Verifiable RFID Location Privacy Scheme Based on NIZK

Abstract

Radio frequency identification technology (RFID) is widely used due to its advantages of contactless identification. How to ensure the location privacy of tags and their users has become an urgent problem in the development of RFID technology. In order to resist active attacks such as tampering and counterfeiting caused by rewriting encryption and canceling encryption by malicious attackers. According to the existing location privacy protection schemes, this paper uses non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) and universal re-encryption, then designs a publicly verifiable location privacy re-encryption scheme. In this scheme, all calculations are performed by the anonymizer. The anonymizer not only performs the ciphertext re-randomization operation, but also needs to provide a NIZK for this. The next anonymizer must verify the proof before re-randomization. The tag only needs to provide a certain reading and writing function to ensure that the ciphertext re-randomized each time will not be tampered with. We can see that this scheme can well protect the tag and user's location privacy through analysis.