Cryptocurrency is a digital currency designed to work as a medium of exchange using cryptography to secure the transactions, to control the creation of additional units, and to verify the transfer of assets. The objective of this study is to evaluate the volatility condition for cryptocurrency (Bitcoin) exchange rate and return. Volatility calculated as standard deviation of logarithmic returns. This study performed normality test using Shapiro-Wilk method. Then, the high volatility detection performed using box-whisker plot and statistical process control chart. In descriptive statistical analysis, the mean for Bitcoin return is 0.006 and the deviation is 0.04458. The standard error indicates the volatility for Bitcoin is 4.458 %. This value is considered as high value of volatility.High value of volatility indicates the investment in Bitcoin is categorical as high risk investment. The important of this study is to assist investors to develop better investment portfolio in targeting better profit and lowering the loss
Bitcoin is a type of crypto-currency that was launched in January 2009 as an emerging digital phenomenon in the financial technology realm by an unknown computer scientist using the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. It is an innovative and independent currency that uses cryptography for its creation and for performing secure transactions. The aim of this article is targeted to introducing into the bitcoin's technology. The survey results and empirical research show that despite the bitcoin benefits over the currency of central authority people do not believe in this crypto-currency because of its speculative character.
Best known for their role in the creation of cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, blockchains are revolutionizing the way technology entrepreneurs finance their business enterprises. In 2017 alone, tech entrepreneurs raised over $6 billion through the sale of blockchain-based digital tokens, with some sales lasting mere seconds before selling out. In a token sale, also referred to as an “initial coin offering” or “ICO,” organizers of a project sell digital tokens to members of the public to finance the development of new technological platforms and services. After the initial sale, cryptocurrency exchanges scattered across the globe list tokens for trading and facilitate an active secondary market in which wild price fluctuations are common.\nThe recent explosion of token sales could mark the beginning of a broader shift in public capital markets. Blockchains drastically reduce the cost of exchanging value and enable anyone to transmit digitized assets around the globe in a highly trusted manner, stoking dreams of truly global capital markets that leverage the power of a blockchain and the Internet to facilitate capital formation. Lacking homogeneity, the status of tokens under U.S. securities laws is unclear. Although the SEC recently issued a Report of Investigation and has initiated several enforcement actions in which it has found that tokens are securities, confusion still surrounds the boundaries between the types of tokens that will be treated as securities and those that will not.\nIn this Article, we argue that the SEC and Congress should provide token sellers and the exchanges that facilitate token sales with additional regulatory certainty and a sensible path to compliance. Specifically, we outline extrinsic and intrinsic factors that courts and regulators should consider when applying the Howey test to digital tokens, adoption of which would help resolve the uncertainty surrounding tokens that mix aspects of consumption and use with the potential for profit. We further propose that lawmakers adopt both a compliance-driven safe harbor for online exchanges that list tokens with a reasonable belief that the public sale of such tokens is not a violation of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 as well as an exemption to the section 5 registration requirement that has been tailored to digital tokens.
Modern law makes currency a creature of the state and ultimately the value of its currency depends on the public’s trust in that state. While some nations are more capable than others at instilling public trust in the stability of their monetary institutions, it is nonetheless impossible for any legal system to make the pre-commitments necessary to completely isolate the governance of its money supply from political pressure. This proposition is true not only today, where nearly all government institutions manage their money supply in the form of central banking, but also true of past private banking regimes circulating their notes under the shadow of public law. However, bitcoin represents a potential third currency regime far more resistant to state control because it mints currency units that exist in no physical place, places a numerical ceiling on the number of units that can be created, and relies on scientific principles from cryptography to guarantee that ceiling and verify any person-to-person transfer. The trust required is not in any government but in the decentralized order of those who verify bitcoin transactions and those who create the software these verifiers choose to run on their connected computers.\nThis Article explores the fundamental structure of bitcoin, first by demystifying it as a technology, and second by showing how its decentralized order contrasts with other currency regimes. Unlike governments that use the power of law to compel action, bitcoin relies on a system of built-in incentives to encourage behavior that benefits not only those seeking to use bitcoin, but also bitcoin miners—those who voluntarily undertake the task of maintaining the payment network. While currently bitcoin is too volatile to compete with all but the worst government-issued currencies, the qualities of this system may give bitcoin a long-term advantage over many currencies. As the bitcoin ecosystem continues to grow, its nonlegal order can help it climb the rungs of stability created by distrust in government.\nThe technology underpinning bitcoin is the next point of innovation in the digital age—the same era that has already seen software create institutional disruption from Amazon, Facebook, and Uber, among many others. As bitcoin gains in popularity, it offers a platform for other kinds of technological alternatives to traditional legal regimes, like smart contracts. Bitcoin’s order without currency law will facilitate other forms of order with less law.\nThis is a propitious time for fundamental examination of bitcoin. Despite experiencing significant speculation and volatility throughout late 2017 and early 2018, its ten-year history demonstrates a downward trend in volatility and an upward trend in market capitalization.
Abstract Distributed ledger technology, a variant of which is blockchain technology, represents one of the most important innovations of the FinTech revolution. Academics, policy-makers, and market participants are experimenting with the technology with the aim of enhancing the functioning of financial markets. Industry consortia are being formed by the biggest financial institutions in the world seeking to leverage the use of the technology, in order to improve the clearing and settlement process. Furthermore, central banks in advanced and developing economies are examining the potential of using the technology in market infrastructures operated by central banks and are even exploring the possibility of issuing digital base money. Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of distributed ledger technology as envisioned by its ardent supporters encounters considerable legal obstacles, including the numerous new regulations imposed on financial markets and market participants in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. This chapter seeks to disentangle the myths from the realities of the so-called distributed ledger technology or blockchain revolution and discusses how the legal regime can act both as an impediment and a catalyst to the widespread adoption of the technology.
Friedrich Holotiuk, Francesco Pisani, Jürgen Moormann
Because of its potentially disruptive influence on business models (BMs), blockchain technology has sparked a lively debate among researchers. Our Delphi study sets out to explore the impact of blockchain in payments, which represents a major cornerstone of banking and the cradle of this technology. The results, grouped around four areas of thoughts, indicate that blockchain allows the offering of new services and renders some of the current ones obsolete. This consequently impacts the financial structure of firms in the payments industry and further generates great potential for new BMs while making some existing ones obsolete. Eventually, new players, which are better able to leverage the po-tential of blockchain, will give a strong impulse to this development. Our findings contribute to the literature by providing new insights about the impact of innova-tive technologies on BMs and have further practical implications by presenting a better understanding of future BMs in payments.
The focus of economists in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies has been on its monetary aspects, particularly its deflationary nature, its fungibility, and its disruption of modern monetary mechanisms. This discussion paper draws the focus away from monetary discourses towards fiscal ones, drawing on the case study of Bulgaria and the confiscation of Bitcoins of a magnitude as to pay off a substantial component of its fiscal burden. The paper thereby raises questions about the role that cryptocurrencies may play, tangentially if not directly, in fiscal policy considerations.
This research explores the effects of adding bitcoin to an optimal portfolio (naïve, long-only, unconstrained and semi-constrained) by relying on mean-CVaR in the Chinese market. Then backtesting to compare the performance of portfolios with and without bitcoin for each scenario is perfomed. Results show significant but weak correlations between various asset classes and bitcoin, implying a more mature financial profile of bitcoin in China compared to that in the west. Backtesting results show that the effect of adding bitcoin to optimal portfolios is not consistent over the entire out-of-sample period. The naïve and the long-only strategy improved the risk-reward ratio up until the late 2013 price-crash with no significant advantages thereafter. Shorting strategies on the other hand, with or without leverage, fail to produce more efficient portfolios when bitcoin is added, and this is consistent over the entire out-of-sample period. The results also show that semi-annual rebalancing amplifies the advantages of adding bitcoin to most portfolios except for the semi-constrained portfolio, although the weights analysis show significant shifts in weights which might not represent a feasible strategy in realistic scenarios.