Amir Dembo, Sreeram Kannan, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse · 7 authors
Nakamoto invented the longest chain protocol, and claimed its security by analyzing the private double-spend attack, a race between the adversary and the honest nodes to grow a longer chain. But is it the worst attack? We answer the question in the affirmative for three classes of longest chain protocols, designed for different consensus models: 1) Nakamoto's original Proof-of-Work protocol; 2) Ouroboros and SnowWhite Proof-of-Stake protocols; 3) Chia Proof-of-Space protocol. As a consequence, exact characterization of the maximum tolerable adversary power is obtained for each protocol as a function of the average block time normalized by the network delay. The security analysis of these protocols is performed in a unified manner by a novel method of reducing all attacks to a race between the adversary and the honest nodes.
Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology allows composable programming across permissioned Ethereum blockchains. It allows for inter-contract and inter-blockchain function calls that are both synchronous and atomic: if one part fails, the whole call graph of function calls is rolled back. This paper analyses the processing overhead of using this technique compared to using multiple standard non-atomic single blockchain transactions. The additional processing is analysed for three scenarios involving multiple blockchains: the Hotel - Train problem, Supply Chain with Provenance, and an Oracle. The technology is shown to reduce the performance of Hyperledger Besu from 375 tps to 39.5 tps if all transactions are instigated on one node, or approaching 65.2 tps if the transactions are instigated on a variety of nodes, for the Hotel-Train scenario.
Sean Cao, Lin William Cong, Meng Han, Qixuan Hou · 5 authors
Business transactions by public firms are required to be reported, verified, and audited periodically, which is traditionally a labor-intensive and time-consuming process. To streamline this procedure, we design FutureAB (Future Auditing Blockchain) which aims to automate the reporting and auditing process, thereby allowing auditors to focus on discretionary accounts to better detect and prevent fraud. We demonstrate how distributed-ledger technologies build investor trust and disrupt the auditing industry. Our multi-functional design indicates that auditing firms can automate transaction verification without the need for a trusted third party by collaborating and sharing their information while preserving data privacy (commitment scheme) and security (immutability). We also explore how smart contracts and wallets facilitate the computerization and implementation of our system on Ethereum. Finally, performance evaluation reveals the efficacy and scalability of FutureAB in terms of both encryption (0.012 seconds per transaction) and verification (0.001 seconds per transaction).
Summary Smart contracts can be implemented using either centralized or decentralized (blockchain) platforms. However, for a large class of applications, neither of these two alternatives on its own can provide adequate scalability, performance, quality of service, security, and trust requirements. We argue that for many applications, hybrid solutions that combine both on and off‐blockchain components are more adequate. In this article, we introduce the design and implementation of a novel hybrid smart contract architecture built using the Ethereum blockchain connected to a centralized smart contract management system developed by us. We then compare and evaluate the implementation of an asset tracking service using three different architectures: on‐chain, off‐chain, and hybrid. We demonstrate that using a hybrid architecture, we can substantially improve performance of applications while retaining security and trust for critical tasks.
Yi Liu, Jialiang Peng, Jiawen Kang, Abdullah M. Iliyasu · 6 authors
Federated learning (FL) has recently been proposed as an emerging paradigm to build machine learning models using distributed training datasets that are locally stored and maintained on different devices in 5G networks while providing privacy preservation for participants. In FL, the central aggregator accumulates local updates uploaded by participants to update a global model. However, there are two critical security threats: poisoning and membership inference attacks. These attacks may be carried out by malicious or unreliable participants, resulting in the construction failure of global models or privacy leakage of FL models. Therefore, it is crucial for FL to develop security means of defense. In this article, we propose a blockchain-based secure FL framework to create smart contracts and prevent malicious or unreliable participants from being involved in FL. In doing so, the central aggregator recognizes malicious and unreliable participants by automatically executing smart contracts to defend against poisoning attacks. Further, we use local differential privacy techniques to prevent membership inference attacks. Numerical results suggest that the proposed framework can effectively deter poisoning and membership inference attacks, thereby improving the security of FL in 5G networks.
Yuefeng Du, Huayi Duan, Anxin Zhou, Cong Wang · 6 authors
How to audit outsourced data in centralized storage like cloud is well-studied, but it is largely under-explored for the rising decentralized storage network (DSN) that bodes well for a billion-dollar market. To realize DSN as a usable service in a truly decentralized manner, the blockchain comes in handy -- to record and verify audit trails in forms of proof of storage, and based on that, to handle fair payments with necessary dispute resolution. Leaving the audit trails on the blockchain offers transparency and fairness, yet it 1) sacrifices privacy, as they may leak information about the data under audit, and 2) overwhelms on-chain resources, as they may be practically large in size and expensive to verify. Prior auditing designs in centralized settings are not directly applicable here. A handful of proposals targeting DSN cannot satisfactorily address these issues either. We present an auditing solution that addresses on-chain privacy and efficiency, from a synergy of homomorphic linear authenticators with polynomial commitments for succinct proofs, and the sigma protocol for provable privacy. The solution results in, per audit, 288-byte proof written to the blockchain, and constant verification cost. It can sustain long-term operation and easily scale to thousands of users on Ethereum.
Degree verification is the process of verifying the academic credentials of successfully graduated students. It is a time-consuming and costly process as universities annually spend millions of dollars on handling the degree verification requests. Hence, there is a dire need to improve the degree verification process, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA, has introduced the blockcerts, a blockchain-based solution for freely handling the degree verification requests. Although blockcerts eliminates the cost of the degree verification process, it also alters the existing workflow of degree issuance. This is because blockcerts are primarily focused on facilitating the students, and there is room for improvement from the perspective of educational institutes. In this article, we have introduced the docschain to tackle the three mentioned limitations of the blockcerts. Docschain seamlessly incorporates within the existing workflow of degree issuance by operating over the hard copies of the degree documents. This is achieved through optical character recognition (OCR), and the record of each degree document is stored along with the details of the corresponding OCR template to understand the semantics of the data stored at different sections of the degree document. In contrast to blockcerts, docschain also supports the bulk submission of degree details for both the previously and newly graduated students.
Many important cryptographic primitives offer probabilistic guarantees of\nsecurity that can be specified as quantitative hyperproperties; these are\nspecifications that stipulate the existence of a certain number of traces in\nthe system satisfying certain constraints. Verification of such hyperproperties\nis extremely challenging because they involve simultaneous reasoning about an\nunbounded number of different traces. In this paper, we introduce a technique\nfor verification of quantitative hyperproperties based on the notion of trace\nenumeration relations. These relations allow us to reduce the problem of\ntrace-counting into one of model-counting of formulas in first-order logic. We\nalso introduce a set of inference rules for machine-checked reasoning about the\nnumber of satisfying solutions to first-order formulas (aka model counting).\nPutting these two components together enables semi-automated verification of\nquantitative hyperproperties on infinite state systems. We use our methodology\nto prove confidentiality of access patterns in Path ORAMs of unbounded size,\nsoundness of a simple interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol as well as\nother applications of quantitative hyperproperties studied in past work.\n
Recently emerging Decentralized Finance (DeFi) takes the promise of cryptocurrencies a step further, leveraging their decentralized networks to transform traditional financial products into trustless and transparent protocols that run without intermediaries. However, these protocols often require critical external information, like currency or commodity exchange rates, and in this respect they rely on special oracle nodes. In this paper, we present a comprehensive measurement study of DeFi price oracles deployed in practice. First, we investigate designs of mainstream DeFi platforms that rely on data from oracles. We find that these designs, surprisingly, position oracles as trusted parties with no or low accountability. Then, we present results of large-scale measurements of deployed oracles. We find and report that prices reported by oracles regularly deviate from current exchange rates, oracles are not free from operational issues, and their reports include anomalies. Finally, we compare the oracle designs and propose potential improvements.
Ward Beullens, Tim Beyne, Aleksei Udovenko, Giuseppe Vitto
The Legendre PRF relies on the conjectured pseudorandomness properties of the Legendre symbol with a hidden shift. Originally proposed as a PRG by Damgård at CRYPTO 1988, it was recently suggested as an efficient PRF for multiparty computation purposes by Grassi et al. at CCS 2016. Moreover, the Legendre PRF is being considered for usage in the Ethereum 2.0 blockchain. This paper improves previous attacks on the Legendre PRF and its higher-degree variant due to Khovratovich by reducing the time complexity from O(< (p log p/M) to O(p log2 p/M2) Legendre symbol evaluations when M ≤ 4√ p log2 p queries are available. The practical relevance of our improved attack is demonstrated by breaking three concrete instances of the PRF proposed by the Ethereum foundation. Furthermore, we generalize our attack in a nontrivial way to the higher-degree variant of the Legendre PRF and we point out a large class of weak keys for this construction. Lastly, we provide the first security analysis of two additional generalizations of the Legendre PRF originally proposed by Damgård in the PRG setting, namely the Jacobi PRF and the power residue PRF.
To implement a blockchain, we need a blockchain protocol for all the nodes to follow. To design a blockchain protocol, we need a block publisher selection mechanism and a chain selection rule. In Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based blockchain protocols, block publisher selection mechanism selects the node to publish the next block based on the relative stake held by the node. However, PoS protocols, such as Ouroboros v1, may face vulnerability to fully adaptive corruptions. In this paper, we propose a novel PoS-based blockchain protocol, QuickSync, to achieve security against fully adaptive corruptions while improving on performance. We propose a metric called block power, a value defined for each block, derived from the output of the verifiable random function based on the digital signature of the block publisher. With this metric, we compute chain power, the sum of block powers of all the blocks comprising the chain, for all the valid chains. These metrics are a function of the block publisher's stake to enable the PoS aspect of the protocol. The chain selection rule selects the chain with the highest chain power as the one to extend. This chain selection rule hence determines the selected block publisher of the previous block. When we use metrics to define the chain selection rule, it may lead to vulnerabilities against Sybil attacks. QuickSync uses a Sybil attack resistant function implemented using histogram matching. We prove that QuickSync satisfies common prefix, chain growth, and chain quality properties and hence it is secure. We also show that it is resilient to different types of adversarial attack strategies. Our analysis demonstrates that QuickSync performs better than Bitcoin by an order of magnitude on both transactions per second and time to finality, and better than Ouroboros v1 by a factor of three on time to finality.
In this article, we propose the first self-tallying decentralized e-voting protocol for a ranked-choice voting system based on Borda count. Our protocol does not need any trusted setup or tallying authority to compute the tally. The voters interact through a publicly accessible bulletin board for executing the protocol in a way that is publicly verifiable. Our main protocol consists of two rounds. In the first round, the voters publish their public keys, and in the second round they publish their randomized ballots. All voters provide Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) proofs to show that they have been following the protocol specification honestly without revealing their secret votes. At the end of the election, anyone including a third-party observer will be able to compute the tally without needing any tallying authority. We provide security proofs to show that our protocol guarantees the maximum privacy for each voter. We have implemented our protocol using Ethereum's blockchain as a public bulletin board to record voting operations as publicly verifiable transactions. The experimental data obtained from our tests show the protocol's potential for the real-world deployment.
Inspired by Bitcoin, many different kinds of cryptocurrencies based on blockchain technology have turned up on the market. Due to the special structure of the blockchain, it has been deemed impossible to directly trade between traditional currencies and cryptocurrencies or between different types of cryptocurrencies. Generally, trading between different currencies is conducted through a centralized third-party platform. However, it has the problem of a single point of failure, which is vulnerable to attacks and thus affects the security of the transactions. In this paper, we propose a distributed cryptocurrency trading scheme to solve the problem of centralized exchanges, which can achieve secure trading between different types of cryptocurrencies. Our scheme is implemented with smart contracts on an Ethereum blockchain and deployed on an Ethereum test network. In addition to implementing transactions between individual users, our scheme also allows transactions among multiple users. The experimental result proves that the cost of our scheme is acceptable.
Purpose The purpose of this work is to bridge FL and blockchain technology through designing a blockchain-based smart agent system architecture and applying in FL. and blockchain technology through designing a blockchain-based smart agent system architecture and applying in FL. FL is an emerging collaborative machine learning technique that trains a model across multiple devices or servers holding private data samples without exchanging their data. The locally trained results are aggregated by a centralized server in a privacy-preserving way. However, there is an assumption where the centralized server is trustworthy, which is impractical. Fortunately, blockchain technology has opened a new era of data exchange among trustless strangers because of its decentralized architecture and cryptography-supported techniques. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the author proposes a novel design of a smart agent inspired by the smart contract concept. Specifically, based on the proposed smart agent, a fully decentralized, privacy-preserving and fair deep learning blockchain-FL framework is designed, where the agent network is consistent with the blockchain network and each smart agent is a participant in the FL task. During the whole training process, both the data and the model are not at the risk of leakage. Findings A demonstration of the proposed architecture is designed to train a neural network. Finally, the implementation of the proposed architecture is conducted in the Ethereum development, showing the effectiveness and applicability of the design. Originality/value The author aims to investigate the feasibility and practicality of linking the three areas together, namely, multi-agent system, FL and blockchain. A blockchain-FL framework, which is based on a smart agent system, has been proposed. The author has made several contributions to the state-of-the-art. First of all, a concrete design of a smart agent model is proposed, inspired by the smart contract concept in blockchain. The smart agent is autonomous and is able to disseminate, verify the information and execute the supported protocols. Based on the proposed smart agent model, a new architecture composed by these agents is formed, which is a blockchain network. Then, a fully decentralized, privacy-preserving and smart agent blockchain-FL framework has been proposed, where a smart agent acts as both a peer in a blockchain network and a participant in a FL task at the same time. Finally, a demonstration to train an artificial neural network is implemented to prove the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
The latest technological progress in the industrial sector has led to a paradigm shift in manufacturing efficiency and operational cost reduction. More often than not, this cost reduction comes at the price of dismissing information security, especially when multiple stakeholders are involved and the complexity increases. As a further matter, most of the legacy systems and smart factoring processes lack a security by design approach, making them highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Taking into consideration the aforementioned issues, we propose an architectural framework for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) that provides authentication and guaranteed integrity. Our proposal properly addresses the security by design principle while combining some of the emerging technologies like Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) for grounded policy rules and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) for an immutable and transparent registry.
Open access
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Cryptography and Data Security
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Diego Pennino, Maurizio Pizzonia, Andrea Vitaletti, Marco Zecchini
Proving that an endpoint (e.g. URL, telephone number, ecc.) is controlled by a subject is crucial in many applications. In the web, this is witnessed by the widespread adoption of HTTPS. In centralized architectures, this task is usually carried out by trusted certification authorities (CAs). In decentralized applications, for example based on blockchains, or for self-sovereign identity management (SSI), it would be desirable to perform these checks in a decentralized way, relying on the collective behavior of a society of individuals rather than on a single trusted entity. In any case, the result should be a widely usable certificate, as in the centralized CA case. In this paper, we show two blockchain-based methods to prove the association between a subject and an endpoint in a decentralized manner. Our methods are compatible with a wide variety of endpoints and contribute to fill the gap of the current SSI approaches with respect to decentralization. We analyze the security of our proposal and provide a proof-of-concept implementation. We also evaluate performances, costs, and compatibility with current standardization efforts about SSI.
Sean Bowe, Alessandro Chiesa, Matthew Green, Ian Miers · 6 authors
Ledger-based systems that support rich applications often suffer from two limitations. First, validating a transaction requires re-executing the state transition that it attests to. Second, transactions not only reveal which application had a state transition but also reveal the application's internal state.We design, implement, and evaluate ZEXE, a ledger-based system where users can execute offline computations and subsequently produce transactions, attesting to the correctness of these computations, that satisfy two main properties. First, transactions hide all information about the offline computations. Second, transactions can be validated in constant time by anyone, regardless of the offline computation.The core of ZEXE is a construction for a new cryptographic primitive that we introduce, decentralized private computation (DPC) schemes. In order to achieve an efficient implementation of our construction, we leverage tools in the area of cryptographic proofs, including succinct zero knowledge proofs and recursive proof composition. Overall, transactions in ZEXE are 968 bytes regardless of the offline computation, and generating them takes less than 1min plus a time that grows with the offline computation.We demonstrate how to use ZEXE to realize privacy-preserving analogues of popular applications: private user-defined assets and private decentralized exchanges for these assets.
Jiaheng Zhang, Tiancheng Xie, Yupeng Zhang, Dawn Song
We present a new succinct zero knowledge argument scheme for layered arithmetic circuits without trusted setup. The prover time is O(C + nlogn) and the proof size is O(D logC +log2n) for a D-depth circuit with n inputs and C gates. The verification time is also succinct, O(D logC + log2n), if the circuit is structured. Our scheme only uses lightweight cryptographic primitives such as collision-resistant hash functions and is plausibly post-quantum secure. We implement a zero knowledge argument system, Virgo, based on our new scheme and compare its performance to existing schemes. Experiments show that it only takes 53 seconds to generate a proof for a circuit computing a Merkle tree with 256 leaves, at least an order of magnitude faster than all other succinct zero knowledge argument schemes. The verification time is 50ms, and the proof size is 253KB, both competitive to existing systems.Underlying Virgo is a new transparent zero knowledge verifiable polynomial delegation scheme with logarithmic proof size and verification time. The scheme is in the interactive oracle proof model and may be of independent interest.
Philipp Schindler, Aljosha Judmayer, Nicholas Stifter, Edgar Weippl
A reliable source of randomness is not only an essential building block in various cryptographic, security, and distributed systems protocols, but also plays an integral part in the design of many new blockchain proposals. Consequently, the topic of publicly-verifiable, bias-resistant and unpredictable randomness has recently enjoyed increased attention. In particular random beacon protocols, aimed at continuous operation, can be a vital component for current Proof-of-Stake based distributed ledger proposals. We improve upon previous random beacon approaches with HydRand, a novel distributed protocol based on publicly-verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) to ensure unpredictability, bias-resistance, and public-verifiability of a continuous sequence of random beacon values. Furthermore, HydRand provides guaranteed output delivery of randomness at regular and predictable intervals in the presence of adversarial behavior and does not rely on a trusted dealer for the initial setup. Compared to existing PVSS based approaches that strive to achieve similar properties, our solution improves scalability by lowering the communication complexity from $\mathcal{O}\left( {{n^3}} \right)$ to $\mathcal{O}\left( {{n^2}} \right)$ . Furthermore, we are the first to present a detailed comparison of recently described schemes and protocols that can be used for implementing random beacons.
Bitcoin has been a popular research topic recently. Ethereum (ETH), a second generation of cryptocurrency, extends Bitcoin's design by offering a Turing-complete programming language called Solidity to develop smart contracts. Smart contracts allow creditable execution of contracts on EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) without third parties. Developing correct and secure smart contracts is challenging due to the decentralized computation nature of the blockchain. Buggy smart contracts may lead to huge financial loss. Furthermore, smart contracts are very hard, if not impossible, to patch once they are deployed. Thus, there is a recent surge of interest in analyzing and verifying smart contracts. While most of the existing works either focus on EVM bytecode or translate Solidity smart contracts into programs in intermediate languages, we argue that it is important and necessary to understand and formally define the semantics of Solidity since programmers write and reason about smart contracts at the level of source code. In this work, we develop a formal semantics for Solidity which provides a formal specification of smart contracts to define semantic-level security properties for the high-level verification. Furthermore, the proposed semantics defines correct and secure high-level execution behaviours of smart contracts to reason about compiler bugs and assist developers in writing secure smart contracts.
Lodovica Marchesi, Michele Marchesi, Roberto Tonelli, Maria Ilaria Lunesu
Blockchain and the programs running on it, called smart contracts, are increasingly applied in all fields where trust and strong certifications are required. Our work focuses on industrial applications of blockchains and not on cryptocurrencies or tokens. We use frameworks to compare public and permissioned blockchains specifically suited for industrial applications. We also propose a complete solution based on Ethereum to implement a decentralized application, putting together in an original way, components and patterns already used and proven. This solution is characterized by a set of validator nodes running the blockchain using Proof-of-Authority or similar efficient consensus algorithms, by the use of an explorer enabling users to check the blockchain state, and the source code of the smart contracts running on it. From time to time, the hash digest of the last mined block is written into a public blockchain to guarantee immutability. The right to send transactions is granted by validator nodes to users by endowing them with the Ethers mined locally. Overall, the proposed approach has the same transparency and immutability as a public blockchain, largely reducing its drawbacks.
Blockchain is an evolving technology which helps in keeping records and process transactions in decentralized manner. Blockchain is considered as safest medium because of its decentralized nature and many protocols, algorithms which it follows to make sure that transaction are immutable. Blockchain concept basically uses BZT theorem, this is considered as one of secured algorithm to predict secure results. however formal verification approach for the smart contract is still the best way to perform verification. In our paper, we have depicted various algorithm according to which we can verify the smart contract in best possible way.
Although almost all information about Smart Contract addresses is shared via websites, emails, or other forms of digital communication, Blockchains and distributed ledger technology are unable to establish secure bindings between websites and corresponding Smart Contracts. For a user, it is impossible to differentiate whether a website links to a legitimate Smart Contract set up by owners of a business or to an illicit contract aiming to steal users' funds. Surprisingly, current attempts to solve this issue mostly comprise of information redundancy, e.g., displaying contract addresses multiple times in varying forms of images and texts. These processes are burdensome, as the user is responsible for verifying the correctness of an address. More importantly, they do not address the core issue, as the contract itself does not contain information about its authenticity. To solve current issues for these applications and increase security, we propose a solution that facilitates publicly issued SSL/TLS-certificates of Fully-Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) to ensure the authenticity of Smart Contracts and their owners. Our approach combines on-chain identity assertion utilizing signatures from the respective certificate and off-chain authentication of the Smart Contract stored on the Blockchain. This approach allows to tackle the aforementioned issue and further enables applications such as the identification of consortia members in permissioned networks. The system is open and transparent, as the only requirement for usage is ownership of an SSL/TLS-certificate. To enable privacy-preserving authenticated Smart Contracts, we allow one-way and two-way binding between website and contract. Further, low creation and maintenance costs, a widely accepted public key infrastructure and user empowerment will drive potential adaption of Ethereum Authenticated Smart Contracts (AuthSC).