Incentive Mechanism for Redactable Blockchain Governance: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Abstract

Blockchain technology has garnered significant attention in recent years due to its capacity to offer secure and transparent transactional systems. However, the technology's inherent immutability can present challenges in specific scenarios. While earlier research has concentrated on the development of redactable blockchain, existing solutions have primarily focused on the modification mechanism, often overlooking the critical element of an incentive mechanism for governance, which is paramount for ensuring the security of redactable blockchain. Some previous researches have explored the design of incentive mechanisms, but these studies exhibit certain shortcomings. To promote active participation, we have designed an incentive mechanism rooted in evolutionary game theory for stakeholders in redactable blockchain, aiming to facilitate the governance of redactable blockchain. Furthermore, we have conducted a comprehensive simulation founded on game-theoretic analysis. The results substantiate the effectiveness of our redactable blockchain incentive mechanism in achieving its intended objectives.