Threat Landscape in Decentralized Systems: Sybil Attacks, Related Vulnerabilities, and Blockchain Security Evolution (2015–2025)

Abstract

Blockchain technology has profoundly revolutionized decentralized applications across financial systems, global supply chains, and applied informatics. However, it remains susceptible to systemic security hazards. This systematic review comprehensively evaluates core architectural vulnerabilities within blockchain infrastructures, consensus mechanisms, and peer-to-peer (P2P) network layers spanning the decade from 2015 to 2025. We focus primarily on the mechanics, operational taxonomy, and evolutionary trajectories of Sybil attacks, wherein malicious actors forge multiple pseudonymous identities to gain disproportionate systemic influence. By synthesizing the foundational academic literature with real-world empirical case studies, such as automated airdrop farming exploits in Layer-2 ecosystems (e.g., Arbitrum, zkSync) and decentralized finance (DeFi) governance manipulations, we analyze attack mechanisms, quantifiable impacts, and mitigation vectors. Our findings chart the structural evolution of Sybil strategies from rudimentary P2P routing disruptions to complex, economically driven application-layer interventions. Finally, we evaluate contemporary defenses, such as Proof-of-Personhood (PoP) systems and zero-knowledge (ZK) cryptography, offering actionable recommendations for the integration of W3C-compliant decentralized identity (DID) frameworks and behavioral analytics to enhance systemic fault tolerance.