Blockchain adoption strategy in a platform dual‐channel supply chain with risk‐averse sellers

Abstract

Abstract This paper investigates blockchain technology (BT) adoption strategy in a platform dual‐channel supply chain, wherein the supplier establishes a direct selling channel (DC) in addition to the existing reselling channel (RC) of the e‐retailer. Both the supplier and the e‐retailer are risk‐averse, and they have access to consumers through a common online platform. The online platform possesses the capability to introduce BT and can opt to introduce it to neither, one (DC or RC) or both channels. Game models for the four strategies are developed, and the corresponding equilibrium outcomes are obtained using backward induction. Our analysis reveals that when competition intensity is high and both perceived risk aversion level and BT's unit cost are low, the online platform prefers only DC with adopting BT. Otherwise, it prefers both channels with adopting BT. The supplier shares the same preference as the online platform for BT adoption strategy. Interestingly, the e‐retailer prefers only DC with adopting BT only when BT's unit cost is high; otherwise, she prefers solely RC with adopting BT. Furthermore, we enhance the basic model by modifying parameter configurations and the sequence game, and verify that our main findings in these extensions remain robust.