Blockchain-enabled game-theoretic framework for supply chain finance under information asymmetry

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to develop a blockchain-enabled game-theoretic framework that addresses information asymmetry in Supply Chain Finance (SCF). The study aims to model strategic interactions among SCF participants and assess the impact of blockchain adoption on equitable benefit allocation and risk reduction.Methodology: This research adopts a decentralized Stackelberg game model combined with Shapley value allocation to represent the hierarchical and cooperative interactions among suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers. The model incorporates blockchain costs into payoff functions and uses replicator dynamics to simulate the strategic evolution of stakeholders under varying levels of information-sharing uncertainty.Findings: Simulation results demonstrate that blockchain implementation significantly improves supply chain performance, even when information-sharing efficiency is as low as 30%. Compared to traditional systems, blockchain-enabled frameworks yield higher payoffs, enhanced transparency, and more stable strategic equilibrium. As information-sharing efficiency increases to 50%, the marginal gains in system-wide utility and strategic stability are amplified, confirming the robustness and scalability of blockchain integration under various cost scenarios.Originality/Value: This study advances the literature by integrating blockchain technology with Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) and Shapley value allocation in an SCF framework. The proposed model quantitatively assesses strategic behavior under information asymmetry, incorporating blockchain costs into replicator dynamics and payoff functions. The analysis offers novel insights into risk mitigation, policy design, and equitable profit distribution, providing practical guidance for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), financial institutions, and regulators in adopting blockchain-enabled SCF systems.