Informal payments are a frequently overlooked source of local public finance in developing countries. We use microdata from ten countries to establish stylized facts on the magnitude, form, and distributional implications of this "informal taxation." Informal taxation is widespread, particularly in rural areas, with substantial in-kind labor payments. The wealthy pay more, but pay less in percentage terms, and informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes. Failing to include informal taxation underestimates household tax burdens and revenue decentralization in developing countries. We propose a simple model of information and enforcement constraints that parsimoniously explains the patterns in the data.
The paper examines the progress being made in local finance reforms and indicates pathways to advance those reforms. A summary of the effects of decentralization is given as a contextual background for the discussion of local finance reforms. The inefficient tax assignment has constrained the mobilization of local tax revenues even as local government units have become very dependent on the intergovernmental fiscal transfer, called the internal revenue allotment. The paper raises the importance of revisiting the internal revenue allotment formula. It identifies the local finance reforms currently being undertaken and reports the progress being made at the local and national level. The final section comments on the outstanding issues in local finance reform and gives some recommendations.
The growth of Africa’s towns and cities has outpaced local authority capacity in terms of management, infrastructure, and financing. Many African towns and cities are now facing a governance crisis. Accordingly, the capability and capacity of urban local government to provide basic services to a growing population have entered the core of the development debate. In particular, fiscal decentralization – the devolution of revenue mobilization and spending powers to lower levels of government – has become a main theme of urban governance in recent years.\nThis paper explores the opportunities and constraints facing local revenue mobilization in urban settings in Africa. The study examines various revenue instruments available, including property taxes, business licences, and user fees, and their effect on economic efficiency and income distribution. Moreover, political and administrative constraints facing various revenue instruments and factors impacting on citizens’ compliance behaviour are discussed. The analysis is exemplified by cases from across Africa and other regions. Local governments need to be given access to adequate resources to do the job with which they are entrusted. However, a general conclusion emerging from this study is that local revenues mobilized in most urban authorities in Africa are necessary but not sufficient to develop and supply adequate services for the fast-growing urban population.
This paper attempts to trace and find evidence for the linkages between the quality of governance, and development at the local level since the adoption of the fiscal decentralization policy in the Philippines in 1991. The concern since then over the links has been prompted by the observed persistent imbalances in local development - across and within regions - which many believe is due to the less than prudent exercise of the devolved powers and responsibilities - hence, low quality of local governance. To be sure, the decentralization has led to not a few innovations in local service delivery and financing, and in increased people's participation in local civic activities. However, the spread of innovation has been slow and there has been less than genuine participation in the mandated local special bodies. The uneven quality of local governance thus may have contributed to imbalanced regional growth. Evidence also indicate that the initial level of economic conditions determine the acceptable quality of local governance, which explains why certain poor areas remain in the vicious circle of penury and misgovernance. To help improve the quality of local governance, some policy inputs are suggested.
Decentralization in Indonesia was introduced institutionally in 2001, with a democratization drive promoted by international donors and by the intention of the new government to clear away the centralistic image of Soeharto. Decentralization has had some effects on regional economies and on local government administration. Compared to the period before decentralization, the share of GRDP and local government finance has increased in Java, though investment and bank borrowing have expanded to the outer islands. In qualitative aspects, decentralization has transferred not only administrative authority but also many new vested interests from the center to regions. Local governments have become more extensive economic actors in regional economies. Regional economic actors now compete actively for such vested interests and have missed the opportunity to create market-friendly regional economies. The government sector should not be a mere rent-seeking economic actor, but should play a role as a facilitator promoting private sector activities in regional economies.
O trabalho discute, do ponto de vista economico, as vantagens e desvantagens que diferentes graus de centralizacao/descentralizacao fiscal e tributaria apresentam para um crescimento economico equilibrado. Para tanto, sao apresentadas as posicoes defendidas pelos centralistas e descentralistas, autores que, baseados nos resultados de suas pesquisas, tendem a se aproximar de um ou de outro polo, no continuum do sistema politico federalista, os primeiros sustentando a concentracao do poder de tributar e de gastar nas maos do governo central, e os ultimos defendendo a devolucao desses poderes ao nivel de governo o mais distante possivel do centro. O trabalho comeca apresentando as relacoes entre o Federalismo e as estruturas tributaria e fiscal; em seguida coloca a polemica entre as duas correntes mencionadas, concluindo com a indicacao dos temas de uma agenda de pesquisa voltada para o estabelecimento de uma estrutura fiscal e tributaria adequada aos paises em desenvolvimento, uma vez que muito da literatura sobre o tema esta voltada para os problemas dos paises desenvolvidos.Abstract This paper provides a discussion, in economic grounds, of the advantages and disadvantages that different degrees of fiscal and tax centralization/decentralization pose towards achieving a balanced economic growth. Accordingly, it introduces arguments and contentions of both centralist and decentralist authors. Based on their research outcomes they reveal a tendency towards a polarized position within the continuum of the political system of federalism. Whereas the former group sustains the concentration of taxation and spending powers at the federal level, the latter advocates the devolution of such powers to the level of government the most afar from the center. The paper starts presenting the relationships between Federalism and fiscal and tax structures; then it analyses the arguments posed by members of the two streams of thought and concludes proposing specific themes to compose a discussion agenda devised towards the institution of fiscal and tax structures specifically designed to fulfill particular characteristics of developing countries, given that most of the literature is based on the experience of developed countries. Key words: Public goods. Public finance. State and local taxation. State and local budget and expenditures. Intergovernmental relations. Federalism
The Indonesian authorities are exploring options for the establishment of subnational government endowment funds and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has drafted regulations in that context. However, the motivations and objective for establishing an endowment fund at the subnational level diverge across various stakeholders. Clarity of the objectives and purpose of the endowment fund will be critical for informing features of its architecture, and the endowment fund should be aligned with the national fiscal policy objectives. Establishing such funds at a time of fiscal deficit entails a “borrowing-to-save” approach which is not optimal from a fiscal policy perspective. Currently, there is a misalignment between the design of inflow and outflow rules, the endowment fund’s objectives, and the fiscal/economic context. In addition, the current draft MoF regulations restrict the investment policy to conform with the law on decentralization enacted in 2022. This report emphasizes that regardless of the structure of the endowment fund, it needs to be fully integrated within the budget. The report also provides recommendations on assessing the full cost of the subnational government endowment fund, its design and implementation, and provides suggestions to improve the draft MoF regulations.
This Article argues that the restoration of a communitarian approach to taxation can help soften the widespread anti-tax sentiment that has engulfed the United States. It proposes and analyzes a concrete plan for the collection of revenue that taps into the same sense of shared community sacrifice that was invoked in fourteenth-century England. It proposes that the United States adopt a modernized, decentralized system of revenue collection modeled after the requisition, which was the chief means of raising revenue in the early American republic. Whereas the federal government currently collects approximately seventy percent of the nation's tax dollars, and the state and local governments collect the remaining thirty percent, this Article contemplates how the United States, and the individual states themselves, might differ if those numbers were reversed. The article begins by explaining why, due to the historical peculiarities of America's fiscal history, a decentralized approach to collecting revenues is not currently under consideration. Further, the article proposes a tax system in which the federal government would abolish the individual income tax, and discusses the likely effects of such a program on governmental spending by the states and on citizen mobility. The Article then explores the justifications for such an approach to taxation. The Article also consists of a utilitarian analysis of the costs and benefits of shifting to requisitions finance. Finally, the Article confronts the serious policy challenges that would arise if society were to implement requisitions finance, and ends with a discussion of several variations on the requisitions finance model that can address several of the communitarian and utilitarian criticisms.
This two-part paper provides a theoretical framework for appraising trade-offs between alternative methods of delegating authority over the delivery of public services, on the targeting and cost-effectiveness of public spending programs in developing countries. Authority over these programs has to be delegated owing to absence of information at the central level concerning local needs and costs of specific communities. In a top-down centralized system, this authority is delegated to bureaucrats by a central government that has limited ability to monitor their performance with respect to either service delivery or cost control. In a decentralized system, it is allocated instead to elected local governments or client groups, which may be subject to capture by local elites. Both systems are thus prone to local corruption and lack of accountability. Part 1 of the paper studies the relevant tradeoffs in the context of a poverty alleviation program, whose aim is to deliver a private merit good available on competitive markets to the poor. Decentralization generally dominates with respect to inter-community targeting as well as cost-effectiveness. However, the ranking of intracommunity targeting under the two systems is ambiguous, and depends on the relative degree of capture that local and national governments are prone to, besides the nature of uncertainty and preferences of the good by the nonpoor. Part 2 of the paper considers an infrastructure service provided by a public enterprise which has a natural monopoly. In this context it is shown that decentralization dominates if the following four conditions are satisfied: (i) local governments are not vulnerable to capture; (ii) local governments have access to adequate local financing sources; (iii) there are no interjurisdictional externalities in service provision; and (iv) local governments have all the bargaining power and access to relevant cost information vis-a-vis public enterprise managers. Absent any one of these institutional conditions, however, decentralization may perform worse than centralization. The Appendix develops a model of electoral competition (adapted from Grossman-Helpman (1996)) where parties are prone to capture by special interest groups, which helps identify some of the institutional determinants of the degree of capture of local and central governments.
Via regression analysis, this study is able to establish factors that impinge on per capita social sector expenditures. In addition, 32 out of the 62 provincial governments have allocated less on social sectors than what is needed to maintain their 1991 expenditure level in real terms. Inconsistencies regarding budget allocation of provincial governments on the social sectors and the objective indicators are detected.