Cybernetic Governance for Renewable Energy Systems Using Blockchain: A Framework for Trustworthy Impact Monitoring

Abstract

The transition toward decentralized renewable energy systems creates monitoring problems that current digital infrastructures do not solve: sustainability claims are produced by the same actors they evaluate, environmental evidence is reported periodically rather than observed continuously, and the communities most affected by deployment cannot inspect the data used to represent their territories. Existing integrated platforms combine subsets of the blockchain, Internet of Things (IoT) sensing and life cycle assessment (LCA) at the data layer, but they do not organize that integration through an explicit governance structure. This paper contributes a cybernetic governance framework in which the Viable System Model (VSM) supplies the organizing structure of a blockchain–IoT–LCA monitoring architecture, so that sensing, distributed trust, strategic intelligence and participatory governance are recursively coupled rather than sequentially chained. The framework was developed and evaluated under the Design Science Research paradigm, and instantiated in the IMPACT Energy.CO platform across two technology routes, wind and solar, in La Guajira, Cesar, Atlántico and Magdalena, Colombia. Evaluation against six pre-declared criteria reports 45 executed test cases with a 100% pass rate, 90% unit and 87% integration code coverage, load tests up to 5000 concurrent users with zero errors and sub-second mean response, an operating hash-chained provenance layer issuing verifiable LCA certificates, 14 participatory validation workshops, 199 users trained and 166 technicians certified. We use traceability in a deliberately narrow sense throughout: the property whereby a committed record can be linked to the ingested data series, model version and computation that produced it, and its integrity and ordering checked by a party that does not trust the producer. It is provenance and integrity traceability from the point of ingestion onward, and it is not metrological traceability: the architecture cannot verify that an original sensor measurement corresponds to the physical quantity it purports to represent. We accordingly make explicit what the architecture does not guarantee: a ledger protects records after commitment but cannot certify measurement at the point of capture, and we present a threat model, a set of implemented controls and the residual risk that remains. This study contributes an architecture, a reproducible development and evaluation method, and a calibrated account of what verifiable environmental monitoring can and cannot deliver in contested Global-South territories.