Simona Ibba, Andrea Pinna, Gavina Baralla, Michele Marchesi
Abstract An Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is an innovative way to raise funds and launch a startup. It is also an opportunity to take part in a project, or in a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization). The use of ICO is a global phenomenon that involves many nations and several business categories: ICOs collected over 5.2 billion dollars only in 2017. The success of an ICO is based on the credibility and innovativeness of project proposals. This fund-raising tool contains however some critical issues, such as the use of tokens that have no intrinsic value and do not generate direct liquidity, and the role of investors in the management of the startup. We analyzed if the Lean Startup methodology is helpful to face this critical aspects and we examined some ICOs in which the proposing team states explicitly that a lean startup approach is used.
This article presents a brief overview of the Distributed Ledger Technology, Token Offering and their regulation, if any, in four main jurisdictions, the United States (U.S.), Switzerland, the European Union (EU), and Singapore. It should be noted that is expected to have new developments on the regulatory side, in this and other jurisdictions, of Distributed Ledger Technology and token offerings, Malta, for example, has recently officially stated the creation of the Malta Digital Innovation Authority that will be responsible to regulate and incentivize this industry in Malta and the EU. Distributed Ledger Technology and token offerings are fairly new concepts and are revolutionizing different industries at an incredibly fast pace. The regulators, as well as all other stakeholders, must maintain attention and remain vigilant to any developments in this regard. Conclusively, the Distributed Ledger Technology will, undoubtedly, bring innovative solutions to different industries, especially the financial services industry. As analyzed in the present article, key components previous to launching a token offering, are: define the jurisdiction that will be used for the corporate structure; the categorization of the token; and the applicable regulation accordingly.
Naoyuki Yoshino, Tim Schloesser, Farhad Taghizadeh–Hesary
To achieve the sustainable development goals (SDGs) as well as the Paris Agreement major investments in renewable energy (RE) production are necessary worldwide. In particular, decentralized, small-scale projects offer copious potential to create energy access as well as to contribute to an affordable, reliable and sustainable energy supply system. However, in developing countries such projects often face issues in finding funding. Direct private investment tools like the community-based hometown investment trust (HIT) fund address this issue and offer a way of financing for those projects. Technical developments in the sphere of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) provide the opportunity to increase the fund's transparency and thus to improve its functioning. On that basis, this paper contributes to the literature in two ways: First, it delineates a concrete application of DLTs in the field of green financing, which offers the potential to increase social welfare. Second, the decision problem of investors is modeled, which illustrates through which channel the use of DLTs impacts the investors' behavior.
Much American electoral and policy debate now centers on how best to reignite the nation’s economic dynamism and rebuild its competitive strength. Any such undertaking presents an extraordinary challenge, demanding a correspondingly extraordinary institutional response. This Article proposes precisely such a response. It designs and advocates a new public instrumentality--a National Investment Authority (“NIA”)--charged with the critical task of devising and implementing a comprehensive long-term development strategy for the United States.Patterned in part after the New Deal-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in part after modern sovereign wealth funds, and in part after private equity and venture capital firms, the NIA is an inherently hybrid, public-private entity that combines the unique strengths of public instrumentalities--their vast scale, lengthy investment horizons, and explicit backing by the public’s full faith and credit--with the micro-informational advantages of private market actors. By creatively adapting familiar tools of financial and legal engineering, the NIA overcomes obstacles that ordinarily impede or discourage private investment in critically necessary and even transformative public infrastructure goods. By channeling presently speculative private capital back into the real economy, moreover, the NIA plays an important role in enhancing the resilience and stability of the U.S. and global financial systems.The Article makes original contributions not only to contemporary policy debates over how to revive America’s productive prowess and bring its financial system back into the service of the real economy, but also to current theoretical understandings of “public goods,” “market failures,” and how to provide or address them. It offers an account of what it calls “collective goods”--a broader category than orthodox public goods--as solutions to collective action problems that pervade decentralized markets, hence as goods that can be supplied only through exercises of collective agency. Our NIA proposal operationalizes this theoretical insight by elaborating a specific institutional form that such collective agency can take.
Which is more innovative: the decentralized, diversified firm, or the centralized, more narrowly focused firm? The economics and finance literatures argue that diversified firms have innovation advantages as their operating units have access to an internal capital market. In contrast, the strategy and entrepreneurship literatures argue that managers of these firms suffer from “managerial myopia,” discouraging them from investing in projects with long‐term, uncertain payoffs. We take a fresh look at the relationship between innovation and diversification using a comprehensive sample of diversified and nondiversified firms and a novel approach that teases out the mechanisms influencing the relationship between diversification and innovation. Consistent with conceptual and empirical work in strategy, we find a robust negative correlation between diversification and R&D intensity, suggesting that diversification reduces innovation by discouraging investment. However, our analysis suggests that internal capital market inefficiencies, rather than managerial myopia, is responsible for this observed negative relationship.
The objective of this research is to provide the reader an overview of the distributed ledger technology (DLT), its fundamental challenges, the current and potential future uses in the financial industry, and to suggest future fields of the topic to be researched. The first task of this thesis is trying to answer, “how will the distributed ledger technology impact the financial industry”. Although the thesis will not cover exhaustively all the financial industry’s needs towards the distributed ledger technology, it will give an overview of the DLTs probable usage in the industry. By reading the thesis and especially its use cases from the fields of private equity, and settlement and clearing of public securities’ trading, the reader should get a more accurate answer to the secondary question “how can the public securities and private equity markets use distributed ledger technology in the near future”. The question about the distributed ledger technology’s impact on the whole market is complicated. Despite the amount of financing this technology has acquired in the recent years, there are no new, disruptive or widespread usages for the DLT in the financial industry. However, it is expected that during the next five years, the DLTs become reality. This is due to their enormous potentiality in security, efficiency and automation, which all could save the financial industry up to 50% of their current costs. Additionally, during the same time period, it is highly expectable that some financial service applications, basing on the DLT, will be presented for the consumers by the players from outside the traditional markets. To answer the secondary question, the both markets will face significant changes during the upcoming years: public securities’ post-trade processes will benefit from the more secure and rapid settlement, whereas the private equity market’s whole nature can become a more accessible for both the investors and the businesses seeking for financing.
Talent hits a target others cannot hit, Genius hits a target others cannot see (Arthur Schopenhauer). Bereits 2013 begannen sich neue Kryptowährungsunternehmen zu formieren, die sich von der Wild‐West‐Mentalität der Mt. Gox und der Silk Road abgrenzen wollten. Die entstehenden Kryptowährungsdienstleister – großteils finanziert von US Venture Capital-Gebern – unterwerfen sich teils freiwillig den Know Your Customer (KYC) Bestimmungen der Finanzaufsichtsbehören. Gleichzeitig entstanden Kryptowährungsstartups, deren Gründer die Meinung vertraten, dass eine Kooperation mit den Finanzinstituten bzw. den Fiatwährungen statt Konfrontation wirtschaftlich sinnvoller wäre und damit begannen, neue Kryptotransaktionssysteme mit dieser Zielrichtung zu entwickeln (beispielsweise Ripple Lab vgl. auch Abschn. 14.2.). Zeitgleich – auch hier spielten die Interessen der investierten Venture-Capital-Geber eine wichtige Rolle – begannen Startups intensiv am Einsatz des Bitcoin‐Transaktionssystems für alternative Zwecke zu arbeiten. Dabei wird unterschieden in:
Dominic Wörner, Thomas von Bomhard, Yan-Peter Schreier, Dominik Bilgeri
The Bitcoin ecosystem has grown tremendously in recent years.While the main sectors of growth and venture capital funding have been infrastructure for the Bitcoin ecosystem itself as well as financial services, there is also a more recent evolution in sectors beyond financial services.We classify the venture-capital backed start up ecosystem accordingly and present its evolution over time.Thereby, we identify interesting sectors, i.e. digital assets, marketplaces, and notary services.Each sector is further subdivided, and six representative venture-backed start-up companies are presented in comprehensive case studies.We extract the core innovations and Bitcoin features on which these are based.Finally, we critically discuss their disruptive potential.
This dissertation addresses the assembly of organizational resources by technology ventures. We study how innovative firms acquire human and financial capital and then organize those resources, and how public policy affects that capability.\nIn the first chapter, we study the role of information in organizational decision-making for the financing of entrepreneurial ventures. We formally model a decentralized set of agents who vote strategically to allocate resources to a project with unknown outcome; they can each acquire costly information to improve their decision quality. We test our predictions in the setting of venture capital, where partners make their own angel investments outside of their employer. We find that the venture capital partners, acting independently, make riskier investments into younger firms with less educated and younger founding teams, but these investments perform better on some metrics even when controlling for investment size and stage. Geographic distance and liquidity constraints increase the probability the investment is taken up by a partner and not the VC.\nIn the second chapter, we evaluate the impact of skilled immigration on U.S. innovation by exploiting a random lottery in the H-1B visa program. Proponents argue that immigration allows firms to access technical skills and promote innovation, while opponents argue that firms substitute domestic labor for cheaper but equally or less skilled foreign labor. We find that winning an H-1B immigrant does not significantly increase patent applications or grants at the firm level, and there is pervasive use of the program in industries where patenting is not the main value-appropriation strategy.\nIn the third chapter, we study how a firm should organize the diversity of technical experience, contained within its pool of inventive human capital, for firm-level innovation. Using a sample of biotechnology start-ups, we examine the implications of alternate firm-level design regimes, drawing on both a firm-year panel structure and an inventor-year difference-in-differences empirical approach. Organizing a firm's human capital with greater across-team diversity yields increased firm-level innovation benefits as compared to organizing with greater within-team diversity. The benefits of across-team diversity stem mainly from the influence of that regime on team stability.
Abstract We show how decentralized individual investments can efficiently allocate capital to innovating firms via equity crowdfunding. We develop a model where consumers have privately known consumption preferences and may act as investors. Consumers identify worthwhile investments based on their own preferences and invest in firms whose product they like. In the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty, an efficient capital allocation is achieved if all groups of consumers have enough liquidity to invest. If some groups of consumers cannot invest, capital flows reflect preferences of liquid investors but not future demand. Comparing with traditional financing forms, crowdfunding in the absence of liquidity constraints can be superior unless traditional financiers are fully competitive and perfectly informed.
Jan 1, 2016·Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Maximilian Friedlmaier, Andranik Tumasjan, Isabell M. Welpe
The blockchain (i.e., a decentralized and encrypted digital ledger) has the potential to disrupt many traditional business models. This study investigates the emerging blockchain business-application landscape by analyzing its industry, venture capital funding, and regional distribution. By matching four venture databases on blockchain-based startups we create a unique database to analyze the technology from a diffusion of innovation theoretical perspective. First, our results show that blockchain startups are present across all industry segments and are most prominently represented in the Finance & Insurance and Information & Communication industries. A fine-grained analysis of financial services yields increasing novel applications in existing service offerings. Second, we find that mainly Finance & Insurance and Information & Communication industries are funded by venture capital, but that blockchain startups are present across all industries. Third, our regional distribution analysis of the emerging ventures identifies two leading geographical blockchain clusters (i.e., the US and UK).
This thesis examines how Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) could be utilized in capital markets in general and in the Nordic capital market in particular. DLTs were introduced with the so called cryptocurrency Bitcoin in 2009 and has in the last few years been of interest to various financial institutions as a means to streamline financial processes. By combining computer scientific concepts such as public-key cryptography and consensus algorithms DLTs make it possible to keep shared databases with limited trust among the participators and without the use of a trusted third party. In this thesis various actors on the Nordic capital market were interviewed and their stance on DLTs were summarized. In addition to this a Proof of Concept of a permissioned DLT application for ownership registration of securities was constructed. It was found that all the interviewees were generally optimistic about DLTs potential to increase the efficiency of capital markets. The technology needs to be adopted to handle the capital markets demand for privacy and large transaction volumes, but there is a general agreement among the interviewees that these issues will be solved. The biggest challenge for an adoption of DLTs seem to lie in that of finding a common industry-wide standard.
Over the last decade, information technology has contributed significantly to the evolution of financial markets, without, however, revolutionising the way in which financial institutions interact with one another. This may be about to change, as some market players are now predicting that new database technologies, such as blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), could be the source of an imminent revolution. This paper analyses the main features of DLTs that could influence their potential adoption by financial institutions and discusses how the use of these technologies could affect the European post-trade market for securities. The original protocol underlying DLTs has its roots in the anarchic world of virtual currencies, which operate outside the conventional financial system. The public debate on DLTs has also been very much focused on the revolutionary potential of the technology. This paper concludes that, irrespective of the technology used and the market players involved, certain processes that feature in the post-trade market for securities will still need to be performed by institutions. DLTs could, however, stimulate a reorganisation of financial markets, which could in turn: (i) reduce reconciliation costs, (ii) streamline the post-trade value chain, and (iii) allow more efficient use to be made of collateral and regulatory capital. It should, nevertheless, be remembered that research into DLTs and their uses is at an early stage. The scope for financial institutions to adopt DLTs and their potential impact on mainstream financial markets are still unclear. This paper discusses three potential models of how market players could adopt DLTs for performing core post-trade functions. The DLT could be adopted either: (i) in clusters, (ii) collectively, or (iii) peer to peer. The evaluation of the three adoption models assumes that they are all equally compatible with the regulatory framework. It shows that, assuming this to be the case, they would each have different advantages and costs. JEL Classification: G21, G23, L15, O33
Applying the Monti-Klein framework, we examine the optimal financing strategy of a fi rm that requires funding for individual projects at an imperfect credit market. In particular, we study under which circumstances the firm should raise debt for projects separately (decentralized funding) or jointly (centralized funding) and how this organizational choice af fects the selection and resource allocation among projects. We fi nd that it is optimal to decentralize funding when competition at the credit market and the fi rm s level of equity are both either rather low or rather high. In this case, funding the strongest projects is optimal. For intermediate values of competition and equity, centralized funding is optimal. In this case, bundling strong projects with weak projects can be optimal (corporate socialism). All these funding strategies serve winner picking, i.e. the firm shifts disproportionately more funds to the pro table projects. In contrast to previous literature, winner picking and corporate socialism are not necessarily exclusive; rather, corporate socialism allows winner picking more aggressively.
This manuscript builds on my existing research program that (a) broadly seeks to analyze laws, regulations, instruments, and policy levers that inhibit a market’s ability to recognize an asset’s intrinsic value, whether in terms of financial, social, or human capital, and (b) explores and advances interdisciplinary corporate governance theories by employing a heterodox economic analytic to derive its proposal to the paradox of an unregulated virtual currency market (Bitcoins) and an overly regulated crowdfunding market (Kickstarter). The manuscript functions not only as an homage to Charles MacKay’s legendary 1841 book, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, which described the human, social, and economic psychology of financial bubbles — particularly the Dutch tulip bulb bubble — but also as an offering of problems and proposals that crowdfunded and Kickstarted entrepreneurial businesses, including those funded by Bitcoin currencies, present for a wide swath of societal stakeholders. To describe the problem, this manuscript (i) describes behavioral finance, (ii) details the new entrepreneurial business possibilities that virtual currencies and crowdfunded entities can explore, (iii) describes how current rules and regulations represent unnecessary constraints to traditional equity-based funding models and concerning governance models of entrepreneurial enterprises, and (iv) questions why one form of capital deployment (currencies) may provide equity-like returns and unique governance, while the other form of investing (crowdfunding), provides only soft-dollar-like returns and no governance for middle-class investors. While both virtual currencies and crowdfunding represent risks, including economic bubble risk, this Article believes that a heterodox economic analysis demonstrates unnecessary constraints on entrepreneurial businesses imposed by extant regulation, regulators, and law and policymakers. To assuage these paradoxic problems for emerging business enterprises, this Article proposes a minarchist heterodox solution of modest statutory language that requires market-based solutions that employ needed risk reduction strategies while redeploying necessary capital to private startup business enterprises. This proposal thus benefits the middle class entrepreneurs, suppliers of capital, and job seekers harmed by the current regulatory regime, while permitting for an expansion of the U.S. and global economies.
Abstract We study transactions in which sellers fear being underpaid because their outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize various observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. Key to these solutions is granting the seller upside participation. In contrast, the lemons problem calls for granting the buyer downside protection. But, in either case, the seller (buyer) receives a convex (concave) claim. Thus, contracts usually associated with the lemons problem, such as debt or cash-equity offers, can be equally well manifestations of the smart buyer problem, although the two information asymmetries have opposite cross-sectional implications. Received December 23, 2014; accepted May 23, 2016 by Editor Uday Rajan.
Jeff Greene, Dennis Purcell, Brian Edelman, Doug Giordano · 9 authors
In a roundtable published in this journal a year ago, there was a clear consensus that the R&D function in big pharma was inefficient and in need of major restructuring, possibly through increased investments by venture capital and private equity firms. In this discussion, an accomplished group of industry practitioners begins by looking at the prospects for both venture capital and private equity to play meaningful roles in financing early‐ and mid‐stage drug development. In so doing, they explore questions like the following: Are there ways for big pharma and biotech to reduce “science risk” and make R&D funding more profitable and attractive to venture capital and private equity—and perhaps even hedge funds? What roles do you see for specialty PE firms like Symphony Capital and Paul Capital, which are now bundling mid‐stage development assets and securitizing royalties? Then the panelists turn to the broader life sciences industry and consider the outlook for leveraged private equity transactions involving marketed products, late‐stage development, and services. Here they consider issues like the following: Will PE be attracted to less‐R&D‐intensive activities like medtech and generics? Have the recent consolidation through mergers and reorganization of big pharma into decentralized business units created opportunities for carve‐outs of certain businesses? For big pharma and life sciences companies in general, the answers to such questions point to greater specialization and focus achieved partly through strategic alliances with venture capital, private equity, and even hedge funds, and involving marketed products and services as well as early‐stage drug development.
Mira Belenkiy, Melissa Chase, Markulf Kohlweiss, Anna Lysyanskaya
Abstract. Efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are a powerful tool for solving many cryptographic problems. We apply the recent Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system for pairing product equations (Eurocrypt 2008) to two related cryptographic problems: compact e-cash (Eurocrypt 2005) and simulatable verifiable random functions (CRYPTO 2007). We present the first efficient compact e-cash scheme that does not rely on a random oracle. To this end we construct efficient GS proofs for signature possession, pseudo randomness and set membership. The GS proofs for pseudorandom functions give rise to a much cleaner and substantially faster construction of simulatable verifiable random functions (sVRF) under a weaker number theoretic assumption. We obtain the first efficient fully simulatable sVRF with a polynomial sized output domain (in the security parameter). 1
We examine the pyramidal ownership structure of a large sample of newly listed Chinese companies controlled by local governments or private entrepreneurs. Both types of the owners use layers of intermediate companies to control their firms. However, their pyramiding behaviors are likely affected by different property rights constraints. Local governments are constrained by the Chinese laws prohibiting free transfer of state ownership. Pyramiding allows them to credibly decentralize their firm decision rights to firm management without selling off their ownership. Private entrepreneurs are constrained by their lack of access to external funds. Pyramiding creates internal capital markets that help relieving their external financing constraints. Our empirical results support these conjectures. Local governments build more extensive corporate pyramids when they are less burdened with fiscal or unemployment problems, when they have more long-term goals, and when their firm decisions are more subject to market and legal disciplines. The more extensive pyramids are also associated with smaller "underpricing" when the firms go public. Entrepreneur owners construct more complex corporate pyramids when they do not have a very deep pocket - as indicated by whether they are among the top-100 richest people in China.