Fiscal decentralization and public R&D policy: a cross-country analysis

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to examine whether the level of fiscal decentralization of a country is a relevant variable to explain public investment in innovation (measured as the share of research and development (R&D) spending in total government budget) and the intensity of basic research within the public R&D bundle. To assess the effects of decentralization, we present a theoretical model where a 'benevolent government' invests in R&D aiming at maximizing net income available in the country (central government) or in the respective region (subnational government), states compete to attract capital investment, and R&D results are subject to interregional knowledge spillovers. According to the model, decentralization leads to a lower share of basic research in government innovation spending. The impact on total R&D is ambiguous, although it tends to be negative. The conclusions of the model are tested through an empirical analysis using country aggregate data. Confirming the predictions of the model, we find evidence that expenditure decentralization leads to lower intensity of basic research within public R&D, and that both types of decentralization negatively affect the size of innovation spending. Our findings suggest that deepening fiscal decentralization should be considered along with measures to compensate for innovation spending decrease, and that the central government should play a greater role in financing or carrying out basic research.