Autonomy and federacy

Abstract

The link between autonomy and federalism might seem intuitively obvious, but is far from easy to pin down with precision. Some scholars, indeed, question whether the two are linked in any meaningful way. Bernhardt, for example, nds the two terms “neither synonymous nor closely connected institutions, but very distinct phenomena in modern history with basically different underlying philosophies” (1981: 23). Benedikter concurs, arguing that “Regional autonomy is a speci c territorial political organization having its own constituent features. It should not be confused with a subcategory of federalism” (2007: 2). This insistence that “Regional autonomy is a political and constitutional organization sui generis that deserves distinct attention and analysis in theory and practice,” is characteristic of the approach of specialists in constitutional or international law; political scientists writing on the subject are more inclined to emphasize similarity than difference and to recognize that the concepts of federalism and autonomy, while not synonymous, share certain key characteristics. The term “autonomy” derives from the two Greek words auto, meaning self, and nomos, meaning rule or law (Lapidoth 1994: 276). Since the idea of self-rule is at the very core of most de nitions of federalism, it seems incongruous to argue that the two are “not closely connected institutions.” In its broadest meaning, autonomy clearly encompasses a more diverse range of phenomena than federalism. Even when limited to territorially de ned expressions of self-rule, most de nitions of autonomy are exible enough to include cases that range from self-rule based on decentralization – the devolution of power from the center to the autonomous entity – to virtual independence in the case of associated statehood. In the former case, the powers delegated by the center to the autonomous region may be extensive, but they can be revoked unilaterally by the central government; in the latter case, the autonomous entity is legally endowed with statehood and may terminate the association at any time. The point of overlap between autonomy and federalism occurs somewhere between these two extremes. For current purposes, I take this point to be that at which an autonomous entity most resembles a subunit in a federation. When an autonomous entity enjoys self-rule that is reasonably protected from unilateral revocation by the center its legal/constitutional status is akin to that of a subunit in a federation. This protection may be provided in the common-state constitution, as in the case of Mindanao (the Philippines), in a special law, compact, or treaty between the national government and the autonomous entity, as in the case of Aceh (Indonesia), or even by an international agreement or treaty, such as that which protects the autonomy of the South Tyrol (Italy). When the autonomy (selfrule) of an entity is legally or constitutionally protected against having its status unilaterally revoked, it satis es the “self-rule” component of the denition of a federal system. Where territorial autonomy most obviously differs from federalism is in the organization of the rest of the system. A federal subunit is one unit among many in a system-wide institution; a territorially autonomous unit is one unit (or one of a small number) in an otherwise unitary system. For current purposes, a unitary system that contains one autonomous unit, or a small number of these, can be termed a federacy.