Krzysztof Gogol, Johnnatan Messias, Deborah Miori, Claudio J. Tessone · 5 authors
Arbitrage can arise from the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same asset in different markets in order to profit from a difference in its price. This work systematically reviews arbitrage opportunities between Automated Market Makers (AMMs) on Ethereum ZK rollups, and Centralised Exchanges (CEXs). First, we propose a theoretical framework to measure such arbitrage opportunities and derive a formula for the related Maximal Arbitrage Value (MAV) that accounts for both price divergences and liquidity available in the trading venues. Then, we empirically measure the historical MAV available between SyncSwap, an AMM on zkSync Era, and Binance, and investigate how quickly misalignments in price are corrected against explicit and implicit market costs. Overall, the cumulative MAV from July to September 2023 on the USDC-ETH SyncSwap pool amounts to $104.96k (0.24% of trading volume).
Darren Shannon, Michael Dowling, marjan zhaf, Barry Sheehan
Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) rose to prominence as a wide-scale implementation of blockchain technology to support the emergence of crypto-asset markets. These nascent digital markets raise questions about the behaviours of investors in the digital economy and their appetite for risk. Using 28,919 auction listings, 4937 sales, and 30,197 Telegram messages, we conduct a field study on the bidding and selling behaviours of NFT investors in a Dutch auction system. We reveal risk-seeking behaviours in our sample of Dutch auction sales. We document that time pressures and value propositions significantly influence NFT investors: fast clock speeds and greater price separations induce underbidding behaviours and are associated with low value retention for sellers. These results are confirmed using a matched-pairs analysis. Our study raises further questions on the risk preferences of investors in emergent digital marketplaces. We propose value maximisation strategies for marketplace developers and participants, while drawing attention to the presence of potentially exploitable biases and heuristics amongst participants, courtesy of bidding incentivisation schemes significantly altering how investors value NFTs. • We identify the bidding and listing behaviours of NFT investors in Dutch auctions. • 28,919 listings, 4937 sales, and the sentiment of 30,197 messages are examined. • We identify risk-seeking underbidding behaviours from NFT investors. • Time pressures, value propositions, and market experience are influential factors. • Strategies are proposed for NFT developers and traders to maximise profit.
Abstract The following contribution explains how a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) can technologically supplement the governance process in complex environments, in this case urban environments where Fab City is active. DAOs are implementations of the blockchain technology which can be considered as coordination tools and de facto “decentralized ERP* (Enterprise Resource Planning) systems on the internet”. They can enable organizations and communities to address challenges that are otherwise too complex in a tangible, dynamic and sustainable manner which caters to the general need for transition governance. To facilitate collaboration and coordination, the idea of a DAO is to effectively capture the various rule sets, actor constellations and general conditions to address the four universal problems in organizing-task division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information flows. The following conceptualization aims to provide a practical solution alternative to supplement cooperation and coordination between various actors within the wider ecosystem using a DAO. The current state of blockchain and DAO research serves as a rich backdrop when exploring the given opportunity and shedding light on the most important requirements, risks, and success factors. Despite remaining challenges in particular the legal domain, the focus of this article is to showcase how a progressive path forward can lead to a setting in which DAOs can be successfully integrated and become an operational part of an urban environment.
Douglas Wegner, Rovian Dill Zuquetto, Fernando Correa Grisi
Objective: this study aims to review the literature on DAOs in business administration and propose a framework for DAOs compared to the key features of market, hierarchy, and network governance forms and avenues for future research. Methods: we performed a systematic literature review in Scopus and Web of Science databases and identified 69 articles on DAOs published in or before March 2024 in the field of business and management. Results: we describe the main characteristics, opportunities, and challenges for DAOs. Our study also discusses how DAOs can be further explored and how they may or may not fit in different governance and organizational forms. Conclusions: we conclude by offering several guidelines to researchers who want to comprehend the phenomena of DAOs and contribute to theory and practice in business administration.
Paul van Vulpen, H.M. Heijnen, S. P. van Mens, Thijn Kroon · 5 authors
Upgradeable smart contracts allow decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to address bugs, enhance security, and expand functionality post-deployment. The proxy pattern enables smart contract upgradeability but introduces admin-centric governance, where power is concentrated in a single or small number of addresses. This paper explores the potential of decentralized smart contract governance to overcome admin centric governance while achieving flexibility in governing smart contracts. We investigate the Diamond Pattern as a flexible upgradeable contract framework that allows for modular smart contracts. Using the SecureSECO DAO as a case study, we examine how the diamond pattern can be configured for decentralized governance. The used architecture allows DAOs to upgrade smart contracts collectively through community consensus, and the implementation provides proposals, votes, and execution without requiring technical knowledge. The study highlights the benefits of this approach, namely, flexibility in smart contract governance, enhanced modularity, and a single point of interaction for governance. We also discuss limitations and challenges for upgradeable smart contracts such as the decision-making delays and potential vulnerabilities. To encourage adoption of consensus governance, we call for the creation of user-friendly tooling and smart contract facets.
To understand the disruption and implications of distributed ledger technologies for financial reporting and auditing, we analyze firm misreporting, auditor monitoring and competition, and regulatory policy in a unified model. A federated blockchain for financial reporting and auditing can improve verification efficiency not only for transactions in private databases but also for cross-chain verifications through privacy-preserving computation protocols. Despite the potential benefit of blockchains, private incentives for firms and first-mover advantages for auditors can create inefficient under-adoption or partial adoption that favors larger auditors. Although a regulator can help coordinate the adoption of technology, endogenous choice of transaction partners by firms can still lead to adoption failure. Our model also provides an initial framework for further studies of the costs and implications of the use of distributed ledgers and secure multiparty computation in financial reporting, including the positive spillover to discretionary auditing and who should bear the cost of adoption. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge research support from the FinTech Laboratory at J. Mack Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University, the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago, the Ripple University Blockchain Research Initiative, and the Smith AI Initiative for Capital Market Research at the University of Maryland. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02577 .
This note and agenda serve as a cause for thought for scholars interested in researching Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), addressing both the opportunities and challenges posed by this phenomenon. It covers key aspects of data retrieval, data selection criteria, issues in data reliability and validity such as governance token pricing complexities, discrepancy in treasuries, Mainnet and Testnet data, understanding the variety of DAO types and proposal categories, airdrops affecting governance, and the Sybil problem. The agenda aims to equip scholars with the essential knowledge required to conduct nuanced and rigorous academic studies on DAOs by illuminating these various aspects and proposing directions for future research.
Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre
The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) rewards in an on-chain competition, known as the MEV-boost auction. While more than 90% of blocks are currently built via MEV-Boost, trade-offs between builders' strategic behaviors and auction design remain poorly understood. In this paper we address this gap. We introduce a game-theoretic model for MEV-Boost auctions and use simulations to study different builders' bidding strategies observed in practice. We study various strategic interactions and auction setups and evaluate how the interplay between critical elements such as access to MEV opportunities and improved connectivity to relays impact bidding performance. Our results demonstrate the importance of latency on the effectiveness of builders' strategies and the overall auction outcome from the proposer's perspective.
NFTs (Non-Fungible Tokens) have seen significant growth since they first captured public attention in 2021. However, the NFT market is plagued by fake transactions and economic bubbles, e.g., NFT wash trading. Wash trading typically refers to a transaction involving the same person or two colluding individuals, and has become a major threat to the NFT ecosystem. Previous studies only detect NFT wash trading from the financial aspect, while the real-world wash trading cases are much more complicated (e.g., not aiming at inflating the market value). There is still a lack of multi-dimension analysis to better understand NFT wash trading. Therefore, we present the most comprehensive study of NFT wash trading, analyzing 8,717,031 transfer events and 3,830,141 sale events from 2,701,883 NFTs. We first optimize the dataset collected via the OpenSea API. Next, we identify three types of NFT wash trading and propose identification algorithms. Our experimental results reveal 824 transfer events and 5,330 sale events (accounting for a total of \$8,857,070.41) and 370 address pairs related to NFT wash trading behaviors, causing a minimum loss of \$3,965,247.13. Furthermore, we provide insights from six aspects, i.e., marketplace design, profitability, NFT project design, payment token, user behavior, and NFT ecosystem.
We present a comprehensive analysis of the implications of artificial latency in the Proposer-Builder Separation framework on the Ethereum network. Focusing on the MEV-Boost auction system, we analyze how strategic latency manipulation affects Maximum Extractable Value yields and network integrity. Our findings reveal both increased profitability for node operators and significant systemic challenges, including heightened network inefficiencies and centralization risks. We empirically validates these insights with a pilot that Chorus One has been operating on Ethereum mainnet. We demonstrate the nuanced effects of latency on bid selection and validator dynamics. Ultimately, this research underscores the need for balanced strategies that optimize Maximum Extractable Value capture while preserving the Ethereum network's decentralization ethos.
In this paper, we analyze the decentralization features of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) and evaluate the limitations of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) benefits in this context. Our research explores the essential characteristics of consensus algorithms, including security, finality, and efficiency, for CBDCs and considers the trade-off between transaction throughput and decentralization. After examining various options, we conclude that Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof of Stake (PoS) are unsuitable for CBDCs. However, Proof of Authority (PoA), Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS), and Notary Services are promising alternatives. Our findings reveal that while CBDCs possess some decentralization components in their architecture, they still maintain political and logical centralization due to regulation by the Central Bank. Consequently, CBDCs can only partially leverage all the benefits of DLT, such as the ability to withstand challenges, which still depend on the Central Bank as the sole point of failure. This paper aims to equip policymakers with valuable insights to make informed decisions regarding the design of CBDC consensus algorithms.
In this paper, to estimate the risk of economic loss incurred by both parties in production order transactions, we propose a scheme that enables escrow and confirmation of the results without relying on a third party. In such transactions, both parties risk incurring economic losses if the other party behaves dishonestly. Generally, the risk can be reduced with an escrow service provided by a trusted third party. However, there is a risk of fraud by the third party; in some cases, the third party may not be available for the buyer or seller. Several existing schemes utilize fair exchange and blockchain to disburse the deposited payment upon the delivery of specific data. However, in production order transactions, some cases cannot be handled only by completion of delivery, such as disputes that arise when the data does not meet the quality expected by the buyer. In such cases, before the transaction starts, a party would confirm the counterparty’s behavior in past transactions to estimate the risk of a dispute occurring. In this paper, we propose a scheme that records the history of past transaction processes while utilizing blockchain-based escrow and allows future counterparties to confirm the history as a reference for estimating risk. By the opportunity loss that a history of dishonest behavior causes and applying blockchain-based escrow, the scheme motivates sellers and buyers to behave in good faith. We implemented a prototype system on top of Ethereum and verified its feasibility. By expanding the scope of transactions, we expect that it will be possible to determine whether transactions between individuals over the Internet are feasible without relying on a specific escrow service.
A growing number of products use layer 2 solutions to expand the capabilities of primary blockchains like Ethereum, where computation is off-loaded from the root chain, and the results are published to it in bulk. Those include optimistic and zero-knowledge rollups, information oracles, and app-specific chains. This work presents an analysis of layer 2 blockchain strategies determining the optimal times for publishing transactions on the root chain. There is a trade-off between waiting for a better layer 1 gas price and the urgency to finalize layer 2 transactions. We present a model for the problem that captures this trade-off, generalizing previous works, and we analyze the properties of optimal publishing strategies. We show that such optimal strategies hold a computable simple form for a large class of cost functions.
This article describes a case study concerned with modelling the price of wholesale diamonds, as part of a project to develop an online diamond auction platform. The work was extended to exploring how to develop an index that could be used to track market trends of wholesale diamond prices. The approach we used is readily generalised to defining market indices for so-called Collectables, and can provide the basis for construction of derivatives. With the burgeoning interest in new markets of collectables such as those generated by the concept of a Non-Fungible Token, it is reasonable to suppose that there will be concomitant increasing interest in developing derivatives for these markets.
Abstract We consider a situation in which two parties have concluded an efficient contract corresponding to one major bargaining solution. After the parties have agreed on one particular contract, an unanticipated shock may change the contract outcomes in a way that benefits one party but harms the other party. If this happens, they have the option to either stay with the original exchange contract or adjust some contract parameters such as the price. We propose a model to perform such adjustments automatically, to obtain the same bargaining solution as in the initial contract under the restriction that the new contract dominates the outcomes of the original contract. We study several bargaining solutions within this general framework. These bargaining solutions offer various sharing rules to distribute the benefit between the parties. To reflect practical considerations, we only consider adjustments made via one contract parameter (the price), while all other parameters result from the original contract and the random shock. To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach, we also compare it to a full re-negotiation scenario, in which all parameters can be modified within the boundaries resulting after the random shock. However, waiting and re-negotiation might be costly compared to the situation when the smart contract executes the adjustment automatically. Therefore, the automatic adjustment might be more efficient compared to the other types of contracts. We present several numerical examples and run large random simulations, which we also check statistically.
The future distribution grid is a peer-to-peer (P2P) community formed by a large number of active energy agents (AEAs), and renewable energy certificate (REC) trading is an efficient way to realize a low-carbon AEA community. AEAs can trade not only electricity but also RECs among themselves to economically and efficiently meet the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requirements. Aiming to lower the market barrier and increase the trading benefits for market participants, this paper proposes a blockchain-based renewable energy certificate (BCREC) that supports divisible and multiple transactions. The trade process includes four stages: setup, pre-transaction, transaction, and post-transaction. A scheme based on blockchain oracles and smart contracts is implemented to achieve decentralized BCREC issuance and transaction and to support a more flexible trading market. By exploring two typical market scenarios, we verify the advantages of BCREC trading and evaluate its impacts on AEA profits and market efficiency.
Initial coin offering (ICO) is a Web-3 based financing method for ventures, which allows them to use digital assets (e.g., tokens) to raise capital. During an ICO, the entrepreneur has control on ownership; they can choose to issue a very small number of tokens which would allow them to keep “their skin in the game” and retain ownership, or issue all the tokens they hold, which would distribute ownership to investors and have a community-decentralized orientation. While previous literature has identified several factors of ICO success, they have not delved into the role of ownership in ICO success. In this study, we explore whether retaining or distributing ownership during an ICO is more beneficial for raising capital. We find a two-pronged explanation. When looking at ICOs maintaining a higher level of ownership, entrepreneurs are catering to corporate-market logic investors, and we see a U relationship where the optimal percentage in which the entrepreneurs show they have skin in the game at the same time as giving enough to investors. But then, there are ICOs distributing most of its ownership in which entrepreneurs are attracting community-oriented investors, and as such, the higher the distribution the higher the investment. We propose that this is related to how there are different investors audiences’ that will value different practices and ideals and choose differently on what types of projects to invest in. Our research elucidates this new funding source. Nonetheless, future research should investigate these exploratory findings.
We propose a new approach for a secure decentralized and censorless upgrade of existing cryptocurrencies to newly created tokens without interaction from any external information sources (oracles). The proposed scheme is based on burning of existing cryptocurrencies tokens and implemented via the multi-currency auction. The auction is carried out on the blockchain of the new token and implemented using a smart-contract that processes participants' bids of burnt tokens of other cryptocurrencies and supports a new token price discovery algorithm for each cryptocurrency with no oracles or any other trusted source of information. Contrary to traditional ways of getting the new asset, like centralized and decentralized exchanges, etc., our method requires no user registration (as well as no KYC – “know your customer” procedure that requires obligatory client identification) and provides a predicted supply level of the new asset for an adequate price within a model with economically rational participants. We provide the results of decentralized auction simulations implemented for several strategies of user behavior (based on bid prices with normal and log-normal distribution laws), both under the normal operation and in the presence of adversary who follows specific strategies.
Ludéric Van Calck, Alexandre Pacheco, Volker Strobel, Marco Dorigo · 5 authors
Robot swarms are generally considered to be composed of cooperative agents that, despite their limited individual capabilities, can perform difficult tasks by working together. However, in open swarms, where different robots can be added to the swarm by different parties with potentially competing interests, cooperation is but one of many strategies. We envision an information market where robots can buy and sell information through transactions stored on a distributed blockchain, and where cooperation is encouraged by the economy itself. As a proof of concept, we study a classical foraging task, where exchanging information with other robots is paramount to accomplish the task efficiently. We illustrate that even a single robot that lies to others-a so-called Byzantine robot-can heavily disrupt the swarm. Hence, we devise two protection mechanisms. Through an individual-level protection mechanism, robots are more sceptical about others' information and can detect and discard Byzantine information, at the cost of lower efficiency. Through a systemic protection mechanism based on economic rules regulating robot interactions, robots that sell honest information acquire over time more wealth than Byzantines selling false information. Our simulations show that a well-designed robot economy penalises misinformation spreading and protects the swarm from Byzantine behaviour. We believe economics-inspired swarm robotics is a promising research direction that exploits the timely opportunity for decentralised economies offered by blockchain technology.
We study the following problem that is motivated by Blockchains where ``miners'' are serially given the monopoly for assembling transactions into the next block. Our model has a single good that is sold repeatedly every day where new demand for the good arrives every day. The novel element in our model is that all unsatisfied demand from one day remains in the system and is added to the new demand of the next day. Every day there is a new monopolist that gets to sell a fixed supply $s$ of the good and naturally chooses to do so at the monopolist's price for the combined demand. What will the dynamics of the prices chosen by the sequence of monopolists be? What level of efficiency will be obtained in the long term? We start with a non-strategic analysis of users' behavior and our main result shows that prices keep fluctuating wildly and this is an endogenous property of the model and happens even when demand is stable with nothing stochastic in the model. These price fluctuations underscore the necessity of an analysis under strategic behavior of the users, which we show results in the prices being stable at the market equilibrium price.
We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop out after posting bids or if n bidders collude to try to learn the nth bidder's bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden bid value. This allows us to penalize users who abandon bids for exactly the bid value, while supporting simultaneous bidding in multiple auctions with a shared collateral pool. Our protocols are concretely efficient and we have implemented them in an Ethereum-compatible smart contract which automatically enforces payment and delivery of an auctioned digital asset.
Currently, over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built using MEV-Boost, an auction that allows validators to sell their block-building power to builders who compete in an open English auction in each slot. Shortly after the merge, when MEV-Boost was in its infancy, most block builders were neutral, meaning they did not trade themselves but rather aggregated transactions from other traders. Over time, integrated builders, operated by trading firms, began to overtake many of the neutral builders. Outside of the integrated builder teams, little is known about which advantages integration confers beyond latency and how latency advantages distort on-chain trading. This paper explores these poorly understood advantages. We make two contributions. First, we point out that integrated builders are able to bid truthfully in their own bundle merge and then decide how much profit to take later in the final stages of the PBS auction when more information is available, making the auction for them look closer to a second-price auction while independent searchers are stuck in a first-price auction. Second, we find that latency disadvantages convey a winner's curse on slow bidders when underlying values depend on a stochastic price process that change as bids are submitted.
Adithya Bhaskara, Rafael Frongillo, Lindgren, Elias, Maneesha Papireddygari
Liquidity provisioning in automated market makers is the practice of recruiting third-party liquidity providers (LPs) to contribute assets to the market in exchange for fees skimmed off of trades. This paper introduces a general framework for liquidity provisioning in cost function prediction markets. Our most general protocol allows LPs to submit or update an arbitrary cost function that specifies their liquidity over the entire price space. We show that our protocol encapsulates several notions of running market makers in parallel, which we prove to be equivalent. We also recover existing protocols from decentralized finance as special cases. In our protocol, liquidity can be expressed as a matrix-valued function, which we argue is necessary with three or more securities. Due to this inherent multidimensionality, the design of trading fees with three or more securities is nontrivial: we show that natural axioms on the design of these fees are incompatible.
We present and analyze an attack on Ethereum 1's consensus mechanism, which allows miners to obtain higher mining rewards compared to their honest peers. This attack is novel in that it relies on manipulating block timestamps and the difficulty-adjustment algorithm (DAA) to give the miner an advantage whenever block races ensue. We call our attack Uncle Maker, as it induces a higher rate of uncle blocks. We describe several variants of the attack. Among these, one that is risk-free for miners.