Game Theory Analysis of Collaborative Regulation in Blockchain-Based Logistics Service Supply Chains

Abstract

With the standardization of the logistics market and advancements in innovation, trust issues arising from information asymmetry among supply chain participants have become increasingly prominent. This paper examines a blockchain-enabled collaborative regulatory system for logistics service supply chains involving the government, logistics enterprises, and the logistics market. Using evolutionary game theory, a three-party evolutionary game model is constructed and validated through system dynamics simulations to explore the impacts of various factors on the collaborative regulatory system. The results indicate that, during the system’s evolution, logistics enterprises stabilize first, followed by the government, with the logistics market converging the slowest. The added value of logistics services is identified as the core factor driving logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain, exhibiting a significantly stronger impact compared to regulatory benefits or improvements in quality and safety. While robust incentive policies can rapidly increase enterprises’ willingness to adopt blockchain technology, they concurrently weaken the government’s enthusiasm for regulation.