Federalismo fiscale in Europa e in Italia

Abstract

This paper is devoted to discuss some European evidence of decentralized public finance, as they may prove useful to give some suggestions for implementing the Italian current proposals of more fiscal decentralization. Except than in Nordic countries, new settlements of fiscal decentralization are planned or underway almost everywhere in main European countries, and not just in Italy. A common trend may be envisaged toward an increase of sub-national functions, while the way to more fiscal autonomy seems more uncertain. A prevailing mixed model (decentralization with scattered elements of political federalism) seems to emerge. However expenditure overlaps are so widespread to cancel out the popular idea that functions (exclusive or concurrent) may be allocated among government layers in a clear-cut way. In the average of EU15 countries, the financing of sub-national governments comes still largely from national block transfers highly perequating. A trade-off seems to exist, not easy to be removed, between the degree of decentralization and the room of manoeuvre of decentralized taxes. Following the European experiences, more autonomous financing might be obtained mainly by enlarging sub-national governments’ rate-freedom with respect to increased amount of national taxes (personal income tax and VAT) to be shared. Perequating systems widely differ among countries. Some recent reforms may however give some useful guidelines for a dualistic country as Italy. Transfers should be of vertical type, linked also to the regional needs and at least for a part targeted to specific aims. Fiscal decentralization may induce a decrease in overall budget responsibility. To control for this, international experience suggests that fiscal rules might be usefully integrated by formal cooperation between central and sub-national governments. Codici Jel H70, H72, H74, H77 Parole chiave:Federalismo fiscale; Italia; Europa Indirizzi E-mail : [email protected], [email protected]