Analysis of the impact of platform reputation systems on NFT copyright protection using repeated and evolutionary games

Abstract

In recent years, non-fungible tokens (NFTs) have rapidly emerged as a novel business model based on blockchain technology. However, this phenomenon also challenges the existing copyright protection system. This research develops game models between creators and collectors in the NFT market, considering different platform reputation mechanisms. First, the potential for individuals to achieve cooperative equilibrium in repeated games is explored, and then the group evolutionary stability in evolutionary games is analyzed. The findings indicate that platforms with reputation systems are more effective in encouraging creators to consistently produce original works, which is beneficial for copyright protection. For individuals, the degree of importance that creators place on future profits plays a crucial role in fostering long-term cooperation. In this context, reputation systems can lower the threshold for cooperation by reducing the required emphasis on future gains, thereby fostering greater cooperation. For groups, in the absence of reputation systems, creators tend to adopt non-original strategies. Conversely, a reputation system can encourage originality when sufficient incentives and a critical mass of initial original creators are present. The research offers a game-theoretic perspective on copyright protection in the NFT market, offering theoretical insights for designing effective reputation systems on NFT platforms and serving as a reference for policymakers.