Game Strategy for Low-Carbon Investment by Electric Power Enterprises under the Dual Drivers of Carbon Quota Mechanism and Blockchain Technology

Abstract

This study investigates low-carbon investment strategies in power supply chains under the combined influence of carbon quota mechanisms (CQM) and blockchain technology (BCT). A two-echelon system consisting of a power generator and an electricity retailer is modeled, and four decision scenarios are constructed by considering blockchain adoption under both the grandfathering method (GFM) and benchmarking method (BMM). A Stackelberg game framework is employed to analyze the interactions among low-carbon technology investment, low-carbon electricity promotion, market demand, and enterprise profitability. Results show that the BMM consistently induces higher low-carbon investment levels, stronger market demand, and greater retailer profitability than the GFM, regardless of blockchain adoption. Furthermore, blockchain-enabled information traceability exhibits a significant threshold effect: when implementation costs remain below a critical level, trusted information transmission enhances consumer green trust, stimulates demand for low-carbon electricity, and improves the economic performance of supply-chain participants. Sensitivity analysis further demonstrates that consumer green trust, low-carbon preference, and responsiveness to low-carbon promotion positively influence both emissionreduction efforts and enterprise profitability, whereas excessive blockchain deployment costs weaken these benefits. The proposed framework provides a quantitative methodology for analyzing information-enabled lowcarbon decision making and coordinated investment strategies in modern power systems.