Blockchain adoption and application in closed‐loop production under information asymmetry

Abstract

Abstract Although the decentralization and traceability features of blockchain technology are crucial for fostering closed‐loop production, there are numerous obstacles and insufficient incentives for its implementation. This paper constructs the analysis framework of blockchain adoption and application in closed‐loop production, including four parts: blockchain adoption incentive contract, condition analysis of blockchain application, revenue analysis of blockchain application, and information screening analysis of blockchain application. It is found that the adoption incentive contract is an important driving force to promote manufacturer to apply blockchain technology, and the manufacturer needs to pay information rent to the consumer under information asymmetry. The manufacturer can obtain consumer traceability preference and realize information screening between the manufacturer and consumer. Consumer traceability preference for new products can better promote traceable information technology level and closed‐loop revenue. This research is of great significance in promoting sustainable closed‐loop production.