Academic publication of latest research results are crucial to advance the development of all disciplines. However, the current academic publication procedure lacks transparency in the review process, and reviewers do not have strong incentives to provide quality reviews for their peers. This may lead to misconducts in the review process, e.g. an anonymous reviewer may give biased comments to a paper without being noticed since the comments are seldom published for evaluation. In addition, it is ironic that the research community has to pay a lot to access papers reviewed by the community for free, though free sharing of research results is important for research advances.To address the above problems, we propose Open-Pub, a decentralized, transparent yet privacy-preserving academic publication scheme based on the blockchain technology. The blockchain promises transparency in the review process and provides an incentive mechanism based on cryptocurrency, but the privacy requirement in the double-blind review process still needs to be fulfilled. To this end, we first design a threshold identity-based group signature (TIBGS) using verifiable secret sharing to protect identity confidentiality. Then we develop a strong double-blind procedure to protect the identities of authors and reviewers. With this strong double-blind procedure, authors can choose to submit papers anonymously, and validators distribute papers anonymously to reviewers on the blockchain according to their research interests. This process is publicly recorded and traceable on the blockchain so as to realize transparent peer preview. To evaluate its efficiency, we implement Open-Pub based on Ethereum and conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate its performance, including computation costs and processing delay. The experiment results show that Open-Pub is highly efficient in computation and processing anonymous transactions.
Sylvain Chatel, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Juan Ramón Troncoso-Pastoriza, Jean‐Pierre Hubaux
In the digital era, users share their personal data with service providers to obtain some utility, e.g., access to high-quality services. Yet, the induced information flows raise privacy and integrity concerns. Consequently, cautious users may want to protect their privacy by minimizing the amount of information they disclose to curious service providers. Service providers are interested in verifying the integrity of the users' data to improve their services and obtain useful knowledge for their business. In this work, we present a generic solution to the trade-off between privacy, integrity, and utility, by achieving authenticity verification of data that has been encrypted for offloading to service providers. Based on lattice-based homomorphic encryption and commitments, as well as zero-knowledge proofs, our construction enables a service provider to process and reuse third-party signed data in a privacy-friendly manner with integrity guarantees. We evaluate our solution on different use cases such as smart-metering, disease susceptibility, and location-based activity tracking, thus showing its versatility. Our solution achieves broad generality, quantum-resistance, and relaxes some assumptions of state-of-the-art solutions without affecting performance.
There is a great interest in many approaches towards blockchain in providing a solution to record transactions in a decentralized way. However, there are some limitations when storing large files or documents on the blockchain. In order to meet the requirements of storing relatively large data, a decentralized storage medium is produced. IPFS is a distributed file system which is content-addressable. It works very similar to the blockchain network. There are some attempts which take advantage of the blockchain concept and IPFS to design new approaches. Unfortunately, there are some inefficiencies in sharing data using the combination of IPFS and blockchain. In this paper, we proposed a secure file sharing system that brings a distributed access control and group key management by the adoption of the IPFS proxy. The IPFS proxy which plays an important role in the design is adopted to take responsibility for the control policies. The combination of the IPFS server and the blockchain network with the adoption of the IPFS proxy make a secure file sharing system which the members on the system can create new groups or join different groups by their own choice. Although there is no access control mechanism in IPFS server and blockchain network, the secure file sharing system manages the access control policies. The members access files only belong to the group they authorized.
We present a work in progress strategy for implementing privacy in Nano at the consensus level, that can be of independent interest. Nano is a cryptocurrency that uses an Open Representative Voting (ORV) as a consensus mechanism, a variant of Delegated Proof of Stake. Each transaction on the network is voted on by representatives and each vote has a weight equal to the percentage of their total delegated balance. Every account can delegate their stake to any other account (including itself) and change it anytime it wants. The fundamental goal of this paper is to construct a tool for the consensus algorithm to function without knowing the individual balances of each account. The tool is composed of three different schemes. The first is a weighted threshold secret sharing scheme based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme, used to generate a secret amongst a set of distributed parties, which will be a private key of an additive homomorphic ElGamal cryptosystem over elliptic curves. The second is a polynomials commitment scheme used to make the previous scheme verifiable, i.e., without the need for a trusted dealer. Finally, the third scheme is used to decrypt an ElGamal ciphertext without reconstructing the private key, which, because of this, can be used multiple times.
Federated learning enables the development of a machine learning model among\ncollaborating agents without requiring them to share their underlying data.\nHowever, malicious agents who train on random data, or worse, on datasets with\nthe result classes inverted, can weaken the combined model. BlockFLow is an\naccountable federated learning system that is fully decentralized and\nprivacy-preserving. Its primary goal is to reward agents proportional to the\nquality of their contribution while protecting the privacy of the underlying\ndatasets and being resilient to malicious adversaries. Specifically, BlockFLow\nincorporates differential privacy, introduces a novel auditing mechanism for\nmodel contribution, and uses Ethereum smart contracts to incentivize good\nbehavior. Unlike existing auditing and accountability methods for federated\nlearning systems, our system does not require a centralized test dataset,\nsharing of datasets between the agents, or one or more trusted auditors; it is\nfully decentralized and resilient up to a 50% collusion attack in a malicious\ntrust model. When run on the public Ethereum blockchain, BlockFLow uses the\nresults from the audit to reward parties with cryptocurrency based on the\nquality of their contribution. We evaluated BlockFLow on two datasets that\noffer classification tasks solvable via logistic regression models. Our results\nshow that the resultant auditing scores reflect the quality of the honest\nagents' datasets. Moreover, the scores from dishonest agents are statistically\nlower than those from the honest agents. These results, along with the\nreasonable blockchain costs, demonstrate the effectiveness of BlockFLow as an\naccountable federated learning system.\n
Although the iterative double auction has been widely used in many different applications, one of the major problems in its current implementations is that they rely on a trusted third party to handle the auction process. This imposes the risk of single point of failures, monopoly, and bribery. In this article, we aim to tackle this problem by proposing a novel decentralized and trustless framework for iterative double auction based on blockchain. Our design adopts the smart contract and state channel technologies to enable a double auction process among parties that do not need to trust each other, while minimizing the blockchain transactions. In specific, we propose an extension to the original concept of state channels that can support multiparty computation. Then, we provide a formal development of the proposed framework and prove the security of our design against adversaries. Finally, we develop a proof-of-concept implementation of our framework using Elixir and Solidity, on which we conduct various experiments to demonstrate its feasibility and practicality.
David Yakira, Avi Asayag, Ido Grayevsky, Idit Keidar
We study the problem of providing blockchain applications with \emph{economically viable randomness} (EVR), namely, randomness that has significant economic consequences. Applications of EVR include blockchain-based lotteries and gambling. An EVR source guarantees (i) secrecy, assuring that the random bits are kept secret until some predefined condition indicates that they are safe to reveal (e.g., the lottery's ticket sale closes), and (ii) robustness, guaranteeing that the random bits are published once the condition holds. We formalize the EVR problem and solve it on top of an Ethereum-like blockchain abstraction, which supports smart contracts and a transferable native coin. Randomness is generated via a distributed open commit-reveal scheme by game-theoretic agents who strive to maximize their coin holdings. Note that in an economic setting, such agents might profit from breaking secrecy or robustness, and may engage in side agreements (via smart contracts) to this end. Our solution creates an incentive structure that counters such attacks. We prove that following the protocol gives rise to a stable state, called Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, from which no coalition comprised of a subset of the players can agree to deviate. In this stable state, robustness and secrecy are satisfied. Finally, we implement our EVR source over Ethereum.
Abstract Round complexity is one of the fundamental problems in zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems. Non-malleable zero-knowledge (NMZK) protocols are ZK protocols that provide security even when man-in-the-middle adversaries interact with a prover and a verifier simultaneously. It is known that the first constant-round public-coin NMZK arguments for NP can be constructed by assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions (Pass, R. and Rosen, A. (2005) New and Improved Constructions of Non-Malleable Cryptographic Protocols. In Gabow, H.N. and Fagin, R. (eds) Proc. 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Baltimore, MD, USA, May 2224, 2005, pp. 533542. ACM) and has relatively high round complexity; the first four-round private-coin NMZK arguments for NP can be constructed in the plain model by assuming the existence of one-way functions (Goyal, V., Richelson, S., Rosen, A. and Vald, M. (2014) An Algebraic Approach to Non-Malleability. In 55th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2014, Philadelphia, PA, USA, October 1821, 2014, pp. 4150. IEEE Computer Society and Ciampi, M., Ostrovsky, R., Siniscalchi, L. and Visconti, I. (2017) Delayed-Input Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge and Multi-Party Coin Tossing in Four Rounds. In Kalai, Y. and Reyzin, L. (eds) Theory of Cryptography15th Int. Conf., TCC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Baltimore, MD, USA, November 1215, 2017, Part I, Vol. 10677, pp. 711742. Springer). In this paper, we present a six-round public-coin NMZK argument of knowledge system assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions and a three-round private-coin NMZK argument system from multi-collision resistance of hash functions assumption in the keyless setting.
Role-based access control (RBAC) policies represent the rights of subjects in terms of roles to access resources. This research proposes a scalable, flexible and auditable RBAC system using the EOS blockchain platform to meet the security requirements of organizations. The EOS blockchain platform for developing smart contract and decentralized applications (DAPPs) aims to address the scalability problem found in existing blockchain platforms. This smart contract platform aims to eliminate transaction fees while conducting millions of transactions per second. In our proposed approach, the EOS blockchain transparently stores RBAC policies. Administrative roles control access to resources at a higher level according to the way organisations perform operations. An organisation creates roles, role hierarchies and constraints to regulate user actions. Therefore, once an RBAC framework is established, the administrative user (issuer) only needs to grant and revoke roles to support changes in the organisational structure. Our proposed blockchain-based RBAC supports delegation capabilities using gaseless transactions which makes it adoptable and appealing in a large number of application scenarios. Our proposed solution is application-agnostic and well-suited for diverse use cases. Existing state-of-the art security frameworks are not suitable due to the difficulty of scale, higher cost and single point of failure. Consequently, organisations demand a scalable, cost-effective and lightweight access control solution which can better protect their privacy as well. A proof of concept implementation is developed based on the EOS blockchain. Our experimental results and analysis clearly show that our EOS blockchain-based RBAC outperforms existing blockchain platforms in terms of cost, latency, block generation time, contract execution time and throughput.
Gulshan Kumar, Rahul Saha, William J. Buchanan, G. Geetha · 8 authors
A distributed and transparent ledger system is considered for various e-commerce products including health medicines, electronics, security appliances, food products and many more to ensure technological and e-commerce sustainability. This solution, named as 'PRODCHAIN', is a generic blockchain framework with lattice-based cryptographic processes for reducing the complexity for tracing the e-commerce products. Moreover, we have introduced a rating based consensus process called Proof of Accomplishment (PoA). The solution has been analyzed and experimental studies are performed on Ethereum network. The results are discussed in terms of latency and throughput which prove the efficiency of PRODCHAIN in e-commerce products and services. The presented solution is beneficial for improving the traceability of the products ensuring the social and financial sustainability. This work will help the researchers to gain knowledge about the blockchain implications for supply chain possibilities in future developments for society.
BACKGROUND: Genomic data have been collected by different institutions and companies and need to be shared for broader use. In a cross-site genomic data sharing system, a secure and transparent access control audit module plays an essential role in ensuring the accountability. A centralized access log audit system is vulnerable to the single point of attack and also lack transparency since the log could be tampered by a malicious system administrator or internal adversaries. Several studies have proposed blockchain-based access audit to solve this problem but without considering the efficiency of the audit queries. The 2018 iDASH competition first track provides us with an opportunity to design efficient logging and querying system for cross-site genomic dataset access audit. We designed a blockchain-based log system which can provide a light-weight and widely compatible module for existing blockchain platforms. The submitted solution won the third place of the competition. In this paper, we report the technical details in our system. METHODS: We present two methods: baseline method and enhanced method. We started with the baseline method and then adjusted our implementation based on the competition evaluation criteria and characteristics of the log system. To overcome obstacles of indexing on the immutable Blockchain system, we designed a hierarchical timestamp structure which supports efficient range queries on the timestamp field. RESULTS: We implemented our methods in Python3, tested the scalability, and compared the performance using the test data supplied by competition organizer. We successfully boosted the log retrieval speed for complex AND queries that contain multiple predicates. For the range query, we boosted the speed for at least one order of magnitude. The storage usage is reduced by 25%. CONCLUSION: We demonstrate that Blockchain can be used to build a time and space efficient log and query genomic dataset audit trail. Therefore, it provides a promising solution for sharing genomic data with accountability requirement across multiple sites.
Abstract In January 2009, Bitcoin was launched as the first ‘cryptocurrency’, a term used to refer to a ‘digital representation of value’ operating with Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). Commonly known as ‘Blockchain’, DLT has been an object of study in different legal disciplines, which seek to understand its financial and legal impacts. However, international law literature is still silent regarding the impacts that DLT technology could have on the different legal regimes. This article contextualizes DLT as digital governance ‘infrastructure’ that could affect the way that public authority is exercised; in this sense, cryptocurrencies are the product of such infrastructure. Taking this notion into account, it is further argued here that the concept of ‘crypto-investment’ could be useful in international investment law when certain conditions come into play.
Abstract Cryptocurrencies play a major role in the global financial ecosystem. Their presence across different geopolitical corridors, including in repressive regimes, has been one of their striking features. In this work, we leverage this feature for bootstrapping Censorship Resistant communication. We conceptualize the notion of stego-bootstrapping scheme and its security in terms of rareness and security against chosencovertext attacks. We present MoneyMorph , a provably secure stego-bootstrapping scheme using cryptocurrencies. MoneyMorph allows a censored user to interact with a decoder entity outside the censored region, through blockchain transactions as rendezvous, to obtain bootstrapping information such as a censorshipresistant proxy and its public key. Unlike the usual bootstrapping approaches (e.g., emailing) with heuristic security, if any, MoneyMorph employs public-key steganography over blockchain transactions to ensure provable cryptographic security. We design rendezvous over Bitcoin, Zcash, Monero, and Ethereum, and analyze their effectiveness in terms of available bandwidth and transaction cost. With its highly cryptographic structure, we show that Zcash provides 1148 byte bandwidth per transaction costing less than 0.01 USD as fee.
Conventional certificate verification, whether paper-based or backed by a centralized digital registry, remains exposed to forgery, single points of failure, and slow manual cross-checking between issuers, holders, and verifiers. This paper presents a decentralized, blockchain-based framework for issuing, storing, and verifying academic and professional certificates that addresses these weaknesses without placing the full document on-chain. Each certificate is reduced to a SHA-256 hash, signed with the issuing institution's RSA private key, and recorded through an Ethereum smart contract, while the original file is retained off-chain on IPFS and referenced by its Content Identifier. Only institutions that pass a unanimous, vote-based onboarding process administered by a validator consortium are permitted to issue certificates, which constrains the system to a trusted-issuer model while preserving decentralization across the validator set. A hash-mapped Bloom Filter sits in front of the blockchain query path and performs a fast probabilistic existence check, allowing forged or non-existent certificates to be rejected before an on-chain lookup is triggered. A prototype was implemented with Solidity smart contracts on the Ethereum Sepolia testnet, a Node.js/Web3.js application layer, and a React.js frontend with MetaMask-based authentication. Evaluation on the testnet shows that the Bloom Filter pre-check lowers the average lookup time for invalid certificates by roughly 87%, keeps verification of valid certificates under two seconds end-to-end, holds the false-positive rate below 0.5% for up to 50,000 stored certificate hashes, and reduces the gas cost of issuing a certificate to approximately 4.57 USD. These results indicate that combining consortium governance, cryptographic hashing, and probabilistic filtering yields a certificate validation pipeline that is simultaneously tamper-resistant, low-cost, and fast enough for real-time institutional use.
The celebrated result of Fischer, Lynch and Paterson is the fundamental lower\nbound for asynchronous fault tolerant computation: any 1-crash resilient\nasynchronous agreement protocol must have some (possibly measure zero)\nprobability of not terminating. In 1994, Ben-Or, Kelmer and Rabin published a\nproof-sketch of a lesser known lower bound for asynchronous fault tolerant\ncomputation with optimal resilience against a Byzantine adversary: if $n\\le 4t$\nthen any t-resilient asynchronous verifiable secret sharing protocol must have\nsome non-zero probability of not terminating.\n Our main contribution is to revisit this lower bound and provide a rigorous\nand more general proof. Our second contribution is to show how to avoid this\nlower bound. We provide a protocol with optimal resilience that is almost\nsurely terminating for a strong common coin functionality. Using this new\nprimitive we provide an almost surely terminating protocol with optimal\nresilience for asynchronous Byzantine agreement that has a new fair validity\nproperty. To the best of our knowledge this is the first asynchronous Byzantine\nagreement with fair validity in the information theoretic setting.\n
Yanhong Xu, Reihaneh Safavi–Naini, Khoa Nguyen, Huaxiong Wang
Policy-based signatures (PBS) were proposed by Bellare and Fuchsbauer (PKC 2014) to allow an {\em authorized} member of an organization to sign a message on behalf of the organization. The user's authorization is determined by a policy managed by the organization's trusted authority, while the signature preserves the privacy of the organization's policy. Signing keys in PBS do not include user identity information and thus can be passed to others, violating the intention of employing PBS to restrict users' signing capability. In this paper, we introduce the notion of {\em traceability} for PBS by including user identity in the signing key such that the trusted authority will be able to open a suspicious signature and recover the signer's identity should the needs arise. We provide rigorous definitions and stringent security notions of traceable PBS (TPBS), capturing the properties of PBS suggested by Bellare-Fuchsbauer and resembling the "full traceability" requirement for group signatures put forward by Bellare-Micciancio-Warinschi (Eurocrypt 2003). As a proof of concept, we provide a modular construction of TPBS, based on a signature scheme, an encryption scheme and a zero-knowledge proof system. Furthermore, to demonstrate the feasibility of achieving TPBS from concrete, quantum-resistant assumptions, we give an instantiation based on lattices.
Jacob Swambo, Spencer Hommel, Bob McElrath, Bryan Bishop
A bitcoin covenant is a mechanism to enforce conditions on how the control of coins will be transferred in the future. This work introduces deleted-key covenants; using pre-signed transactions with secure key deletion. With this, a general class of covenants are possible without introducing new security risks to bitcoin. There is a range of security models for the key deletion process, but this is subject to a security-convenience trade-off and requires interactivity in a multi-party context. On the other hand, this work makes a compelling case for what can be gained through a soft-fork upgrade to the signature hash system [Dec17] which enables recovered-key covenants through elliptic curve key recovery. This has similar properties to script-based covenant mechanisms proposed previously [Rub20]. Key factors are discussed and compared for the three covenant mechanisms, including; the enforcement process, methods for proving accessibility of funds and whether or not they are bound by a covenant, methods for dynamic fee allocation, the underlying cryptographic assumptions, and their feasibility in single-party, hierarchical and adversarial multi-party contexts. Despite the relative downsides of deleted-key covenants, they are a practical tool for custody protocol design. The comparison shows precisely how soft-fork proposals improve the practicality of bitcoin covenants, through non-interactive enforcement and tighter cryptographic assumptions, to enhance custody protocols and enable some adversarial applications such as payment protocols.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) have emerged as a revolutionary cryptographic technique that enables one party to prove knowledge of a statement without revealing any underlying information. ZKPs play a crucial role in enhancing cybersecurity by enabling privacy-preserving authentication, secure transactions, and data integrity verification. This paper explores the fundamentals of zero-knowledge proofs, including their classifications—interactive, non-interactive, and succinct proofs—along with real-world applications in secure communications, blockchain security, and identity verification. Furthermore, we discuss the challenges of implementing ZKPs and the potential future advancements in this cryptographic field
In recent years, there is an emerging trend that some computing services are moving from cloud to the edge of the networks. Compared to cloud computing, edge computing can provide services with faster response, lower expense, and more security. The massive idle computing resources closing to the edge also enhance the deployment of edge services. Instead of using cloud services from some primary providers, edge computing provides people with a great chance to actively join the market of computing resources. However, edge computing also has some critical impediments that we have to overcome. In this paper, we design an edge computing service platform that can receive and distribute the computing resources from the end-users in a decentralized way. Without centralized trade control, we propose a novel hierarchical smart contract-based decentralized technique to establish the trading trust among users and provide flexible smart contract interfaces to satisfy users. Our system also considers and resolves a variety of security and privacy challenges when utilizing the encryption and distributed access control mechanism. We implement our system and conduct extensive experiments to show the feasibility and effectiveness of our proposed system.
Tactical Data Link (TDL) is a communication system that utilizes a particular message format and a protocol to transmit data via wireless channels in an instant, automatic, and secure way. So far, TDL has shown its excellence in military applications. Current TDL adopts a distributed architecture to enhance anti-destruction capacity. However, It still faces a problem of data inconsistency and thus cannot well support cooperation across multiple militarily domains. To tackle this problem, we propose to leverage blockchain to build an automatic and adaptive data transmission control scheme for TDL. It achieves automatic data transmission and realizes information consistency among different TDL entities. Besides, applying smart contracts based on blockchain further enables adjusting data transmission policies automatically. Security analysis and experimental results based on simulations illustrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed scheme.
As the blockchain 2.0 platform, Ethereum's turing complete programming language and smart contract components make it play an important role in the commercialization of blockchain. With the further development of blockchain applications, the privacy and security issues of Ethereum have gradually emerged. To solve this problem, we proposed a blockchain privacy protection model called RZcash in the previous work. It implements the dynamically updateable and verifiable hiding of the asset information in Ethereum, namely the account balance and transaction amount. However, RZcash does not pay attention to the key redundancy problem that may be caused by the creation of secret accounts. In addition, the large size of proofs gives it high communication costs. In response to these problems, we further improve RZcash. For the key redundancy problem, we construct a new signature scheme based on the ciphertext equivalent test commitment. Moreover, we use the Schnorr signature and bulletproof to improve the corresponding proof scheme in RZcash, thereby reducing the size of proof. Based on these improvements, we propose a decentralized payment system, called RZcoin, based on Ethereum. Finally, we implement the algorithm model of RZcoin and evaluate its security and performance. The results show that RZcoin has higher security and Lower communication cost than RZcash.
Itay Tsabary, Matan Yechieli, Alex Manuskin, Ittay Eyal
Smart Contracts and transactions allow users to implement elaborate constructions on cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Many of these constructions, including operational payment channels and atomic swaps, use a building block called Hashed Time-Locked Contract (HTLC). In this work, we distill from HTLC a specification (HTLC-Spec), and present an implementation called Mutual-Assured-Destruction Hashed Time-Locked Contract (MAD-HTLC). MAD-HTLC employs a novel approach of utilizing the existing blockchain operators, called miners, as part of the design. If a user misbehaves, MAD-HTLC incentivizes the miners to confiscate all her funds. We prove MAD-HTLC's security using the UC framework and game-theoretic analysis. We demonstrate MAD-HTLC's efficacy and analyze its overhead by instantiating it on Bitcoin's and Ethereum's operational blockchains. Notably, current miner software makes only little effort to optimize revenue, since the advantage is relatively small. However, as the demand grows and other revenue components shrink, miners are more motivated to fully optimize their fund intake. By patching the standard Bitcoin client, we demonstrate such optimization is easy to implement, making the miners natural enforcers of MAD-HTLC. Finally, we extend previous results regarding HTLC vulnerability to bribery attacks. An attacker can incentivize miners to prefer her transactions by offering high transaction fees. We demonstrate this attack can be easily implemented by patching the Bitcoin client, and use game-theoretic tools to qualitatively tighten the known cost bound of such bribery attacks in presence of rational miners. We identify bribe opportunities occurring on the Bitcoin and Ethereum main networks where a few dollars bribe could yield tens of thousands of dollars in reward (e.g., \$2 for over \$25K).
Academic credentials are documents that attest to successful completion of any test, exam or act as a validation of an individual's skill. Currently, the domain of academic credential management suffers from large time consumption, high cost, dependence on third-party and a lack of transparency. A blockchain based solution tries to resolve these pain-points by allowing any recruiter or company to verify the user credentials without dependence on any centralized third party. Our decentralized application is based off of BlockCerts, an MIT project that acts as an open standard for blockchain credentials. The project talks about the implementation details of the decentralized application built for BlockCerts Wallet. It is an attempt to leverage the power of the blockchain technology as a global notary for the verification of digital records.