Asymmetric Information in Blockchain-Based Fundraising

Abstract

Blockchain-based fundraising transforms the way issuers raise capital from the public, promising to reduce transaction costs, expand financial access, and reshape issuer-investor interactions. Despite these promises, the blockchain finance market is currently plagued by severe asymmetric information and is rife with fraudulent and low-quality issuers who exploit this friction. This chapter explores the reasons for the severe asymmetric information in this market and discusses the extent to which signaling and analysts can address it. It suggests that the effectiveness of signaling is limited due to the low costs of producing and disseminating signals and investors' inability to verify biased signals ex ante and punish biased signals ex post. These limitations make analysts a vital source for reducing asymmetric information but they, too, appear to suffer from significant problems – ranging from conflicts of interest to lack of transparency to low competence and expertise – which hinder their effectiveness in reducing asymmetric information. The chapter concludes with the policy implications arising from these observations, which can also guide policy-makers in addressing emerging blockchain-based fundraising mechanisms, such as non-fungible token (NFT) offerings.