences in cess rates; Reform options include: 1. Abolish cess in one step 2. Gradual phasing out of cess 3. Reduce the cess rate, broaden its base, and improve capacity for collection 4. Institute a differential cess for food- and non-food crops 5. Completely remove cess in food crops, leaving it only for traditional and other export crops. Simple simulations of option 3 combined with option 4 (3% for traditional cash crops, 2% for food crops) indicate that LGAs would need to improve their efficiency in collection (the share of potential cess that is actually collected) from the current estimated 28% to 41% to maintain revenue, and would increase revenue with further improvements. Complete elimination of cess on food crops (option 5) would make LGA’s jobs quite challenging, especially if rates were reduced on traditional export crops. Leaving the rate on these crops unchanged at 5%, LGAs would have to achieve nearly 60% efficiency in their collection to maintain their current revenues; dropping the cess on traditional export crops to 3% while eliminating it on food crops would require an almost certainly unattainable 83% efficiency. Based on the analysis in the paper, and in keeping with the view that improvement in tax systems is a long-term process featuring continuous, incremental improvement, the report suggests that option 3 combined with option 4 – reducing the rate of the cess (thereby reducing its variability over space), introducing a slight differential between food crops and traditional export crops, and broadening the cess collection base by working continuously to improve the human and institutional capacity of LGAs to collect taxes in efficient and fair fashion, is likely to be the best option for Tanzania. Piloting of technological and institutional innovations such as the use of mobile money for cess payment are proposed as one way to address both the inadequate local capacity and the scope for corruption in cess collection.
This study focuses on the subnational governments’ revenues, their productivity and contribution to the total budget of the region. In Ethiopia, the regions get significant amount of revenue from the central government’s block grant and their revenue sources generate very small amount of revenues and their tax bases are also very narrow. The study describes the revenue contribution of tax and non-tax bases separately and their trends throughout the periods. Moreover, it distinguishes specific revenue sources and their productivity, consistency of revenues from specific sources to finance local needs, and challenges in administration of their own revenue sources. Key w ords : Fiscal federalism, block grant, tax revenues, non-tax revenues, government budget.
Jackson O Otieno, Paul A. Odundo, Charles M. Rambo
The Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) is an intergovernmental transfer system, supplementing the financing of service delivery within the framework of fisc0al decentralization. LATF’s objectives are to improve service delivery, enhance financial management and accountability as well as reduce debts accumulated by local authorities. The purpose of this study was to establish the influence of LATF on service delivery by local authorities, focusing on Siaya Municipal Council. We gauged residents’ perspectives about improvement of water supply, garbage collection, and sewerage services. We sourced primary data from 188 household heads and 202 market traders. The study found that 63.2% of the participants believed that there was no change in water supply consistency, while 69.5% reported the same about adequacy of water provided by the Council. Besides, 55.6% of the participants indicated that garbage collection had deteriorated, while 63.8% said the same about sewerage services. The findings suggest that access to LATF resources over the preceding decade had not improved service delivery in Siaya Municipality. Delivery of services was constrained by political interference (57.4%), procurement malpractices (44.1%), weak revenue base (38.7%), and understaffing (33.1%), among other factors. In view of this, local authorities should shape up to meet the current service demand, as well as gear up to address the needs of urban population, which is set to grow over the coming years.
Since the seminal work of Oates (1972) on scal federalism, a central question of public finance has been which level of a federation should be as- signed the provision of public goods. In this paper we study the problem of a government that is to choose the optimal centralization/decentralization mechanism for the final treatment of municipal solid waste. We analyze incentives, equilibria and implications of the governance framework for the disposal of waste. The key decisions revolve around the mobility of waste and the externalities (pollution) associated with its disposal, be it incineration or landfill. Moreover, if the Regions are characterized by different levels of efficiency in the processes they apply to the final treat- ment of waste, in theory a certain degree of waste mobility across regions should allow to reap the benefits of higher efficiency. On the other hand, as transportation and other environmental costs implied by mobility and concentration are significant, a trade-off emerges. Our model evaluates the implications of that trade-off for the optimal degree of decentralization in waste management.
The implications of delegating fiscal decision making power to sub-national governments has become an area of significant interest over the past two decades, in the expectation that these reforms will lead to better and more efficient provision of public goods and services. The move towards decentralization has, however, not been homogeneously implemented on the revenue and expenditure side: decentralization has materialized more substantially on the latter than on the former, creating vertical fiscal imbalances. These imbalances measure the extent to which sub-national governments' expenditures are financed through their own revenues. This mismatch between own revenues and expenditures may have negative consequences for public finances performance, for example by softening the budget constraint of sub-national governments. Using a large sample of countries covering a long time period from the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, this paper is the first to examine the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances on fiscal performance through the accumulation of government debt. Our findings suggest that vertical fiscal imbalances are indeed relevant in explaining government debt accumulation, and call for a degree of caution when promoting fiscal decentralization.
The purpose of this article is to compare systems of fiscal decentralization in EU member states according to selected quantitative criteria. The results indicate that a higher number of lower levels of government usually indicate a greater share of local finance; however, this finding does not confirm the inverse link. Although the structure of expenditures is similar, the shares of funds for the implementation of individual tasks differ significantly. On average, the countries allocate most funds to education, social security, healthcare, and administration, with only a quarter of the countries recording the same or higher amounts of revenues than expenditures. Most countries still cover the existing deficit through transfers from the central government, equalization schemes, or borrowed funds.
The purpose of an article is to compare systems of fiscal decentralization in EU member states according to selected quantitative criteria and European Charter of Local Self-Government principles. The results show that a higher number of lower levels of government usually indicate a greater share of local finance within the total public finance, however, this finding does not confirm the inverse link. Even though the structure of expenditures in EU countries is similar, the shares of funds for the implementation of individual tasks differ significantly. On average, the countries allocate most funds to education, social security, healthcare, administration and political systems, with only a quarter of the countries recording the same or higher amounts of revenues than expenditures. Most of the countries still cover the existing deficit either through transfers from the central to lower levels of government or through equalization schemes or borrowing, which otherwise represents a departure from one of the basic principles of the Charter, which stipulates that financial resources must be commensurate with the responsibilities of local self-government.
This paper critically accounts for why fiscal decentralization does not necessarily enhance revenue autonomy in the experience of Taiwan, as local governments do not pursue it. This experience is especially relevant to unitary countries that are undergoing both democratization and fiscal decentralization. This paper shows that, with inter‐jurisdictional competition, democratically elected local governments are inclined to pursue tax harmonization and have little incentive to maximize taxing powers even though doing so increases own‐source revenues. The local governments in Taiwan take a ‘mini‐max’ fiscal strategy, which involves minimizing changes to own‐source revenues while maximizing local expenditures. To finance increasing expenditures as a response to the demands of constituencies, local governments tend to press the central government to increase local government's tax bases, and to try to gain a greater share of intergovernmental transfers by having their administrative status upgraded. In summary, revenue autonomy is not being pursued by local governments because of political considerations. In a decentralized fiscal system, local governments can be fiscally accountable, but still irresponsible .
Alina Florentina Cucos, Кукош, А., Trif, N., Триф, Н. · 5 authors
Water supply and sewerage services represent utilities that must be provided to all users, both the urban and the rural. The responsibility to ensure these services in terms of non-discrimination and affordability belongs to the local authorities, which in the spirit of decentralization have exclusive jurisdiction on their establishment, organization and operation. Regardless of the chosen management, the funding of water supply and sewerage services, is accomplished by means of the prices and tariffs paid by the users. Their quantum, specific to some social services, covers the costs without allowing the accumulation of consistent profit margins, which would ensure the development of the specific infrastructure from the operators' own funds. It is therefore necessary that funding for the creation and rehabilitation of water supply and sewerage systems to be provided from other sources than the budgets of operators, such as: budgetary allocations of local public authorities, government or European funding programs. This paper is of interest because it captures just how the prices and tariffs for these services are composed, and the entire procedure for foundation, adjustment and modification that follows different rules from those of pricing in the market economy, and it provides a review of the types of programs through which the development of the specific technical-urban infrastructure and the significant increase in the number of users in the past 25 years.
This paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of statewide fiscal limitations—the decentralized government finance archetype—and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants (the conventionally and somewhat misleadingly termed “flypaper effect”) arises in the constrained tax mix irrespective of whether lower or upper limits bind and how it cannot, in general, be taken as a symptom of local government overspending. An empirical application to Italian province panel data provides consistent evidence of the role of corner solutions produced by two-sided tax limits in explaining the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants.
The decentralization process was continuous in Romania starting with 1990, generating the implication of local authorities in local public finance, as a result of exclusives, shared and delegate competences and, so, the necessity of ensuring a good management of resources and expenditures. Therefore, the decentralization of competences / responsibilities from State to local governments was a major Romanian political theme and a first rank component of management of local public finance, as main driving instrument for local development. Specific legal framework of local responsibilities is established both to European and national level. Researchers based on regulation and practice have tried to quantify the responsibilities developing different models to measure local revenue and expenditures autonomy. The paper aims is to identify some models for measuring local expenditure autonomy and to apply for Romania. The study is oriented to measure local expenditure autonomy in Romania using Bell, Ebel, Kaiser and Rojchaichainthorn's model.
This study is the first attempt to examine the determinants of expenditure decentralization at sub-provincial levels in China. The Chinese central government gives detailed guidelines to local governments on public finance, but, ironically, their expenditure assignment is far from being well-regulated. Differences in fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side are enormous among local governments. Employing a panel dataset of 1995–2006, we provide empirical evidence that transfer dependency negatively affects expenditure decentralization in Chinese local governments. It suggests that intermediate governments, i.e., provincial governments, may have “grabbed” central grants for self-interests.
Gover Barja Daza, Sergio Villarroel Böhrt, David Zavaleta Castellón
The second generation fiscal federalism (sGff) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model. findings at the municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spending with local interests due to dominance of transfers over own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers (disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). findings at the prefecturall level are: i) misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAt (national-level tax) due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development objective of the national government.